

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Geo. Sumner

HISTORICAL SKETCH

OF THE

SECOND WAR

BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

AND

GREAT BRITAIN,

DECLARED BY .

ACT OF CONGRESS, THE 18th OF JUNE, 1812,

AND CONCLUDED BY PEACE, THE 15th OF FEBRUARY, 1815.

BY

CHARLES J. INGERSOLL.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

EMBRACING THE EVENTS OF 1812-13.

PHILADELPHIA:
LEA AND BLANCHARD.
1845.

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1863, Oct. 15.

Sir,
Hon. Charles Sumner,
of Boston.
(Care of Room).

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by

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HISTORICAL SKETCH.

CHAPTER I.

DECLARATION OF WAR.—EFFECTS.—CAUSES AND CHARACTER BY DALLAS.—JOHN ADAMS.—EASTERN CLERGY.—AMERICAN CHURCH.—DEBT.—WM. LOWNDES.—MASSACHUSETTS.—TIMOTHY PICKERING.—WAR LOANS.—DANIEL WEBSTER.—RUFUS KING.—JEREMIAH MASON.—EXECUTIVE ADMINISTRATION.—FOREIGN RELATIONS.

In this historical sketch I shall endeavour to submit the truth in an account of the contest between Great Britain and the United States of America, declared by act of Congress, approved the 18th of June, 1812. It enacted that war was thereby declared to exist between the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland and the Dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their Territories; and that the President of the United States was thereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue private armed vessels of the United States commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he should think proper and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects of the government of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the subjects thereof.

This short act is the first declaration of war by law enacted through all the deliberative forms, debates and sanctions of the public proceedings of two distinct and independent houses of national representatives in congress, assembled from the distant regions of a republic of confederated states, approved by an elective chief magistrate, pursuant to the provisions of an organized

written constitution, that such congress alone shall declare war. The judicial, an independent department of American government, with the common proneness to diversity of judgment, differed radically in opinion whether legislative declaration of war imparts to the executive and enforces on the community the whole belligerent power of forcibly executing it against enemies, depriving them of liberty and property, and life if need be, without further more specific législative enactment. Be that as it may, as will hereafter be examined, constitutional transfer of the war-declaring faculty from the executive to a legislature is an inestimable pledge of peace and preventive of wanton war, first conferred on mankind by American republican institutions.

This short and comprehensive act was drawn by William Pinkney, then Attorney-General of the United States, in which office, not long before, he succeeded Cæsar Augustus Rodney.

The war of the Revolution began in tumult and rebellion, was waged by the imposition of martial law for regular authority; and closed by an act of national bankruptcy, leaving an imperfect union of barely confederated States, discontented and exanimate, poor and intractable. During the Revolution the country was rent by civil discord; the tories could, with some reason, plead the merits of loyalty. The war of 1812, solemnly declared in constitutional method, was waged in due subordination to law, opposed on less justifiable grounds, and terminated with manifold meliorations, since as generally acknowledged as those of the peace of independence. Commerce, manufactures, navigation, agriculture, national character, the respect of other nations, Great Britain especially, and confidence in republican institutions, till then by no means great, even among Americans themselves; derived from less than three years of excitement by war, advantages which peace could not have conferred. The war of the Revolution left unpaid a national debt of near 360 millions of dollars; whereas, not long after the war of 1812, a debt of 123 millions was paid. An American historian, Ramsey, considers that the talents of the people of the United States were improved by the war of the Revolution, but that their morals were deteriorated. The physical and mental capacities of the country were all advanced by the war of 1812, without moral or political detriment. The government since has been as republican as before; while the tone of public and private morality has been much more impaired

by long peace since, than it was by that war. Like the Revolution, the war of 1812 was inevitable and defensive; put off longer before extorted from intolerable wrongs; undertaken for vindication, not aggrandizement, although Canadian conquest was to be one of its means. The cause was as just; the preparation greater; also the forbearance; and the consequences as beneficial. Moral, physical, and mental independence were achievements of the conflict of 1812 as much as political emancipation that of 1775. The common, perhaps salutary impression, that the Revolution was more unanimously supported, is a mistake. The majorities in Congress on all the essential principles in 1774 were extremely small. The Declaration of Independence was carried with difficulty, if not by accident. Most of the great questions of measures and men from 1774 to 1778, were decided in Congress by the vote of a single state, and that often by the vote of one man. The nation was more divided in the war of the Revolution than in that of 1812. There was no overt treason in the latter.

Destiny seems to delight to bring about great results from insignificant and doubtful beginnings, inexplicable commotions, like vast conflagrations from mere sparks. It may be questioned whether any great revolution originated with the will of a majority. Where freedom prevails, submission of minorities to ostensible majorities becomes a fundamental doctrine. However small the majority, it means all the nation. In monarchies, the monarch or his minister rules instead of the majority. In republics, that mysterious and overruling power, the sovereignty of the people, seen nowhere, felt everywhere, resides in a mere majority; and in war, as was the case in that of 1812, large, acrimonious minorities, which exasperate, may corroborate the majority, and elicit great national exploits. Republicans deride the dogma of kings' divine right: Americans can hardly comprehend it. Their government rests on an antagonist principle. Yet philosophically analyzed, is the sovereignty of the people perfectly obvious? Invisible and intangible reality governing all, where is it palpable? Directly it makes none of the laws of which it is indirectly the sole author. It is diffused throughout the mass whose will begets and controls public opinion by individual agency, and its voice may be compared to that of the Deity in power, inscrutable and irresponsible. War between the principles of popular sovereignty and the divine right of kings, begun by the American Declara-

tion of Independence, has spread over nearly all the new and much of the old world. Whatever be the fact, majorities are at least supposed to govern, and minorities to submit. The wars of 1775 and 1812 between Great Britain and the United States of America, were waged by nations both acknowledging the sovereignty of the people. Probably, the English and American commonwealths, in rebellions against established governments, united the most perfect examples of individual subordination with national liberty.

My sketch of the war of 1812 will present only what I had good opportunity to know by actual instrumentality in the government of the United States from the meeting of the special session of Congress, 24th of May, 1813, till the peace announced at Washington, the 15th of February, 1815. During the three war sessions of Congress in that period, I was there on intimate and confidential terms with most of those who governed. With natural preferences, party and personal prejudices, my narrative shall, nevertheless, be authentic and candid according to my own impressions: long meditated, yet not composed till interval enough for experience by results and calm consideration, now published for the good, and dedicated to the honour of my country.

The method is free, familiar, desultory, without pretension to historical dignity. Errors there must be, but no misrepresentation; as near the truth as cotemporary statement may come; truer than the fictions of posterior history. Without regal or revolutionary annals, European magnitude of events and characters to describe, but the plain, comparatively small, often dull transactions of a new and peculiar nation, the embellishments and attractions of most history are not to be expected. To exhibit plainly the causes and course of the war, its legislative, economical, jurisprudential and belligerent operations, is my attempt; submitted to the indulgent judgment of my countrymen, without acrimonious condemnation of the great people the war was waged against, whose wrongs and misconduct, however, being the burden of the story, must be told as they merit, without extenuation or suppression, or the truth will not be told at all.

The first war between the United States and Great Britain was a contest for political independence, accomplished. The second war between them was for maritime and personal independence, also mainly effected. •

Still, however, a contest for commerce, manufactures, and territories continues, national rivalry and antagonism, fomented by the press, inseparable from the intimacy of national relations, which may produce another war.

Should it be so, the United States will never be the aggressor. Innumerable sympathies bind us to Great Britain with reverential attachments. He must be unnatural, who, with nothing but English blood in his veins, reviles Great Britain. But the greatest of American regenerations is to become perfectly independent of the vast influences of that mighty nation among her former colonies.

It is impossible not to admire her grandeur, at least to respect her power, and grateful to an American to do justice to her glory.

Yet, he would be an unfaithful annalist and an unworthy American, who, in an account of the vengeance which his country was constrained to take for the wrongs England inflicted, hesitates to describe the misdeeds her public agents were guilty of in endeavours to maintain those wrongs. To preserve peace hereafter, a full exposure of them is not only truer but wiser than suppression or extenuation. Malicious or ungenerous recollections of war are unmanly and impolitic. But amnesty is not oblivion.

The duty of history to our own country, moreover, requires its vindication, if consistent with truth. The first war between the United States and Great Britain proved that the American nation is capable of self-defence. The second war demonstrated, as events show, the strength of republican and confederated nationality. We were right, and triumphed in the second as in the first. Nothing can so effectually prevent a third, as convincing both nations, by recurrence to the former, what may be expected of another contest in arms.

The character of the war is well expressed in the last sentence of the President's Message to Congress, convened by him in special session to vote the means of waging it. "The contest in which the U. States engaged appealed for its support, to every motive that can animate an uncorrupted and enlightened people; to the love of country; to the pride of liberty; to an emulation of the glorious founders of their independence, by a successful vindication of its violated attributes; to the gratitude and sym-

tion of Independence, has spread over much of the old world. Whatever may be supposed to govern, and minor wars between 1775 and 1812 between Great Britain and America, were waged by nations in defence of the sovereignty of the people. Probably the American commonwealths, in rebellions against their monarchs, united the most perfect examples of civil wars with national liberty.

My sketch of the war of 1812 affords a good opportunity to know by an official report of the Government of the United States from the session of Congress, 24th of May 1812 at Washington, the 15th of February 1813, the war sessions of Congress in this country, and confidential terms with most of the principal actors, and natural preferences, party and personal interests. I shall, nevertheless, be authentic and impartial impressions: long meditated, yet not uncorrected for experience by results and consequences. I am for the good, and dedicated to the truth.

The method is free, familiar, and unostentatious, but with historical dignity. Errors are corrected by the truth; as near the truth as can be ascertained, is truer than the fictions of political writers. In the revolutionary annals, European writers have attempted to describe, but the plainness of the transactions of a new and untried system, and attractions of most historical events, have not a bit plainly the causes and consequences. Political, juridical, and historical facts, submitted to the indulgent justice of the victors, and acrimonious condemnation of the vanquished, against whose wrongs and injuries, the truth, then of the story, must be told, or suppressed, or the truth was

The first war between the United States and Great Britain, a contest for political independence, was also mainly effected

to a party to the first memorable coalition against assumed the character of a belligerent power; for, that the distance of the scene would no longer United States from the influence, and the evils, of conflict. [On the one hand, their government was France, by treaties of alliance and commerce; which that nation had rendered to the cause of independence, had made such impressions upon the as no virtuous statesman could rigidly condemn, and a rigorous statesman would have sought in vain to the other hand, Great Britain, leaving the treaty of unratified, forcibly retained the American posts upon the frontier; and, slighting every overture to place the divided commercial relations of the two countries upon a friendly foundation,¹ seemed to contemplate the success of the American revolution, in a spirit of unextinguishable animosity. Her voice had, indeed, been heard from Quebec and in instigating the savages to war.² Her invisible arm was seen in the defeats of General Harmer,³ and General St. Clair. And even the victory of General Wayne⁴ was achieved in the presence of a fort which she had erected, far within the territorial boundaries of the United States, to stimulate and counteract the barbarities of the Indian warrior.⁵ Yet, the American government, neither yielding to popular feeling, nor acting upon the impulse of national resentment, hastened to adopt the policy of peace and steady neutrality; and solemnly announced that to the citizens at home, and to the nations abroad, by the proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793.”

the relaxation in the rigour, without any alteration in the terms, of the order in council of the 6th of November, 1793, was produced by the subsequent orders of the 8th of January, 1794, and the 25th of January, 1798: but from the ratification of the treaty of 1794, until the short respite afforded by the treaty of 1802, the commerce of the United States continued

¹ Adams' Correspondence.

² Letters of Lord Dorchester.

³ On the waters of the Miami of the lake, on the 21st of October, 1790.

⁴ On the Recovery, on the 4th of November, 1791.

⁵ On the Miami of the lakes, in August, 1794.

⁶ The conference between Mr. Randolph, the American Secretary of State, and Lord Mervill, the British plenipotentiary, dated May and June, 1794.

pathy which demand security from the most degrading wrongs, of a class of citizens who have proved themselves so worthy the protection of their country by their heroic zeal in its defence; and finally, to the sacred obligation of transmitting entire, to future generations, that precious patrimony of national rights and independence held in trust by the present, from the goodness of divine providence."

These animating sentiments are now cherished by most Americans in grateful acknowledgment of the national benefits of that war, including its opponents generally in the United States, and even many of its foreign enemies. A large, intelligent, united, and imposing portion of the people, nevertheless, disputed and condemned the measures, and denied the justice of the war, and thwarted its progress. Without malicious exposure of their errors, refutation of them is much of the lesson history is to teach; especially as our former English enemies, notwithstanding continued abuse of this country, seldom deny the merits of the war of 1812.

My narrative is therefore premised by a vindication of the war extracted from Mr. Dallas's admirable exposition of its causes and character, prepared towards the close of it, in the midst of his labours as Secretary of the Treasury, and intended as an official manifesto; but peace coming before it was published, this masterly defence did not appear till success rendered its publication less important. Mr. Dallas says,

"And if, in fine, the assertion, that it has been a policy, by all honourable means, to cultivate with Great Britain, those sentiments of mutual good will, which naturally belong to nations connected by the ties of a common ancestry, an identity of language, and a similarity of manners, be doubted, the proofs will be found in that patient forbearance, under the pressure of accumulating wrongs, which marks the period of almost thirty years, that elapsed between the peace of 1783 and the rupture of 1812.

"The United States had just recovered, under the auspices of their present constitution, from the debility which their revolutionary struggle had produced, when the convulsive movements of France excited throughout the civilized world, the mingled sensations of hope and fear—of admiration and alarm. The interest which those movements would, in themselves, have excited, was incalculably increased, however, as soon as Great

Britain became a party to the first memorable coalition against France, and assumed the character of a belligerent power; for, it was obvious, that the distance of the scene would no longer exempt the United States from the influence, and the evils, of the European conflict. [On the one hand, their government was connected with France, by treaties of alliance and commerce; and the services which that nation had rendered to the cause of American independence, had made such impressions upon the public mind, as no virtuous statesman could rigidly condemn, and the most rigorous statesman would have sought in vain to efface. On the other hand, Great Britain, leaving the treaty of 1783 unexecuted, forcibly retained the American posts upon the northern frontier; and, slighting every overture to place the diplomatic and commercial relations of the two countries upon a fair and friendly foundation,¹ seemed to contemplate the success of the American revolution, in a spirit of unextinguishable animosity. Her voice had, indeed, been heard from Quebec and Montreal, instigating the savages to war.² Her invisible arm was felt, in the defeats of General Harmer,³ and General St. Clair,⁴ and even the victory of General Wayne⁵ was achieved in the presence of a fort which she had erected, far within the territorial boundaries of the United States, to stimulate and countenance the barbarities of the Indian warrior.⁶ Yet, the American government, neither yielding to popular feeling, nor acting upon the impulse of national resentment, hastened to adopt the policy of a strict and steady neutrality; and solemnly announced that policy to the citizens at home, and to the nations abroad, by the proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793.”

“Some relaxation in the rigour, without any alteration in the principle, of the order in council of the 6th of November, 1793, was introduced by the subsequent orders of the 8th of January, 1794, and the 25th of January, 1798: but from the ratification of the treaty of 1794, until the short respite afforded by the treaty of Amiens, in 1802, the commerce of the United States continued

¹ Mr. Adams' Correspondence.

² Speeches of Lord Dorchester.

³ On the waters of the Miami of the lake, on the 21st of October, 1790.

⁴ At Fort Recovery, on the 4th of November, 1791.

⁵ On the Miami of the lakes, in August, 1794.

⁶ Correspondence between Mr. Randolph, the American Secretary of State, and Mr. Hammond, the British plenipotentiary, dated May and June, 1794.

to be the prey of British cruisers and privateers, under the adjudicating patronage of the British tribunals. Another grievance, however, assumed at this epoch a form and magnitude which cast a shade over the social happiness, as well as the political independence of the nation. The merchant vessels of the United States were arrested on the high seas, while in the prosecution of distant voyages; considerable numbers of their crews were impressed into the naval service of Great Britain; the commercial adventures of the owners were often, consequently, defeated; and the loss of property, the embarrassments of trade and navigation, and the scene of domestic affliction, became intolerable. This grievance (which constitutes an important surviving cause of the American declaration of war) was early, and has been incessantly, urged upon the attention of the British government. Even in the year 1792, they were told of 'the irritation that it had excited; and of the difficulty of avoiding to make immediate reprisals on their seamen in the United States.'¹ They were told 'that so many instances of the kind had happened, that it was quite necessary that they should explain themselves on the subject, and be led to disavow and punish such violence, which had never been experienced from any other nation.'² And they were told 'of the inconvenience of such conduct, and of the impossibility of letting it go on, so that the British ministry should be made sensible of the necessity of punishing the past, and preventing the future.'³ But after the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, had been ratified, the nature and the extent of the grievance became still more manifest; and it was clearly and firmly presented to the view of the British government, as leading unavoidably to discord and war between the two nations. They were told, 'that unless they would come to some accommodation which might ensure the American seamen against this oppression, measures would be taken to cause the inconvenience to be equally felt on both sides.'⁴ They were told, 'that the impressment of American citizens, to serve on board of British armed vessels, was not only an injury to the unfortunate indi-

¹ Letter of Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Mr. Pinkney, minister at London, dated the 11th of June, 1792.

² Letter from the same to the same, dated the 12th of October, 1792.

³ Letter from the same to the same, dated the 6th of November, 1792.

⁴ Letter from Mr. Pinkney, minister at London, to the Secretary of State, dated the 13th of March, 1793.

viduals, but it naturally excited certain emotions in the breasts of the nation to whom they belonged, and of the just and humane of every country; and that an expectation was indulged that orders would be given, that the Americans so circumstanced should be immediately liberated, and that the British officers should, in future, abstain from similar violences.¹ They were told, 'that the subject was of much greater importance than had been supposed; and that, instead of a few, and those in many instances equivocal cases, the American minister at the court of London had, in nine months (part of the years 1796 and 1797) made applications for the discharge of two hundred and seventy-one seamen, who had, in most cases, exhibited such evidence, as to satisfy him that they were real Americans, forced into the British service, and persevering, generally, in refusing pay and bounty.'² They were told, 'that if the British government had any regard to the rights of the United States, any respect for the nation, and placed any value on their friendship, it would facilitate the means of relieving their oppressed citizens.'³ They were told, 'that the British naval officers often impressed Swedes, Danes, and other foreigners, from the vessels of the United States; that they might, with as much reason, rob American vessels of the property or merchandize of Swedes, Danes, and Portuguese, as seize and detain in their service, the subjects of those nations found on board of American vessels; and that the president was extremely anxious to have this business of impressing placed on a reasonable footing.'⁴ And they were told, 'that the impressment of American seamen was an injury of very serious magnitude, which deeply affected the feelings and honour of the nation; that no right had been asserted to impress the natives of America; yet, that they were impressed; they were dragged on board British ships of war, with the evidence of citizenship in their hands, and forced by violence there to serve, until conclusive testimonials of their birth could be obtained; that many must perish unrelieved, and all were detained a con-

¹ Note of Mr. Jay, envoy extraordinary, to Lord Grenville, dated the 30th of July, 1794.

² Letter of Mr. King, minister at London, to the Secretary of State, dated the 13th of April, 1797.

³ Letter from Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, minister at London, dated the 10th of September, 1796.

⁴ Letter from the same to the same, dated the 26th of October, 1796.

siderable time, in lawless and injurious confinement; that the continuance of the practice must inevitably produce discord between two nations, which ought to be the friends of each other; and that it was more advisable to desist from, and to take effectual measures to prevent an acknowledged wrong, than by perseverance in that wrong, to excite against themselves the well-founded resentments of America, and force the government into measures which may very possibly terminate in an open rupture.¹

“Such were the feelings and the sentiments of the American government, under every change of its administration, in relation to the British practice of impressment; and such the remonstrances addressed to the justice of Great Britain. It is obvious, therefore, that this cause, independent of every other, has been uniformly deemed a just and certain cause of war; yet, the characteristic policy of the United States still prevailed: remonstrance was only succeeded by negotiation; and every assertion of American rights, was accompanied with an overture, to secure, in any practicable form, the rights of Great Britain.² Time seemed, however, to render it more and more difficult to ascertain and fix the standard of the British rights, according to the succession of the British claims. The right of entering and searching an American merchant ship, for the purpose of impressment, was, for awhile, confined to the case of British deserters; and even so late as the month of February, 1800, the minister of his Britannic majesty, then at Philadelphia, urged the American government ‘to take into consideration, as the only means of drying up every source of complaint and irritation, upon that head, a proposal which he had made two years before, in the name of his majesty’s government, for the reciprocal restitution of deserters.’³ But this project of a treaty was then deemed inadmissible, by the President of the United States, and the chief officers of the executive departments of the government, whom he consulted, for the same reason, specifically, which, at a subsequent period, induced the President of the United States

¹ Letter of Mr. Marshall, Secretary of State, (now Chief Justice of the United States,) to Mr. King, minister at London, dated the 20th of September, 1800.

² See particularly, Mr. King’s propositions to Lord Grenville and Lord Hawkesbury, of the 13th of April, 1797, the 15th of March, 1799, the 25th of February, 1801, and in July, 1803.

³ Mr. Liston’s note to Mr. Pickering, the Secretary of State, dated the 4th of February, 1800.

to withhold his approbation from the treaty negotiated by the American ministers at London, in the year 1806; namely: 'that it did not sufficiently provide against the impressment of American seamen;'¹ and 'that it is better to have no article, and to meet the consequences, than not to enumerate merchant vessels on the high seas, among the things not to be forcibly entered in search of deserters.'² But the British claim, expanding with singular elasticity, was soon found to include a right to enter American vessels on the high seas, in order to search for and seize all British seamen; it next embraced the case of every British subject; and, finally, in its practical enforcement, it has been extended to every mariner, who could not prove, upon the spot, that he was a citizen of the United States.

"While the nature of the British claim was thus ambiguous and fluctuating, the principle to which it was referred, for justification and support, appeared to be, at once, arbitrary and illusory. It was not recorded in any positive code of the law of nations; it was not displayed in the elementary works of the civilian; nor had it ever been exemplified in the maritime usages of any other country, in any other age. In truth, it was the offspring of the municipal law of Great Britain alone; equally operative in a time of peace, and in a time of war; and, under all circumstances, inflicting a coercive jurisdiction upon the commerce and navigation of the world.

"For the legitimate rights of the belligerent powers, the United States had felt and evinced a sincere and open respect. Although they had marked a diversity of doctrine among the most celebrated jurists, upon many of the litigated points of the law of war; although they had formerly espoused, with the example of the most powerful government of Europe, the principles of the armed neutrality, which were established in the year 1780, upon the basis of the memorable declaration of the empress of all the Russias; and although the principles of that declaration have been incorporated into all their public treaties, except in the instance of the treaty of 1794; yet, the United States, still faith-

¹ Opinion of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, enclosing the plan of a treaty, dated the 3d of May, 1800, and the opinion of Mr. Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 14th of April, 1800.

² Opinion of Mr. Stoddert, Secretary of the Navy, dated the 23d of April, 1800, and the opinions of Mr. Lee, Attorney-General, dated the 26th of February, and the 30th of April, 1800.

ful to the pacific and impartial policy which they professed, did not hesitate, even at the commencement of the French revolutionary war, to accept and allow the exposition of the law of nations, as it was then maintained by Great Britain ; and, consequently, to admit, upon a much contested point, that the property of her enemy, in their vessels, might be lawfully captured as prize of war.¹ It was also freely admitted that a belligerent power had a right, with proper cautions, to enter and search American vessels, for the goods of an enemy, and for articles contraband of war ; that if, upon a search, such goods or articles were found, or if, in the course of the search, persons in the military service of the enemy were discovered, a belligerent had a right of transshipment and removal ; that a belligerent had a right, in doubtful cases, to carry American vessels to a convenient station for further examination ; and that a belligerent had a right to exclude American vessels from ports and places, under the blockade of an adequate naval force. These rights the law of nations might, reasonably, be deemed to sanction ; nor has a fair exercise of the powers necessary for the enjoyment of these rights, been, at any time, controverted or opposed by the American government.

“ But it must be again remarked, that the claim of Great Britain was not to be satisfied, by the most ample and explicit recognition of the law of war ; for, the law of war treats only of the relations of a belligerent to his enemy ; while the claim of Great Britain embraced, also, the relation between a sovereign and his subjects. It was said, that every British subject was bound by a tie of allegiance to his sovereign, which no lapse of time, no change of place, no exigency of life, could possibly weaken or dissolve. It was said, that the British sovereign was entitled, at all periods, and on all occasions, to the services of his subjects. And it was said, that the British vessels of war upon the high seas, might lawfully and forcibly enter the merchant vessels of every other nation (for the theory of these pretensions is not limited to the case of the United States, although that case has been, almost

¹ Correspondence of the year 1792, between Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, and the ministers of Great Britain and France. Also, Mr. Jefferson's letter to the American minister at Paris, of the same year, requesting the recall of Mr. Genet.

exclusively, affected by their practical operation) for the purpose of discovering and impressing British subjects."¹

"The injustice of the British claim, and the cruelty of the British practice, have tested, for a series of years, the pride and the patience of the American government: but, still, every experiment was anxiously made, to avoid the last resort of nations. The claim of Great Britain, in its theory, was limited to the right of seeking and impressing its own subjects, on board of the merchant vessels of the United States, although, in fatal experience, it has been extended (as already appears) to the seizure of the subjects of every other power, sailing under a voluntary contract with the American merchant; to the seizure of the naturalized citizens of the United States, sailing, also, under voluntary contracts, which every foreigner, independent of any act of naturalization, is at liberty to form in every country; and even to the seizure of the native citizens of the United States, sailing on board the ships of their own nation, in the prosecution of a lawful commerce. The excuse, for what has been unfeelingly termed, 'partial mistakes, and occasional abuse,'² when the right of impressment was practised towards vessels of the United States, is, in the words of the prince regent's declaration, 'a similarity of language and manners:' but was it not known, when this excuse was offered to the world, that the Russian, the Swede, the Dane and the German; that the Frenchman, the Spaniard, and the Portuguese; nay, that the African and the Asiatic; between whom and the people of Great Britain there exists no similarity of language, manners, or complexion; had been, equally with the American citizen and the British subject, the victims of the impress tyranny?³ If, however, the excuse be sincere; if the real object of the impressment be merely to secure to Great Britain the naval services of her own subjects, and not to man her fleets, in every practicable mode of enlistment, by right, or by wrong; and if a just and generous government, professing mutual friendship and respect, may be presumed to prefer the accomplishment, even of a legitimate purpose, by means the

¹ British declaration of the 10th of January, 1813.

² British declaration of the 10th of January, 1813.

³ Letter of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, minister at London, of the 26th of October, 1790; and the letter of Mr. Marshall, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, of the 20th of September, 1800.

least afflicting and injurious to others, why have the overtures of the United States, offering other means as effectual as impressment, for the purpose avowed, to the consideration and acceptance of Great Britain, been forever eluded or rejected? It has been offered, that the number of men to be protected by an American vessel, should be limited by her tonnage; that British officers should be permitted, in British ports, to enter the vessel, in order to ascertain the number of men on board; and that, in case of an addition to her crew, the British subjects enlisted should be liable to impressment.¹ It was offered in the solemn form of a law, that American seamen should be registered; that they should be provided with certificates of citizenship;² and that the roll of the crew of every vessel should be formally authenticated.³ It was offered, that no refuge or protection should be given to deserters; but that, on the contrary, they should be surrendered.⁴ It was 'again and again offered to concur in a convention, which it was thought practicable to be formed, and which should settle the questions of impressment, in a manner that would be safe for England, and satisfactory to the United States.'⁵ It was offered, that each party should prohibit its citizens or subjects from clandestinely concealing or carrying away, from the territories or colonies of the other, any seaman belonging to the other party.⁶ And, conclusively, it has been offered and declared by law, that 'after the termination of the present war, it should not be lawful to employ on board of any of the public or private vessels of the United States, any persons except citizens of the United States; and that no foreigner should be admitted to become a citizen hereafter, who had not, for the continued term of five years, resided within the United States, without being, at any time, during the five years, out of the territory of the United States.'⁷

¹ Letter of Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Mr. Pinkney, minister at London, dated the 11th of June, 1792, and the letter of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, minister at London, dated the 8th of June, 1796.

² Act of Congress, passed the 28th of May, 1796.

³ Letter of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, minister at London, dated the 8th of June, 1796.

⁴ Project of a treaty on the subject, between Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, and Mr. Liston, the British minister, at Philadelphia, in the year 1800.

⁵ Letter of Mr. King, minister at London, to the Secretary of State, dated the 15th of March, 1799.

⁶ Letter of Mr. King to the Secretary of State, dated in July, 1803.

⁷ Act of Congress, passed on the 3d of March, 1813.

“But Great Britain has, unhappily, perceived in the acceptance of the overtures of the American government, consequences injurious to her maritime policy ; and, therefore, withholds it, at the expense of her justice. She perceives, perhaps, a loss of the American nursery for her seamen, while she is at peace ; a loss of the service of American crews, while she is at war ; and a loss of many of those opportunities, which have enabled her to enrich her navy by the spoils of the American commerce, without exposing her own commerce to the risk of retaliation or reprisals.”

“The present review of the conduct of the United States towards the belligerent powers of Europe, will be regarded by every candid mind, as a necessary medium to vindicate their national character from the unmerited imputations of the prince regent’s declaration of the 10th of January, 1813 ; and not as a medium, voluntarily assumed, according to the insinuations of that declaration, for the revival of unworthy prejudices, or vindictive passions, in reference to transactions that are past. The treaty of Amiens, which seemed to terminate the war in Europe, seemed, also, to terminate the neutral sufferings of America ; but the hope of repose was, in both respects, delusive and transient. The hostilities which were renewed between Great Britain and France, in the year 1803, were immediately followed by a renewal of the aggressions of the belligerent powers, upon the commercial rights and political independence of the United States. There was scarcely, therefore, an interval separating the aggressions of the first war from the aggressions of the second war ; and although, in nature, the aggressions continued to be the same, in extent, they became incalculably more destructive. It will be seen, however, that the American government inflexibly maintained its neutral and pacific policy in every extremity of the latter trial, with the same good faith and forbearance, that, in the former trial, had distinguished its conduct ; until it was compelled to choose, from the alternative of national degradation or national resistance. And if great Britain alone then became the object of the American declaration of war, it will be seen, that Great Britain alone had obstinately closed the door of amicable negotiation.

“The American minister at London, anticipating the rupture between Great Britain and France, had obtained assurances from

the British government, 'that, in the event of war, the instructions given to their naval officers should be drawn up with plainness and precision; and, in general, that the rights of belligerents should be exercised in moderation, and with due respect for those of neutrals.'¹ And in relation to the important subject of impressment, he had actually prepared for signature, with the assent of Lord Hawkesbury and Lord St. Vincent, a convention, to continue during five years, declaring that 'no seamen, nor seafaring person, should, upon the high seas, and without the jurisdiction of either party, be demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel, belonging to the citizens or subjects of one of the parties, by the public or private armed ships, or men-of-war, belonging to, or in the service of, the other party; and that strict orders should be given for the due observance of the engagement.'² This convention, which explicitly relinquished impressments from American vessels on the high seas, and to which the British ministers had, at first, agreed, Lord St. Vincent was desirous afterwards to modify, 'stating, that on further reflection, he was of opinion that the narrow seas should be expressly excepted, they having been, as his lordship remarked, immemorially considered to be within the dominion of Great Britain.' The American minister, however, 'having supposed, from the tenour of his conversations with Lord St. Vincent, that the doctrine of *mare clausum* would not be revived against the United States on this occasion, but that England would be content with the limited jurisdiction, or dominion, over the seas adjacent to her territories, which is assigned by the law of nations to other states, was disappointed, on receiving Lord St. Vincent's communication; and chose rather to abandon the negotiation than to acquiesce in the doctrine it proposed to establish.'³ But it was still some satisfaction to receive a formal declaration from the British government, communicated by its minister at Washington, after the recommencement of the war in Europe, which promised, in effect, to reinstate the practice of naval blockades, upon the principles of the law of nations; so that no blockade should be considered as existing, 'unless in respect of particular ports, which might be actually invested; and, then, that the vessels bound to

¹ Letter of Mr. King to the Secretary of State, dated the 16th of May, 1803.

² Letter of Mr. King to the Secretary of State, dated July, 1803.

³ Letter of Mr. King to the Secretary of State, dated July, 1803.

such ports should not be captured, unless they had previously been warned not to enter them.¹

“All the precautions of the American government were, nevertheless, ineffectual; and the assurances of the British government were, in no instance, verified. The outrage of impressment was again, indiscriminately, perpetrated upon the crew of every American vessel, and on every sea. The enormity of blockades, established by an order in council, without a legitimate object, and maintained by an order in council, without the application of a competent force, was more and more developed. The rule, denominated ‘the rule of the war of 1756,’ was revived in an affected style of moderation, but in a spirit of more rigorous execution.² The lives, the liberty, the fortunes and the happiness of the citizens of the United States, engaged in the pursuits of navigation and commerce, were once more subjected to the violence and cupidity of the British cruisers. And, in brief, so grievous, so intolerable, had the afflictions of the nation become, that the people, with one mind and one voice, called loudly upon their government for redress and protection;³ the Congress of the United States, participating in the feelings and resentments of the time, urged upon the executive magistrate the necessity of an immediate demand of reparation from Great Britain;⁴ while the same patriotic spirit, which had opposed British usurpation in 1793, and encountered French hostility in 1798, was again pledged, in every variety of form, to the maintenance of the national honour and independence, during the more arduous trial that arose in 1805.”

“It has been shown, that a treaty proposed, emphatically by the British minister resident in Philadelphia, ‘as the means of drying up every source of complaint, and irritation, upon the head of impressment,’ was ‘deemed utterly inadmissible,’ by the American government, because it did not sufficiently provide for

¹ Letter of Mr. Merry to the Secretary of State, dated the 12th of April, 1804, and the enclosed copy of a letter from Mr. Nepean, the Secretary of the Admiralty, to Mr. Hammond, the British under Secretary of State for foreign affairs, dated January 5, 1804.

² Orders in council of the 24th of June, 1803, and the 17th of August, 1805.

³ Memorials of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, &c., presented to Congress in the end of the year 1805, and the beginning of the year 1806.

⁴ Resolutions of the Senate of the United States, of the 10th and 14th of February, 1806; and the resolution of the House of Representatives.

that object.¹ It has, also, been shown, that another treaty, proposed by the American minister, at London, was laid aside, because the British government, while it was willing to relinquish, expressly, impressments upon American vessels, on the high seas, insisted upon an exception, in reference to the narrow seas claimed as a part of the British dominion: and experience demonstrated, that, although the spoliations committed upon the American commerce, might admit of reparation, by the payment of a pecuniary equivalent; yet, consulting the honour and the feelings of the nation, it was impossible to receive satisfaction for the cruelties of impressment, by any other means, than by an entire discontinuance of the practice. When, therefore, the envoys extraordinary were appointed in the year 1806 to negotiate with the British government, every authority was given for the purposes of conciliation; nay, an act of Congress, prohibiting the importation of certain articles of British manufacture into the United States, was suspended, in proof of a friendly disposition;² but it was declared, that ‘the suppression of impressment, and the definition of blockades, were absolutely indispensable;’ and that, ‘without a provision against impressments, no treaty should be concluded.’ The American envoys, accordingly, took care to communicate to the British commissioners, the limitations of their powers. Influenced, at the same time, by a sincere desire to terminate the differences between the two nations; knowing the solicitude of their government, to relieve its seafaring citizens from actual sufferance; listening with confidence to assurances and explanations of the British commissioners, in a sense favourable to their wishes; and judging from a state of information, that gave no immediate cause to doubt the sufficiency of those assurances and explanations; the envoys rather than terminate the negotiation without any arrangement, were willing to rely upon the efficacy of a substitute, for a positive article in the treaty, to be submitted to the consideration of their government, as this, according to the declaration of the British commissioners, was the only arrangement they were permitted,

¹ Mr. Liston’s letter to the Secretary of State, dated the 4th of February, 1800; and the letter of Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to the President of the United States, dated the 20th of February, 1800.

² Act of Congress, passed the 18th of April, 1806; and the act suspending it, passed the 19th of December, 1806.

at that time, to propose or to allow. The substitute was presented in the form of a note from the British commissioners to the American envoys, and contained a pledge, 'that instructions had been given, and should be repeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of British seamen; that the strictest care should be taken to preserve the citizens of the United States from any molestation or injury; and that immediate and prompt redress should be afforded, upon any representation of injury sustained by them.'¹

"Inasmuch, however, as the treaty contained no provision against impressment, and it was seen by the government, when the treaty was under consideration for ratification, that the pledge contained in the substitute was not complied with, but, on the contrary, that the impressments were continued with undiminished violence in the American seas, so long after the alleged date of the instructions, which were to arrest them; that the practical inefficacy of the substitute could not be doubted by the government here, the ratification of the treaty was necessarily declined; and it has since appeared, that after a change in the British ministry had taken place, it was declared by the secretary for foreign affairs, that no engagements were entered into, on the part of his majesty, as connected with the treaty, except such as appear upon the face of it.'²

"The American government, however, with unabating solicitude for peace, urged an immediate renewal of the negotiations on the basis of the abortive treaty, until this course was peremptorily declared, by the British government, to be 'wholly inadmissible.'

"But, independent of the silence of the proposed treaty, upon the great topic of American complaint, and of the view which has been taken of the projected substitute, the cotemporaneous declaration of the British commissioners, delivered by the command of their sovereign, and to which the American envoys refused to make themselves a party, or to give the slightest degree of sanction, was regarded by the American government as ample cause of rejection. In reference to the French decree, which had been issued at Berlin on the 21st of November, 1806,

¹ Note of the British commissioners, dated 8th of November, 1806.

² Mr. Canning's letter to the American envoys, dated 27th October, 1807.

³ Same letter.

it was declared, that if France should carry the threats of that decree into execution, and 'if neutral nations, contrary to all expectation, should acquiesce in such usurpations, his majesty might, probably, be compelled, however reluctantly, to retaliate, in his just defence, and to adopt, in regard to the commerce of neutral nations with his enemies, the same measures which those nations should have permitted to be enforced, against their commerce with his subjects:' 'that his majesty could not enter into the stipulations of the present treaty, without an explanation from the United States of their intentions, or a reservation on the part of his majesty, in the case above-mentioned, if it should ever occur;' and 'that, without a formal abandonment, or tacit relinquishment of the unjust pretensions of France; or without such conduct and assurances upon the part of the United States, as should give security to his majesty, that they would not submit to the French innovations in the established system of maritime law, his majesty would not consider himself bound, by the present signature of his commissioners, to ratify the treaty, or precluded from adopting such measures as might seem necessary for counteracting the designs of the enemy.'¹

"The reservation of a power to invalidate a solemn treaty at the pleasure of one of the parties, and the menace of inflicting punishment upon the United States for the offences of another nation, proved, in the event, a prelude to the scenes of violence which Great Britain was then about to display, and which it would have been improper for the American negotiators to anticipate. For, if a commentary were wanting to explain the real design of such conduct, it would be found in the fact, that within eight days from the date of the treaty, and before it was possible for the British government to have known the effect of the Berlin decree on the American government; nay, even before the American government had itself heard of that decree, the destruction of American commerce was commenced by the order in council of the 7th of January, 1807, which announced, 'that no vessel should be permitted to trade from one port to another, both which ports should belong to, or be in possession of France or her allies: or should be so far under their control, as that British vessels might not trade freely thereat.'²

¹ Note of the British commissioners, dated the 31st of December, 1806. Also, the answer of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney to that note.

² Order in council of January 7, 1807.

“During the whole period of this negotiation, which did not finally close until the British government declared, in the month of October, 1807, that negotiation was no longer admissible, the course pursued by the British squadron, stationed more immediately on the American coast, was, in the extreme, vexatious, predatory and hostile. The territorial jurisdiction of the United States, extending, upon the principles of the law of nations, at least a league over the adjacent ocean, was totally disregarded and contemned. Vessels employed in the coasting trade, or in the business of the pilot and the fisherman, were objects of incessant violence; their petty cargoes were plundered; and some of their scanty crews were often either impressed or wounded, or killed by the force of British frigates. British ships of war hovered, in warlike display, upon the coast; blockaded the ports of the United States, so that no vessel could enter or depart in safety; penetrated the bays and rivers, and even anchored in the harbours of the United States, to exercise a jurisdiction of impressment; threatened the towns and villages with conflagration; and wantonly discharged musketry, as well as cannon, upon the inhabitants of an open and unprotected country. The neutrality of the American territory was violated on every occasion; and, at last, the American government was doomed to suffer the greatest indignity which could be offered to a sovereign and independent nation, in the ever memorable attack of a British fifty gun ship, under the countenance of the British squadron, anchored within the waters of the United States, upon the frigate Chesapeake, peaceably prosecuting a distant voyage. The British government affected, from time to time, to disapprove and condemn these outrages; but the officers who perpetrated them were generally applauded; if tried, they were acquitted; if removed from the American station, it was only to be promoted in another station; and if atonement were offered, as in the flagrant instance of the frigate Chesapeake, the atonement was so ungracious in the manner, and so tardy in the result, as to betray the want of that conciliatory spirit which ought to have characterized it.”¹

¹ Evidence of these facts reported to Congress in November, 1806.

Documents respecting Captain Love, of the *Driver*; Captain Whitby, of the *Leander*, &c.

Correspondence respecting the frigate *Chesapeake*, with Mr. Canning, at London; with Mr. Rose, at Washington; with Mr. Erskine, at Washington, &c.

“But the American government, soothing the exasperated spirit of the people, by a proclamation which interdicted the entrance of all British armed vessels into the harbours and waters of the United States,¹ neither commenced hostilities against Great Britain, nor sought a defensive alliance with France, nor relaxed in its firm, but conciliatory efforts, to enforce the claims of justice upon the honour of both nations.

“The rival ambition of Great Britain and France, now, however, approached the consummation, which, involving the destruction of all neutral rights, upon an avowed principle of action, could not fail to render an actual state of war comparatively more safe and more prosperous than the imaginary state of peace to which neutrals were reduced. The just and impartial conduct of a neutral nation ceased to be its shield and its safeguard, when the conduct of the belligerent powers towards each other became the only criterion of the law of war. The wrong committed by one of the belligerent powers was thus made the signal for the perpetration of a greater wrong by the other; and if the American government complained to both powers, their answer, although it never denied the causes of complaint, invariably retorted an idle and offensive inquiry into the priority of their respective aggressions; or each demanded a course of resistance against its antagonist, which was calculated to prostrate the American right of self-government, and to coerce the United States against their interest and their policy, into becoming an associate in the war. But the American government never did, and never can, admit that a belligerent power, ‘in taking steps to restrain the violence of its enemy, and to retort upon them the evils of their own injustice,’² is entitled to disturb and to destroy the rights of a neutral power, as recognized and established by the law of nations. It was impossible, indeed, that the real features of the miscalled retaliatory system should be long masked from the world; when Great Britain, even in her acts of professed retaliation, declared that France was unable to execute the hostile denunciations of her decrees;³ and when Great Britain herself unblushingly entered into the same commerce with her enemy (through the medium of forgeries, perjuries and licenses), from which she had interdicted unoffending neutrals.

¹ Proclamation of the 2d of July, 1807.

² Orders in council of the 7th of January, 1807.

³ *Ibid.*

The pride of naval superiority, and the cravings of commercial monopoly, gave, after all, the impulse and direction to the councils of the British cabinet; while the vast, although visionary, projects of France, furnished occasions and pretexts for accomplishing the objects of those councils.

“The British minister, resident at Washington, in the year 1804, having distinctly recognized, in the name of his sovereign, the legitimate principles of blockade, the American government received, with some surprise and solicitude, the successive notifications of the 9th of August, 1804, the 8th of April, 1806, and, more particularly, of the 16th of May, 1806, announcing, by the last notification, ‘a blockade of the coast, rivers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive.’¹ In none of the notified instances of blockade, were the principles that had been recognized in 1804, adopted and pursued; and it will be recollected by all Europe, that neither at the time of the notification of the 16th of May, 1806, nor at the time of excepting the Elbe and Ems, from the operation of that notification,² nor at any time during the continuance of the French war, was there an adequate naval force actually applied by Great Britain, for the purpose of maintaining a blockade from the river Elbe to the port of Brest. It was, then, in the language of the day, ‘a mere paper blockade;’ a manifest infraction of the law of nations; and an act of peculiar injustice to the United States, as the only neutral power against which it could practically operate. But whatever may have been the sense of the American government on the occasion, and whatever might be the disposition to avoid making this the ground of an open rupture with Great Britain, the case assumed a character of the highest interest, when, independent of its own injurious consequences, France, in the Berlin decree of the 21st of November, 1806, recited, as a chief cause for placing the British islands in a state of blockade, ‘that Great Britain declares blockaded places before which she has not a single vessel of war; and even places, which her united forces would be incapable of blockading; such as entire coasts, and a whole empire: an unequalled abuse of the right of blockade,

¹ Lord Harrowby’s note to Mr. Monroe, dated the 9th of August, 1804; and Mr. Fox’s notes to Mr. Monroe, dated respectively the 8th of April and the 16th of May, 1806.

² Lord Howick’s note to Mr. Monroe, dated the 25th of September, 1806.

that had no other object than to interrupt the communications of different nations; and to extend the commerce and industry of England upon the ruin of those nations.¹ The American government aims not, and never has aimed, at the justification either of Great Britain or of France, in their career of crimination and recrimination; but it is of some importance to observe, that if the blockade of May, 1806, was an unlawful blockade, and if the right of retaliation arose with the first unlawful attack made by a belligerent power upon neutral rights, Great Britain has yet to answer to mankind, according to the rule of her own acknowledgment, for all the calamities of the retaliatory warfare. France, whether right or wrong, made the British system of blockade the foundation of the Berlin decree; and France had an equal right with Great Britain to demand from the United States an opposition to every encroachment upon the privileges of the neutral character. It is enough, however, on the present occasion, for the American government to observe, that it possessed no power to prevent the framing of the Berlin decree, and to disclaim any approbation of its principles, or acquiescence in its operations; for, it neither belonged to Great Britain nor to France to prescribe to the American government the time, or the mode, or the degree, of resistance, to the indignities and the outrages with which each of those nations in its turn assailed the United States."

"When the American government received intelligence that the orders of the 11th of November, 1807, had been under the consideration of the British cabinet, and were actually prepared for promulgation, it was anticipated that France, in a zealous prosecution of the retaliatory warfare, would soon produce an act of at least equal injustice and hostility. The crisis existed, therefore, at which the United States were compelled to decide, either to withdraw their seafaring citizens, and their commercial wealth from the ocean, or to leave the interests of the mariner and the merchant exposed to certain destruction; or to engage in open and active war for the protection and defence of those interests. The principles and the habits of the American government were still disposed to neutrality and peace. In weighing the nature and the amount of the aggressions which had been perpetrated, or which were threatened, if there were any preponderance to determine the balance against one of the bellige-

¹ Berlin decree of the 21st of November, 1806.

rent powers rather than the other, as the object of a declaration of war, it was against Great Britain, at least, upon the vital interest of impressment, and the obvious superiority of her naval means of annoyance. The French decrees were, indeed, as obnoxious in their formation and design as the British orders; but the government of France claimed and exercised no right of impressment; and the maritime spoiliations of France were, comparatively, restricted, not only by her own weakness on the ocean, but by the constant and pervading vigilance of the fleets of her enemy. The difficulty of selection, the indiscretion of encountering, at once, both of the offending powers; and, above all, the hope of an early return of justice, under the dispensations of the ancient public law, prevailed in the councils of the American government; and it was resolved to attempt the preservation of its neutrality and its peace, of its citizens and its resources, by a voluntary suspension of the commerce and navigation of the United States. It is true, that for the minor outrages committed under the pretext of the rule of war of 1756, the citizens of every denomination had demanded from their government, in the year 1805, protection and redress; it is true, that for the unparalleled enormities of the year 1807, the citizens of every denomination again demanded from their government protection and redress; but it is, also, a truth, conclusively established by every manifestation of the sense of the American people, as well as of their government, that any honourable means of protection and redress were preferred to the last resort of arms. The American government might honourably retire, for a time, from the scene of conflict and collision; but it could no longer, with honour, permit its flag to be insulted, its citizens to be enslaved, and its property to be plundered on the highway of nations.

“ Under these impressions, the restrictive system of the United States was introduced. In December, 1807, an embargo was imposed upon all American vessels and merchandize,¹ on principles similar to those which originated and regulated the embargo law, authorized to be laid by the President of the United States, in the year 1794; but soon afterwards, in the genuine spirit of the policy that prescribed the measure, it was declared by law, ‘ that in the event of such peace, or suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers of Europe, or such changes

¹ Act of Congress, passed the 22d of December, 1807.

in their measures affecting neutral commerce, as might render that of the United States safe, in the judgment of the President of the United States, he was authorized to suspend the embargo, in whole or in part.¹ The pressure of the embargo was thought, however, so severe upon every part of the community, that the American government, notwithstanding the neutral character of the measure, determined upon some relaxation; and, accordingly, the embargo being raised, as to all other nations, a system of non-intercourse and non-importation was substituted in March, 1809, as to Great Britain and France, which prohibited all voyages to the British or French dominions, and all trade in articles of British or French product or manufacture.² But still adhering to the neutral and pacific policy of the government, it was declared, 'that the President of the United States should be authorized, in case either France or Great Britain should so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, to declare the same by proclamation, after which the trade of the United States might be renewed with the nation so doing.'³ These appeals to the justice and the interests of the belligerent powers proving ineffectual, and the necessities of the country increasing, it was finally resolved by the American government to take the hazards of a war; to revoke its restrictive system, and to exclude British and French armed vessels from the harbours and waters of the United States; but, again, emphatically to announce, 'that in case either Great Britain or France should, before the 3d of March, 1811, so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States; and if the other nation should not, within three months thereafter, so revoke or modify her edicts, in like manner,' the provisions of the non-intercourse and non-importation law should, at the expiration of three months, be revived against the nation refusing, or neglecting to revoke or modify its edict.'⁴

"On the expiration of three months from the date of the president's proclamation, the non-intercourse and non-importation law was, of course, to be revived against Great Britain, unless, during

¹ Act of Congress, passed the 22d of April, 1808.

² Act of Congress, passed the 1st of March, 1809.

³ 11th section of the last cited act of Congress

⁴ Act of Congress, passed the 1st of May, 1810.

that period, her orders in council should be revoked. The subject was, therefore, most anxiously and most steadily pressed upon the justice and the magnanimity of the British government; and even when the hope of success expired, by the lapse of the period prescribed in one act of Congress, the United States opened the door of reconciliation by another act, which, in the year 1811, again provided, that in case, at any time, 'Great Britain should so revoke or modify her edicts, as that they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the President of the United States should declare the fact by proclamation; and that the restrictions, previously imposed, should, from the date of such proclamation, cease and be discontinued.'¹ But, unhappily, every appeal to the justice and magnanimity of Great Britain was now, as heretofore, fruitless and forlorn. She had, at this epoch, impressed from the crews of American merchant vessels, peaceably navigating the high seas, not less than six thousand mariners, who claimed to be citizens of the United States, and who were denied all opportunity to verify their claims. She had seized and confiscated the commercial property of American citizens to an incalculable amount. She had United in the enormities of France to declare a great proportion of the terraqueous globe in a state of blockade; chasing the American merchant flag effectually from the ocean. She had contemptuously disregarded the neutrality of the American territory, and the jurisdiction of the American laws, within the waters and harbours of the United States. She was enjoying the emoluments of a surreptitious trade, stained with every species of fraud and corruption, which gave to the belligerent powers the advantages of peace, while the neutral powers were involved in the evils of war. She had, in short, usurped and exercised on the water, a tyranny similar to that which her great antagonist had usurped and exercised upon the land. And, amidst all these proofs of ambition and avarice, she demanded that the victims of her usurpations and her violence should revere her as the sole defender of the rights and liberties of mankind.

“When, therefore, Great Britain, in manifest violation of her solemn promises, refused to follow the example of France, by the repeal of her orders in council, the American government was compelled to contemplate a resort to arms, as the only re-

¹ Act of Congress, passed the 2d of March, 1811.

maining course to be pursued for its honour, its independence, and its safety. Whatever depended upon the United States themselves, the United States had performed, for the preservation of peace, in resistance of the French decrees as well as of the British orders. What had been required from France, in its relation to the neutral character of the United States, France had performed, by the revocation of its Berlin and Milan decrees. But what depended upon Great Britain, for the purposes of justice, in the repeal of her orders in council, was withheld; and new evasions were sought when the old were exhausted. It was, at one time, alleged, that satisfactory proof was not afforded that France had repealed her decrees against the commerce of the United States, as if such proof alone were wanting to ensure the performance of the British promise.¹ At another time it was insisted that the repeal of the French decrees in their operation against the United States, in order to authorize a demand for the performance of the British promise, must be total, applying equally to their internal and their external effects; as if the United States had either the right or the power to impose upon France the law of her domestic institutions.² And it was finally insisted, in a dispatch from Lord Castlereagh to the British minister, residing at Washington, in the year 1812, which was officially communicated to the American government, 'that the decrees of Berlin and Milan must not be repealed singly and specially, in relation to the United States; but must be repealed, also, as to all other neutral nations; and that in no less extent of a repeal of the French decrees, had the British government ever pledged itself to repeal the orders in council;'³ as if it were incumbent on the United States not only to assert her own rights, but to become the coadjutor of the British government, in a gratuitous assertion of the rights of all other nations.

"The Congress of the United States could pause no longer. Under a deep and afflicting sense of the national wrongs and the national resentments, while they 'postponed definitive measures with respect to France, in the expectation that the result of un-closed discussions between the American minister at Paris and

¹ Correspondence between Mr. Pinkney and the British government.

² Letters of Mr. Erskine.

³ Correspondence between the Secretary of State, and Mr. Foster, the British minister, in June, 1812.

the French government, would speedily enable them to decide, with greater advantage, on the course due to the rights, the interests, and the honour of the country,¹ they pronounced a deliberate and solemn declaration of war, between Great Britain and the United States, on the 18th of June, 1812.

“ But, it is in the face of all the facts which have been displayed in the present narrative, that the prince regent, by his declaration of January, 1813, describes the United States as the aggressor in the war. If the act of declaring war constitutes, in all cases, the act of original aggression, the United States must submit to the severity of the reproach; but if the act of declaring war may be more truly considered as the result of long suffering and necessary self-defence, the American government will stand acquitted, in the sight of Heaven, and of the world. Have the United States, then, enslaved the subjects, confiscated the property, prostrated the commerce, insulted the flag, or violated the territorial sovereignty of Great Britain? No; but, in all these respects the United States had suffered for a long period of years, previously to the declaration of war, the contumely and outrage of the British government. It has been said, too, as an aggravation of the imputed aggression, that the United States chose a period for their declaration of war when Great Britain was struggling for her own existence, against a power which threatened to overthrow the independence of all Europe; but it might be more truly said, that the United States, not acting upon choice, but upon compulsion, delayed the declaration of war, until the persecutions of Great Britain had rendered further delay destructive and disgraceful. Great Britain had converted the commercial scenes of American opulence and prosperity into scenes of comparative poverty and distress; she had brought the existence of the United States, as an independent nation, into question; and, surely, it must have been indifferent to the United States, whether they ceased to exist as an independent nation, by her conduct, while she professed friendship, or by her conduct, when she avowed enmity and revenge. Nor is it true that the existence of Great Britain was in danger at the epoch of the declaration of war. The American government uniformly entertained an opposite opinion; and, at all times, saw more to apprehend for the

¹ President's message of the 1st of June, 1812; and the report of the committee of foreign relations, to whom the message was referred.

United States, from her maritime power, than from the territorial power of her enemy. The event has justified the opinion and the apprehension. But what the United States asked, as essential to their welfare, and even as beneficial to the allies of Great Britain, in the European war, Great Britain, it is manifest, might have granted, without impairing the resources of her own strength or the splendour of her own sovereignty; for, her orders in council have been since revoked; not, it is true, as the performance of her promise, to follow, in this respect, the example of France, since she finally rested the obligation of that promise upon a repeal of the French decrees, as to all nations; and the repeal was only as to the United States; nor as an act of national justice towards the United States; but, simply, as an act of domestic policy, for the special advantage of her own people.

“The British government has, also, described the war as a war of aggrandizement and conquest, on the part of the United States; but, where is the foundation for the charge? While the American government employed every means to dissuade the Indians, even those who lived within the territory, and were supplied by the bounty of the United States, from taking any part in the war,¹ the proofs were irresistible, that the enemy pursued a very different course;² and that every precaution would be necessary to prevent the effects of an offensive alliance between the British troops and the savages, throughout the northern frontier of the United States. The military occupation of Upper Canada was, therefore, deemed indispensable to the safety of that frontier in the earliest movements of the war, independent of all views of extending the territorial boundary of the United States. But, when war was declared, in resentment for injuries, which had been suffered upon the Atlantic, what principle of public law, what modification of civilized warfare, imposed upon the United States the duty of abstaining from the invasion of the Canadas? It was there alone that the United States could place themselves upon an equal footing of military force with Great Britain; and it was there, that they might reasonably encourage the hope of being able, in the prosecution of a lawful retaliation, ‘to restrain

¹ Proceedings at the councils, held with the Indians, during the expedition under Brigadier General Hull; and the talk delivered by the President of the United States to the Six Nations, at Washington, on the 8th of April, 1812.

² Documents laid before Congress on the 13th of June, 1812.

the violence of the enemy, and to retort upon him the evils of his own injustice.' The proclamations issued by the American commanders, on entering Upper Canada, have, however, been adduced by the British negotiators at Ghent, as the proofs of a spirit of ambition and aggrandizement on the part of their government. In truth, the proclamations were not only unauthorized and disapproved, but were infractions of the positive instructions which had been given for the conduct of the war in Canada. When the general, commanding the north-western army of the United States, received, on the 24th of June, 1812, his first authority to commence offensive operations, he was especially told, that 'he must not consider himself authorized to pledge the government to the inhabitants of Canada, further than assurances of protection in their persons, property, and rights.' And on the ensuing 1st of August, it was emphatically declared to him, 'that it had become necessary that he should not lose sight of the instructions of the 24th of June, as any pledge beyond that was incompatible with the views of the government.'¹ Such was the nature of the charge of American ambition and aggrandizement, and such the evidence to support it."

"The conduct of the United States, from the moment of declaring the war, will serve, as well as their previous conduct, to rescue them from the unjust reproaches of Great Britain. When war was declared, the orders in council had been maintained, with inexorable hostility, until a thousand American vessels and their cargoes had been seized and confiscated, under their operation; the British minister at Washington had, with peculiar solemnity, announced that the orders would not be repealed, but upon conditions, which the American government had not the right, nor the power, to fulfil; and the European war, which had raged with little intermission for twenty years, threatened an indefinite continuance. Under these circumstances, a repeal of the orders, and a cessation of the injuries which they produced, were events beyond all rational anticipation. It appears, however, that the orders, under the influence of a parliamentary inquiry into their effects upon the trade and manufactures of Great Britain, were provisionally repealed on the 23d of June, 1812, a few days subsequent to the American declaration

¹ Letter from the Secretary of the War Department to Brigadier General Hull, dated the 24th of June, and the 1st of August, 1812.

of war. If this repeal had been made known to the United States, before their resort to arms, the repeal would have arrested it; and that cause of war being removed, the other essential cause, the practice of impressment, would have been the subject of renewed negotiation, under the auspicious influence of a partial, yet important, act of reconciliation. But the declaration of war, having announced the practice of impressment, as a principal cause, peace could only be the result of an express abandonment of the practice; of a suspension of the practice, for the purposes of negotiation; or of a cessation of actual sufferance, in consequence of a pacification in Europe, which would deprive Great Britain of every motive for continuing the practice."

"The reluctance with which the United States had resorted to arms, was manifested by the steps taken to arrest the progress of hostilities, and to hasten a restoration of peace. On the 26th of June, 1812, the American charge d'affaires, at London, was instructed to make the proposal of an armistice to the British government, which might lead to an adjustment of all differences, on the single condition, in the event of the orders in council being repealed, that instructions should be issued, suspending the practice of impressment during the armistice. This proposal was soon followed by another, admitting, instead of positive instructions, an informal understanding between the two governments on the subject.¹ But both of these proposals were unhappily rejected.² And when a third, which seemed to leave no plea for hesitation, as it required no other preliminary than that the American minister, at London, should find in the British government a sincere disposition to accommodate the difference relative to impressment, on fair conditions, was evaded, it was obvious that neither a desire of peace nor a spirit of conciliation influenced the councils of Great Britain.

"Under these circumstances, the American government had no choice, but to invigorate the war; and yet it has never lost sight of the object of all just wars, a just peace. The Emperor of Russia having offered his mediation to accomplish that object, it

¹ Letters from the Secretary of State to Mr. Russell, dated the 26th of June, and 27th of July, 1812.

² Correspondence between Mr. Russell and Lord Castlereagh, dated August and September, 1812; and Mr. Russell's letters to the Secretary of State, dated September, 1812.

was instantly and cordially accepted by the American government;¹ but it was peremptorily rejected by the British government. The emperor, in his benevolence, repeated his invitation: the British government again rejected it. At last, however, Great Britain, sensible of the reproach to which such conduct would expose her throughout Europe, offered to the American government a direct negotiation for peace, and the offer was promptly embraced, with perfect confidence that the British government would be equally prompt in giving effect to its own proposal. But such was not the design or the course of that government. The American envoys were immediately appointed, and arrived at Gottenburgh, the destined scene of negotiation, on the 11th of April, 1814, as soon as the season admitted. The British government, though regularly informed that no time would be lost on the part of the United States, suspended the appointment of its envoys until the actual arrival of the American envoys should be formally communicated. This pretension, however novel and inauspicious, was not permitted to obstruct the path to peace. The British government next proposed to transfer the negotiation from Gottenburgh to Ghent. This change, also, notwithstanding the necessary delay, was allowed. The American envoys, arriving at Ghent on the 24th of June, remained in a mortifying state of suspense and expectation for the arrival of the British envoys until the 6th of August. And from the period of opening the negotiations to the date of the last dispatch of the 31st of October, it has been seen that the whole of the diplomatic skill of the British government has consisted in consuming time, without approaching any conclusion. The pacification of Paris had, suddenly and unexpectedly, placed at the disposal of the British government a great naval and military force; the pride and passions of the nation were artfully excited against the United States, and a war of desperate and barbarous character was planned, at the very moment that the American government, finding its maritime citizens relieved, by the course of events, from actual sufferance under the practice of impressment, had authorized its envoys to waive those stipulations upon the subject, which might, otherwise, have been indispensable precautions.”

Little need or can be added to Dallas' authentic and persuasive view of the justice of the war. It is of great importance to

¹ Correspondence between Mr. Monroe and Mr. Daschkoff, in March, 1813.

imbue the American nation, and impress others, with just ideas of the course vindicated in arms by a comparatively weak American against the most powerful European nation; and to convince all that they were not resorted to till expostulation and forbearance were exhausted. Stung, outraged, and roused to conflict by uninterrupted series of insufferable wrongs and contumelious defiance, the pride and fortitude of a patient people were provoked and confirmed. Many think that Great Britain always hankered after the recolonization of the United States. Not content with its commercial accomplishment, by which this country free is more profitable to that than it could be as colonies, the mother country, by various insidious devices, as some believe, was contriving to resume at least metropolitan supremacy. Detention of the frontier posts long after the peace of 1783, in flagrant violation of the treaty, and contempt of remonstrance by Washington, may have been with the design to confine the American States to the east side of the Ohio river. While the savages on the west were carefully kept in British subjection, Indian sales of lands to the American government or settlers might be easily invalidated by reason of their roving ownership giving no title by occupancy or cultivation; and thus the whole western wilds retained by or for the English. On the maritime side England had complete mastery by sea. With both flanks so controlled, the States deprived of lands beyond the Ohio, and trade upon the ocean, environed by British fortifications on all sides, and overwhelmed by British sway, would perhaps seek again British protection. The attempt at Ghent to negotiate Indian sovereignty within the States, looks like furtherance of the original intent. The attack of New Orleans, the key of the West, in the midst of the negotiations at Ghent, the legality of the American acquisition of Louisiana from France being denied in the English manifesto when attacking New Orleans, with open communication to sea, and indisputable command of all the rivers, lakes, and bays of the south-west, controlling the whole valley of the Mississippi, viewed in connection with prior designs upon the United States through northern divisions, all combine to infer that before and during the war, and until the peace of 1815, England had not relinquished hopes of extensive control over large parts of this country. Its growth in population, resources, national power and national pride since the peace of 1815 would

not allow now endurance for a moment of any one of the many acts of injustice then borne for several years. A swamp in Oregon, a port in California, a point of honour, may now produce a war, which till both nations ascertained that the United States both can and will declare and prosecute it if necessary, was altogether discredited by the English, discouraged and dreaded by many of the most respectable and intelligent Americans.

Opposition to it comprehended most of the merchants for whose relief and at whose instance it was made, their dependents, the lawyers of the seaports, the traders and mechanics connected with navigation. Jefferson's restrictive system, embargo, non-importation, non-intercourse, fell with severe force on Eastern navigating interests, and soured that intolerant population. Their clergy, the champions of war against England in 1775, were bitter and uncompromising opponents of it in 1812. Party, the police of republics, and protection of minorities from the oppression and proscription of majorities, in this country, if not others, involves the church in excesses, which, like all extremes, should not be deprecated, cannot be avoided, and, if moderated, should not be stifled. That venerable patriarch of Eastern federalism, John Adams, as soon as war was declared, rebuked opposition to it by persons in authority, as he said, ecclesiastical and civil, and political and military, denouncing it as unjust, unnecessary and unexpected. "It is utterly incomprehensible to me," said Mr. Adams, "that a rational, a social or a moral creature can say the war is unjust; how it can be said to be unnecessary is very mysterious. I have thought it both just and necessary for five or six years.

"How can it be said to be unexpected is another wonder. I have expected it more than five and twenty years, and have had great reason to be thankful that it has been postponed so long. I saw such a spirit in the British Islands, when I resided in France, in Holland, and in England itself, that I expected another war much sooner than it has happened. I was so impressed with the idea, that I expressed to Lord Lansdowne (formerly Lord Shelburne) an apprehension that his lordship would live long enough to be obliged to make, and that I should live long enough to see, another peace made between Great Britain and the United States of America. His lordship did not live long enough to make the peace, and I shall not probably live to see it; but I

have lived to see the war that must be followed by a peace, if the war is not eternal."

The East, commercial and navigating, for whose vindication the war was undertaken, opposed it: Massachusetts, then including Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut, with a large part of New York, and the majority of New Jersey. The West and South, with nothing but principles to fight for, together with the large Central States, Virginia and Pennsylvania, supported it. Vermont, a frontier state, was the only one of New England for the war. As the most violent and influential moral resistance to it came from the Eastern clergy, a view of that curious offspring of freedom, the American church, is one of the first points for philosophical attention. Not the Church of England or of Rome, the Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, or any other particular sect of Christian worship, but the whole, in all their many varieties and modifications, as developed by American institutions and influences, and combined in what may be denominated the American church, or the voluntary religion of the United States. The political influences of this church are felt every day throughout this country; its action upon the war of 1812 is among the most striking and memorable of its circumstances.

European misconception or misrepresentation disparages American religion, as formerly they did men and animals, and still do government and society. Liberty is always accused by hierarchies of infidelity and immorality: want of ecclesiastical rectitude being inferred from want of political power. Such was the Pagan and is the Mahometan dogma; and until exploded by American devotion, it was a Christian doctrine. Similar contempt of arbitrary for self-government maligns republicanism; to which disparagements of the religion and politics of America the Old World superadds that of American descent said to be bastardized by ancestral crime. Yet the origin of the United States of America was more ideal, identical, primordial and pious than that of any European nation. Emigrants from various countries sought America from sympathetic motives, and even their colonial settlements were not merely accidental or their governments convulsive, as most other nations have originated, but were of one mind. Political and religious freedom was their pervading impulse. Jesuits, Puritans, Quakers, Huguenots, Calvinists, they were all missionaries, and many of them martyrs, fugitives for conscience,

not crime. Bringing the free thoughts just beginning in Europe, the Bible was the code of many, Christianity the common law of all: when French and English colonists were led to war against each other, their religious and political predilections continued still the same, notwithstanding hostilities.

Less mixed than the many-peopled origin of most old nations, American extemporized beginning was less accidental, national fusion more complete, lineage more homogeneous. Similarity of language, much more perfect throughout all the United States of America than in any other nation, is not a more effectual amalgamation than unity of religious and political sympathy. The populace of Europe are beneath American comparison. The most exclusive nobility, with often fabricated pedigrees, rarely pretend to date beyond American settlement. The boasted blue blood of aristocracy marks no national identity or individual character beyond the plebeian articulation of America: upstart, but by one impulse of self-government, from first to last in unbroken tradition. From embryo to adult there has been no change since creation. Religion and politics have been peculiar, constant and national. Instinct with devotional and polemical fervour American religion passed through the successive stages from ecclesiastical domination to toleration, and from that to divorce of church and state, till the dominion of religious liberty has become more potent than that of absolute hierarchy, and religion seems destined to greater supremacy than where church and state are united. Political independence and union were meditated by the American colonies two-thirds of a century before they were declared and established. Voluntary religion, always progressive with civil liberty, was in the grain of American institutions before its incorporation with the federal and state constitutions of the United States. All these constitutions, unlike those of old, were long premeditated. Religious freedom preceded the Revolution. The Church of England was the established church, but tithes and glebes were hardly known. While nearly the whole of a vast scarcely inhabited country was part of the see of London, church democracy was working its independence of all the old jurisdictions. In that respect so little cause of complaint existed that the Declaration of Independence, in its catalogue of grievances, mentions no religious abuse. No Unitarian scruple prevented Franklin and Adams from signing the defini-

tive treaty of peace with Great Britain, in the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity, nor did repugnance to slavery forbid Jay, together with them, subscribing the English stipulation that negroes are property. The Articles of Confederation bound the states to assist each other against all attacks upon any of them on account of religion. But the last line of the federal constitution merely declares that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification for any office or public trust; to which sparing salvo the first amendment adds, that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The state constitutions, more appropriate repositories of such provisions, abound with interdicts of all connection between church and state and protections for the rights of conscience.

Christianity is claimed throughout the United States as the religion of self-government, the appropriate faith of republicanism. Spontaneity produces ecclesiastical establishments of all kinds, and pastoral influences at least as numerous and effectual as wherever religion is part of politics. Toleration is an American reality; mere sufferance is unknown. States, society, seminaries of education, families experience no annoyance from variety of creeds. Most of the education proceeds from clergymen: and with equal acceptance whether the teacher be a Presbyterian, a Jesuit, or a Quaker. The teacher's merit is that he is qualified to teach, not that he is of any particular creed. The extensive school system, begun in New England and extending everywhere, fortifies clerical authority by uniting the power of knowledge to the strongest of feelings. Religious principle, thus strengthened by toleration, political separation of church from state, has had the further unlooked-for result of aggrandizing the church by irresistible influence, beyond that of political government. So intense is religious feeling that political rights are even rejected by some because Christianity is not acknowledged by the constitution. It is inseparably connected with the whole frame of society. American separation of church from state binds them more closely than ever. Religion is the essence of governing, though government be dissevered from it. Its American authority exceeds that of American political government. As government forbears, religion interposes and becomes the cement of the community. Divorcing church from state,

while it annuls compulsive obedience and support, substitutes the stronger tie of voluntary attachment, often enthusiastic. It is only necessary to observe how the Sabbath day is kept holy throughout the United States, to be sensible of the extensive, nearly universal predominance of church discipline. Free religion has raised up a predominant church, of all creeds, which rivals, if it does not regulate, the commonwealth. The American church is as well if not better organized than the state. It has its polity, its officers, its constituency, its numerous sects and controversies, but all moving together for religious supremacy. It is a dynasty of more unity, perhaps perpetuity, than the state. Religious associations, charitable and beneficial institutions, combine masses of intelligence, wealth, zeal, all the elements of union, activity and control. While young democracy was gradually growing up, an independent church, like an independent currency, at the same time started forward, and the two latter have become able, either one, to regulate the former. Each has its free press, its intellectual and lucrative support, its numerous and devoted followers. The church has more seminaries of learning than the state, more constant, ardent and able advocates; its offices are mostly filled by educated men; there is no rotation in office among them; the incumbent is always so by life tenure; if he behaves well, from eighteen to eighty years of age his services, influence, and maintenance do but increase. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction is universal, active and uncontradicted, while that of the state is limited, forbearing, timid and often frustrated. The state does not interfere with the church: while the church is continually regulating the state. Religion in the United States is a vocation more attractive, absorbing and profitable than politics. The pecuniary contributions in every way to ecclesiastical and its affiliated objects in the United States exceed many millions of dollars a year; probably as much as an established state church would cost, perhaps as much as the federal government. Church missionary establishments, both foreign and domestic, are more extensive and expensive than any similar relations maintained by the federal government. Bible societies, temperance, abolition of slavery, and various other combinations, open, ardent, opulent, numerous, are constantly in energetic action. They rival, check, and control political government. Without further explanation

of this interesting topic than is proper in connection with the subject in hand, enough has been said to show, as a fact, that clerical power always strong and strengthening, was accustomed to display itself especially in New England. There its ascendancy was marked by fitful acts of signal intolerance. Probably as many were tortured and executed, in proportion to population, for imputed and absurd heresies there, as suffered, in the same period of time, by the executioner anywhere. The gallows had victims as numerous and unoffending, in that proportion, as the flames of inquisition or the guillotine of Jacobinism. Twenty put to death for witchcraft in the neighbourhood whence the most violent sermons were fulminated against the war of 1812, sixty tortured or terrified into false confessions, jails filled with accused by the bigotry of one age, were the natural predestination of the intolerance of another. Nor was it only clerical outrage. A law of New York that all Popish priests coming voluntarily into that state should be hanged, was as deadly a blow as any dealt by the most bigoted monarch. The clergy of New England, who took an active and efficient part for the war of the Revolution, cast the sword of their fiery opposition into the scale against the second war with England, which most of the state legislatures, the lawyers, merchants, and wealthy people of that region at first promoted and then opposed. When declared, eastern pulpits resounded with its curses. "It was a war unexampled in history, proclaimed on the most frivolous and groundless pretences," preached one; "let no consideration whatever deter my brethren, at all times and in all places, from execrating the present war. Mr. Madison has declared it, let Mr. Madison carry it on. The Union has been long since virtually dissolved, and it is high time that this part of the disunited states should take care of itself." "The strong prepossessions of so great a proportion of his fellow-citizens in favour of a race of demons, (French,) and against a nation of more religion, virtue, good faith, generosity and beneficence than any that now is, or ever before has been, on the face of the earth," (British,) sighed another of these reverend pastors to his congregation, "wring my soul with anguish, and fill my heart with apprehension and terror of the judgments of Heaven upon this sinful people. If at the command of weak or wicked rulers they undertake an unjust war, each man who volunteers

his services in such a cause, or loans his money for its support, or by his conversation, his writings, or any other mode of influence encourages its prosecution, that man is an accomplice in the wickedness—loads his conscience with the blackest crimes—brings the guilt of blood upon his soul, and in the sight of God and his law is a murderer.

“Since the period of the pretended repeal of the French decrees, scores if not hundreds of our vessels have been seized in French ports or burnt at sea by French cruisers; while many of their unoffending crews were manacled like slaves, confined in French prisons, or forced on board French ships to fight against England.

“Our government, with a hardihood and effrontery at which demons might have blushed, persisted in asserting the repeal.

“My mind has been in a constant agony, not so much at the inevitable loss of our temporal prosperity and happiness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at its guilt, its outrage against Heaven; against all truth, honesty, justice, goodness—against all the principles of social happiness.

“Were not the authors of this war nearly akin to the deists and atheists of France; were they not men of hardened hearts, seared consciences, reprobate minds, and desperate wickedness; it seems utterly inconceivable that they should have made the declaration. One hope only remains, that this stroke of perfidy may open the eyes of a besotted people; that they may awake like a giant from his slumbers, and wreak their vengeance on their betrayers, by driving them from their stations and placing at the helm more skilful and faithful hands.

“If at the present moment no symptoms of civil war appear, they certainly will soon, unless the courage of the war party should fail them.

“A civil war becomes as certain as the events that happen according to the known laws and established course of nature.

“The Israelites became weary of yielding the fruit of their labour to pamper their splendid tyrants. They left their political woes. They separated. Where is our Moses? Where is the rod of his miracles? Where is our Aaron? Alas, no voice from the burning bush has directed them here. There is a point, there is an hour beyond which you will not bear.

“Such is the temper of American republicanism, so called. A new language must be invented before we attempt to express the baseness of their conduct, or describe the rottenness of their hearts.

“New England, if invaded, would be obliged to defend herself. Do you not then owe it to your children, and owe it to your God to make peace for yourselves.

“You may as well expect the cataract of Niagara to turn its head to Lake Superior, as a wicked Congress to make a pause in the work of destroying their country, while the people will furnish the means.

“Alas! we have no Moses to stretch his rod over the sea! No Lebanon, nor Carmel, nor Zion invites us across the deep.

“The republics of Rome and Venice, and perhaps another which alone exists, have been as oppressive as the despotism of Turkey, of Persia or Japan.

“Should the English now be at liberty to send all their armies and all their ships to America, and, in one day, burn every city from Maine to Georgia, your condescending rulers would play on their harps, while they gazed at the tremendous conflagration.

“Tyrants are the same on the banks of the Nile and the Potomac; at Memphis and at Washington, in a monarchy and a republic.

“Like the worshipers of Moloch, the supporters of a vile administration sacrifice their children and families on the altar of democracy. Like the widows of Hindostan, they consume themselves. Like the frantic votaries of Juggernaut, they throw themselves under the car of their political idol. They are crushed by its bloody wheels.

“The full vials of despotism are poured on your heads. And yet you may challenge the plodding Israelite, the stupid African, the feeble Chinese, the drowsy Turk, or the frozen exile of Siberia, to equal you in tame submission to the powers that be.

“Here we must trample on the mandates of despotism, or here we must remain slaves forever.

“You may envy the privilege of Israel, and wonder that no land of Canaan has been promised to your ancestors. You can not separate from that mass of corruption, which would poison the atmosphere of Paradise. You must in obstinate despair bow down your necks to the yoke and with your African brethren

drag the chains of Virginia despotism, unless you discover some other mode of escape.

“ Has not New England as much to apprehend as the sons of Jacob had ? but no child had been taken from the river to lead us through the sea.

“ If judgments are coming on the nation, if the sea does not open thee a path, where, how, in what manner will you seek relief ?

“ God will bring good from every evil : the furnaces of Egypt lighted Israel to the land of Canaan.

“ What sooty slave, in all the ancient dominions, more obsequiously watched the eye of his master and flew to the indulgences of his desires more servilely than those same masters have waited and watched and obeyed the orders of the great Napoleon ?

“ Let every man who sanctions this war by his suffrage or influence, remember that he is labouring to cover himself and his country with blood. The blood of the slain will cry from the ground against him.

“ How will the supporters of this anti-christian warfare endure their sentence—endure their own reflections—endure the fire that forever burns—the worm which never dies—the hosannas of heaven, while the smoke of their torments ascends for ever and ever !

“ To raise army after army to be sacrificed, when the English do all which is possible to soften the rigors of captivity, by kindness to the prisoners which they have taken by thousands and thousands, restoring them to their families without a ransom and without their request ; to carry on such a war after their only avowed cause had been removed, is it not the lawless attacks of Goths and Vandals, the daring pillage of wild Arabs, a libidinous outrage on all the principles of Christianity, an impious abandonment of Divine protection ?

“ The legislators who yielded to this war, when assailed by the manifesto of their angry chief, established iniquity and murder by law.

“ In the first onset (of the war) moral principle was set at defiance. The laws of God and hopes of man were utterly disdained. Vice threw off her veil, and crimes were decked with the highest honours. This war not only tolerates crimes, but calls for them, demands them. Crimes are the food of its life, the arms of its strength. This war is a monster which every hour gormandizes a thousand

crimes, and yet cries 'give, give!' In its birth it demanded the violation of all good faith; perjury of office; the sacrifice of neutral impartiality. The first moment in which the dragon moved, piracy and murder were legalized. Havoc, death, and conflagration were the viands of her first repast.

"Those western states which have been violent for this abominable war of murder, those states which have thirsted for blood, God has given them blood to drink. Their lamentations are deep and loud.

"Our government, if they may be called the government, and not the destroyers of the country, bear all these things as patiently as a colony of convicts sail into Botany Bay."

Such were some of the eastern pulpit fulminations against the war. Detestation of fellow-countrymen, idolatry of the enemy, dismemberment of the Union, diabolical hatred of the French are the materials of rhapsodies, still not without the redeeming spirit of conviction, or the unction of that peculiar oratory which, from the pages of Scripture, lights the torch by its flagrant denunciations. The same exclusive provincialism limited the morbid, otherwise elegant speeches of Fisher Ames to evanescent recollection, while the Catholic nationality of Adams' embalms his with historical odour.

During the French hostilities of the latter's presidency, adhesion to his administration was signalized by the same furious declamation from the pulpit and the bar of New England, which afterwards turned to sour opposition to the war against Great Britain. In a Fourth of July address by one of the clergy, he charged his hearers to watch the ungrateful souls who murmur about taxation and oppression, the burdens of government and religion, as traitors to God and Christianity; to be jealous of those who declaimed against alien and sedition laws, for they had probably a hankering for lying and rebellion. The reverend gentleman added, "Cursed be he that keepeth back his sword from blood; let him that hath none sell his coat and buy one; the contest is desirable." "The intimate connection," said another clergyman, in an address to President Adams from a convention of Congregational ministers, "between our civil and Christian blessings, is alone sufficient to justify the decided part which the clergy of America have uniformly taken in supporting the constituted au-

thorities and political institutions of their country." "As citizens," says another, "we ought, with one heart, to cleave to and support our own government; to repel with indignation every suggestion and slanderous insinuation calculated to weaken a just confidence in the rectitude of the intentions of our constituted authorities."

Yet the church has its schisms and feuds, when distraction vents itself in division: without superior authority to quell or regulate them, the church is as liable to commotion as civil government; the most peculiar, if not most peaceable of all, is without discipline beyond reason and inward faith. Churches are every day in America raised and built by popular or polemical preachers. Eloquence is capital as reliable as orthodoxy. Not only clergymen, but many others of the devout of both sexes go, as it were, armed with controversial talent. Some sects, by printed homilies, war on others. Not one is passive, not one obedient to government. Many deem it a duty to denounce as sinful whatever political or social error they deem such. Thousands of popes excommunicate. The scaffold, stake and incarceration are supplanted by anathemas which, with overwhelming influence, attack all backslidings doomed to reprobation. The passages from sermons exactly before quoted, indicate a church militant in the United States, with acrimonious faculties. Freedom prevails in the church as for the press and for speech; and the results of the experiment are wonderfully working out. Still the spirit which converted the heathen, burned women for witchcraft, and propagates doctrine to the uttermost ends of the earth, is an educated and brave spirit, however intolerant or rancorous; extravagant if not licentious and ferocious; a spirit of unconquerable ardour and patriotism; a spirit not meek but militant.

This element of American political influence has been but little attended to. Politics, parties, government, society, manners, habits, education, feel the meddlesomeness of a voluntary church, whose numberless creeds are propagated by innumerable enthusiasts in restless activity, at great expense and every hazard.

The character and opinions of the church had great effect on those of the state. The Congress which declared war, deterred by the denunciations of the church and authorities of several states, left undone the duty of levying direct taxes and internal duties. After a session protracted from the 4th November, 1811,

till the 6th July, 1812, it adjourned upon the declaration of war, having enacted many laws to increase expenditures by organizing and augmenting the military and naval establishments, without any tax beyond doubling the impost. Five millions of treasury notes, one hundred per cent. addition to the impost, and a loan of eleven millions of dollars, with no other security than the surplus of the eight millions a year theretofore pledged, by way of sinking fund, to redeem the existing national debt, then amounting to forty-five millions of dollars, were the only acts of the war-declaring Congress for invigorating the money-sinew of war. The national income of the year 1812 was only about nine millions and a half of dollars. It soon appeared that the war cost between thirty and forty millions a year. The income of 1813, with double duties, was about thirteen millions, independent of loans. The outstanding national debt of forty-five millions, with which the war began, was increased by less than three years of it to one hundred and twenty-three millions, mostly by loans at six and more per cent. interest, and heavy discount. Within twenty-three years afterward, the whole debt of the United States was extinguished, with partial atonement for the non-payment of that of the Revolution, by an extensive pension system, somewhat requiring the soldiers of the Revolution, defrauded of their pay by continental or paper money and national insolvency. This American Republic is the only nation that has ever paid its national debts in full. Other nations never do so. While England calumniates us for national dishonesty, she will not, cannot, no one supposes that she ever can pay, the principal of her debt, the interest of which has been frequently compromised, and for a quarter of this century was paid only in paper promises to pay money which was not paid. Our debt was contracted chiefly by loans, and paid in paper money, but it was legally convertible into money. What other governments unjustly leave to posterity, Congress paid; the same generation that contracted the debt paid it; many of them the same men who voted for the war, and supported it throughout. Among these it is due to William Lowndes, of South Carolina, to signalize him as a leading author of this exemplary national honesty and policy, originated during the presidency of James Monroe, and completed during

that of Andrew Jackson ; three men whose conspicuous parts in the war of 1812 will shine in its annals.

William Lowndes entered Congress a young man, voted for the declaration of war, and remained always a distinguished member of Congress till his death, some years after the war, at sea, on a voyage prescribed for his failing health. Extremely tall, six feet six inches high, and slender, not erect nor of prepossessing appearance, he was a gentleman of respectable parentage, and considerable patrimonial fortune ; educated at school in England, never at college there or here, well read, with retentive memory, a turn for political economy and those principles of freedom from industrial restriction which since flourish in South Carolina. The delegation from that state in Congress, Langdon Cheves, John C. Calhoun, and William Lowndes particularly, were constant advocates of the war, opposed to the restrictive system of embargoes, non-importation, and non-intercourse by which Jefferson strove in vain to prevent recourse to arms ; and opposed to all such restraints. Mr. Lowndes was retiring and unassuming, firm and constant in his manners and politics ; without a good voice, not a powerful speaker ; so generally esteemed and respected that he was much regarded as a statesman fit to be president. It was he who said of that elevation since so openly canvassed, that it should neither be sought nor avoided. Premature death, when, I believe, not much more than forty years of age, deprived him of the public honour which the United States had to confer on one not, perhaps, so popular with the mass as some others, but universally respected and esteemed, and without enemies.

In 1812, when our budget was about twenty-five millions, that of Great Britain was near five hundred millions ; her loan larger than our whole revenue.

The most violent opposition to the war came from Massachusetts, particularly Boston, the cradle of the revolution, where they seemed to become as strong in English attachments as they once were in aversions. Many of the most violent opposers of the war of 1812, almost rebels against it, were sons or near connections of the noblest rebels in the Revolution. Parties were so nearly divided there, that in 1812, Caleb Strong, the candidate of the peace party for governor, succeeded by a

majority of but thirteen hundred out of more than a hundred thousand votes altogether, over Elbridge Gerry, the candidate of the war party, soon after chosen Vice-President of the United States. Boston not long before was represented in Congress by William Eustis, afterwards Secretary of War; but in the thirteenth Congress by Artemas Ward, the son, I believe, of the General Ward who figured in the beginning of the Revolution. A surviving member of the Massachusetts delegation in that Congress, Mr. John Reed, now lieutenant-governor, in 1814 represented a north-eastern district, much of it taken and held by the British, without serious molestation from our people. The island of Nantucket, part of the Boston district, was neutral ground, if even that, throughout the war. The strongest champions of incessant and implacable hostility to war, of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress, were Timothy Pickering and Cyrus King. Mr. King was a half-brother of Rufus King; another brother, William, was afterwards Governor of Maine. Cyrus King was a frequent, vehement, and the loudest speaker in the House of Representatives. Timothy Pickering's is a name familiar and conspicuous in the first fifty years of the United States. He served in the commissariat in the army of the Revolution; was Postmaster-General, then Secretary of State in Washington's administration, and as the latter inherited by President John Adams, to whom it proved an unprofitable devise; for he became so hostile to his own chief as to condemn his measures, his appointments, and even carry opposition to the extreme of denouncing the president at his drawing-rooms as a fool and a marplot. This was because Mr. Adams paused in going all lengths in joining England in a war against France. In 1812, Mr. Pickering abated none of this antipathy; but abominated the French and their emperor as heartily as the Englishman who proclaimed it part of his creed to hate a Frenchman. Mr. Pickering was a large-framed, muscular man, with a prominent Roman face, intense in his politics, hating Adams, not esteeming Washington's talents, holding Jefferson and his school in sovereign aversion. It was said that Washington spoiled a good postmaster-general to make a bad secretary of state, when he promoted Mr. Pickering from one of these places to the other. But Mr. Madison jocularly added that after due allowance for Pickering's abuse of the French,

with which his dispatches were always spiced, they were able papers. In 1812 he was the representative of what was called the Essex Junto, a root and branch opponent of the war, and denounced all who loaned money for it. If he had been a clergyman, his homilies would have been in unison with those before quoted as specimens of the clerical tone of Massachusetts; yet was he perhaps as well entitled to his opinions as those who thought otherwise, and perfectly sincere in them. His reputation was that of a consistent, upright man, who lived and died firm in the convictions he cherished; hard, but honest. On a great field day debate, in 1814, on the Loan Bill, when the House in committee of the whole gave six weeks to those speeches for political capital at home and abroad, which are among the ways and means of free countries with a free press—much preferable to more serious combats—Mr. Pickering, in the course of his harangue looking through his spectacles full in the chairman's face, said, with great emphasis, swinging his long arm aloft, that he stood on a rock. "I stand on a rock," said he, "from which all democracy," then raising his voice and repeating it, "not all democracy, and *hell to boot*, can move me—the rock of integrity and truth."

Governor Strong, in his message to the Legislature of Massachusetts, likewise from that same Plymouth rock, denounced Madison's administration as subservient to France, discredited the war loans; sowed the seeds of the Hartford Convention next year. The Governor of Connecticut, and the Governor of Maryland, were also strong in disapprobation of the war. Mr. Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury's policy, if not that of Madison's administration, to begin war by loans, without taxes, contrary to the wish of Mr. Langdon Cheves, chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, and other proper advocates of the war, rendered the revenue by loans alone, or mostly so, for the loans were larger than the income from customs, the most vulnerable point of government, upon which eastern opposition fastened its fangs with furious acridity.

Newspapers teemed with denunciation of such as should subscribe to war loans, in which the pulpit of Boston vied with the press. "The subscribers to war loans," said a reverend clergyman, "would be participators in the unholy, unrighteous, wicked,

abominable and unnatural war." "Let no one," said a press, "dare to prostrate himself at the altar, who wishes to continue the war by lending money. They are as much partakers in the war as the soldier who thrusts the bayonet, and the judgment of God will overtake them. Do not prevent the abusers of their trust becoming bankrupt. Pray do not: any federalist who loans money to government, must go and shake hands with James Madison, and claim fellowship with Felix Grundy! Let him no more call himself a federalist and friend to his country. He will be called by others infamous. Who can tell whether future rulers may think the debt ought to be paid? Two very strong reasons why federalists will not lend money, are first, because it would be a base abandonment of political and moral principles; secondly, because it is pretty certain they never will be paid again. The universal sentiment is, that any man who lends his money to the government at the present time, will forfeit all claim to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends to the country." As far south as the city of New York, where the kind of opposition rife in New England, did not prevail, the press of a New England editor declared that no true friend to his country would be found among the subscribers to the Gallatin loan. "No peace," said an eastern clergyman, "will ever be made till the people say there shall be no war. If the rich men continue to furnish money," said this minister of the Gospel, with anguish at their alacrity of subscription, "the war will continue till the mountains are wetted with blood, till every field in America is white with the bones of the people." Advertisements appeared in Boston newspapers, promising to conceal the names of subscribers to the loans; such was the intimidation leveled at all who ventured to subscribe. Timothy Pickering openly and anxiously decried these loans.

Some years after the war, Harrison Gray Otis published fifteen letters to vindicate the Hartford Convention, of which he was a leading member; to the last of which is appended a short correspondence between him and George Cabot, to show that at a certain advanced period of the war, when a gentleman of high character went from Philadelphia to Boston, with proposals from opulent persons in the one to the other city, to be concerned in taking one of the loans proposed by the United States, a meeting of some of the principal and opulent citizens of Boston was held, at which the expediency of subscribing to the loan was considered.

Mr. Otis urged various sufficient reasons for subscribing, but was overruled by the majority. Lucrative, like patriotic considerations, failed. A respectable descendant of one of the discoverers of America, Mr. Cabot, and an eminent descendant, Mr. Otis, as he justly boasts, of some of the most distinguished opponents of Great Britain in the war of the Revolution, with many other influential men, were not permitted to lend even their credit to government for the war of 1812: when the peace party ticket, Mr. Otis says, was elected in Massachusetts by a majority of twenty-four thousand.

Both the loans were, nevertheless, taken; that of eleven millions in 1812, chiefly by banks; that of sixteen millions in 1813, by David Parish, and Stephen Girard, at Philadelphia, Mr. John Jacob Astor of New York, and other persons, as well as banks; the latter at 88 per cent. for six per cent. stock, or at par with an annuity of one and a half per cent. per annum. Worse than the opposition and abuse leveled at these loans was the resort to such expedients: exchanging the credit of government for that of banks or individuals not as good as the credit of the government, paying usury for the exchange, and borrowing on such terms without taxes or any other security. These valid objections to Gallatin's loans, as they were called, were not mentioned; on the contrary, they were used as arguments by one class of opponents to persuade another to subscribe, because of the manifest gain to the lender, and disadvantage to government. Reason was cast down with patriotism, and trampled upon by factious disaffection.

With resistance to the war loans, New England joined refusal of their well-organized militia to the command of officers of the army, appointed by the president to command them. The constituted authorities of Massachusetts, legislature, governor, and judiciary unanimously resolved that their militia were not liable to be called out when the President of the United States thought necessary, and that when called out he could not depute his authority to command them. To these heresies was added the other extremely mischievous blow to the war, that militia cannot be lawfully marched beyond the frontiers of their own country. Finally, Mr. Josiah Quincy, who had represented Boston in Congress, and said that the United States could not be kicked into a war, as a member of the Senate of Massachusetts moved a resolution that in a war waged like ours, without sufficient

cause, and prosecuted in a manner indicating that conquest and ambition were its real motives, it was unbecoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits, not immediately connected with the defence of our coast and soil. The gentleman who moved this resolution was of revolutionary pedigree; Governor Strong had been an officer of the Revolution; like many others equally unreserved in resistance to the war of 1812, they never lost the confidence of those by whom they were elevated to high public stations: which, together with all other indications, infers a state of enmity to the war and the administration of it, deeply rooted in the public sentiment of that intelligent part of the country.

This feeling of exasperated opposition to the war, predominant in New England, sent to Congress some thirty-five of the forty members of the popular branch, and seven of the ten senators from that quarter of the Union, with the confidence of four states, and the influence of powerful talent in both Houses, ably sustained by eminent members of the New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Maryland delegations. Daniel Webster, the son of a New Hampshire farmer, not then distinguished as he has since become, was among the first, of whom Jeremiah Mason, Timothy Pickering, and Timothy Pitkin, were the most conspicuous, from New England. Mr. Webster's dark complexion, sunk and searching eye, prominent brow, voluminous head, and well-sized person, are good frontispiece of his powerful intellect and oratory. Diction chaste, pure, and elegant; logic admirable; but action not animated or attractive, render his speeches less effective when delivered than as read afterwards. His greatest performances are elaborations. Whatever nature has done, labour does her part too. Not merely education, but after-culture, without which the learning of schools, however indispensable, seldom suffices. Evolving striking thoughts with great force, though occasionally sarcastic or ironical, he is never aggressive, personal, or rude. It was said that when William Pinkney was at the head of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, he designated Mr. Webster as fit to follow him there, where his performances soon came to be such, that after Pinkney's death, he was the acknowledged leader. Mr. Webster came to the House of Representatives, one of the New Hampshire members. During the war of 1812,

New Hampshire was a federal state, and Vermont democratic, party positions which they have changed since.

By act of Congress of the 8th April, 1812, the Territory of Louisiana was declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, with one member in the House of Representatives. The eighteen states thus constituting the Union, by the act of the 23d December, 1811, apportioning representatives at the rate of one for every thirty-five thousand inhabitants, pursuant to the third enumeration of the whole, numbered one hundred and seventy-seven members in the House of Representatives, and thirty-six senators, altogether two hundred and thirteen members of Congress, besides the Vice-president of the United States, presiding in the Senate. The New York delegation of twenty-seven members of the House, was then, for the first time, more numerous than that of any other state. Pennsylvania was the second state in members, having twenty-three representatives; Virginia the third, with twenty-two. The members from New Hampshire, most of those from Massachusetts, then including Maine, those of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware, with several from New York, some from Virginia and North Carolina, one from Pennsylvania, and three from Maryland, opposed the war. The members from Vermont, some from New York, all but one from Pennsylvania, most from Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, all from South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana, supported it. The States of New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and Delaware were represented by senators opposed to the war. Massachusetts and Maryland were divided. Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana were represented by senators supporting the war, in the first session of the thirteenth Congress. Of course there were some shades of opinion in both Houses. A senator from each of the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland was indisposed to Madison's administration; as also two or three members of the House of Representatives from North and South Carolina and Kentucky. Of the large commercial towns, Boston and New York were represented by members opposed to the war. Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans,

by members for it. The eastern states were mostly opposed to it. The west all for it. The southern and middle states divided. The war administration had a majority of about forty votes in the House of Representatives, and of several in the Senate. The war was opposed by most of the merchants, lawyers, and clergy, and some of the planters. It was supported generally by the farmers, planters, mechanics, mariners, and the mass of the people. Taking the reasoning faculty of the country for judge, probably the declaration of war was mostly condemned; but the instinctive patriotism of the young, the laborious and ardent enthusiastically maintained it. Few denied that there was cause enough; though the time and mode were condemned.

With Mr. Webster came Mr. Jeremiah Mason, a senator from New Hampshire, still living, an eminent lawyer at Boston. His politics obnoxious to the democratic party of New Hampshire, when they gained the ascendant, induced an attack on Mr. Mason as president of the Branch Bank of the United States, at Portsmouth, which ended in his change of residence to Boston. The combination for his discharge from the bank was resisted by Nicholas Biddle, the president of that institution, between whom and Mr. Samuel D. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treasury, began the skirmish that became exterminating conflict between the bank and President Jackson. Mr. Mason, six feet seven inches tall, and corpulent, was one of the most frequent and formidable debaters of the Senate, sagacious, sarcastic, active, well-informed, one of the ablest opponents of the war and Madison's administration.

The leader of the federal party in the Senate during the war, was a native of Massachusetts; and one of the delegates from that respectable commonwealth to the Convention which formed the present constitution of the United States, in which assembly of wise men, though then a young one, he was conspicuous for abilities—Mr. Rufus King. Marrying a lady of considerable fortune in New York, he established himself there, and represented that state in the Senate of the Union, during part of Washington's presidency. Appointed by him to succeed Major, afterwards Major-General Thomas Pinckney, as American minister to England, Mr. King resided there during seven years, under Washington, John Adams, and Jefferson's administrations, returning to New York in 1803: some years after, again elected to the Senate. It was well for the country that he filled the im-

portant station of leader of the minority during the war, for he was liberal, fair, and conciliatory, never the patron of intemperate or factious opposition. He was a man well educated and well informed, fond of learning, a good speaker and writer, a federalist of the school of Washington, with, perhaps, some of Hamilton's more English propensities, but, like them both, patriotic in American predilections. His party designed him for the presidency. He subscribed, I think, to the war loans, and his opposition to it was never personal to Madison's administration. In 1825, President John Quincy Adams appointed him again minister to England; after a short stay there, afflicted with the gout, he returned, and closed a long life of eminent public service. If New England had been influenced in 1812 and 1813 by Mr. King's temperate and honourable spirit, the states which frustrated the war might have added Canada to their weight in the Union.

There was, indeed, abundant basis for legitimate opposition, without resort to what was unfounded, if not unprincipled. The country suffered not less from its government, than from the party making opposition to it. The executive and Congress of 1812 were both obnoxious to severe animadversion, and it is the part of all historical recollection to explain the extreme imperfectness, from which the United States were providentially rescued by the inherent energies and resources of a free, martial, and intellectual people. At the same time, large allowances are due to those on whom the experiment, for such it was, devolved of making war without soldiers or officers, money, taxes, or manufactures. As the country grows, even with republican repugnance to restraint, it improves in military preparations. The United States are much further advanced in armament now, compared with 1812, than in 1812 they were compared with 1776. Thirty years of popular and lucrative peace, in 1812 found the government not only without most of the means and science, but nearly all the spirit and aptitude for hostilities.

The war began with a president commander-in-chief who abhorred war; a man of probity, and, as a chief magistrate, resolved to do all he could for its prosecution. But he had no taste, pretended to no knowledge of it, and did not even sustain himself by counsellors knowing more than he. The only one, with any turn or experience that way, was not appointed for that reason; the Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, had never performed more than

slight military service many years before, as a lieutenant or aide-de-camp. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin, avowedly opposed to declaring war, after it was declared, deemed speedy peace, by other than belligerent means, the only salvation of the country. The Secretary of War, Eustis, had probably never seen a brigade of regular troops, had never served in any military capacity or had any knowledge of the subject. The Secretary of the Navy, Hamilton, had, perhaps, never seen a ship of war, had no knowledge whatever of naval affairs. The attorney-general, Pinkney, questioned whether war was not premature while government was so entirely unprepared. The Postmaster-General, Gideon Granger, not then, as now, a cabinet officer, but at the head of a department important for military operations, was disaffected to the president, in party sympathies with senators and others professing, perhaps entertaining, inclinations for the war, but denying that with Madison as leader, it ever could prosper. The numerous and respectable party, who, as a party opposed the declaration of war, not quite as well founded in their resistance to it, as those who, in 1775 and 1776 opposed the Declaration of Independence, had, nevertheless, much reason in the alleged precipitancy of the step for resisting it. If the peace party of 1812 had, like the temporizers of the Revolution, acquiesced when the declaration lawfully took place, their position would have been not only honourable, but for the first two years of war, during its wretched noviciate, more enviable than that of the war party. But in New England particularly, either from sectional temperament, or because several states there were governed by those always opposed to Jefferson and Madison's government, and held the local power with angry disaffection to wield it, opposition was carried beyond all patriotic bounds, until at length, touching upon treason, it was fortunately crushed by western and southern victories, together with maritime successes, and English unwarrantable warfare, rousing and uniting the masses who think less than feel, together with the considerate and calculating, to rally round the federal government for support, to save the Union from dismemberment, the states from anarchy, the country from civil, worse than foreign war.

The conjuncture was altogether new for the executive; a single and responsible chief-magistrate with great constitutional power, indeed, which no one comprehended more fully and precisely

than Madison. The uttermost emergencies of war never extorted from him any excess of authority. If De Witt Clinton had superseded Madison, by the presidential election of 1812, it is no disparagement of either to say that the tone of executive action would have been much more imposing; such is the difference of men's minds on any given subject. There was nothing like that potent secret machinery, which in other countries acts with great effect as police: no fund of secret service money. The president was obliged to do openly nearly all he could do. A much abused act of Congress of 1798, concerning alien enemies, which Madison and Gallatin opposed as unconstitutional, and their partisans stigmatized as one of the worst rescripts of what was called the Reign of Terror, was waked from slumber, to confer nearly all the authority President Madison had or found necessary for much of his interior government. This law provides that in case of war, invasion, or predatory incursion, attempted or threatened against the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the president proclaiming the event, all males of the hostile nation, upwards of fourteen years of age, and unnaturalized, may be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies: for which purpose the president is authorized by public act to provide. The courts of the United States, and of each state, having criminal jurisdiction, are ordered to take cognizance of such cases, and the marshals of the several districts to remove alien enemies out of the territory of the United States, pursuant to order of the courts, or the president. This act, with a supplement of July 1812, immaterial to our present object, conferred all the executive power the president had, except as such by the declaration of war, and inherent significance of that term. Before the congress which declared war adjourned, they provided in the last moment of session by a hasty enactment, that the president should have power to make such regulations and arrangements for the safe keeping, support and exchange of prisoners of war as he might deem expedient, until otherwise provided for by law, and placed \$100,000 at his disposal for that purpose. But the succeeding congress never did otherwise make legal provision for the purpose, or meddle with the matter at all. General John Mason, then living on his beautiful island of Analoston, in the Potomac, near Washington in hospitable elegance, a favourite with the president, and

deservedly so, for he performed the duties of the office with ability, was appointed commissary general of prisoners, by executive fiat, without specified authority by act of Congress. The marshals, by the before-mentioned act of 1798, directed to remove alien enemies out of our territories, were likewise by the mere war executive power of the president made to place them in security at certain distances from sea-ports within the United States. In all the business of life, much is accomplished imperceptibly, almost of itself. In war there must needs be many important things done by inherent or constructive power; under a government of granted and limited authorization, an everlasting subject of dispute. It was fortunate for the country that however imperfectly some of the belligerent functions were performed by one so scrupulous and fastidious as Madison, no one understood better the exact amount of his authority, or was less inclined to make more of it than the law allowed.

In all European governments, there is a power of secret and effectual instrumentality called police, which acts with great authority. This was wholly unknown in the United States.— Though the war was alleged to be partly caused by Henry's clandestine mission from Canada into New England, and Madison's administration gave him \$50,000 for disclosing that design, (probably more than the disclosure was worth,) yet was there no American emissary anywhere. Congress usually appropriate annually a small sum for the expenses of intercourse with foreign nations; for the year 1813, \$35,400. Nearly the whole appropriation for the army, and for the navy, was to be paid by borrowed and paper money. The Postmaster-General, Granger, of Connecticut, a large man in person, shrewd but disinclined to Madison's administration, if not to the war, like Mr. Gallatin inherited by Madison from Jefferson's administration, though the postmaster-general was not then, as since, a cabinet officer— Granger was so inimical to Madison, that he found it necessary in 1814, to remove him from office, and appoint the Governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs, instead. This department throughout the war rendered but little aid to it.

The incongruity between appropriations and provision for them by taxation, was such, that without a cent to be raised by taxes, more than fifteen millions of dollars were appropriated for the army, and nearly two million seven hundred thousand for the navy,

when the income by customs for 1811 did not exceed thirteen millions, and that of 1812 was only about nine millions and a half. All modern wars are carried on in part by loans, but loans secured by taxes. Our war was to be sustained by borrowed money without taxes, at any rate till after the presidential election. The loan of sixteen millions, authorized by act of the 8th of February, 1813, superadded to that for eleven millions, authorized by act of the 14th of March, 1812, together with an issue of five millions of treasury notes by act of the 30th of June 1812; these thirty-two millions of dollars, borrowed without any substantial pledge for payment, of even interest of the debt to that amount, were the device of the treasury, and the delusion of Congress. The loan of 1813, for sixteen millions of dollars, was taken at 88 per cent. for 6 per cent. stocks, or at par with an annuity of one and a half per cent. per annum. Seven millions of the sum were subscribed by Stephen Girard and David Parish, two millions by John Jacob Astor, the other seven millions by different banks and persons, mostly at Philadelphia and New York. Stephen Girard being by birth a Frenchman, Astor and Parish Germans, and Mr. Gallatin a Swiss, though all American citizens of high standing, and all but Parish of long standing, it was objected that all the means the American government had for carrying on the war were supplied by foreigners; an imputation to which nearly all the governments of Europe, since, have frequently been obnoxious, if not always. Governments, like individuals, when inclined to borrow, get the loan wherever they can. It was a much more serious objection to this loan of ours that it was a resort, if not ruinous, at least dangerous, to that wasteful system of finance which paper money, bank-credits and devolution of payment on posterity engrafted on the stock of substantial revenue. It was also remarked that while Frenchmen and Germans supplied our war funds, their administration was confided through the war to Mr. Gallatin, a Swiss, Mr. Campbell, a Scotchman, and Mr. Dallas, an Englishman: to which also, however, the reply was that the American financial system originated with Robert Morris, an Englishman, and Alexander Hamilton, a native of an English West India island. My small subscription, (of all I was worth, however,) in the alphabetical list of the Bank of Pennsylvania, came next to that of a rich German, Jacob Gerard Koch, who subscribed half a million of dollars. Opposition to

the loans caused some reacting patriotism; and many subscribed more than they otherwise would, in order to show their confidence in the government and support of the war: of which class Mr. Koch was one.

Thus curtailed of war's common appliances at home, the Senate deprived Madison abroad of whatever the House of Representatives did not combine with it to stint him of. The president's power is strongly executive to fortify the country with sentinels in the character of foreign ministers whenever he may think proper. Madison had never been on any of those missions, but Monroe and Pinkney who had, were well aware of their importance at such a conjuncture. They would have been of great importance to plead and vindicate the cause of our forlorn war in Europe. But it lingered for more than a year without one such help. Mr. Adams was in Russia; but like Mr. Gallatin, of opinion that nothing but prompt peace could save the country from ruin. Joel Barlow, our minister to France, died at Zarnowich, in Poland, the 26th of December, 1812. Jonathan Russel, transferred from Paris to London, was American charge d'affaires there, only till the declaration of war withdrew his faculties. Mr. George W. Erving went in 1811 on a special mission to Denmark, like Mr. Adams, far from the scene for explanation; and not commissioned with any special view to it. Till Mr. Crawford took Mr. Barlow's place, in April, 1813, we had hardly a representative in all Europe. Austria, Prussia, Italy, Spain, Holland, Portugal, Sweden, where we now have public agents, (and even the Congress of the Revolution deemed them, as they always are, essential,) were without an American public minister or private emissary. It is true that Holland and Portugal, Italy and other parts of Europe were then welded into the vast machinery of French dominion. Yet while Spain was disputed between Ferdinand and Joseph, we had no minister there, for what, under the peculiar circumstances, was the very reason why two should have been commissioned or more if necessary. Madison was thwarted by a jealous Senate. In May, 1813, when he nominated Jonathan Russel as Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden, the appointment was negatived by the Senate on frivolous pretences largely set forth in publications on the subject by William B. Giles, one of the Virginia senators. In November of that year, Mr. De Kantzow arrived at Washington as minister resident from

Sweden, and then, at last, Mr. Russel was suffered to pass the Senate. But the president should have had several more at other European capitals; his power for that purpose was ample, as Washington had exercised it without the sanction of the Senate. Excepting, however, the special mission of Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard, to be united with Mr. Adams at Gottenburg, under the fruitless Russian mediation, the whole war was conducted from first to last without a diplomatic assistant in Europe. When Mr. Crawford reached Paris the French government was helpless, was English. Mr. Bayard, a gentleman of too much honour and integrity to be wanting to his country, was, nevertheless, of the party opposed to war; Mr. Adams soliciting the Russian mediation, confessed to Romanstzoff, the Czar's minister, that the war could do no good; he had no hope of it; he avowed hostile feelings against France. Mr. Gallatin went still further quest of any peace rather than any war. Our foreign relations were deserted and desolate.

CHAPTER II.

INVASION OF CANADA.—HALIFAX CAMPAIGN.—HULL'S EXPEDITION.—CAPTURE OF MICHILIMACINACK.—HULL'S SURRENDER.—LOSS OF MICHIGAN.—GENERAL CRAIG.—CAPTURE OF THE FRIGATE GUERRIERE.—CAPTAIN HULL.—GENERAL VAN RENSSELAER.—BATTLE OF QUEENSTOWN.—GENERAL SMYTHE.—GENERAL SCOTT.—MILITIA.—SMYTHE'S FAILURE.—NORTHERN ARMY.—GENERAL DEARBORN.—COLONEL DUANE.—END OF CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

MY Historical Sketch will begin with the first session of the thirteenth Congress, May, 1813, when I took my seat; that I may tell only what I had occasion to know. But the events of 1813, '14, and '15 will not be so intelligible as if premised by some preliminary account of those of 1812. The first chapter having explained the causes and character of the war, this chapter will submit an outline of the belligerent operations of the six months of the first year after its declaration.

To conquer Canada was the promise and reliance of those who made war against orders in council and impressment. Nothing could be done by sea, as was supposed; and one of the embarrassments of the advocates of war was, that while defensive against maritime aggressions, it must take the appearance and bear the odium of being aggressive, for foreign conquest. This false position was especially a hindrance, as the constituted authorities and majority of the people of the New England states were opposed to the war, and denounced the invasion of Canada as its worst direction and effort. Its advantages and disadvantages were then fully discussed; expatiation on them now since the design came to nothing, would be useless. A more important historical consideration is, whether our plan of invasion was not wrong; beginning with blows aimed at the branches instead of striking at once at the root of English territorial and naval power in America.

A project was then presented by a very young American officer, whose name will occur often hereafter in connection with the most brilliant feats of arms. A project was presented to

Eustis, the Secretary of War, which he put aside with the rather contemptuous remark, that it was a very pretty plan. It predicated the enemy's resistless control of the ocean; and the probability that Napoleon's gigantic domination by land was tottering to its fall. To meet Great Britain's superior force, then triumphant everywhere, the United States had but the skeletons of a few regiments, and a few frigates. The American sea-coast would soon be entirely blockaded, while our land operations during the first year of hostilities must be left chiefly to volunteers and militia. How then should we make what force we had be most effectually felt? Study of naval power shows that it does not depend on ships but on seamen, that the nurseries of seamen are commerce and fisheries; the naval marine depends on the commercial. In both the United States are second only to Great Britain, with advantages of position which with energetic action would enable them to neutralize, if not destroy her transatlantic ascendancy. France, when she possessed the north-eastern coasts of America and adjacent islands, employing thirty thousand seamen in the fisheries and the trade they nourished, was a full match for England at sea. At that time the American colonies fitted out an expedition which besieged and took Louisburg, on cape Breton, finally exchanged for Madras at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. At last, however, France lost those possessions, and with them the trident of the ocean passed into the hands of Great Britain. North American territories and fisheries are the main pillar of British naval power. With Nova Scotia and cape Breton to protect the Canadas, command Newfoundland and the gulf St. Lawrence fisheries, Great Britain is an insular fortress with these (and numerous other) outworks from which to project ships of war, like missile weapons, upon the wings of every wind, with which to strike any quarter of the globe. Hemp and ship timber for her navy she may get from her North American colonies, as well as from the north of Europe; with her American fisheries and possessions, she can build, man, equip, rig, arm, and refit her fleets altogether from her own means. Bermuda is another outwork, by means of which Mexico is controlled, a nation that never can be naval. While the United States act on the policy of not interfering with foreign nations, Great Britain, with Halifax in the North-East, and Bermuda in the South, can put the Mexicans, the Indians,

and her own marine in positions to act against the United States. By seizing upon Halifax, the transatlantic faculties of Great Britain would be paralyzed; an entire revolution effected in the commercial and naval power of the world. Canada would fall, of course, including Quebec, which, during six months, would be cut off by ice from all European assistance. Montreal, York, Kingston, Malden would also fall, of course. The Canadas would not only become parts of the United States, but the empire of the seas would be transferred from old England to New England. Halifax was the great rendezvous and principal American station, with its large and excellent port, of British naval power. To wrest it from her was a simple, however difficult operation, worthy the utmost exertions of the American nation. It was the only place where British vessels could be sheltered and refitted with perfect security, despatch and convenience.

In this confidential memoir presented to the Secretary of War, Eustis, it was further argued that the political influence of beginning our hostilities by an expedition against Halifax, striking at the root instead of wasting strength in beating the air by blows at the branches, Malden, York, Fort George, Kingston, and Montreal, might, and probably would, be to unite all parties in the United States, particularly Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, in a movement to depend for its success mainly on their efforts, if successful, to redound chiefly to their advantage. The commercial, Northern and Eastern, parts of the Union were those opposed to the war, and to Madison's administration. Would not an intelligent and sharp-sighted population perceive in this movement, motives for their rallying to the standard of their country, enabling government to unite and employ the whole moral and physical capacity of the nation in the prosecution of a war, the justice of which most acknowledged? which thus directed would render its results especially profitable to the maritime interests, would vastly increase their commerce, and give a territorial counterpoise to the southern preponderance by the recent admission of Louisiana into the Union. Halifax, with its fifteen thousand inhabitants, was not as difficult a conquest in 1812, as Louisburgh in 1748, when the people of New England captured that well-armed fortress without English co-operation.

As a military measure, the mere movement of a considerable column in that direction must draw nearly the whole British force to be concentrated there for the protection of Halifax; thus strip the whole coast of blockading ships; Quebec, Montreal, and all other places in both Canadas as far as from the first named to Mackinaw, of all but a few troops, and leave those places at the mercy of our troops. If we took Halifax, a death blow was struck at British American power; as a diversion or demonstration, the expedition would be more effectual than any one or more we could send into Upper Canada.

This project, of which the foregoing is a faint outline, was suggested, first, to Dr. Eustis, when Secretary of War, who merely said it was a very pretty plan; and afterwards to his successor in that department, General Armstrong, through Colonel Duane, but none of them relished it till Mr. Monroe superseded General Armstrong as acting Secretary of War. Then it was seriously contemplated, and would probably have been the plan of operations for the campaign of 1815, but for the peace of Ghent, in December, 1814. In the proper stage of these historical remembrances it will be more fully explained. At that time the young officer who suggested it, employed as lieutenant-colonel commanding a recruiting rendezvous at Hartford, in Connecticut, when the convention sat there with clandestine and ominous designs, as was apprehended, hostile to the union, was instructed to ascertain whether even northern disaffection might not be induced to unite in so advantageous an undertaking for New England, as the transfer of British maritime and commercial wealth, the fisheries and Canadas to New England preponderance in the United States. I was then in daily communication with Mr. Monroe at Washington, and heard from him of this movement. The officer to whom its suggestion was confided, reported favourably of its reception by a member of the Hartford Convention. If the government would give assurances of a settled determination to capture Halifax, and hold the north-eastern fisheries for the Eastern states, he thought that all New England would embark in the undertaking. We can take Halifax, said he, as easily as we took Louisburgh; but then, if we do, we must have assurances that what we take is not to be surrendered in any event. It is unnecessary to add more here than that such was the plan of the campaign of 1815, prevented by the peace of December, 1814. Its results would

have depended on the people of New England and the fortune of war. But we had then disciplined armies in considerable numbers, experienced commanders, having confidence in themselves, enjoying that of their followers and of the country, a Secretary of the Treasury, Dallas, and a Secretary of War, Monroe, who would have strained every nerve for great national achievements. Since then the British tonnage employed in the North American fisheries and trade has quadrupled. More than a million of tons navigated by seventy thousand seamen, all—trade, shipping and seamen, constantly increasing, with the multiplying population, improvements and resources of the British American Colonies. British bottoms, British subjects, British manufactures, British colonial staples, are the transatlantic outworks of that great European fortress entrenched by insular defences in front of the old world, exercising immense power over the new. Fully appreciating the military advantages of her position, Great Britain is ever on the alert to increase and strengthen them; seizing upon every spot which may be rendered available.

When we come to the naval operations of the war of 1812, we shall see that, even without an army, our little squadron, if well advised and directed, might have struck a severe, if not fatal blow, at English American power, by concentrating its force upon Halifax as soon as war was declared, before England was prepared for it. Co-operating with a land expedition moving from Maine on that place, it could hardly have failed. The shortsighted schemes of government, lukewarmness in the executive, timidity in Congress, the unwarlike spirit of free institutions, the unnerving influences of protracted peace, the fears of old commanders, the force of circumstances, ordered it otherwise. Canada was not only not conquered, but not even injured. The English government of it, civil and military, nobly defended its provinces. Our efforts, at first, miserable failures, were at last only martial exercises, elementary schools in the art of war.

Instead of striking at the root or stump, we began at the topmost branches; tried to hurt the lion in the tail, as General Armstrong objected, when animadverting on the poor difference he took between attacking Kingston and York, or Fort George. To conquer Canada, General William Hull was sent from his government of Michigan, with a force mostly volunteer and militia,

deemed amply sufficient, as numerically it was, to overcome British resistance in Upper Canada, where the provincial militia did not wish to fight Americans, if left to their choice, and the Indian tribes were so far neutral as to be waiting to join the strongest side. By some inexplicable remissness, the enemy got intelligence in Canada, at Malden and elsewhere, of our declaration of war, before it was made known to even our own posts. We had no force on either of the lakes or waters, where the English reigned in undisputed supremacy. On the 17th July, 1812, the vital post of Mackinaw, on the island of Michilimacinack, at the junction of Lakes Huron and Michigan, was surprised and taken by the enemy, almost without resistance. Lieutenant Hancks, the officer in command, with a garrison of some fifty to sixty regular soldiers, in his report of the 4th of August to General Hull, giving an account of this deplorable first blow in the war, officially stated that the summons to surrender the fort was the first information he had of the declaration of war. With such a secretary, post-master general, commander, and other officers, was the conflict begun! Captain Roberts, commanding the British post of St. Josephs, a vigilant and enterprising officer, whose capture, with his small garrison, should have been our first and easy blow,—instead of that, was allowed, with his inadequate means, to plan and execute the surprize of Mackinaw. By this untoward reverse of what should have been the American outset, the Governor-General Prevost, in his despatch of the 26th of August, 1812, to the Colonial Secretary, Earl Bathurst, was authorized to write that spirit and confidence were given to the Indian tribes, part of whom assisted in the capture of the American fort, and they were determined to advance upon the rear and flanks of the American army as soon as it entered Canada.

The island of Michilimacinack, (or Mackinaw, as it is more commonly called,) is situated in the straits between Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. It is of a circular form, about seven and a-half miles in circumference, between three and four miles from the land in the nearest point. The island is a rock of limestone, covered with a rough and hard but fertile soil, and, originally with a heavy growth of timber, such as sugar-maple, beech, birch, basswood, poplar, hemlock, cedar and spruce—elevated considerably above the mainland in its vicinity, which is low,

flat, and swampy. The island is highest in the centre, and handsomely crowning, resembling, as you approach it at a distance, a turtle's back—from which circumstance it is said to have derived its name, Michilimacinack or the Turtle.

The fort which stands on the south-east side, was handsomely situated on a bluff rock, rising from one hundred to two hundred feet from the water, almost perpendicular in many places, extending about half round the island. It overlooked, and, of course, commanded the harbour, a beautiful semicircular basin of about one mile in extent, and from one to five or six fathoms in depth, sheltered from Lake Huron by two islands stretching across its mouth, and leaving only a narrow ship channel by which to enter the harbour. From the fort there was an uninterrupted view into Lake Huron to the north-east, and into Lake Michigan on the west, entirely commanded by the high ground in its rear, where there was only a stockade defended by two block houses, with a brass six pounder in each. There were also two long nines on a battery in front, besides two howitzers, and a brass three pounder, commanding the approach to the front gate; a good bomb proof magazine, but without much ammunition or implements of war.

It was from the fur trade that the importance of Michilimacinack resulted, having long been the grand depot of those carrying it on, and the key to all the north-western country. Its commercial importance may be estimated from the amount of goods entered at the custom-house there, in 1804, which, including what were brought direct from Montreal, and what came by the way of New York, yielded a revenue to our treasury of about \$60,000. Large quantities of corn and sugar raised and manufactured by the Indians in the vicinity, and by them brought to market, were sold to the merchants, for the support of those engaged, or people employed in the fur trade.

Hull was conquered at Mackinaw: if not before his march began, heralded by pompous and threatening proclamation. The government was not blameless for his miserable failure, perhaps the republic. War for the first time in thirty years; a presidential election pending when it was declared; Congress fearful of their popularity; the executive, much of it lukewarm, if not averse to hostilities; all cherishing more hopes of peace than of war; no military genius, habits or organization, no taxes, short funds, extreme

and culpable inefficiency, if not downright negligence in the first steps of warfare, were ill-starred premises on which an unfortunate leader might lay some of the reproach. Hull's vapouring proclamation only provoked General Brock, the British commander, to confront him; brave, indefatigable, active, energetic, abounding in qualifications, all of which Hull, if he ever had, was without from the moment he heard of the fall of Mackinaw, the gathering of the Indian clans, and the effect of all these things on the English militia. His stores and dispatches and baggage were captured in a boat. Of two detachments he sent out, one under Major Vanhorne, was cut to pieces by Tecumseh; the other under Colonel Miller, though successful in defeating an English attack, gained, poor Hull wrote to the secretary, nothing but honour, and that at the cost of seventy-five lives lost! Familiarized with Indian brutalities, Hull too well knew what he had to fear from this always the most formidable and destructive wing of the English army. Finding the savages more hostile, the Canadian militia less favourable, than he expected, Mackinaw gone, his flanks in danger, his rear not open for supplies to be brought on pack horses 200 miles through a wilderness of trackless swamps; on the 7th of August he began his retreat, benumbed with terror, recrossed from Canada to Michigan, and there quailed at Detroit till the 15th of that month, the day of his ignominious surrender. Hemmed in on every side, cut off from all resource, his force wasting with disappointment, and disease, and death; he was not the man for an emergency requiring the best courage and fortitude. A man of another mould, full of resolution and resource, might have triumphed over the time-serving negligence of his own government and the bold resistance of an enemy who could not fail to perceive that he had a feeble and dismayed antagonist to deal with. The American general was ripe for abject submission when Brock became the assailant; crossing the straits from Sandwich to Detroit with some twelve hundred men, the Indians led by their brave and skillful chieftain, the gallant and generous Tecumseh, much more gallant and humane than many of the English commanders. On the 15th of August, Hull put into articles of capitulation all he could surrender, without striking a blow or showing a sign but of extreme trepidation. No council of war was held on this, the only occasion during the war, when

the commanding general would have been outvoted by all his officers.

All Hull's officers were indignant at his surrender. Colonel Lewis Cass, at Washington, in September, 1813, in a letter published to the Secretary of War, averred that Malden might easily have been taken if attacked when Hull first entered Canada. The Canadian militia disliked the British service and deserted by hundreds, while our troops were in excellent order and high ardour; but contrary to the unanimous wish of his officers, Hull evacuated his camp by night, when there was not even the shadow of an enemy to injure us; abandoning the well disposed Canadian militia to English vengeance and control. In the last resort the officers resolved on incurring the responsibility of divesting the general of the command; and his deposal was prevented merely by two of the commanding officers of regiments being ordered on detachments. When Brock crossed the strait to attack Detroit, his whole force, white, red and black, was but 1030, and ours present fit for duty 1350; the superiority of our position was apparent, and our troops awaited the enemy in the eager expectation of victory. The fourth regiment was in the fort, the Ohio volunteers and part of the Michigan militia behind pickets in a situation in which the whole flank of the enemy would have been exposed; the rest of the Michigan militia in the upper part of the town to resist the incursions of the savages. Two twenty-four pounders loaded with grape shot were posted on a commanding eminence, ready to sweep the advancing column. Not a sign of discontent, not a look of cowardice; every man expected a proud day for his country, each anxious that his individual exertion should contribute to the general result. When the head of the enemy's column arrived within about 500 yards of our lines, orders were received from General Hull for the whole to retreat to the fort, and for the twenty-four pounders not to fire on the enemy. One universal burst of indignation appeared upon this order. Shortly after a white flag was hung out upon the walls. A British officer rode up to inquire the cause. A communication took place between the commanding generals, which ended in capitulation. Hull consulted none of his officers, took counsel of his own feelings only. Not one anticipated surrender. Even the women were indignant at the shameful degradation. At ten o'clock next day the detachment of 350 men from M'Arthur's

and Cass' regiments sent the day before to the river Raisin arrived within sight of Detroit on their return. Colonels M'Arthur, Findley, Cass and Miller all declared that nothing could justify so dishonourable and unjustifiable a capitulation, which was also the universal sentiment among the troops.

Yet the issue might not have been what Colonel Cass so confidently hoped. Among all the vicissitudes of life nothing is so capricious as what has come to be called the fortune of war. In an unpublished letter from an American in London, dated December, 1759, giving an account of one of Chatham's speeches in Parliament, that extraordinary author of the war and colonial policy of Great Britain is stated to have borne the testimony of his experience to the terrible uncertainty of military affairs above all others. "The events of war," said he, "depend on what the world calls chance; a conjunction of incidents which short-sighted man cannot foresee or provide for. It is uncertain whether the day shall end with acclamations of joy, or the war ministers sacrificed to the fury of an enraged multitude for some disaster in the system which the world is always ready to impute to want of ability or fidelity in those who execute it." Hull, however, was lamentably false, at any rate, to one cardinal principle of military affairs, which Chatham, as a war minister, never neglected; to be bold, to trust fortune, to woo that capricious tutelary deity of hostilities by seizing, almost ravishing, her favours. In the several unsuccessful campaigns it cost Chatham to conquer Canada from the French, he never was wanting in that boldness which is as essential as bravery to success in most things, in military more than any other. In the almost continual failures of the American arms in Canada throughout the years 1812 and 1813 boldness was the great need of every commander, want of it the infirmity which degraded them all. In the tournaments, as they may be considered, the isolated and irregular jousts of 1814, when the bravest and best troops of Great Britain were beat in every encounter, boldness or audacity was the American virtue which gained the day. Owing to the radical error of our plan of operations, and the failure to accomplish even the mistaken attempt of the two first years, the British were reinforced in the third by numbers which deprived our forces of the power of conquest, and limited their invasion to the places where it began. Still the effect of bold attacks was

excellent. Without conquering Canada they conquered the English there, and greatly contributed not only to peace, but the satisfactory duration of it. Discipline indeed was then an American virtue, as well as boldness. Without the retrieving of our fortunes which the third year of war afforded to remove the degradation of the first and second years, a history of it would be a sad task for any American. Fortunately it ended well. The end crowned the work, and the crown was made of intrepidity.

Treason, as well as cowardice were imputed to General Hull. He was tried by court martial, convicted of cowardice, and sentenced to be shot, but recommended to mercy. Hull was pardoned by the president, dismissed from the army, and suffered to live; the only convicted, by no means the only discredited American commander foiled in attempts to invade a feeble province, with a small margin of population, along the edge of the waters dividing that country from this; that population even not well disposed to English authority, and thickly sprinkled with natives of the United States. Panic unnerves the stoutest hearts. Malta and Ulm were surrendered to the French, a French army at Baylen to the Spanish, not long before Hull ingloriously laid down his arms, when there was as little need of it, by like infatuation.

Thus in that region our vision of Canadian conquest vanished. The whole west, the frontiers of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Virginia, principal war states, were laid bare to English and Indian invasion, subjected to continual alarms and expenses.— Instead of conquering Canada as far at least as the Falls of Niagara, we were as much disappointed, disconcerted, and astonished, as if that cascade had changed its current, and been thrown from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie upwards, by earthquakes or other convulsive phenomenon. Such was the revulsion in my feelings from overweening confidence to utter amazement. I began to fear that war was to ruin us,—felt as if we were all prisoners of war. Shame was the garb of the war's supporters, joy that of its opponents, with most of whom in Congress, the press, and every where a favourite position was the injustice and madness of foreign war, war of conquest, war on Canada, war, however, where only could we carry it with any chance of success, instead, as its opponents contended, of confining our efforts to the seas, where all parties believed we had no chance

at all. Such was the argument of disaffection. It was right, said the disaffected, at all events, to withhold supplies from war of conquest, war on Canada; militia had a right to refuse to go there; capitalists to withhold loans of money. The effects of Hull's surrender were terrible. He who as a subordinate officer, had established character for courage and fortitude, when young, by deplorable infirmity when promoted to command, afflicted his country with discouragement which might have been fatal, but for relief where no one looked for it. They who expect election returns or foreign news with anxious anticipation, may form some faint idea of the incredulous alternation of fear and hope, which awaits war tidings in a country unused to war. When the Hessians taken by Washington at Trenton, were marched as prisoners of war into Philadelphia, the tories would not believe what they saw, but persisted that there must be some mistake or delusion about it.

My first doubt or uneasiness was the suggestion of an old soldier, whose residence I sometimes visited in the summer season. This gentleman raised a full company of a hundred hardy mountaineers, at the first outbreak of the war of the Revolution, and marched them, before even the Declaration of Independence, through the trackless wilds of northern winter, to join Montgomery, whose army he did not reach till the day after his defeat and death, before Quebec. From that time throughout the war, he was everywhere, as the hardest service called, from Long Island to Georgia, conspicuous in every battle, at Long Island, in Jersey, Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth, Yorktown, closing seven years of constant and arduous, yet to him always cheerful and pleasant campaigning, at the last action of the war, the siege of Savannah: from Quebec to Savannah, never off duty, foremost in all encounters; a soldier in every qualification. To robust frame, insensible of fatigue, he joined an intrepid, though fiery temper; and was regularly bred to arms; a man of good education, good manners, gentle when not excited, but then fierce and dangerous. At the peace of 1783, disbanded with only continental money at a discount of five hundred for one as his pay, he returned home; and having the misfortune to be involved in a tavern fray, in which he was charged with a homicide, he withdrew far into the interior, as it then was, behind the hills of his native county in Pennsylvania, where he lived

many years in total, hospitable, and polite retirement, from the world, visited by only a few friends, but holding the commission of major-general in the militia. My friend Mr. Richard Rush, who as comptroller of the Treasury, though not then, as he afterwards became, a minister of Madison's cabinet, was much consulted by him, enjoyed his entire confidence, and that of Mr. Monroe.—Mr. Rush and I got Mr. Madison to nominate the old soldier to whose memory this passing tribute is devoted, without his knowledge, as a brigadier-general in the regular army in 1812; advanced in years as he was, he would have done honour to the station. He rose from a captain by regular gradation, to be colonel of a regiment in the continental army. Unluckily one of his old associates then, who knew the fierceness of his temper, and feared the harshness of his discipline, made objections to conferring a brigade on him, and the president was prevailed upon to withdraw the nomination, for fear of its rejection, then too common an occurrence in that discontented conclave. General Thomas Craig was of the Gates, or anti-Washington party of the army of the Revolution; as such, and as a man of high, uncompromising temper, had enemies, but fought his way through all grades from captaincy, with which he entered the army, to the command of a regiment, which, therefore, according to the established regulation, entitled him to the nominal rank of general, when he left it at the peace of 1783. To the last of his protracted life, which lasted till he was nearly a hundred years old, he persevered in two sentiments, which in this country of religious and political freedom, however uncongenial with those of most persons, no one can deny his right to. One was disrespect to Washington, whose talents and military capacity he always and utterly denied with unappeasable aversion: the other was denial of the divinity of the author of the Christian religion. Since Washington's fortunate death and canonization, General Craig's infidelity to him has found fewer sympathies probably in Europe or America, than the deism which great numbers share with him, in whose list many place Penn, Franklin, Jefferson, John Adams, and Madison.—Indeed, Washington's opinions, a sincerely pious man, on that subject have never been ascertained.

At General Craig's picturesque residence, trout fishing, pheasant shooting, and deer hunting, were among the sports of a welcome, always warmly hospitable and highly interesting from his inti-

mate and peculiar views of the events, and notabilities of the army of the Revolution. He spoke with enthusiasm of Colonel Burr; said that when arrested for treason, he would have cheerfully gone to Richmond to attend his trial, or do any thing he could for his vindication. He had the same admiration too of General Hamilton, but as strong a dislike to some of the prominent officers of the Revolution. General Craig had experience of Indian warfare, and much familiarity with their habits; has shown me great numbers of the pointed stone heads to their arrows which were scattered over the hills and in the rivulets of his extensive estates; had learned from them to tell with amazing certainty from the twist of a bough, the turn of a leaf, or even the position of a pebble in a run of water, whether a man had passed that way, whether on foot or on horseback, alone or with others. This remarkable specimen of the giants of the Revolution, lived till ninety-five years old, and died a soldier to the last, directing that he should be buried, with military honours, volleys of musketry fired over his grave, and the other customary ceremonies of martial parade on such occasions. Some years before his death, he received the provision made by Congress for the officers and soldiers of the Revolution, not, however, without repugnance to subscribing to some of the terms prescribed, which he considered humiliating. His retired residence has long since been spoiled of its natural beauties and attractions by collieries, canals, and railroads: anthracite coal, of which, when I was there, no conception had been formed, has invited miners into the hills, and crowds the streams with busy boatmen.

It was from this veteran soldier, meeting him at the chief town of his county, that I heard with incredulous annoyance the first doubts of Hull's success. I had no doubt that he was in full and triumphant march from Malden to Queenstown. General Craig expressed his apprehensions of the reverse. He knew the difficulties, the chances, the obstacles in the way; had attentively read all the newspaper accounts of the expedition; could estimate the probabilities of Indian enmity; had experienced the force of English armies; shook his head at my confidence, and cautioned me not to be too sanguine. Not from any disparagement of Hull, but from the inherent mishaps of military proceedings, the fortune of war, this Nestor of another war questioned the success of our outset, and disturbed my dreams of triumph. Our three frigates gone to sea were given up to the mighty maritime

enemy. But in Canada where our superiority of force was unquestionable, General Craig could not prevail on me to harbour so unpatriotic, so unpopular, so unworthy an apprehension as the possibility of reverse. We were to make amends for distress at sea by sweeping triumphs ashore. It was in this mood I was stunned by tidings of Hull's surrender. Its disappointment, disgrace, despondency and mortification were blessedly counteracted by the capture of the *Guerriere* frigate by the *other* Hull, of which the news came just in time to be providential relief, saving our cause, the union and country from perhaps disruption, certainly consequences the most lamentable. General Hull surrendered the 15th of August, Napoleon's birth-day. Captain Hull took the British frigate which vauntingly challenged combat, on the 19th of August. Intelligence of these conflicting events met together as our northern blasts and southern breezes contend, when, after vernal prevalence of wintry weather, balmy refreshment of temperature succeeds. All was not lost with the little army and vast territories abdicated. There was a rainbow over the ocean for whose freedom the war was persisted in after repeal of the orders in council, for the unmolested enjoyments of whose peaceable intercourse we encountered all the fearful odds of the contest. A stream of transcendent successes by sea, which Great Britain could neither turn nor explain, set in, revived, consoled and upheld that maritime and commercial portion of the United States where support of the war was weakest and opposition to it most revolting. Not only public ships, but privateers struck terror into the English marine, commercial and naval; renewed the coast alarms which Paul Jones excited in the Revolution; annoyed the channel trade, increased the rates of insurance; even without the conquest of Canada, maintained Madison's administration in authority, secured his re-election, and enabled Congress to meet in the ensuing spring with majorities and resolution to prosecute war as the only way to peace.

General Hull's vindication submitted by his letter, dated Detroit, the 26th of August, 1812, to the Secretary of War, pleaded the loss of Mackinaw, and thereby the unexpected hostility of all the Indian tribes, headed by Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-Water, Split-log, &c., the privation of all water power by which his communication with the place of his supplies became only land-carriage, on pack-horses, through a wilderness of two hundred miles, only 800 troops at Detroit when he surrendered,

owing to detachments sent away under Colonels M'Arthur and Cass, many sick, and all dispirited, the fort filled with women, children and aged persons, (among whom, I believe, though not mentioned by him, were several ladies of his own family,) the place open and exposed, effectually battered by the enemies cannon, no alternative but to stand an assault thus situated, or to take the field and fight with a force inferior to either the British or Indians, much inferior to them both combined; powder and provisions nearly exhausted, Indians without number and without remorse, the spectres continually haunting his fancy and fomenting his fears. He assumed the whole responsibility of the surrender. The brave officers, he said, and men he commanded would have fought till their last cartridge was exhausted, and every bayonet worn to the socket. There was at least, magnanimity in this confession, however weak the argument.

The most decisive testimonial against Hull was Brock's letter to Prevost, written at the moment of his incredible success, dated Detroit, 16th of August, 1812, a miniature but pregnant volume of proof that Hull was panic-struck. "I hasten to apprise your excellency of the capture of this very important post. 2500 troops have this day surrendered prisoners of war, and about twenty-five pieces of ordnance have been taken without the sacrifice of a drop of British blood. I had not more than 600 troops including militia, and about 600 Indians to accomplish this service. When I detail my good fortune your excellency will be astonished." At Sinclair's retreat from Ticonderoga, Hull's cool courage was remarkable; at Wayne's storming of Stony Point his ardent intrepidity was signalized. Age and thought had changed the ardour of twenty into feeble anxiety near the grand climacteric. In 1777, he would have fought or died without care; in 1812, with not much of life left, he was fearful of losing that little.

A feature in the proceedings against Hull, which merits historical mention as part of the philosophy of American institutions, is the connection with them of an eminent personage, then just beginning, by a wise and successful course of public promotion, his advancement from humble outset to the highest elevation. Alexander James Dallas, who was Secretary of the Treasury next year, was appointed Judge Advocate of the court martial convoked to try General Hull. Mr. Dallas, not finding it convenient to attend the court, Mr. Martin Van Buren was

substituted for him, and performed the duty. Soon after, when General Wilkinson was tried by court martial, Mr. Van Buren was again appointed special judge advocate for that court. General Wilkinson objected to any special judge advocate, and presented his objection to the court, who sustained it, and rejected Mr. Van Buren. These were among the first steps of a statesman, soon raised to be Senator of the United States, Governor of New York, Secretary of State of the U. States, then Minister to England, Vice-President and President, in rapid succession of advancement; superseded at last in the chief magistracy by one of the distinguished officers of the war of 1812, General Harrison, after succeeding another in that station, General Jackson. Mr. Van Buren is now one of the influential dignitaries of the country, enjoying much of its confidence and respect, after enjoying most of its honours.

Every proper spirit engaged in prosecuting the war was roused by Hull's disgrace to exertion to make amends for it. In this generous ardour the commander of the forces on the Niagara frontier made a brave and not injudicious attempt to prevent the first year of the war from closing so disgracefully; which attempt, however, while it did honour to the courage of American soldiery, added little to our military assurance, and exposed the militia, some of them at least, to contempt and degradation. The gentleman in command on that frontier was General Stephen Van Rensselaer, of the New York militia, of amiable manners, excellent character and disposition, large fortune, and laudably emulous of distinction; but with energy unequal to his difficult task. "The national character," he wrote to the commander-in-chief, General Dearborn, in October, 1812, "is degraded, and the disgrace will remain corroding the public feeling and spirit, until another campaign, unless it be instantly wiped away by a brilliant exploit of this." Accordingly, General Van Rensselaer determined wisely, on military as well as politic considerations, to cross the Niagara into Canada, storm the British entrenchments on Queenstown heights, where they had but a small force, wipe away as he said, part of the score of our disgrace, get excellent barracks and winter quarters, and at least be prepared for another campaign next year. The season was far advanced, middle of October, the weather wet, stormy and unfavourable, the stream though narrow, rapid, and a sheet of eddies, the means of transport few, nor under good order.

General Alexander Smythe commanded at Buffalo, only a few miles from General Van Rensselaer, 1500 men of the regular army; but as I was informed by a highly respectable officer of that army still living, was not invited to take part in the projected descent upon Canada and battle of Queenstown, lest the glory of the day should be taken from General Van Rensselaer's cousin, Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, an officer in the militia, both the Van Rensselaers being perhaps laudably, though, as it turned out unfortunately, bent on monopolizing the credit of this affair for the militia, if not exclusively, at any rate in preference to the regular army. The jealousy of corps is as common as that of individuals. Invidious feelings mostly prevail between regular troops, volunteers and militia, army and navy, and as will presently appear, the failure of the most extensive and formidable expedition undertaken during the war of 1812, is more ascribable to the implacable jealousy of the two commanders Wilkinson and Hampton of each other, than to any other cause. Solomon Van Rensselaer, then adjutant-general of the militia of New York, had fought and been wounded in Wayne's expedition against the Indians in 1794, was a man of great courage, and having more military experience than almost any officer of the regular army in that neighbourhood, his kinsman, the general, committed no very great impropriety by placing him at the head of the descent upon Canada, which, by the same stroke, was to redeem the character of the country and of the militia. It was headed by Colonel Van Rensselaer and Colonel Chrystie of the regular troops, with equal numbers of militia and regulars. Before day both parties embarked, but Colonel Van Rensselaer alone effected the landing of his party on the Canada shore sometime before Colonel Chrystie with his. Van Rensselaer gallantly led his men to the charge in spite of all resistance, and though four times severely wounded pushed on as far as he could, soon joined by Chrystie, Captain Armstrong of the regulars, I believe, a son of the secretary of war next year, Captain Ogilvie, Captain Machesney, Captain Totten, now colonel of the corps of Engineers, Captain Wool, now brigadier general, and other officers of the regular army, Captain Gibson, afterwards colonel of a rifle regiment killed at the sortie from Fort Erie, and Colonel Fenwick, who also contrived to get over the river, and were engaged in the enterprise. The stream was extremely difficult, the boatmen mere hirelings, under no other

control than pay and fear; the officers one and all inexperienced, and it would be neither profitable nor perhaps possible to describe the day's confused proceedings intelligibly. The advance, those who first effected a landing, stormed the English entrenchments; in the endeavour to rally his men to retake them just at break of day, the English General Brock was killed, and his volunteer aide-camp Colonel McDowell, of the provincial militia, attorney-general of the province. General Brock was a Guernsey man, and fell from his horse by a shot in the breast, cheering on his soldiers. The carnage was great in proportion to numbers: several of our officers were killed and many more wounded, among the rest Colonel Fenwick, shot in the head and hand severely. There was courage enough, as usual, but little conduct. Our officers had not yet learned their parts, and the militia behaved, most of them, infamously. General Wadsworth, of the New York militia, a gentleman of fortune, who, like General Van Rensselaer, though opposed to the war, turned out with alacrity to carry it on even offensively, (the line is evanescent between offensive and defensive wars,) crossed over to Canada during the fighting, and took the command there; his object being to set the militia a good example, who were beginning not only to refuse to cross, but some who had done so, returning to our side. General Van Rensselaer with similar intentions passed over into Canada during the day, not having gone with the vanguard. At one time it seemed as if we were victorious, but General Sheaffe, who succeeded Brock in command of the enemy, marched up reinforcements of regular soldiers along the margin of the river from Fort George, while the Indian clans, that never-failing resource of English warfare, hurried up from Chippewa. At this stage and prospect of affairs our militia on this side mutinied, absolutely and altogether refusing to cross. The aspect of things soon changed when General Van Rensselaer considered the victory won, and mainly by militia. It was a day of more than usual disorder, though nearly every battle is much less methodical than accounts of it. Lieutenant Colonel Scott had come a volunteer from Buffalo, with two pieces of artillery brought in a boat, as the road was impracticable, conducted by Lieutenant Roach. Both these young men, in full uniform, were so resolved on having part in the battle, that, although ordered back, they persevered, and got over the river almost in spite of interdict, where Scott with his guns drove back

the Indians. It was that gallant officer's first engagement, and his most unfortunate ; for he was taken prisoner, and with many more marched first to Montreal, then Quebec, a spectacle for the enemy. Sheaffe's forces far outnumbering ours on the Canadian side, while we had an all-sufficient number on this who would not cross, after marching about our people for some time reconnoitering, Sheaffe finally attacked and routed them. They fled to the shore, but their boats were gone. General Van Rensselaer who, in the course of the day crossed over, had returned when he heard of the demur of the militia to follow, leaving General Wadsworth in command. Riding among the miscreant militia, with some of their officers and Judge Peck to second him, the disheartened and disgusted general, Van Rensselaer, in vain tried to prevail on them to pass the river and secure the victory won ; one-third of them would do it, he assured them. But neither order, reason, persuasion nor shame had any effect. They had constitutional objections to extra-territorial service. Fifteen hundred able-bodied-men, well armed and equipped, shortly before clamorous with prowess and untameable spirit, now put on the mask of lawfulness, as General Armstrong said, to hide their cowardice. Militia are like what is said of women : various and mutable, excellent or execrable, according to the mood, as valour, or panic, or any other predominant feeling dictates. The militia returns for 1813 gave 720,000 men in the United States ; many of them descendants of those who at Saratoga, Bunker Hill, King's mountain and other places displayed as much fortitude as courage. But on this occasion, Van Rensselaer's excluding the regulars, if he did so for the honour of militia, had terrible retribution. All he could do was to send a supply of ammunition to Wadsworth with a message leaving it optional with him whether to resist or retreat, as he chose. Wadsworth could do neither. Surrender nearly unconditional was all he could do or get for his troops, who from before day in the morning till late in the afternoon had been constantly engaged. They did not yield at once without a sharp conflict, however ; but panic seized some of the militia, and complete rout soon took place instead of orderly retreat, a movement beyond the discipline of unpractised troops. Rushing to the shore and finding no boats, many brave men had no alternative but to surrender on the enemy's terms. An armistice of three days, however, was arranged, and the Americans were humanely

treated, except in some instances, of what Chrystie, an Englishman, mentions as terrible slaughter by Indians, whom it was impossible to restrain. Of about 1100 fighting men who crossed the river, nearly all were killed, wounded or taken. During the engagement, the English batteries damaged some on our side and the brig *Caledonia* there. The American prisoners were paraded through Canada. Brock and his aid M'Donnel were buried at Newark, and minute guns fired from our side during the ceremony, as an act of respect for a brave though dangerous enemy. In a few days General Van Rensselaer resigned the command. His battle of Queenstown added another to numerous proofs that undisciplined valour, though the basis of all martial success, is unavailing without energetic commanders capable of enforcing obedience, a virtue as indispensable as valour to ensure victory. Without obedience in the soldier and energy in the commander an army is but a mob.

General Van Rensselaer's official letter to Governor Tompkins, dated at Buffalo, the 23d of October, 1812, states, that having received General Dearborn's permission to resign his command, he would proceed immediately to Albany. Meanwhile he mentions as distinguished in the battle of Queenstown, General Wadsworth and his aid Major Spencer, Colonel Van Rensselaer, Lieutenant-Colonels Bloom, Allen, Strahan and Mead, Lieutenant Smith and Ensign Grosvenor of Major Moseley's rifle corps; adding, with natural sensibility, that after all the toils and privations of a very perplexing campaign, to be obliged to witness the sacrifice of victory so gallantly won on the shrine of doubt was mortifying indeed.

At a dinner given that winter, at Washington, to General Harrison, his toast was, that a well-organized militia will accomplish great results. But ever since Washington's volumes of complaints of them and short enlistments in the Revolution, no President, Secretary of War, or any one else, has succeeded to organize the militia. Can it be done? Seventy years endeavour have failed. The defeat at Queenstown was not the first, though most fatal of their failures. Some of the Pennsylvania militia, from Erie, refused to accompany General Harrison into Canada, on the constitutional pretext; and others turned back after having crossed the line. The Kentuckians had no scruple. Militia are a local force everywhere; not to be marched upon foreign conquests, like standing armies of enlisted or conscribed

soldiers. But the doctrine was destructive to military operations, which asserted that from New York or Michigan to Canada, over a river, perhaps an ideal frontier, this force cannot be compelled to march. English militia are not transported over sea to Hanover, there to fight the king's battles. Even the French National Guard, or the German Landwehr are troops appropriated to service within the country. But a right to refuse to go beyond the border, was one of the factious dogmas of the war of 1812, preached by the disaffected of Massachusetts, which, in the event of war with the British provinces in that region, might be extremely inconvenient; it was not their doctrine when Pepperell led them to the siege of Louisburgh.

After General Van Rensselaer's departure, General Smythe closed the campaign of 1812, in that quarter, by a failure much ridiculed and yet vindicated; at all events a miserable abortion, which, in November, instead of atoning for, much increased, our discredit of October. On the 10th of November, Smythe issued a proclamation "to the men of New York," in which he stated that "valour has been conspicuous, but the nation unfortunate in the selection of some of those directing it; one army disgracefully surrendered, another lost, and sacrificed by precipitate attempts to pass it over to their enemies' lines with incompetent means; the cause of these miscarriages apparent—the commanders were popular men, destitute alike of theory and experience in the art of war. In a few days the troops under my command will plant the American standard in Canada, to conquer or to die. Men of New York, you desire your share of fame. Then seize the present moment. If you do not you will regret it; say the valiant bled in vain, the friends of my country fell, and I was not there." This pompous proclamation was soon followed by another in similar strain; and a large force from five to six thousand men, none apparently disinclined to cross the river, were embodied under General Smythe for embarkation. This commencement introduced the attempted movement, the entire failure of which caused General Smythe, by an act of executive power, to be excluded from the regular army, in which he had for sometime commanded a regiment before his promotion to a brigade. He was deposed without trial, and complained of it, as he had a right to do, in a petition presented the following December to the House of Representatives by the Speaker.

Roger Nelson, of Virginia, of which state General Smythe was, moved its reference to a select committee. But, on motion of Mr. Troup, chairman of the military committee, it was referred to the Secretary of War; which was delivering the lamb to the wolf, as the secretary was the arbitrary power complained of, which proved in this instance irresistible, because popular sentiment was with its exercise, which enables the American executive sometimes to strike blows and even do wrongs which, in less free countries would not be submitted to. The restrictive system by which Jefferson endeavoured to prevent war, the war itself, and many of Madison's constitutional acts during the war, prove that popular government has vast power.

On the 28th of November an advance was embarked near Buffalo under Colonel Winder and Lieutenant-Colonel Boerstler, in good boats, manned that time by seamen, commanded by Lieutenants Angus and Dudley and Sailing-Master Watts, of the Navy, before day-light, without unfavourable weather, one of the disadvantages which Van Rensselaer and Chrystie had to encounter—a pelting north-eastern storm in that uncomfortable season. The soldiers and sailors made good their landing and, as on the 13th of October, forthwith carried the British batteries by storm. But now, as then, the enemy came upon them from distant stations; and with no more help from General Smythe than the former vanguard had from the militia, our few adventurers in Canada were soon overpowered, Watts killed, Captain King, of the regular army, taken prisoner, the rest getting back to our side of the river, as well as they could, in great confusion. Mr. Samuel Swartwout, since collector of the port of New York, was of this worse than useless expedition. Colonel Boerstler was considered the most prominent leader of it, though General Armstrong never thought well of his soldiership, which, next summer, came to a discreditable end. General Peter B. Porter, of the New York volunteers, who had been a leading member of Congress when war was declared, and was conspicuous in the Canadian battles of 1814, was embarked on the 28th of November, with two thousand men, ready and eager for action; in fact half way over the river. But General Smythe not only staid himself, as the militia had done in October on the American side, with several thousand troops, urgent to cross into Canada in November, but prevented any one going to the relief of the ad-

vance, countermanded the whole expedition; and the day ended in strange inaction. General Porter published General Smythe in the newspapers as guilty of cowardice. General Smythe retorted through the same medium of offence, accusing General Porter of fraud; declaring that his courage and patriotism were solely actuated by gain or loss, as he was contractor to supply the troops. Among other recriminations it was said, in fact printed as history, that Smythe was confounded by the uproar of the English artillery, bugles, trumpets, drums, Indian yells, and other concerted noises, raised to make the day hideous and fright our general from all propriety. He insisted that the contractor's agent had contrived to raise the clamour against him, finding the contract a losing one, and wishing to see the army in Canada that he might not be bound to supply it. He was anxious for the invasion, he said, but wrote to General Dearborn, "I must not be defeated." He averred that he called together the officers commanding corps of the regular army, and they unanimously decided against proceeding. The troops were in tents, sickly, the volunteers not to be depended upon. Smythe's orders were not to cross without 3000 men at the same time. The affair at Queenstown, he argued, was a caution against relying on crowds on the banks, to look on a battle like a play; if disappointed, to break their muskets; if without rations for a day, to desert. Failing, however, to even attempt an invasion heralded by strong condemnation of preceding commanders, supported by a large force, and denounced by the whole population, as a wretched failure, General Smythe became the scapegoat of the day. Assaulting other commanders and comrades by odious disparagement instead of the common enemy of all by arms, he could hardly escape such retribution. Yielding to the clamour, he appointed first one day, then another, after the 28th of November, for other attempts at invasion; the troops were ready, the volunteers embarked; Peter B. Porter in a leading boat, with a flag, to show that he was foremost. But General Smythe, to universal disappointment, chagrin, and indignation, again and finally revoked the whole proceeding, ordered the volunteers to go home, the regular troops into winter quarters, Canada let alone; and another unfortunate general, never tried but in the public journals, and by common opinion, was actually driven away to be no more heard of, mobbed by the militia and populace, not without strenuous

vindication by himself and others in the newspapers, but without favour or further employment. General Smythe after the war represented one of the Virginia districts in Congress. Instead of a battle with the English, his military career ended in a duel with General Peter B. Porter, who accepted Smythe's challenge to that trial of courage. On the 13th December, 1812, the Buffalo Gazette published a communication from Colonel Wm. H. Winder, and Lieutenant Samuel H. Angus, the seconds, by which it appeared that the two generals repaired that day to Grand Island and exchanged a shot, in an intrepid manner by both, without effect. It was then represented by General Smythe's second that General Porter must be convinced that his charge of cowardice was unfounded, and after explanation, it was retracted. General Smythe then said that he knew nought derogatory to General Porter's character as a gentleman and officer; the hand of reconciliation was offered and received, and the seconds congratulated the public on the happy issue. The public would have preferred a battle in Canada.

Besides the unlucky battle of Queenstown, and still more discreditable abortion of the last attempt in that quarter, there remains nothing to tell of that year's campaign but General Dearborn's miscarriage, more inexplicable and mortifying than all, in the neighbourhood of Lake Champlain. There were other slight eruptions of combat on that frontier, border outbreaks hardly worth mentioning. On the 19th October, Colonel Pike tried an incursion into Canada, assaulted an English post, burned a block house, and returned without loss. On the 22d October, Captain Lyon captured forty English at St. Regis, going with dispatches from the governor-general to an Indian tribe, took all their baggage and dispatches, together with a stand of colours; our first trophy on land after five months disastrous warfare. This stand of colours was taken by William M. Marcy, now Secretary of War; the prisoners were the first, (not retaken,) captured on land, so that the first colours and the first prisoners of the war were captured by volunteers. On the 23d November, at Salmon river, not far from St. Regis, the enemy captured a couple of our officers with some forty men and four boats. The crowning act of our military misdeeds that year, absurd end of all, was Dearborn's, the feeblest of all the attempts at invading Canada. Henry Dearborn, of Massachusetts, who had served with repute in the

war of the Revolution, and was Secretary of War during Jefferson's administration, appointed senior commander of our armies for the war of 1812, was a man of large bodily frame, who enjoyed the respect of the officers serving under him, as attested by their valedictory when he was removed from command of the northern army at Fort George in July, 1813. It was General Dearborn's misfortune to have an army to form, an inexperienced, not over-ardent executive, a Secretary of War constrained to resign, a Senate inclined to distrust the Executive, Congress withholding taxes and supplies for near twelve months after war was declared, waiting upon a presidential election, disaffected states, Dearborn's own state, Massachusetts, at the head of disaffection, a country destitute of military means and men, unaccustomed to restraints, and impatient for exploit. These were disadvantages for General Dearborn, which history would be unjust not to acknowledge, whatever hasty judgment was passed upon him at the moment. Perhaps if more time had been allowed, some of the veteran commanders would have done better. But there appeared to be a want of alacrity, of activity, a torpor about Dearborn's movements which induced getting rid of him, it may be with unjust precipitation. Experience of veteran generals, however, was as instructive of their unfitness for command, during most of that war, as of raw recruits. Men qualified to command are always extremely rare. Great generals are like great poets; they appear but once in a series of ages; like poets, too, they must be born generals. Genius is indispensable for command. No art will supply its place. The exfoliation of generals was unintermitting during the first two years of the war. Throughout the autumn of 1812, General Dearborn had his own time, with adequate means to prepare an army of five or six thousand troops, whom if it had been only to keep them from measles, camp fever, and other diseases with which they were afflicted, it was better to put in motion somewhere and somehow on Lake Champlain, even as demonstration to keep Prevost from strengthening Brock and Sheaffe on the Niagara. Dearborn had the largest discretion from the war department to employ troops of any and every sort, hire boats, and otherwise prepare for action, and positive orders to act offensively as soon as possible. He had more than 3000 regular troops, Chandler's and Bloomfield's brigades of infantry, with

adequate numbers of cavalry, field, and light artillery, two thousand Vermont and one thousand New York militia, and might have had more, if deemed necessary, all well provided, even with specie to pay for what they should want in Canada. Some estimated the British force on the Canadian Peninsula formed by the rivers Sorel and St. Lawrence, including the garrisons at Isle Aux Noix, St. Johns, and Chambly, at more than General Dearborn's force. But General Armstrong insists that it did not exceed 3000 altogether, to protect 900 miles in extent, and the provincial militia ought not to have been better than ours. The Aurora newspaper, of Philadelphia, edited by Colonel Duane, an officer of Jefferson's appointment into the regular army, probably derived its information from General Bloomfield, a worthy gentleman, who, like nearly every one of our revolutionary generals, after insignificant service in the war of 1812, was content to stay near home, and commanded at Philadelphia. The editor of the Aurora, on the 23d November, 1812, announced that, pursuant to determination in a council of war, with the utmost unanimity after due consideration of the means and objects, the advance of the northern army, amounting to nearly 6000 men in force for active operation, moved under Brigadier-General Bloomfield, from their position at Plattsburg, destined for Canada. "The army," said this semi-official announcement, "must have entered the enemy's country about the 20th, and three days will have brought the troops to conflict, unless the British make war like the Russians. The gallantry and fidelity of the militia Green Mountain boys and brave Yorkers will save them from the reproach cast upon the hitherto boasted bulwark of the republic by the brutality and cowardice displayed by idle spectators at Queenstown, and put to shame the faithlessness and treachery of neighbours in Massachusetts." So ran this editorial preface to Dearborn's failure, like Smythe's proclamation, premising the farce performed at the same time, on the Niagara. On the 17th November the commander of the Canadian forces in that vicinity, a major of the voyageurs, received intelligence at St. Philips, that Dearborn, 10,000 strong, was approaching Odeltown, and dispatched a couple of companies of that force, with three hundred Indians to the river Lacole; soon followed by other companies of voyageurs, together with as many chasseurs as could be hastily raised from the neighbouring parishes.

On the 20th, in the morning, a captain visiting the picquet guard discovered our fourteen hundred regulars, with a troop of cavalry and a company of militia, led by Colonel Pike, advancing into Canada. A confused and incomprehensible skirmish ensued, in which each party's object seemed to be to get away from the other, till the Americans, in the dark, mistaking themselves for enemies began to fire on each other, killed four or five and wounded as many of themselves, and then returned leaving their dead behind, which Indians never would have done. Where Generals Dearborn, Chandler, and Bloomfield were during this wretched foray, did not then appear, nor can be now told. On no occasion did General Dearborn ever lead his troops into action. After this check, he led his 6000 men back to winter quarters, Chandler's brigade at Burlington, and Bloomfield's at Plattsburg, there to rot and die of the distempers of military idleness, the worst form of that worst of all distempers.

Jefferson, however, did not select Dearborn for Secretary of War, in which department his economy and regularity were remarkable, nor Madison appoint him commander-in-chief of the army without reason. Bred to medicine, he was early and active, brave and exemplary in the field, from first to last in the war of the Revolution; commanded a company at the battle of Bunker Hill, volunteered in the severe expedition with Arnold to follow Montgomery to Quebec, where Dearborn was taken prisoner, was in the battles of Trenton, Princeton and Monmouth, at the siege of Yorktown, and on all occasions a meritorious officer when young.

On this occasion, again, the militia were infected by the leprosy of constitutional right—to refuse orders to wage war as its appointed chiefs ordain. Of the 3000 militia who marched with Dearborn for Canada, nearly all refused to cross the line, including a company who advanced with Pike but halted at the very border. Aimey's dragoons, of Saratoga—a place forever glorious in the annals of militia and volunteers, which gave us Franklin's treaty with France that crowned the war of the Revolution with the capture of Cornwallis—two hundred men under Major Smith, of Plattsburg, and Major Young, of Troy, Birdsall's Riflemen, of Waterwick, Lyon's Troy Invincibles, Highby's Troy Fencibles, and Warner's company, with a few more of the irregular force, were honourable exceptions to the dastard disaffection

which thinned our ranks, demoralized our armies, and largely contributed to frustrate the campaign of 1812. But General Dearborn had regular troops enough at least to have taken the Isle Aux Noix, the key to Canada, when he retreated, or at any other time during that season. There were few, if any, British regular troops opposed to him. Provincial substitutes, French in their habits, language and aversion to English, (whom, however, the governor-general of the province, Prevost, displayed excellent talents for conciliating, commanding and animating with a spirit of local resistance to invasion,) voyageurs, traders, travellers, Indians, were our chief antagonists and English reliance. Encountered at the threshold by such insignificant obstacles, discouraged probably by militia defection, when he should with his regular forces have established himself at Isle Aux Noix for the winter, at least threatening Montreal, if not making good his way there and holding it, for such success would have rallied thousands to his standard, General Dearborn fell back, after a failure, the climax of our military degradation for that year. In 1814 the reverses of 1812 and 1813 were atoned for by brilliant feats of arms, though still barren of Canadian conquests.

The campaign of 1812 ended in total eclipse, without a gleam of consolation; Dearborn's, the last and most inexplicable of all its miscarriages. Hull's incomprehensible surrender was alarming and terrible; the battle of Queenstown a discomfiture not entirely without solace; Smythe's ridiculous balk at least provoking; but the commander-in-chief's miscarriage, without even heroism of disaster, afflicted the friends of war with conviction that they were doomed to defeat. With all indulgence to the commanders of 1812 and 1813, it was not only right to supersede but censure them, as their faults were made known. The English generals had much greater difficulties to contend with for defending Canada than our's to conquer it. Bonaparte's splendid career of Italian triumphs, Wellington's in Spain, began with and overcame much greater similar disadvantages. Such was the case with Washington in the North and Greene in the South. It is nearly always so. Generals must overcome hindrances, privations and prejudices inflicted by their own constituents, harder of management than to subdue enemies in arms against them. A man of talents leading our armies to Montreal, as might have been done in 1812, would probably have brought the war to an

end that year. England was completely surprised by and unprepared for it. Such a general at Detroit, Niagara, or Champlain as would have driven the English beyond Montreal, might have produced immediate peace. As soon as the orders in council were repealed, England tendered it in full confidence that we would agree, for the question of impressment was not incapable of accommodation even while Great Britain remained a belligerent nation. The prince regent's speech to Parliament the 7th January, 1813, was pacific: he expressed regret at unadjusted difficulties with the United States of America, assuring both Houses that all means of conciliation would be employed consistent with the honour and dignity of the crown, and the maritime and commercial rights of the British empire. Hull and Dearborn, and executive inefficiency, were answerable for prolonging the war, the vigorous and successful commencement of which might have creditably closed it soon after it began. The feeling of haughty power did not then stimulate Great Britain which followed the downfall of Napoleon next year. The time for war was fortunate for us, our chance of success good, had either the government or its military agents in command made the most of the opportunity. But the soldiery were demoralized by incapable commanders, in mortifying apprenticeship to the art of war for two years, of transcendent successes by sea, which, if accompanied by something like them by land, might have prevented that noviciate. A free country paid in war for the liberty enjoyed in long peace. Free people will not bear the restraints and expense of military organization in peace. Since the declaration of American Independence, however, all experience in the Old World, as well as the New, proves that disciplined freedom is eventually an overmatch for despotic discipline. The most absolute governments have found it so. The problem to be solved is, how much liberty is consistent with national safety. The progress of the United States in military science and equipment since the war of 1812, has been much greater than from the peace of 1783 till then. Oppression provoked that war, and tribulation was its lesson. But if war by a martial people, disorganized at first, is to succeed at last, is not excessive liberty preferable to extreme discipline? The end crowns the work. Men must be disciplined to obedience and harmony, to unity of action, in order to succeed. How much liberty they will bear, how much disci-

pline they need, are the great questions. The navy, by perfect discipline, never failed. The army, without discipline, never triumphed. Voluntary government, voluntary religion, voluntary hostilities are American experiments, which, according to Jefferson's argument of relative good, have thus far withstood foreign aggression, maintained domestic peace, escaped civil war, and advanced the arts of civilization. By happy mixture of constraint with independence, law and liberty, the United States stand now among the primary powers of the world: to which elevation the war of 1812, with its preliminary reverses and postliminious successes, largely contributed. It may long remain matter of controversy and disputed political science, whether republican government is as strong as others. That war established beyond dispute its capacity for war under difficult and trying circumstances; which seem to have been ordained to prove and vindicate by early misfortune the unconquerable spirit, aptitude, versatility, and resource of a free people.

CHAPTER III.

CONGRESS.—SPECIAL SESSION OF 1813.—TAX BILLS.—JOHN W. EPPES.—JAMES PLEASANTS.—JONATHAN ROBERTS.—TIMOTHY PITKIN.—WILLIAM W. BIBB.—HUGH NELSON.—PREPARATION FOR WAR.—PENSIONS.—PRIVATEERS.—SECRET SESSION.—MR. GALLATIN'S NOMINATION.

THE session of Congress began the 24th of May, 1813. On the 10th of June, the chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, Mr. Eppes, with permission of the House, reported relative to a well-digested system of public revenue, and, on motion and leave presented the tax bills; viz., for the assessment and collection of a direct tax on lands and slaves, a salt tax, on licenses to retailers, carriage tax, still tax, on auctions, on refined sugar, on stamps, on foreign tonnage, further provision for the collections, and a bill to establish the office of commissioner of the revenue. All these bills, were, as usual, read the first and second time, by their titles, that day, and committed to a committee of the whole House. On the 22d of June, the House took them up in committee, Hugh Nelson of Virginia, in the chair, and they were successively passed through the regular stages of enactment. In about a month, by the latter end of July, this considerable body of acts received President Madison's signature, and were put in operation.

John W. Eppes, chairman of the committee which performed this important function, was the son-in-law of Jefferson, the benefit of whose confidential correspondence he enjoyed. Mr. Eppes was a gentleman of respectable abilities, sincere and manly in his sentiments, which were sometimes, however, rather too refined for practical application to the emergencies of war. During most of this session he was confined by a fit of the gout, which devolved on Dr. Bibb, of Georgia, the lead in the committee of Ways and Means. Without meaning any disparagement of Mr. Eppes, it was, perhaps, fortunate for the tax bills that their passage through the House devolved on a member who made no speeches,

as the chairman was no doubt prepared to do, which would have elicited answers and thus consumed time precious for action. William W. Bibb, afterwards, I think, Governor of Alabama, was a young man, slight of person, feeble in health, taciturn, conciliatory, firm, decided in support of the war and Madison's administration, who confined what he said on the floor to short explanations in answer to objections or questions, without indulging in any rhetoric. The tax bills, if flooded with debate, if not foundered, might have been much hindered: the previous question being then a rare application. Dr. Bibb was ably supported in the committee of Ways and Means by James Pleasants of Virginia, (of which state I believe Dr. Bibb was also a native,) one of the most respectable members of that Congress; likewise without ever making a speech. He was a kinsman of Jefferson and resembled him in the sandy complexion said to indicate an enterprising temper. Mr. Pleasants was afterwards Governor of Virginia. Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, as members of public assemblies, filled the highest places without the talent of public speaking, so common as to be almost cheap in the United States, by no means universal in England, and extremely rare in France, where nearly everybody can talk but few speak, which seems to be a difference between using the tongue standing or sitting. Another member of the committee of Ways and Means and a frequent speaker, was Mr. Jonathan Roberts, of Pennsylvania, yet living on or near the farm which his family acquired when some of them came from England with Penn; and which Mr. Roberts tills with his own hands, while fond of literature and well read in polite learning. Mr. Speaker Clay, thorough-going in his party politics, took care to construct his committees with large administration majorities of all such as might have any influence upon the war. The most active member of the minority opposed to war and the administration on this committee, was Mr. Timothy Pitkin, of Connecticut, a gentleman well known for his statistical and historical attainments and works. He too was a frequent and able speaker, decided in his opposition, but temperate and fair. Hugh Nelson, who presided as chairman during the consideration of the tax bills, was remarkably conversant with the rules and usages of a deliberative assembly, son of Thomas Nelson who signed the Declaration of Independence, and afterwards by President Monroe's appointment,

American minister in Spain. The war of 1812 was beheld to James Madison, James Monroe, Henry Clay, James Pleasants, John W. Eppes, William W. Bibb, and Hugh Nelson, all, if I am not mistaken, natives of Virginia, not to mention others, for eminent services in elevated stations. Mr. Nelson represented the district where three successive presidents were born; of the *red* earth, John Randolph said, fruitful of chief magistrates. The ancient dominion, as that state is called, has been a mother of several others, fruitful of political axioms and principles, and was powerfully represented in all branches of government during the war.

The thirteenth Congress convened by the president in special session to impose taxes, represented a sparse people, only twenty-five on an average to the square mile, scattered over disjointed territories two thousand miles square; only eight millions altogether, white, red, and black; for thirty years plunged in the pursuit of gain, unused to restraint, unbroken to taxation, which they had never felt but to resist from the first day of the Revolution in 1775. Tried with all the power of Washington's administration, it was resisted by rebellion. Continued under that of Adams, further rebellion ensued; and taxes were the means by which that administration was overthrown. Always no better than a necessary evil, taxes in England required war for their imposition. The war of the American Revolution was waged almost without them, like that of France, by paper money. Throughout the war of 1812, among all the difficulties this was not one. Whether the twelfth Congress could have laid taxes without overthrowing Madison's administration may be a question. But the thirteenth Congress did so without hesitation or hindrance, doubled them as occasion required, and they were always punctually paid in even the most disaffected parts of the United States. Yet it is not to be wondered at that wise men feared the experiment. The short-lived representatives of a self-governed people are apt to be a people-fearing House of Representatives. Mr. Gallatin might well infer from all the taxation experience of the world, especially that of the American Revolution, and the administrations of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, that Congress must be timid, selfish, parsimonious, and unstable: less disposed as they generally are than their constituents for measures of decision. The federal constitution, however, is in this respect, much stronger

and better government than the confederation. By that, members of Congress eligible for but one year, and ineligible but for three years out of six, revocable at all times by vote of their state legislature, had no authority to act directly upon the community for revenue, but were obliged to approach the people through the mostly impenetrable hindrance of state legislation. Early impressions of popular and state power, of representative dependence and timidity, were therefore natural in 1812. Many years afterwards Mr. Madison said that, without reference to party opposition, there was an inscrutable disaffection, an under toe in Congress he called it, somewhere, which baffled his administration at first. Members of Congress of the war party more than whispered that it was in his cabinet. But many well inclined to republican government at that time deemed a confederated republic incapable of such vigorous and constant action as war required.

Notwithstanding the awkwardness and discomfiture of the commencement of belligerent operations, there was no hesitation in Congress, in 1813, to enact a system of taxation, or in the people to comply with it. On the contrary, seldom has a session of legislation in any country, where the right of free discussion prevails, been conducted with more order, system, vigour, or advantage than the first session of the Thirteenth Congress, which was adjourned the 2d day of August, 1813, after having in seventy days accomplished all the objects of the assembly. Law making in Congress by legislators from the distant parts of an extended country, divided into eighteen sovereign states, with various conflicting local interests, and jarring party politics, sometimes therefore called ambassadors, must be difficult, should be deliberate, but is more apt to be precipitate than tardy, as is the common reproach. The majority of the House in that Congress, were unanimous, and harmonious. There was some dissidence in the Senate; but hardly any, if any at all, in the House, certainly no dissension, among the supporters of the war, whose pressure suppressed whatever inherent tendency to discord there might and must be in such bodies. The opposition was equally united, zealous, and active. But to oppose war duly declared, is disadvantage. Its daily events and tidings, whether victories or defeats, in which the blood shed flows from a common country, are hardly reducible to mere topics of party censure, but mostly must be matters of general exultation or universal condolence. Opposition

vented itself less against the war, than the manner of carrying it on, the place of its transactions, whether it should be Canada or the ocean, the officers conducting it, whether veterans or novices, the funds for its support, whether contributions which ought to be raised from those who denied its justice. The latter was especially the great endeavour of opposition. Not many denied the justice of the war : but were put to contend that it should include France as well as England, or should have been put off for fuller preparation.

The Congress which declared war, appropriated without taxation about ten millions to increased armies, three millions to the navy, half a million for the defence of maritime frontiers, three hundred thousand dollars for repairing ships of war, two hundred thousand dollars a year for three years to purchase ship timber ; directed the enlistment of ten additional regiments of infantry, two of artillery and one of dragoons ; authorized the president to embody fifty thousand volunteers, for which purpose a million of dollars was assigned ; appropriated more than one hundred thousand dollars towards the expenses of six companies of mounted rangers, directed a detachment of one hundred thousand men from the militia, organized a corps of artificers, regulated the ordnance, and otherwise inaugurated hostilities at an expense far beyond the regular income of government. Most of these preliminary enactments preceding or accompanying the declaration of war, required that the treasury should be replenished by the next Congress, as well as the magazines, by such stable and permanent revenue as would, at least, pay the interest of whatever sums might be borrowed ; modern wars being mostly carried on by loans, and guarantee of eventual reimbursement of the principal. To this object the whole of a short session was devoted, excepting the time consumed by Mr. Webster's resolutions, which will be considered, and by other subjects of private or subordinate public importance. The season of the year was not favourable. The weather at Washington was bilious. The president was for some time confined to bed by illness, and though I believe no member died during that sultry and anxious session, yet it bore hard on those unaccustomed to so relaxing a climate. Local divergence of opinion obtained, even among the supporters of the war, as to the best objects of taxation, and the best mode of taxing

them with least inconvenience. But it was no time to differ about minor matters. The war occurrences, of which every day's post brought news, were, perhaps fortunately, nearly all disastrous; Canadian reverses, marauding incursions in Maryland, Delaware and Virginia, all around Washington, at least no success on the western frontier, and the check to naval triumphs by the loss of the ill-fated frigate Chesapeake, the whole horizon overcast, with scarce a gleam of sunshine; all, as if by overruling Providence, operated to bind us firmly together, to subdue murmurs, to animate exertions, and to substitute energetic action for idle recrimination. The majorities on some of the details of the tax-bills were sometimes very small, more than once only one; a vital question on the still-tax was decided by the speaker's casting vote. Southern and eastern prepossessions often came into hard collision. But on every final question the preponderance was imposing, thirty and forty or more votes, and the tax laws went to the country with all the effect of such decision. If there was detrimental delay in their passage, at any rate, the system was better digested by it.

Langdon Cheves, chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, when it was proposed, during the twelfth Congress, was a man of information, thoroughly resolved on the absolute necessity of promptly imposing adequate taxes. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin, was then at his post to afford his important advice in devising a plan, even though he might not choose to remain and aid in its enactment. The House in 1813 had thus the benefit of the labours of the committee and secretary in 1812, whose system was adopted without much change.

It is so general in the old world, and so common even in the new, to decry the order, stability and energy of republican government, particularly the legislative department, above all its popular branch, supposed to be least capable of methodical transaction of business for the exigencies of war, that it is worth while to dwell on the refutation of such misapprehension, manifested by the proceedings of this short session of Congress. Impeded and thwarted as the executive was in many things, and tardy as Congress were in coming to the performance of their duties, the twelfth Congress which declared war, leaving to their successors of the thirteenth Congress the responsibility of providing for carrying it on; it is nevertheless the history of that conjuncture, that

not only did Congress do as much as could be expected from any government, but the House of Representatives was more forward than the Senate in so doing. All the tax bills necessarily originated in that House, and were there matured, though somewhat altered in the Senate. Some war measures, an act much contested for naturalizing certain alien enemies, some of the army and pension bills, the law prohibiting the use of foreign licenses for vessels, that relinquishing the claims of government to goods captured by privateers, and one or two others of no great importance, came from the Senate. But the burthen of creative and diligent legislation was assumed and borne by the popular branch; less orderly or tranquil than one so much fewer in number as the Senate, but also less selfish and factious, more useful in time of need, more reliable for republican government. The Senate of the United States may be a fitter theatre for personal ambition, but in all emergencies, the House of Representatives will probably be that of more patriotic and productive legislation. Whatever may be modern comparisons between the two Houses, the war of 1812 left no reason to prefer that farthest removed from the people. It is a common mistake of political theorists to suppose that American senators, like the English nobility, have passions different from the members of a popular assembly; less lust of power, ambition and avarice; that they require more experience, knowledge and stability of character; that the Senate of the United States, as has been said by a learned jurist, guards better than the House of Representatives the states from usurpation of their authority, and the people from becoming victims of paroxysms of legislation. The fancied resemblance of the American Senate to those of Greece, Rome, or England, is but a fancy. As check and balance, the medium of more deliberation, the Senate is an indispensable department. But the judicial and some other attributes bestowed upon it by the constitution, have not realized the anticipations of its projectors. Judge Story, in his Commentaries, rather censures what he calls Madison's *subdued* praise of it in the Federalist, and indication of more doubt than experience justifies. That doubt was the forethought of a provident founder in his closet, devising a government of which his own judgment was afterwards confirmed, in trying circumstances under his own administration; for the war of 1812, especially as respected the appointing power of the executive, both at home

and for foreign service, was much embarrassed and annoyed by members of the Senate of the war party, whose constituent states supported Madison's administration. Taken altogether, however, Congress, in 1813, executed its important functions with intelligence, promptitude and liberality.

An English cotemporaneous historical account thus sustains these views:—"The extra session of Congress, which concluded in August, conducted its business with unaccustomed dispatch, and with a degree of unanimity proving that, however reluctant a people may be to commence a war, when actually engaged in it, and especially when it is brought to their own doors, they will generally concur in measures rendered necessary by the circumstances. The establishment of a system of war-taxes capable of defraying the interest of the existing debt and of future loans, was the principal business of the meeting; and though there were considerable differences of opinion as to the fittest objects of taxation, the majority gave their support to the measures proposed by the committee of Ways and Means. A variety of acts were also passed relative to the prosecution and conduct of the war, and the provision for widows and orphans; and greater encouragement was given to privateers in respect to prizes. An act also passed conformably to the president's former recommendation, prohibiting the use of British commercial licenses. From all these measures may be seen the rapid approach to the condition of an old belligerent by a new state, the peculiar felicity of whose situation appeared to be that of being placed beyond the sphere of perpetual hostility which involves the greatest portion of the world."

So well, indeed, did free institutions and republican government work in a war begun by a country unprepared for it, against another so much better mechanically prepared, that no contemplative mind can refer to that conjuncture, and the experience of all wars, both in America and Europe, since the American declaration of independence, without at least the pleasing doubt whether freedom from burdensome taxation and much restraint does not prepare a people for hostilities better than if formidably armed, borne down by taxes, and unmanned by subjection. The revenue of the United States during the years 1812—'13—'14 was never more than about one-sixth of their expenditure, the other five-sixths being supplied by loans and treasury

notes; none of it reaching the hands of those to whom it was paid but through the worst of all taxation, depreciated currency. Yet the loans were obtained without much difficulty, the taxes paid without any difficulty at all, and within a few years after the war, the whole war debt of some eighty millions of dollars, together with forty-five millions before due, was all extinguished. War begun without army, navy, or taxes, made them all as it went. The beginning, indeed, was disastrous, but must it always be so? Were not most of its disasters ascribable to veteran officers? In peace prepare for war, is a maxim which has become a political proverb. Yet a people crushed by taxes, taken from home where patriotism has its source in the domestic affections, to be demoralized in garrisons and disciplined in mercenary servitude, can hardly be as well prepared for war as those animated by the spirit of liberty and equality, the possession of property and participation in government. Great Britain is never mechanically as well prepared for hostilities as France, Austria, and Russia. In Europe, moreover, many centuries of inveterate habits of national hostility may require the maintenance of large standing armies, while in this isolated republic the cheap price paid for long peace and perfect freedom, may be less military organization, taxation, and subordination. Within the last seventy or eighty years, since the sovereignty of the people has become common, war has seldom been successful without popular goodwill, has seldom failed with that reinforcement. Nearly every much taxed and well armed nation of Europe, all the most powerful empires, have in turn been conquered, while popular enthusiasm has been the last resort of those who most inculcate the indispensable necessity of armed organization. The period of our own war saw the vast Russian empire reduced to its mere elements, the emperor, a man of talents and popularity, dependent upon the lower classes of his people for defence against half a million of completely disciplined soldiery, led by the most consummate commander of modern times; and shortly after, the armies which under that commander had taken nearly every capital in Europe, submitting to the conqueror's law in their own capital, that law imposed by foreign volunteers and militia. Exhausted and disheartened people, however well armed and commanded, never triumphed in the end, however striking their

commencement of hostilities. Aroused and martial nations overcame those most disciplined. In Spain the mere peasantry, if Spanish accounts instead of English are believed, expelled the most accomplished soldiery and officers of the world. The war of 1812, among its lessons, teaches, that liberty and equality are at least schools of preparation and discipline in which both armies and navies are prepared for great exploits.

An act of Congress, at the first session of 1813, passed both Houses, without dissent, of probably indisputable martial influences, whatever costly corollaries it may have led to: to provide for the orphans and widows of militia slain or disabled in public service. A pension system by which Congress dispenses bounties from the national purse, if they are individuated, seems to consist with all good government, however liable to abuses. Its restriction to military, excluding civil service, is a monarchical relic which common sense may not at once appreciate; especially while grants equivalent to pensions for civil services have been indirectly obtained for nearly every president who needed them, those particularly least favourable to the system. The constitutionality of military pensions lies buried under such heaps of precedents as overwhelm opposition to them, while such men as Jefferson and Madison are obliged to take what they get, if any thing, by some indirect donation for the purchase of a library or a volume of manuscripts.

Analogous to the pension principle is another act of this session, parent of many spurious offsprings; making provision for wagons and teams destroyed in warfare; prolific of improper gratuities, burdensome to the national budget, and polluting legislation; yet, without abuse, just and proper indemnity for losses in public service. A young and promising member, afterwards Post-Master General, and now Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, John M'Lean, advocated this bill with proper limitations to objects taken into public service for the occasions of warfare. Thomas Grosvenor attempted to invalidate by extending it to all property destroyed by the enemy, which though rejected by the House, disclosed abuses of the practice, since more successfully effected.

Congress, at this session, enacted what the common law of war already ruled, that American property protected by enemy's

license is to be forfeited; superadding pecuniary penalties and personal punishments. The Supreme Court, unanimously of this opinion, took the broad ground that mere sailing under enemy's license, without regard to the object of the voyage or port of destination, constitutes, of itself, an illegal act, subjecting the vessel and cargo to confiscation. The act of Congress super-added further inflictions. "It is an attempt," said the court, "by one individual of a country at war, to clothe himself with neutral character by license of the other belligerent, and thus separate himself from the common character of his country."

Extending this foundation of prize-law, on the 16th July, the Senate sent to the House, by their venerable secretary, James Allyne Otis, who had held that place by constant re-elections from April, 1789, at the first session of the Senate, throughout thirteen Congresses till October, 1814, when a resolution attested his deserts, an act confirmatory of it, which, as it finally passed ours, with General Hopkins, of Kentucky, in the chair, inflicted penalties of twice the value of the vessel and cargo and a fine of from one to five thousand dollars upon any citizen or inhabitant of the United States, obtaining or using, either directly or indirectly, a license, pass, or other instrument granted by the government of Great Britain, any officer or agent thereof for the protection of any ship or merchandize, on the sea or elsewhere, making it the duty of the commanders of all public and private armed vessels of the United States to capture such British licensed property sailing under the enemy's flag as prize, and granting it accordingly to the captors on judicial condemnation.

Intercourse of all kinds between Americans and British is so natural and common that it is difficult to repress its continual recurrence, even when the law of war renders it treasonable. Habit, cupidity, and disaffection, the loose loyalty of long peace and lucrative pursuits, caused mischievous relaxation of the inflexible rigours of hostility indispensable to success in war; whose sternest hardships should never be dispensed with but by sovereign authority. British functionaries, admirals, consuls and others, and Americans addicted to trade, were extremely given to illicit gain by unlawful dealings of enemies. The Supreme Court of the United States, by one of its judges, Johnson, forcibly declared that, in war, nations are known to each other only by their armed exterior. It prolongs and aggravates the suffer-

ings of hostilities, to permit individuals to withdraw from their stern commands by partial, personal, and temporary pacification. There should be no individual truce or advantage. All must strike at all, and each at each, however painful the blow, whenever government so directs. Wherefore the bill prohibiting British licenses, after rejecting attempts by Mr. Pickering, Mr. Pitkin, and Mr. Oakley, to frustrate the measure, by comprehending French licenses, and licenses from all nations, in the interdict of the British, became a law by the votes of all the supporters of the war against those of all its opponents.

By act of the 26th March, 1812, concerning letters of marque, prizes, and prize goods, the twelfth Congress appropriated two per cent. of the prize money of captured vessels, and of salvage on those recaptured, by the privateers of the United States, to be paid to collectors of customs and consuls, as a fund for the support and maintenance of the widows and orphans of the slain, wounded and disabled on board privateers, in engagements with the enemy. By subsequent act of the 2d August, of the same session, this bounty was extended to death or disability in the line of duty. On the 30th June, 1813, Hugh Nelson, chairman of the Naval committee, reported amendments to that act, which were considered on the 19th July, in committee of the Whole, Nathaniel Macon in the chair, and next day adopted without alteration or opposition, directing the two per cent. to be paid to the secretary of the treasury, instead of collectors and consuls, and requiring the treasury to place privateersmen on the pension list on the same footing with officers and men of the navy. On the 21st July, Mr. Nelson, from the Naval committee, reported a bill allowing a bounty to every privateersman, upon which the House went into committee of the Whole next day, General Desha in the chair, and passed it on the 29th July, Mr. Kennedy in the chair, the 28th, when the amendments were adopted. By this law every privateersman was entitled to twenty-five dollars for every prisoner captured, brought into port, and delivered to an authorized agent of the United States. Next session the bounty was increased from twenty-five to one hundred dollars. On the 23d July, the Naval committee reported a bill reducing duties on goods captured by privateers, which became a law on the 2d August, so far as to allow a deduction of thirty-three and a third per cent. on the amount of legal duties. On the 3d July, Senate

sent the House a bill to relinquish the claim of the United States to goods captured by privateers, on which we went into committee of the Whole on the 10th July, William R. King in the chair, afterwards secretary of legation in Russia, then for many years senator from Alabama, now American minister in France, and passed it two days afterwards, without amendment, notwithstanding Mr. Pitkin's motion for its indefinite postponement.

By such progressive provisions a tower of naval strength was restored, which disuse and discouragement had impaired. The first treaty of the United States struck at this arm by stipulating that no citizen or inhabitant of the United States, on pain of punishment as a pirate, should apply for, or take from, any prince or state with whom France might be at war, any commission or letter of marque for arming a vessel to act as privateer against French subjects or property. Franklin's long residence in Europe, and providence for the peaceable development of America, disgusted him with the frequent causeless, and dreadful warfare of the old world; and enamoured him with projects of perpetual peace. One of the means of it was to abolish private hostilities by sea, restricting them to war vessels; not foreseeing that at no distant day, privateering would be the cheapest and most efficient of this country's armaments to vindicate the freedom of the ocean. Maritime liberty and equality, peace by sea, democracy of the ocean, like perfectly free international trade, have never yet been reconciled with the practice and prejudices of mankind, segregated in different nations. Several of the early treaties of the United States adopted all these benevolent principles. Great Britain has always resisted them; the last time in 1823, when President Monroe made the proposal, which was unequivocally rejected. Theories of commerce unrestricted, war without private hostilities, and by voluntary instead of compulsory troops, which harmonize with humane and republican institutions, have the practice of ages to contend with. In less than three years of our war, the captures by sea from England, besides 56 vessels of war, mounting 886 cannons, were 2369 merchant vessels, with 800 cannons, 354 ships, 610 brigs, 520 schooners, and 135 sloops, besides 750 vessels of various sizes recaptured, altogether 2425 vessels, with incalculable amount of cargoes, stores, provisions and equipments, and many thousand prisoners of war. Most of

these prizes being made by privateers, this grand total of belligerent annoyance and emoluments by armaments costing the public nothing, afford a volume of argument against relinquishment of such resource for war, whatever humanity and policy may say for that self denial.

On the 15th of July, 1813, late in the afternoon, after a great deal of business had been done that morning, the House went into secret session on proceedings so indicative of the state of things then, as to deserve some account of them. After a mid-summer day's work, on motion of Colonel Philip Stuart, at half-past three o'clock it was cleared of all persons except the members, clerk, sergeant-at-arms and door-keeper, and the doors closed. When confidential communications are received from the president, the rule is to clear the House during their reading and the proceedings thereon. When the speaker or a member informs the House that he has communications to make which he conceives ought to be kept secret, the House is cleared till the communication is made, then determines whether the communication requires secrecy, and takes order accordingly. Colonel Stuart, on whose motion we went into conclave, was a gentleman well advanced in life, had served, if I do not mistake, in the war of the Revolution, and represented a Maryland district contiguous to Washington. He was not a speaking or active member, but a country gentleman, of the federal opposition, which was much less bitter south of the Delaware, though Maryland was a strongly federal state throughout the war. His resolution was precluded by a preamble affirming that the seat of government, from the unprepared and defenceless state of the District of Columbia, was in imminent danger if attacked; the fleet of the enemy was understood to be within a few hours sail of the capital, the immense value of public property exposed to destruction, and the great value of the public records, rendered it important that invasion of the metropolis should be met with vigour and repelled; wherefore a distribution of such arms as were in possession of the government within the District should be immediately placed in the hands of all able-bodied men of the District, and of such members of the House as were willing to receive them, to act against the enemy in any manner not incompatible with their public duties.

There were then none of that large corps of licensed and

licentious news-mongers at Washington, since established in the capitol, as letter writers for various public journals; the National Intelligencer, the only daily paper, was nearly suspended, both the editors and seven of the workmen having gone down with the volunteer companies, together with all the regular troops and volunteers that could be mustered from Washington, Georgetown and that neighbourhood, to the number of about 3000 men, to face the foe; also General Armstrong, Secretary of War; Colonel Monroe, Secretary of State; Captain Jones, Secretary of the Navy; and many others as volunteers. All business was suspended. Most of the men took up arms. The British advancing vessels were supposed to be some miles below, on their way to Washington. The Adams vessel of war, commanded by Lieutenant Wadsworth, Fort Warburton and other defensible points were disposed of as was thought best for resistance, and the Secretary of the Navy slept on board of that vessel. At the same time British vessels were moving up the Chesapeake towards Annapolis, besides those ascending the Potomac towards Washington. Some skirmishing took place at Swan's Point, where one or two of our militia were killed just before Colonel Monroe got on the ground with a troop of horse; he being always among the most active and indefatigable of our volunteers. There were some companies and parts of regiments of the regular infantry and artillery together with the volunteers stationed wherever thought best. The enemy's squadron, as was understood, in two divisions, the first under Admiral Cockburn, the second under Admiral Warren, were carefully sounding and slowly sailing up the Potomac, amounting, according to our tidings, to six or seven line of battle ships, three frigates, a brig, three schooners, and several transports with land forces, taking islands and threatening to visit Washington. Batteries and other defensive works were going up under the superintendence of Colonel Wadsworth, an old officer of artillery, at Greenleaf's Point and the navy yard. Such militia and other troops as remained were drilled every morning at dawn; with perpetual appeals to the spirit of the people, against what the public prints stigmatized as the enemy's character, mode of warfare, and black barbarities.

This state of alarm and excitement continued about a week, during which that attack was apprehended which thirteen months afterwards laid the public edifices of Washington in ruins. Some

of the black barbarities of the English, were blazoned in the Richmond Enquirer, National Intelligencer, and other publications, with particulars shocking to be even alluded to.

Our situation was discouraging. From the beginning, the war had gone continually against us, except at sea, where we were overwhelmed by numbers. There was too much reason to apprehend that the United States were no match for Great Britain. Defeated and disgraced everywhere, Congress was to impose the burthen of taxes on a divided people, who had been taught by leaders of the war party to look upon a tax gatherer as a thief, if not to shoot him as a burglar. The sentiment was universal, that we had not one military man in whom either the army or the country could place confidence. The capture of the unlucky Chesapeake seemed to wake us, as it were, from a dream of unexpected sea comfort, of which the flood was over and the ebb set in. The country was at the lowest point of depression, where fear is too apt to introduce despair. In Senate, the State of New York, a principal theatre of military operations, was represented, in part, by a Senator, Obadiah German; the State of Pennsylvania, nearly unanimous for the war, by another, Michael Leib, popular there and active everywhere; the State of Maryland by a third, General Samuel Smith, a rich merchant of great experience, address and influence; and the State of Virginia by a fourth senator, Wm. B. Giles, the most expert debater and one of the ablest members of that vital branch of both executive and legislative government, all inimical to Madison and his administration; besides several other senators nominally of the war party, but not well disposed to the president, who was opposed by a large and powerful party in that body, in which combinations frequently defeated his most important measures. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin, was gone to Europe to solicit the only relief he considered practicable for the country. The merely perfunctory duties of the treasury department, owing to the president's hardly justifiable adhesion to Mr. Gallatin as its head, were temporarily performed by the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Jones, who with respectable abilities could hardly fulfil the arduous duties of his own station. The Post Master General, Mr. Granger, was so much opposed to the president, that he found it necessary not long

after to remove him from office and put Governor Meigs of Ohio, in his place. The Secretaries of State and War, Colonel Monroe and General Armstrong, were said to be breathing that rivalry for the presidential succession which put the former in the latter's place, when Armstrong was tumultuously driven from Washington the night after its capture by the enemy. The executive departments of government were out of joint with each other, and many of them out of favour with most of the advocates of the war. There was a large, bold, and some of them unscrupulous minority, without, however, any treacherous disloyalty that I know of, beyond the usual struggle of parties to supplant each other. Some members, no doubt, countenanced that extreme opposition which afterwards centered in the Hartford Convention, whatever its undivulged designs may have been. But there was neither despair nor more than party dissension at any moment in either House of Congress, less faction in the minority and more unanimity in the majority, than would have been the case under less trying circumstances. The disastrous commencement of the war was not without the uses of adversity. From a distant point of time we may look back upon the external pressure and internal resistance of that crisis with gratitude to the overruling Providence which, by what seemed calamitous occurrences, prepared the country for happy results. Next to Divine Providence, this historical acknowledgment is due to that popular providence, that much despised, abused and undervalued mass of the people, a considerable, however fluctuating, yet constant majority of the American nation, the least calculating but truest and firmest of all, who under every tribulation upheld and cheered their lineal offspring, a majority in the House of Representatives. Those on whom the taxes bore hardest, whose livelihoods were most interrupted, whose names would probably never be blazoned to celebrity—like the common sailor and soldier who bore the brunt of war, actuated more by patriotic impulse than selfish reason—they never deserted or faltered. “Who loves the people?” said Voltaire, a greater architect than Bonaparte of that prodigious revolution which restored their sovereignty, notwithstanding all its abuses and aberrations. Yet without coincidence with that least selfish, though least refined mass, without even party spirit so much deprecated, what state can be free, what free state great, what statesman strong?

Among the fervid and the fearless to whom no small share of the popular success of that war is attributable under extremely trying circumstances, none is entitled to more grateful recollection than the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Henry Clay. Ardent and bold in support of the war and Madison's administration of it; prompt, clear, cogent and authoritative in the chair; eloquent, forcible, aggressive in speech; impulsive and overbearing, yet adroit and commanding in conduct, resolute and daring in all things, without much learning, study or polish, he was then, in the flower of his age and robust health, the powerful champion of whatever he undertook, and master spirit wherever he acted. His descent from presiding over the representation of popular sovereignty was the first step of his declension.

We had hardly the door closed in secret session before John Rhea, of Tennessee, came within ten votes of carrying his motion to lay Colonel Stuart's resolution on the table, which Rhea denounced as a factious attack upon the administration. As Colonel Stuart submitted the resolution on his responsibility for his sincerity, feeling bound to believe it at least until the contrary should be shown, I voted with Macon and a few others of our party, with all the federalists, against laying it on the table. Mr. Rhea was a great oddity, in appearance, behaviour, dress, speech and temper, a rich old bachelor, a very honest man, a thorough going party man, and a good-natured man, but one of those gruff, growling persons who would rather be considered unkind when he really was not. The Tennessee delegation at that time, besides Mr. Rhea, consisted, among others, of Felix Grundy, a distinguished member of the war party, and of General John Sevier, an old Indian hunter, as straight and almost as stiff as an arrow, with the stern department of reserve and self-possession which men are apt to contract who have much intercourse with savages, and the hardihood of frontier life on the outskirts of civilization, in perpetual conflict with them. General Sevier, if I am not mistaken, had been involved, among the pioneers of the West, in a rencontre with the most extraordinary American of the nineteenth century, General Jackson, also of Tennessee.

After Rhea's motion was negatived, Mr. Thomas G. Gholson, of Virginia, moved to strike out the preamble from Colonel Stuart's resolution, which being done, and the blow at the administration, if any was intended, thus parried, the subject came before the House for consideration on its merits.

The weather was in canicular sympathy with our condition, as representatives of the country and the party on whom its forlorn fortunes were pressing; one of those dry, sultry, windy, not cloudy, but misty, murky, smoky, overcast uncomfortable dog days, whether the regular caniculars had set in or not, which surrounded by an amphitheatre of hills, with the sluggish Potomac, and extensive flats between it and the Tyber, closed July and prefaced August with unwholesome, enervating, sweltering, atrabillious, suffocating, languid, feverish heat, as hot as the faction within and war without. Washington was unhealthy in the latter part of summer and most of autumn. There were few of the crowds of visitors, or of inhabitants now there; most of those few had marched away on the sudden campaign sprung up, and Pennsylvania Avenue, the only peopled part of that metropolis of magnificent distances, had hardly a listener along its disconsolate thoroughfare. Congress were nearly alone in the capitol, of which only the two wings were then built, without the rotunda, or either of the noble fronts now facing east and west; the whole pile imperfect and extemporary. It blew a hurricane, roaring like great guns through the dome of the House of Representatives, and struck down the flag rattling on the top. Distant artillery was audible, as was thought, from time to time, and rumours continually afloat as the enemy advanced. The division of parties was so intense that there was little personal intercourse among many members of opposite sides. The federalists and the republicans did not sit together, except a few republicans overflowing among the federalists, occupying the speaker's left. Debate ran high. Mr. Clay was an excellent presiding officer: but he could not keep the House always in order. Alexander Hanson, a small man, in delicate health, editor of the Federal Republican newspaper, one of the boldest in opposition, was a sharp, fierce speaker, and attacked sometimes the speaker himself. Mr. Thomas Grosvenor, of New York, was the readiest debater and hardest hitter of the federalists; Mr. Gaston, a handsome man, of pleasing address and speech, Mr. Oakley, Mr. Daniel Sheffey, Mr. Richard Stockton, Mr. Webster, Mr. Pickering, Mr. Pitkin, were prominent on that side. Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, Solomon Sharpe, of Kentucky, assassinated in the Beauchamp homicides, Mr. Troup, of Georgia, Governor Wright, of Maryland, James Fisk, of Vermont, Jonathan Fisk, of New York,

William Duval, afterwards governor of Florida, John W. Taylor, afterwards speaker, Felix Grundy, were leading men of the republican party. John Forsyth did not speak that session, nor till the middle of the next, distinguished as he became for speaking talent. Nor did Mr. Webster that session make any of the great speeches on which his reputation rose afterwards. He and Mr. Stockton were gone home when the proceedings of this conclave took place.

Designating some members as more remarkable than others in that, or any Congress of chosen men, and omitting many others, far from inferring judgment on their respective merits, is to be taken as merely referring to a few who, at the moment happened to figure more than the rest. The peculiar characteristics of the Congress of the United States, are almost universal aptitude of speech, facility of fluency transcending the speaking talent of any other representative body, and a general prevalence of strong good sense, mother wit, so that those who speak most and therefore may seem most effective, are not probably the genii of the place, but the whole body is moved and mastered by predominant and pervading intelligence less demonstrative and more felt. Political distinction is extremely short-lived, seldom registered on the rolls of fame; party prominence, topics, and passions still more evanescent. Founders and warriors have historical celebrity; writers sometimes; speakers seldom, and only when they reach, as very few do, the regions of renown. The fame of a member of Congress is like collegiate honour, often eclipsed by much less forwardness. Two of the surviving members of the War Congress, then not prominent, are now, one of them Mr. John M'Lean, afterwards an efficient and successful head of the Post-office department, from which he was removed to the Supreme Court of the United States; the other, after long service as a distinguished senator, Mr. William R. King, now the American minister in France. On the other hand, how many then leading men, are now totally unknown! Rome became mistress of the world before scarcely a Roman appeared to tell of it; while Greece was spoken and written into celebration. Talent for business, for action, in armies, in legislatures, in every branch of government, is the most enduring of all; and even that must depend on those occasions which are considered fortune. Fluency and force of speech, without much learning, but mother wit,

energy and commonalty of intelligence, are the characteristics of the American House of Representatives, as compared with other similar assemblages. Erudition, classical quotation, profound and accurate acquirements, more noise, less order, fewer rules, much less speaking talent are remarkable in the British House of Commons; very little speaking talent, more confusion, but in rare instances, a higher order of elegant oratory, in the French Chamber of Deputies. The freedom of communication between all deliberative assemblies and the public, reports of debates and their influence, have assumed much greater latitude and effect with the growing importance of this country.

There would be little interest now in the debate on Colonel Stuart's motion, which debate dwelt upon for other purposes. After the preamble was disposed of, Mr. William A. Burwell, of the aristocracy of the Virginia democracy—a Randolph, a Carter or a Burwell must have great personal superiority, said Jefferson, over a common competitor to be elected by the people—moved to commit the subject to the committee on military affairs; of which committee, Colonel Stuart, and another respectable officer of the Revolution and a federalist, Colonel Tallmadge, of Connecticut, were members, but with five of the war party which the speaker took care there should be on that committee to control it. Mr. Burwell's motion met the issue, and after it had been sufficiently discussed, by a vote of seventy-four to forty-four, mostly a party vote, it succeeded. Next day Mr. Troup, chairman of the military committee, reported that having examined the state of preparation, naval and military, they were satisfied that it was in every respect adequate, and that no measures on the part of the house were necessary to make it more complete: which was ordered to be inserted in the journal.

So we felt at the time; and feeling so, we thought so. As the enemy had not then land troops enough for the capture of Washington, perhaps it was true that we were in no danger of being surprised in the capital. But thirteen months afterwards, its conflagration—when Washington was sacked, at which time the means of defence were a hundred fold greater than during our alarm of July, 1813—proved deplorably that the assurances of General Armstrong and other military authorities to whom we looked for reliance, were grossly mistaken in their confidence. We voted at all events that the executive had not left the metro-

polis exposed to a sudden incursion, as opposition acrimoniously charged, and our party stoutly denied.

During the angry discussion, when the House was sometimes noisy, the speaker commanded silence with unusual emphasis,—“Gentlemen,” said he, “if we do arm and take the field, I am sure we shall be beat, if there is not more order kept in the ranks than in this House. I should be sorry to head so disorderly a body.” At that time, when the old generals were to be laid aside and successful juniors had not yet appeared, it was, among other devices, one of the expedients contemplated to commission Mr. Clay for the army; also Mr. John Randolph, notwithstanding his unmitigated opposition to the declaration of war. Superseded by Mr. Eppes, Mr. Randolph was not a member of the War Congress: his urgent, constant, and potent efforts to prevent the declaration, having lost him the district he so long represented. Mr. Clay in the field might have found there a theatre for his genius possibly better adapted than Congress.

Aggravating, dismal tidings from all quarters, by land and sea, far and near, and from Europe, the alarm of the 15th July, 1812, contributed to our disgrace. The enemy almost beat up our quarters at Washington; menaced Congress in the capitol; not a topic of consolation had we—nothing like one to be proud of. At last on the 27th July, it was understood at Washington that difficulties encountered by the British ships in passing a place called the Kettle-bottoms, frustrated their approach to the seat of government; and that their naval force, consisting of six line-of-battle ships, three frigates, two sloops of war, five gun brigs, nine schooners, a rocket vessel, and about fifty barges, all turned back, sailing down the river, as was thought intending to go round to Annapolis. Next day, General Van Ness' orders appeared in print dismissing and thanking the militia and volunteers who had under his command repaired to the scene of action. On the 24th July, the president had proclaimed a day of humiliation and prayer, to be observed by the people of the United States with religious solemnity, pursuant to a resolution of Congress, which originated in Senate, and passed the House on the 19th July. The same day we had the melancholy intelligence that on the British landing from their ships, taking Ocracock and Portsmouth, threatening Beaufort and Newbern, in North Carolina; Mrs. Gaston, lady of the member of the House,

fell into convulsions and expired in a few hours—such were the frightful impressions made by their predatory incursions.

Under these circumstances the session was drawing to a close. On Tuesday, the 20th July, the House again went into secret session, upon a message from the president brought by his secretary, John Graham, recommending an embargo to counteract British blockade of our ports, clandestinely licensing enemies disguised as neutrals, and insidiously discriminating between different ports of the United States, thus subjecting American commerce to British regulation and monopoly. The message was referred to the committee of Foreign Relations, in whose behalf their chairman, Mr. Calhoun, reported against the suggestion. Mr. Calhoun had always been opposed to restrictive measures. But the House went into committee on the subject; and when the speaker resumed the chair, resolved by a majority of twenty-seven to adopt the plan, and referred it to a select committee of which Felix Grundy was appointed chairman, and not a single opponent of the executive put on it. The eminent gentlemen of South Carolina, Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Cheves, and Mr. Calhoun had never been reconciled to Jefferson's restrictive system, which Madison adhered to. They all voted against a resort to it on this occasion; when Colonel Pickering voted with us for it. Next day, Mr. Grundy reported a bill conforming to the president's views; which, after a good deal of controversy, we finally passed by a majority of thirty, without one federal vote, and the South Carolinians voting against us: but it was defeated in the Senate on one of the last days of the session, which thus ended with one of the objects of government defeated in Congress; superadding one more mortification to all the rest.

Soon after Congress assembled that session, on the 31st May, 1813, Albert Gallatin, then Secretary of the Treasury, John Quincy Adams, American minister in Russia, and James A. Bayard, a Senator from the state of Delaware, were nominated envoys extraordinary to negotiate peace under the mediation of Russia. That mission will necessarily become the subject of much attention hereafter. At present it is only necessary to state that neither of these gentlemen was of the war party; Mr. Gallatin openly and anxiously against it; Mr. Adams officially declared his belief that no good could come of it; Mr. Bayard of the party which voted against, and always resisted, its declara-

tion. Two days before our special session ended, on the 31st July, 1813, Dr. Leib submitted, in Senate, a motion, decision on which was deferred till next session, when another senator of the war party, Joseph Anderson, of Tennessee, afterwards for many years first comptroller of the treasury, renewed it by a resolution that the offices of envoy extraordinary and Secretary of the Treasury are incompatible, and ought not to be united in the same person. There can be no doubt of this assertion; which however, Madison, with the inflexible tenacity of passionless men, influenced, too, probably, by the high opinion he inherited from Jefferson, of Mr. Gallatin's pre-eminant capacity, and both of them flattering themselves that the war might soon be brought to a close by some unwarlike collateral move—Madison resisted, answered a call from the Senate that the office of Secretary of the Treasury was not vacated; but in the absence of Albert Gallatin, commissioned to treat for peace, the duties of that office were performed by William Jones, Secretary of the Navy, conformably to the provisions of the act of Congress of the 8th May, 1792, and the supplement of 1795, which authorize the president to substitute another incumbent in case of death, absence, or sickness of the Secretary of the Treasury for a period not exceeding six months. Mr. Gallatin's absence was protracted beyond twenty months. But from the first the president had but the mere letter of the law. The Senate resolved that its spirit contemplated inevitable absence; and by that effective majority, one vote, the opposition being joined by Joseph Anderson, Elijius Fromentin, John Galliard, William B. Giles, Michael Leib, Samuel Smith, and Mr. Stone, all of the war party, rejected Mr. Gallatin. He was afterwards nominated when no longer Secretary of the Treasury, and confirmed; but by this operation, reduced from the front to the foot of the commission; of which, till Mr. Clay and Jonathan Russell were added, the war had not an advocate.

Mr. Gallatin's rejection was only one of numerous instances in which the president was overruled by the Senate; so much so, that many nominations and measures of his predilection were not attempted for fear of their rejection. That is a wise, if not indispensable combination which renders legislation dependent on two bodies, constituting the Congress for a republic of states, of various, often conflicting interests; a combination, moreover, wise, be-

cause it requires the deliberate concurrence of a majority of the representatives of the people with that of those of the states, before a bill can be presented to the president, by his approval to become an act of Congress ; furthermore, that is a wholesome fiat of the organic law which renders its alteration so difficult as to be well nigh impossible. But the influence of England predominated when the rubric of acts of Parliament, supposed to proceed from the king, came to be applied to the method which places the popular after the executive branch of Congress, in the title of acts of Congress : still more did this English influence prevail when, by social regulations of precedence, senators take rank of those who represent the sovereignty, as lords do commons.

CHAPTER IV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1813.—NORTH-WESTERN ARMY.—KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS.—GENERAL HARRISON.—WINCHESTER.—MASSACRE AT RIVER RAISIN.—SIEGES AT FORT MEIGS.—REPULSE AT SANDUSKY.—CROGHAN.—NAVAL BATTLE ON LAKE ERIE.—PERRY.—ELLIOTT.—BARCLAY.

HULL's surrender left the north-west in hostile possession ; more than the present state of Michigan ; and exposed the borders of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky. To recover lost ground, a large body of volunteers and militia were called out from Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and placed under the command of Brigadier-General William Henry Harrison, of the Ohio militia, who had long been the popular Governor of the north-western territories. The call to arms was met everywhere with ardour ; in Kentucky with great enthusiasm. Every one had led the frontier life, which renders a warlike order like an invitation to a hunting party. The question was not who should go, but who would stay. It was computed that as many as 15,000 Kentuckians were in the field. The people rose as one man, of all parties, callings, ages and situations. Several members of the Kentucky delegation in Congress with me served as privates, particularly Samuel M'Kee and Thomas Montgomery : Mr. Simpson, a fine young man, six feet six inches tall, member elect, was killed at the river Raisin ; Richard M. Johnson acted as volunteer aid to General Harrison, afterwards as colonel of his excellent mounted regiment, 1200 strong. Mr. Clay, though not under arms, was abroad at the musters, urging them to action, and promising that, (as after many difficulties they did,) they should retake Malden, and bring the British with them prisoners to Kentucky. His fellow citizens were to remember, he said, that they were expected to distinguish themselves, not only as Americans, but as Kentuckians too. The Ohio Senators, Thomas Worthington and Jeremiah Morrow, were also serving as com-

missioners with Governor Meigs of that State to prevail on the Indians not to take up arms against us.

A difficulty as to rank between Winchester and Harrison, both brigadiers, was adjusted at a kind of caucus, as it was called in the west, where Isaac Shelby, Judge Todd of the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Clay and others settled it, that Harrison should be commissioned major-general by Governor Scott, of Kentucky, and thus, without dispute, take his place as leader of the expedition. Some of the primordial friends of the war desired also a western board of war, to direct operations there, deemed too remote from Washington for promptly efficient management. But the Secretary of War, Armstrong, had no difficulty in convincing President Madison that this would never do.

In a short time 10,000 soldiers, nearly all volunteers and militia, excellent raw materials, were embodied. Fragments of the seventeenth regiment of regular Infantry, commanded by Colonel John Miller, and of the nineteenth regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Horne, the seventeenth a Kentucky, the nineteenth an Ohio regiment, to whom afterwards during the siege of Fort Meigs, 200 of the regular dragoons were added, were joined to Harrison's army of 10,000 men from Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia, at probably greater expense of money than the same number of men ever cost. Confidence and ardour pervading the whole, from general to private, Harrison led out this brave force, over forests, deserts, swamps, and almost insuperable obstacles for a winter campaign, doomed to be defeated in the beginning of 1813, with deplorable loss and misfortune.

The peninsula of Michigan which Hull surrendered and Harrison finally with Perry's preliminary victory reconquered, lies in conical configuration between Lakes Michigan, Huron, St. Clair and Erie, with Lakes Superior and Ontario not far distant, in marvellous communication; Green Bay, Manitouline Bay and Saginaw Bay, parts of this immense expanse of Mediterranean seas, all of them much deeper than the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, "deeper than did ever plummet sound;" so clear and transparent, most of their waters, that 200 feet below the surface is discernible; a series of lakes rising in terraces above the level of tide-water and the ocean, in incomprehensible steps of progressive altitude from Ontario to Lake Superior. The magnificent falls of Niagara and the Strait of Detroit are among the natural,

the cities of Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Erie, Sandusky, Buffalo, Rochester and Kingston of the artificial curiosities of this lake region, destined, since steam has come to control wind and water, to be seats of more extensive commerce, plied by more numerous mariners than now man the vessels of these United States, with their millions of tonnage on all the oceans of the world. The surface of Lake Huron is nearly 700 feet above the level of the ocean, while the bottom of that lake is 1100 feet in Saginaw Bay below that level. These lakes altogether are nearly nineteen degrees of latitude in breadth, by sixteen degrees of longitude in length. Their surface covers between ninety and a hundred thousand miles in extent, and they drain an area of territory of about four hundred thousand square miles. Michigan, the cabinet encircled by these frames of water, was the prize for surrendering which, without striking a blow, to an inferior force, Hull was not shot when condemned to be, to regain which Harrison pushed forward with his raw levies, on the attempt of a winter campaign in regions of impracticable difficulty.

A more gallant army than Harrison's never went to battle; the Kentucky part of it especially embraced numbers of the most estimable and considerable men of that state, and many of them veterans in Indian warfare. But seldom was discomfiture more complete or fatal than theirs. While General Harrison with the right wing was lying at Sandusky, General Winchester, commanding the left, was induced to detach Colonels Lewis and Allen, of Kentucky, to advance beyond reach of support, for the protection of the inhabitants of Frenchtown, a village on the river Raisin, which is a small stream emptying into the northwest angle of Lake Erie. The generous but unmilitary motive for this rash advance was to comply with a request of the inhabitants, who sent messages to Winchester entreating protection from Indian pillage and destruction, with which they said they were threatened. On the 18th of January, 1813, the Kentuckians, under Lewis, attacked and defeated a combined Indian and English force of 500 men under Major Reynolds, of the Canadian militia. Colonel Lewis had great experience in Indian hostilities. He had served in the campaigns of Harmer, St. Clair and Wayne, twenty years before, as well as with Governor Scott; was a man of great courage, and the favourite officer of that wing of the army. Such was the universal ardour for this expedition, that in filling the Kentucky quota

of troops to overflowing, many other veterans in Indian warfare, Simon Kenton, Bland Ballard, George Madison and others marched on this occasion. Their success at Frenchtown was so complete that it produced a degree of most unfortunate confidence in the double character of Americans and Kentuckians. The new Secretary of War, General Armstrong, sneered at what he called this *press* of valour under *popular* leaders; he never liked Harrison, and had little confidence in militia.

A good deal of bloodshed in the first essay at Frenchtown, rescuing the inhabitants from the depredations they feared, and the natural effects of complete success, flushed not only the victors themselves under Lewis, but inspired their comrades under Winchester, to almost invidious eagerness for further conflict. The news was electric at the Rapids, a few miles distant, where Winchester was. Not a man under his command could be restrained from rushing forward to join Lewis, renew his triumphs, and share their glory. General Winchester was well-disposed to lead them. He was then an elderly man, having served in the army of the Revolution; a native of Maryland, appointed from Tennessee brigadier-general of the regular army. He was a man of fortune, mild, generous, popular, and no doubt a brave man. When selected for appointment, an obscure man of that state, Andrew Jackson, desired the place given to James Winchester. But the distinguished member of Congress representing the district preferred the latter; and, as was said, because, if not put in the army, Winchester might have been a formidable candidate for Congress. On such insignificant things does the fate of men depend; and of nations. If Jackson had commanded at the Raisin, instead of Winchester, either Jackson, by being defeated, would have marred his wonderful advancement, or by heading the Lewises, Madisons, Harts, Simpsons, and other elite of Kentucky, defeated and destroyed on the 22d January, would have reversed the fortunes of that disastrous day. If so, Malden might have been retaken, the whole current of the campaign changed from a series of discomfitures, into a stream of success. Winchester was so unpopular with the Kentucky volunteers, that, when stationed, before they marched, for some time, at Lexington, prejudice against him went so far as almost to create a mutiny among these self-opinionated troops of whom he took command at Fort Wayne. For a considerable period

it required all the influence of the field officers with the men to prevail on them to submit to the order from Washington, assigning him to the command of high-spirited but insubordinate volunteers, who thought they had a right to name their own commander. By kindness, patience, and generosity, not by the energy with which Jackson would have repressed this untoward spirit, Winchester succeeded, at last, in overcoming it. When he commanded at the river Raisin, he enjoyed the good-will of his troops; but, though a brave and good officer in many respects, he was probably unequal to the perilous independent command of the day which defeated him and destroyed so many valuable lives. On the 20th January, 1813, he joined Lewis on the Raisin. His report of his advance to Harrison, reached the latter at Sandusky the 19th, with intelligence of the battle and victory of the 18th. Harrison instantly set off for Winchester's encampment at the rapids, but did not get there till Winchester was gone. Harrison followed as fast as he could, retarded by swamps almost impassable to artillery, having dispatched his Inspector-General, Captain Nathaniel Hart, to Winchester, with orders to maintain the position at the river Raisin, at any rate. Winchester had sent word to Harrison that he thought he could do so, if reinforced. Harrison accordingly forwarded reinforcements to Winchester, but they did not reach him till after his defeat. In all these proceedings, even the unpractised in military affairs perceives the want of unity, of subordination, above all, of fortune, which must combine for victory.

The weather was severe winter, in a climate of unusual rigour to our troops. The ground was covered with deep snow; yet the everlasting swamps of that region were not hard frozen. The gallant volunteers were ill provided with clothing and camp-covering; too many of the officers ignorant and negligent of indispensable precautions in the midst of an Indian country, within twenty miles of their English allies under Colonels Proctor and St. George, Major Muir, and other thorough-bred soldiers, unscrupulous of whatever means would lead to the great end of success, and relying for it chiefly on their numerous savage auxiliaries. As is generally the case, a small error or blunder, superadded to the imperfect state of the forces altogether, occasioned, probably, the terrible calamities of the battle of the 22d, and cruel massacre of the 23d January, at

the river Raisin, which will long be lamented in the accounts of western warfare. When Winchester arrived at the Raisin with some 300 men, he found Lewis with 600, posted in gardens, yards, and the enclosures within them, well prepared for any emergency. On Lewis's right was an open field bounded by another enclosure like those in which he had posted his men. With General Winchester came Colonel Wells, who, being of the regular army, outranked Colonel Lewis of the volunteers. Lewis' advice to Winchester was to post the 300 men with Wells in the enclosure on Lewis' left. To this Wells objected, requiring the right of Lewis, which General Winchester allowed him to take, in an open exposed field, instead of being under cover of the enclosures. To this slight circumstance may be attributed much of the misfortune of a fatal day. The British and Indians attacked early in the morning of the 22d January, 1813. Colonel Wells' detachment resisted, unprotected by any cover, the fierce attack of superior numbers, fought not only with unflinching bravery, but with great effect, till their ammunition began to fail; a sad deficiency which ought not to have occurred. General Winchester, who courageously commanded, ordered Wells to retire into the enclosures where Lewis was stationed. Attempting to execute this difficult movement, to withdraw in the face of a superior enemy pressing upon them, Wells' men fell into confusion. Directions to fall back into Lewis' enclosures, were mistaken for an order to retreat. Instead of falling back upon Lewis, which would have rendered them quite safe, with an officer of experience as well as courage, the bewildered men, unhappily passed over the river on the ice, and retired into the woods, towards the rapids. They were immediately, in fact constantly, pursued by the Indians, who surrounded and cut them to pieces, fighting to the last with the utmost resolution, selling their lives dearly, and inflicting on their assailants heavy loss: All of Wells' detachment were killed but twenty-eight, and about forty taken prisoners. General Winchester and Colonel Lewis, who accompanied and attempted to rally them, with the general's aid and son, were taken prisoners. The general's official account of the action, written at Malden the next day, says, that "the few of us that remained with the retreating party, borne down by numbers, at length submitted." By thus losing their two principal officers, our troops, never

more than half the number of their enemies, were not only reduced to less than 500 remaining with Major Madison within the pickets, but were deprived of their principal commanders, and at least 300 of their companions. Thus reduced, however, the remainder maintained their position with undaunted and even desperate spirit, repulsing the British regulars several times and killing many more of them than their official accounts after the battle acknowledged. The false report of the British Adjutant-General Edward Baynes, dated at Quebec the 8th February, 1813, was, that 400 took refuge in the houses of the town, and kept up a galling fire from the windows. The fact was that Madison repulsed every attack on his position, and maintained it till near noon from day-break, when the battle began; the British having suffered so severely that they deemed it necessary to resort to a stratagem in which they unhappily succeeded. Falsehood is perhaps not among the forbidden arts of war, and the mere stratagem by which the surrender of the remainder of our brave men was effected, might not be deemed contrary to the usages of legitimate hostilities. But the vile use made of, at any rate, rather an unmanly trick, calls for the strongest reprobation of a base contrivance. General Winchester was prevailed upon, when taken prisoner, from motives of humanity, to send his aid Major Overton with a flag of truce to Major Madison, with proposals for an honourable capitulation, if he would surrender. At that time the firing had so far ceased, that our men supposed that the British flag had come to propose a cessation of hostilities. General Winchester had only acceded to Proctor's proffer of an honourable capitulation, in order to save the lives of many valuable men, the flower of the citizens of Kentucky, who were with Major Madison. Proctor told him that unless they surrendered, the buildings in which they were would be immediately set on fire, and that he would not be responsible for the conduct of the Indians, who were greatly exasperated by the number of their warriors killed in the action. In this critical situation, desirous of saving the lives of the brave men with Major Madison, and expressly stipulating with Proctor that they should be protected from the savages, allowed to retain their private property, and have their side arms returned to them, Winchester yielded to Proctor's earnest solicitation, and sent Major Overton with the flag of truce to

Major Madison, who, not without great reluctance and every proper and possible precaution, finally submitted himself and his gallant comrades, prisoners of war. Between 400 and 500 men thus fell into the hands of the enemy, of whom a great many were wounded, and doomed next day to horrible assassination. The British account claims to have killed between 400 and 500 of our people; Adjutant-General Baynes, in his official report, boasting that the Indian chief, Round-head, with his band of warriors, rendered essential service by their bravery and good conduct; and that all the Americans who attempted to save themselves by flight, were cut off by the Indian warriors. It was Round-head who captured General Winchester, and delivered him to Colonel Proctor, to be the amiable and good-natured instrument of his vile contrivances.

Such was the battle of the River Raisin on the 22d of January, 1813, preceding the massacre of the next day, which covered nearly every respectable family in Kentucky with mourning, filled every generous American bosom with indignation; was visited by condign retribution at the battle of the Thames in the following October, and should forever be exposed among the detestable acts of English barbarity in that war, which, nevertheless, found disaffected Americans graceless enough if not to vindicate, at all events to palliate and rejoice over.

After the capitulation, Major Madison strongly remonstrated with the British commanding officer upon the necessity and duty of protecting the wounded American prisoners from the savages, who were hovering about like blood-hounds thirsting to prey upon them. The stipulated protection was again promised, with renewed assurances that the terms of capitulation should be faithfully and justly complied with. Next day, after General Winchester and other superior officers had been removed to Malden, when but two of the seven American surgeons survived the action of the day before, our wounded officers and men, in want of every thing and suffering the rigours of a winter, the severest almost ever known in that cold climate, (when, if they had surrendered at discretion, every dictate of humanity and principle of manhood, even without regard to articles of capitulation, required their protection,) were given up by British officers to the ruthless brutalities of the Indians, and put to death according to their most barbarous proceedings on such occasions.

Never giving or taking quarter, they make no prisoners, but exercise what is, perhaps, the sternest right of war, by putting all their captives to death. According to the regulations of civilized hostilities, this right does not exist but in case of absolute necessity for self-preservation; and under no circumstances can it be exercised with tortures, mutilation, scalping, burning, and other abominable excesses. All our prisoners were, according to promise, to have been conveyed in sleighs from the Raisin to Malden. Instead of that, every one of them unable to march, was not only murdered, but most of them tortured to death by the savages, as mischievous children torment insects by tearing them to pieces. Captain Nathaniel Hart, Mr. Clay's brother-in-law, had been wounded in the battle in the knee, and was unable to walk. He had greatly signalized himself by undaunted intrepidity. A half-breed Indian, Elliott, holding the King of England's commission, who had been a college companion of Captain Hart, promised to have him carried to Malden and there taken care of in Elliott's own house. A band of ruffian savages, nevertheless, tore him from the bed on which he was lying, and were about to kill him when he was rescued by a brother officer. Soon after, while mounted on a horse on his way to Malden, (on the 23d January,) he was shot by a party of Indians, tomahawked, and scalped, his body left on the road unburied to be devoured by hogs. The fate of many other most respectable men was similar to Captain Hart's. Nearly all our prisoners were stripped of their clothing, rifled of their money, the officers' swords given up to the savages; men of education, talents, and the highest respectability treated by British officers of every grade, from the highest to the lowest, with supercilious harshness, unmanly, ungentlemanly, and inhuman. When an American officer urged the necessity of British surgical assistance to the wounded, (as five of our seven surgeons were killed,) Elliott's execrable reply was, *the Indians are excellent doctors*. Sixty-four wounded Americans were left on the ground, under the care of Doctors Tod and Bowers, (the two surviving surgeons,) with every assurance and full reliance that they would be kindly removed in sleds next day to Malden. At sunrise, on the 23d, a large body of Indians stripped them, as they lay extended on the cold ground, tomahawked, and scalped all who were unable to march, (such was their frightful surgery,) and

took away a few surviving prisoners with them for further and more excruciating tortures. Among those assassinated, were Captains Hickman, Mead, Edwards, Price, M'Cracken, many valuable and highly respectable subaltern officers and privates, nearly all of whom were among the most considerable citizens of Kentucky. Seldom, if ever, has a greater outrage been committed. The murdered prisoners and poisoned wells imputed to Bonaparte in Egypt, were no worse than these barbarities, which are unquestionable, while the British Egyptian stories are as fabulous as many of the romances of that remote country. The unfortunate victims at Raisin were betrayed to their destruction. I incorporate with my narrative, as more authentic and particular than anything I could give, the following account from Captain M'afee. The troops within the picketing under Majors Graves and Madison, had, with Spartan valour, maintained their position, though powerfully assailed by Proctor and his savage allies. The British had posted a six-pounder behind a small house, about two hundred yards down the river, which considerably annoyed the camp till its supplies of ammunition, which were brought in a sleigh, were arrested by killing the horse and his driver. Major Graves, in passing round the lines, was wounded in the knee—he sat down, and bound it up himself, observing to his men, “never mind me, but fight on.” About ten o'clock, Colonel Proctor, finding it useless to sacrifice his men in vain attempts to dislodge this little band of heroes, withdrew his forces to the woods, intending either to abandon the contest, or to wait the return of the Indians, who had pursued the retreating party. The loss sustained by our men was inconsiderable; and when Proctor withdrew, they employed the leisure it afforded them to take breakfast at their posts.

As soon as Proctor was informed that General Winchester was taken, he basely determined to take advantage of his situation to procure the surrender of the party in the picketing. He represented to the general, that nothing but an immediate surrender would save the Americans from an indiscriminate massacre by the Indians. A flag was then seen advancing from the British lines, carried by Major Overton, one of the general's aids, and accompanied by Colonel Proctor himself and several other officers. Having halted at a respectful distance, Major Madison with Brigade-Major Garrard, proceeded to meet them, expecting

that the object of the flag was to obtain a cessation of hostilities for the British to bear off their dead. They were much mortified to find that Major Overton was the bearer of an order from General Winchester, directing the officer commanding the American forces to surrender them prisoners of war. This was the first intimation they had that their general had been taken. Colonel Proctor, with great haughtiness, demanded an immediate surrender, or he would set the town on fire, and the Indians would not be restrained in committing an immediate massacre. Major Madison observed, "that it had been customary for the Indians to massacre the wounded and prisoners after a surrender, and that he would not agree to any capitulation which General Winchester might direct, unless the safety and protection of his men were stipulated." Colonel Proctor then said, "Sir, do you mean to dictate to me?" "No," replied Madison, "I mean to dictate for myself, and we prefer selling our lives as dear as possible, rather than be massacred in cold blood." Proctor then agreed to receive a surrender on the following terms: that all private property should be respected, that sleds should be sent next morning to remove the sick and wounded to Amherstburg, on the island opposite Malden, that, in the meantime, they should be protected by a guard, and that the side arms of the officers should be restored to them at Malden.

Major Madison, after consulting with Garrard, thought it most prudent to capitulate on these terms. Half the original force was already lost; the rest would have to contend with more than three times their number; there was no possible chance of a retreat, nor any hope of a reinforcement to save them; and worst of all, their ammunition was nearly exhausted, not more than one third of a small keg of cartridges being left.

Among those who fell in the course of these two memorable days, were Colonel Allen, an eminent jurist, who would, in all probability, have been the next Governor of Kentucky, and Captain Simpson, a member of Congress elect from that state, whose tall person, six feet six inches high, was an object of great admiration for the savages, as well as too good a mark for their rifles. They gathered round his body where he lay to admire its gigantic proportions. Among the prisoners, between 4 and 500, were General Winchester, Lieutenant-Colonel William Lewis, Major George Madison, Brigade-Inspector James Garrard, Junior, Adju-

tant John M'Calla, Quarter Master Pollard Keen, Surgeon John Tod, with many officers of inferior rank.

The Wyandot Indians, who were the principal perpetrators of the butchery, were considerably advanced in civilization, many of them tolerably educated, most of them professing the Christian religion, to which their progenitors had probably been converted by French missionaries. Frenchtown was a well improved village surrounded by cultivated gardens and fields, with a church and other evidences of advancement beyond the barbarism to which they were restored by shocking English subornation.

Mr. Christie's English Narrative, published at Quebec, of the operations of the war, acknowledges, that what he calls the ungovernable ferocity of their Indian allies, on the day *after* the battle *slaughtered* such of the *wounded prisoners* as were unable to walk, "at which," he adds, "humanity revolts, while declaring that it was done in spite of the British." Proctor's official account of the action, by letter to General Sir Roger Sheaffe, dated the 25th of January, 1813, says, "that Brigadier-General Winchester was taken in the pursuit by the Wyandot chief Roundhead, who surrendered him to me. The American force posted in houses and enclosures, which, from dread of falling into the hands of the Indians, they most obstinately defended, surrendered *at discretion*. This assertion is positively false. That nothing may be wanting to the enormity of this falsehood, Adjutant-General Baynes' before mentioned report of the action, adds the aggravation, "that the gallantry of Colonel Proctor was most nobly displayed in his humane and unwearied exertions, which succeeded in rescuing the vanquished from the revenge of the Indian warriors." Finally, the Governor-General Prevost's official dispatch to Earl Bathurst, dated at Quebec, the 8th of February, and published by authority in the London Gazette of the 24th of April, 1813, contains no allusion whatever to the barbarities which took place. On the contrary, Colonel Proctor was, for the battle of the river Raisin, promoted to the rank of brigadier-general in Upper Canada, and continued in the enjoyment of his ill-got spoils, promotion and reputation for humanity as well as courage and conduct, till after his cowardly flight from the battle of the Thames, where he deserted his army, as will hereafter be shown, his baggage, his dispatches and his spoils, and disgracefully escaped with only seventeen men to Burlington heights; when,

but not till then, he was reprimanded and publicly dishonoured in October, by the same governor-general who applauded and promoted him in February. Retribution for his crimes was not long deferred, and inflicted by his own superiors. If they had condemned and rebuked the massacre at the river Raisin, at the moment, as it required, it would have been much more deserving the boasted British character for honour and humanity. Christie, always more candid than the English official accounts, says, "that Proctor having represented to his prisoner, Winchester, whom he received soon after the commencement of the action, from the hands of the Wyandot chief Roundhead, that *no responsibility would be taken for the conduct of the Indians*, Winchester was induced thereby to send a flag of truce to his men, and agreed on their part to surrender, upon condition of their being protected from the fury of the savages, and allowed to preserve their private property." It is therefore no American misrepresentation of the transaction, as it actually occurred, but the truth as confessed by English history, well known to British officers at the time, that a vile falsehood prefaced an execrable massacre, contrary to the rules of war, and the feelings of humanity, for which the perpetrator was promoted from the command of a regiment to that of a brigade, received the thanks of his commanding officers for humanity, and was (for to be sure, but a brief period) the hero of a military achievement. Mr. Christie adds, "that Proctor's promotion by Prevost until the pleasure of the prince-regent should be known, was approved and confirmed by that great dispenser of British power and favour. At the same time the Canadian Assembly by resolution voted their thanks to Proctor for the exemplary humanity displayed by him in the moment of victory, which," Mr. Christie thinks "would not have been done if the assembly had been aware of the facts."

Is it ungenerous to doubt whether they would have hesitated? Until the overthrow of Napoleon enabled England to fill Canada, and indeed cover North America from Montreal to New Orleans, with British troops, the main reliance of her officers in Canada, for saving that province from conquest, was the use of those savages, who, in both her wars upon the United States, have furnished her most considerable and formidable power. The Canadian Assembly was part of the government which by Indian instrumentality preserved the province from conquest. When, therefore, the first steps were taken in the wicked employment of

the savages, national passions excited, and prejudices enlisted, suppressing the truth was but an insignificant aggravation of the original offence. In the British accounts of the Canadian war, savage instrumentality is scarcely disguised, and always perceptible. History has no more solemn duty to perform than to expose such cruelty to universal abhorrence. It has been a principal part of all English hostilities against their American kindred ever since denounced by Chatham in 1777, in the House of Lords, "as warfare of the tomahawk and scalping knife, worse than that of blood-hounds, atrocities degrading the pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war, which makes ambition virtue." Though thus denounced in the solemn assembly of British nobles, prelates and princes, of course, therefore, well known to the English government, it seems to be impossible that it can be known to a people, who have long since by negotiations, great expenditures and almost in arms, been labouring to put an end to the slave trade, certainly a much less atrocious national violation of humanity.

The brave Kentuckians, captured and disarmed by artifice and falsehood, preserved to the last their spirits unbroken. General Winchester, Colonel Lewis and Major Madison were sent prisoners to Quebec and remained a long time in captivity. Besides courage and constancy, the Kentucky volunteers always displayed a cheerful endurance of hardship and privation, a buoyancy of spirit and alacrity for duty, deserving of especial applause. They had been long encamped under trying circumstances, before marched to the unhappy end of their campaign on the Raisin.

The left wing of the northwestern army under General Winchester, after relieving Fort Wayne, in September, moved down to the site of old Fort Defiance, where these troops built Fort Winchester. That wing was composed exclusively of Kentucky volunteers and regulars. There they remained until November, and built pirogues, or large canoes, for the transportation of baggage on the Maumee down to the Rapids. To pass some shoals, however, the army moved down the river about six miles, and encamped at what was afterwards called camp No. 3. At that camp the volunteers received the clothing which their friends in Kentucky had prepared for them, the weather being then very cold; a supply doubly acceptable, as coming in such good time, but more especially as having been the spontaneous product of

the affection and regard of the matrons and young women of their native homes. There was one regiment of regulars at the camp whose clothing had not arrived. Although there was both ice and snow, and very cold weather, they were in their linen fatigue dresses. The officers of the volunteers proposed to General Winchester, and even generously insisted on being allowed to do all the camp and detachment service, and to permit the destitute regulars to remain by their fires, and do nothing but provide their own fuel, until they were supplied with winter clothing, which was done, and cemented the good feeling existing between the two services to a high degree.

The troops were picketed at camp No. 3, and remained there awaiting supplies to enable them to advance, which never came. At one time the whole left wing at No. 3 were fourteen days without the slightest supply of flour, the ration consisting of one and a half pounds of beef alone: and that beef was the carcasses of cattle killed in a state of famine to prevent their natural death. Hickory roots, elm bark and beech nuts made up the ration.

About the 8th January orders were issued to march to the Rapids. That march was made through a snow twenty-seven inches on a dead level. On the march those brave men harnessed themselves to sleighs and drew their baggage. On arriving at the rapids, after remaining a day or two, orders were given for the advance to the river Raisin; also through deep snow, or over ice on the border of the lake. They marched 18 miles the first day and 18 miles by 3 o'clock the second day, went at once into action, and kept it up until 6 o'clock.

On the 22d of January, until the order was given to surrender, the soldiers who remained in the pickets believed that they had won the day, and were rejoicing at it. When informed of the true state of the case, and that they were prisoners of war, many of them loudly refused to obey, others shed tears of rage; some broke their guns over the pickets behind which they were standing.

When at Malden, news of the massacre of their wounded comrades reached them, disarmed, the scene was terrible. Two or three had left brothers behind them, who they thus knew were butchered, and all lost dear friends or comrades. It was

a scene of such poignant but manly grief and rage as might have been expected from such men in such a situation.

After being detained in Malden four days they were conducted by Detroit, over Lake St. Clair, to the mouth of the Thames, up which they marched 90 miles, thence across to and down Grand River to Lake Ontario and to Fort George, all the time through snow and very cold weather, where they were paroled not to serve until exchanged, and put across to Fort Niagara. Hence the late prisoners travelled to Buffalo, to Erie, to Pittsburgh, and down to Maysville in Kentucky, and home, having marched, during the campaign, a round of about 1300 miles.

General Harrison was warmly censured and defended for not immediately advancing to avenge General Winchester's defeat, when he met some of the fugitives escaping from the action. The secretary of war, Armstrong, who never omitted a fling at him, said that Harrison and Proctor were always the terror of each other, and mostly without cause. As an act of humanity, Harrison might have run every risk to hasten to the banks of the river Raisin. But, as a military commander, with all the responsibility of a critical predicament, without personal apprehension, he might well hesitate to go. That consideration often deters the bravest men. General Harrison, always brave, was seldom bold; and if, when he considered the case desperate, he had advanced, that very sentiment would have prevented his success, and might have much increased the disaster. The whole frontier and campaign were in his charge. If his defeat or capture had been superadded to that of Winchester, the campaign would have ended by laying bare the frontiers of Ohio and Pennsylvania to Indian depredations and probably extensive devastation.

Retreating therefore to his post on the Miami, he went to work to fortify it by the title of camp Meigs; all further advance into the enemy's territories being necessarily abandoned for the present. Instead of invading and retaking Michigan, American hostilities were reduced to defending the western states from invasion by the allied English and Indians, for which purpose Fort Meigs was a useful, if not indispensable rampart. By Winchester's defeat and the failure of Harrison's winter campaign, to whatever causes attributable, and whoever was to blame, if any one, more than the inexperience of most of the commanding officers, and the rawness of all the troops, the whole character of

hostilities was reversed, and we were thrown back upon the defensive, until Perry gained his victory upon Lake Erie. Fort Meigs, by General Harrison's direction, was skillfully constructed by Colonel Wood, an excellent engineer, killed next year at the boldest and most brilliant exploit of the whole northern war,—the sortie under General Brown from Fort Erie. General Harrison withstood two sieges in Fort Meigs, of which the president in his annual message to Congress, when we met in December that year, made the usual felicitous display for a state paper not abounding in materials for public exultation. But I shall not dwell upon those passive sieges, because though there were occurrences there deserving recollection, yet others are now at hand of more importance, particularly an American victory on land which took place the 2d of August, 1813, the last day of the first session of Congress that year, that seemed to be a turning point in the fortunes of our warfare in the west; for with Croghan's success English reverses began which led to their expulsion from that region. Fort Meigs was besieged by Proctor and Tecumseh, with several thousand English and Indians approaching by land and water, who, after many days bombardment, were compelled to retire. Indians, even under so valiant a leader as Tecumseh, are of little use for besieging a fortified place; and without the Indians, the English seldom performed much. On the 5th of May, General Green Clay arrived in the neighbourhood of Fort Meigs with twelve hundred fresh Kentucky militia, destined, like those in January, to partial success, and then great discomfiture. They were ordered by General Harrison to attack the British redoubts on one side of the river, in concert with a sortie from Fort Meigs, which vigorously assailed the enemy on the other side. The sortie was headed by Colonel John Miller, of the 19th regiment of regulars, afterwards Governor of Missouri, who was a member with me of the twenty-seventh Congress. General Harrison's plan on this occasion was not only good but well executed, but for one of those misfortunes which seemed to be inseparable from our arms until to superabundant bravery our men added knowledge of the art of war. Obedience, subordination, unity of action in different corps are lessons to be learned by the bravest men, without which, success in arms is extremely problematical. General Harrison's orders to Clay's corps were positive to make their way into Fort Meigs as soon as they drove the English

from the position assigned for their attack. Both the attacks succeeded completely. Miller with the regulars gallantly stormed the redoubts on one side, while the Kentucky militia with equal celerity drove the British and Indians before them on the other side. But eager to pursue the Indians, and disregarding their orders, they strayed so far in pursuit of the retreating enemy as to allow Proctor and Tecumseh to intercept, surround, and overcome them. One half their number was either killed or taken. Not more than a moiety of General Clay's troops made good their arrival at Fort Meigs. Thus another reverse was the result of rash confidence, and want of discipline, the insensibility of inexperienced troops to the vital importance of implicit obedience, perhaps on this, as on many other occasions, to the want of that energetic control by a commander, without which, even discipline and obedience often fail. Hitherto war had been confined to the sorry endeavour to defend the country from invasion, while its numerical and physical power, if well directed, was able to have made itself felt in large conquests of extensive foreign territories.

General Harrison, leaving Fort Meigs in charge of General Clay, busied himself during the rest of the summer of 1813 elsewhere in further preparations to recover the ground which Hull lost, and he would hardly have been able to regain, but for the capture of the British fleet on the lake; for which Captain Perry was building vessels at Erie, in Pennsylvania; the British fleet under Commodore Barclay holding the undisputed command. Nearly two summers, an autumn and spring of gloomy discomfitures and wretched mismanagement had occurred since the declaration of war, with scarce one solitary gleam of relief by land, where our strength and English weakness were supposed to be. At length, on the day Congress adjourned, the 2d August, 1813, our first success in the northwest broke out from unexpected circumstances. Harrison had stationed a very young captain of the regular army, George Croghan, with a few also very young companions, about 150, in a weak fort called Fort Stephenson, on lower Sandusky, a place not well chosen for the purpose, whose young commander was left in it with perplexing orders. Croghan's orders from Harrison were to abandon the fort, should the enemy approach in force, with cannon, and retreat, should retreat then be practicable. Proctor and Tecumseh advanced upon Fort Stephenson in such force that to retreat was much more hazardous

than to remain. Captain Croghan, however, required no such dilemma to induce his answering Proctor's summons with defiance. By this time the savages had become the boast, as well as the power of General Proctor, who sent to Croghan the hackneyed menace of indiscriminate slaughter by ungovernable Indians, if the fort was not surrendered without assault. The brave young commander answered that it was his duty to defend it and that he should do his duty. The bearer of the summons to surrender was the half-breed Elliott, who said at the massacre on the Raisin, that Indians are excellent surgeons. Hull's dread of them produced his deplorable surrender a year before. Vile use made by Proctor, with Elliott's aid, of the terror of the savages was attended by fatal consequences at the river Raisin. But this contrivance had no effect at Fort Stephenson.—There was but one cannon in that poor fort, which required great good management and good fortune, as well as calm courage, to defend it and repulse the assault, as was admirably done. In the broad day-light of a dog-day sun, it was attempted, with the confidence then become habitual with the British soldiery, who had, as yet, never failed, by force or fraud, to vanquish our people. Deserted by their savage allies, who are of little use for storming forts, the English were gallantly and profanely led to the assault by Lieutenant-Colonel Short, cheering on his followers, with oaths, to give no quarter to the Americans. By a well-directed discharge of their solitary cannon, reserved till the proper moment, the assailants were so many of them killed, that their repulse was complete, and our victory instantaneous. Proctor and Tecumseh then led their forces back to Malden. Small as this harbinger of our successes in the northwest was, it was hailed with great and general gratification. The author of the manifesto of the causes and character of the war, Mr. Dallas, was my communicant of the news, as I was his next year of the victory at New Orleans to him.

During the affair at Fort Stephenson, General Harrison, a humane and kindly disposed man, never confident, much less sanguinary, was distressed at Fort Meigs by apprehensions for the result. The enemy's force was so superior, and the young men in charge of the fort so inexperienced, that he feared the worst consequences.

Six weeks after that beginning, Perry's capture of the British

fleet on Lake Erie, opened the way to Harrison's capture of Proctor on the Thames, and the relief of the entire west from British thralldom; except, however, Mackinaw, which they continued to hold. An expedition for its recapture by Croghan failed for want of adequate force, without coming to blows; and need not, therefore, be more than thus cursorily mentioned.

Two of the most distinguished American authors, Washington Irving, in the *Analectic Review*, and Fenimore Cooper, in his *Naval History*, have described the battle on Lake Erie; of which also many other accounts are in print. It would be superfluous, therefore, to attempt more than some gleaning after those abundant harvests of history. From the moment that Captain Perry, by order of Commodore Chauncey, commander-in-chief of the lakes, repaired to Lake Erie, his conduct was uniformly marked by industry, activity, courage, discretion, and the success such qualities seldom fail to yield. From first to last the superiority of American to British seamen was conspicuous. Perry, then twenty-seven years of age, was a volunteer from the sea to the lake service, in search of distinction. With indefatigable attention and excellent judgment, he built, equipped, armed, manned, and got his fleet upon the water, with great expedition, resolution, and adroitness in the face of a superior enemy, having command of the lake, blockading Erie, the town where Perry's squadron was prepared for service, and where a more enterprising, or more fortunate or strenuous enemy would have confined or destroyed it. There were several feet less water on the bar at Erie than were required to float the American vessels out of port, which was, nevertheless, accomplished, in spite of the British, by admirable contrivance, boldness, and seamanship. No sooner afloat than Perry offered battle several times, always declined by his antagonist, though the British force was superior. There were 500 men in the British squadron, against 400 in the American. Perry and many of his men were disqualified by lake sickness, and when they captured the British squadron, there were more British prisoners than Americans to take charge of them. It has been contended, in disparagement of Perry's merits, that but few of the British crews were full seamen, many of them Canadians, and the marines artillerists taken from the forts. But they had the advantage of much longer service on the lake, than either Perry or his men, some of whom were volunteers

from shore, and none of them practised in lake navigation. There were six more cannons in the British than in the American fleet; the British metal was probably heavier, so it was always believed, till that point has been latterly brought into question, and their gunpowder was much better. Still, in this, as in every other naval engagement throughout the war, the superiority of American gunnery was obvious. How can it be otherwise, between those accustomed to the constant use of firearms, if the inhabitants of frontiers, living by them; and Englishmen, of whom numbers are punished every year, by the severe penalties of the game laws, for using arms at all? Nor was there as much alacrity in the English squadron as in the American to come to action. It is not certain that the war would not have ended on Lake Erie, as it did on Lake Ontario, without any naval engagement, owing to the British marine declining that trial, if the British commander on Lake Erie had not been constrained to put out from Malden, and risk a general action. By remaining there, leaving Perry in command of the lake, the English forces became straitened for supplies, and Captain Barclay had no option but to put out and fight, when he encountered his opponent. Odious comparisons of these two brave commanders are unnecessary, and were never introduced by American notices of their conflict. On the 9th September, Barclay sailed forth. As soon as Perry heard of it, on the 10th, he also made sail from Put-in-Bay, where his fleet was at anchor. As the fleets neared each other, the wind was unfavourable to Perry, who went to battle leaving his enemy the advantage of the weather-gage. A fortunate change of wind during the anxious moments of approximation gave to Perry that advantage which he was willing to forego. He was much younger than the English commander, who had learned his duties under Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar, where that heroic admiral executed the master-stroke of British naval superiority by breaking through the opposing fleet, cutting it asunder and subjecting it to still greater disadvantage than a hostile army must undergo from being out-flanked and beset at the same moment rear and front. Perry and his young comrades had never seen the effect of a broadside. The whole art of naval combat by fleets was a mystery to them. But their enthusiasm was guided by that calmness which is the life of hostilities, and from first to last on that glorious day,

good fortune never failed to attend their noble daring. Perry's ship, leading into action, for a long time bore the brunt. When completely disabled, most of the crew killed or wounded, guns dismounted, equipments dismantled, the vessel a mere unmanageable wreck, Perry himself, without a scar, under the influence of one of those revelations of genius, which are decisive, got into his boat and had himself rowed, through showers of musketry, to Elliott's ship, which had not been injured. In that uninjured vessel, after a short consultation between those two young commanders, Perry, with the blessing of a favourable breeze just then springing up, made for and broke through the enemy's line, firing broadsides right and left with great effect. At the same time Elliott, by similar boldness, got into his boat and rowing through a shower of balls which covered him with their splashing in the water, instantly brought up the smaller vessels from their distant places to support their commander. In a very minutes the whole British fleet was subdued. The same afternoon Perry dispatched his classically short and pregnant letters to General Harrison and the secretary of the navy. A month afterwards, on the 8th October, 1813, the Canadian Commander-in-Chief Prevost's official letter to Bathurst, the Colonial Secretary, makes the remarkable acknowledgment that all Prevost then knew of the defeat of the British squadron on Lake Erie was derived from the American account of it, "the only one," says the English commander, "I can expect to receive for a great length of time, in consequence of the dangerous situation of Captain Barclay, and of the death, wounds, or captivity of *all* the officers serving under him."

Barclay took his fleet out of port to fight, because otherwise, Perry deprived the English forces of supplies. Perry instantly led out his, despising the nautical superstition that Friday is unlucky. He saw, or thought he saw, an eagle soaring above his masts, on whose lofty tops the flag of his country waved in western sunshine, cheerful acceptance of the omen.

Commodore Barclay's official dispatch, dated at Put-in-Bay, Lake Erie, 12th Sept. 1813, was not published in the London Gazette till the 8th of February, 1814. At a public ball given to him at Terrebonne, in Canada, on the 20th of April, Barclay's just and manly toast was "*Commodore Perry, the gallant and generous enemy.*" The candour and feeling of that brave man

were contrasted with the misconduct of Captain Carden, and many other British officers placed in a similar situation. Barclay dared to speak the truth, which was no small daring to the British government and people. His official account of the battle, not merely confessed the reluctance with which he engaged in it, but pleaded the small number of experienced British seamen in his squadron, and the extreme scarcity of provisions, with which both the land and naval forces of the English in that quarter were straitened. He was obliged, in short, he said, to relieve himself and them from blockade by Perry's squadron. In fact, we were indebted to Major-General Proctor for the capture of Barclay's fleet. Urged by scarcity, and by Proctor, whose instructions Barclay was directed to consult, and whose wishes he was enjoined to execute, the English commodore ventured forth to the necessity, as he owned, of risking a battle. His object was to bring Perry to action among the islands, which was frustrated by the fortunate change of wind, shifting the weather-gage from the English to the American squadron. Barclay's fleet fired for thirty minutes before Perry returned a shot. The day was against the American commodore in the British commodore's opinion, when the Englishman witnessed the American transferring his flag on which was inscribed, "*Don't give up the ship!*" from his own disabled brig to the fresh and uninjured one of Captain Elliott, his second in command. But Lieutenant George Inglis, who took command when Barclay was obliged to go below, was soon compelled to say that the British flag was struck when he and Captain Barclay just before thought they had the best of the action..

Thoughtful men of mature age, like Harrison, though not fearing danger or death, still dread the responsibility of decision and the disgrace of failure. Young men, like Croghan, Perry and Elliott, fear nothing, but brave at once, both the responsibility and the danger. Yet in all their conduct, old heads were united with young hearts. As the professional particulars of their conflict are vividly explained by Mr. Irving and Mr. Cooper, nothing remains for commemoration but some of its philosophy and patriotism. From first to last there was, as it were, special Providence in the whole contest on Lake Erie, by no means concluded in national vindication with the victory. Then came the young victor's noble rebuke of British inhumanity. Christie says,

“the prisoners were landed at Sandusky and treated with the gratest humanity by the American commodore, who paroled Captain Barclay, and treated that gallant officer with all the kindness and attention which his unsuccessful bravery deserved.” The bones of the wounded American prisoners murdered in cold blood at Frenchtown, the day after they surrendered to English captors, were bleaching, exposed, unburied on the banks of the Raisin. The common decency of burial had been denied the brave victims of that massacre. The day after the battle on the lake, the American and English wounded were alike and together soothed by every kindness and nursed by suitable attendants. The dead of both nations were interred on the next Sunday in a common grave. Military honours were performed at their funeral. Religious rites consecrated their consignment to the earth. After the English left the victims of their massacre on the Raisin to putrefy on the earth, for hogs to mutilate still further, Colonel Johnson with a detachment of his regiment, in June, gathered and buried them. As Governor Shelby returned with the Kentucky levies, in October, after Harrison's victory of the Thames, the detestable barbarism was discovered of the murdered Kentuckians having been dragged from their graves and once more exposed on the surface of the ground; they were again, for the second and last time, under Shelby's superintendence, gathered and interred.

Mr. Washington Irving, in his account of the naval engagements between the United States and Great Britain, without direct disparagement of his countrymen, indirectly does them injustice by not contrasting their uniform humanity and gentlemanly kindness, with the rough, supercilious, and often cruel behaviour which marked the English officers. Not to mention these circumstances would be to suppress the truth of history, and the just characteristics of kindred nations brought into national collision. Making every allowance for the prejudices which must necessarily obscure such a topic, it is nevertheless undeniable, that, in general, the English were haughty, harsh, and sometimes cruel; while the Americans were hardly ever, if ever so. Especially is this vindication of the American character appropriate, whenever western or frontier Americans, particularly Kentuckians, came to blows with the English. The Kentuckians were mentioned in all English accounts as barbarians, not much less fero-

cious than the Indians. Yet certainly their breeding and humanity were superior to the English. May habitual European insolence and habitual American reverence be imputed to arrogated superiority of the old world, and assumed inferiority of the new? Never afraid to fight their foes, the Americans seemed, nevertheless, over anxious for their good will, and solicitous of their condescension. Commodore Barclay's official account of his defeat ascribes it, mainly, to the want of British seamen, and the substitution of Canadians in their places; when certainly, the Canadian boatmen, for lake service, are much better qualified, and the American seamen more active, intelligent, enterprising, tractable and sober than the boasted British mariner. National comparison may have, at least, the salutary effect of satisfying Americans that they are equal to Englishmen; a conviction which, till the war of 1812, had but little foothold in this country, was derided in Great Britain, and discountenanced throughout Europe.

Mr. Christie angrily and effectually rebukes and disproves the preposterous English arrogance which assigns to all mankind, even Welshmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen, (not only Germans, Spaniards, Frenchmen and Americans,) inferiority to Englishmen, arrogance to which too many Americans yield. Christie says, "that the provincial officers compelled to fall into the rear of those of the royal navy, were uniformly successful, and not excelled by any thing performed on the lakes by the officers of the navy who superseded the provincial officers. The former were, perhaps, superior in tactics, and cherished a hearty, though mistaken contempt for the Americans, in which they have been since woefully undeceived. The provincial officers were surely not less brave, though more prudent than the former, and as things have turned out, our fleets on Lakes Erie and Champlain might as well have been entrusted to provincial, as navy officers. The former with one or two exceptions, have been always more successful on the lakes than the latter." Such is the sentiment of a British subject on the unworthy attempt to depreciate the victory on Lake Erie because won over Canadian not British seamen. National vanity is often the worst of national prejudices.

Long after Perry's success, controversy arose between detractors and supporters of Captain Elliott, as to his share in the Lake Erie triumph. Harrison and Johnson's respective adherents have also contested the merit of suddenly suggesting the charge of

cavalry by which the latter accomplished the former's victory at the Thames: idle and invidious controversies. Hamilton's indiscreet admirers would deprive Washington of the merit of his farewell address to his countrymen. Cannot the invidious and envious see that great occasions yield credit enough for all parties to them; and that each diminishes his own by begrudging or disparaging another's? The debasing infatuation of envy, Horace says, characterizes mediocrity; and Ovid calls it its own executioner. Perry's success by water, which superinduced Harrison's by land, broke down the Indian and English alliance, and relieved the whole west from farther molestation. In such achievements there is glory enough for all participants. The scale of operations was smaller, the fleets and troops less numerous than in the great conflicts of European hostilities. But territories were freed from molestation more extensive than the islands of Great Britain.

The naval action on Lake Erie abounded in dramatic incidents, with most of which, however, the public are familiar. Friday, 10th Sept., 1813, was a clear day of western sunshine. The lake was placid, with a gentle ripple at first, afterwards increasing with the wind to greater undulations of the waves. The British ships were all fresh painted, their canvas perfectly white as displayed to the wind, and as they approached the American squadron, fine English bands of music played Rule Britannia. When the British bugle sounded for action, the crews of their vessels gave loud huzzas; cheering throughout the action, as they generally do more than ours. On board the British commodore's ship, the *Detroit*, there were three Indian warriors, making their first essay in naval combat. They were placed in the round tops, with rifles, to pick off the American officers. It was a bright cloudless morning, and the savages took their novel stations with great ardour for the kind of bloodshed they delight in. The action beginning with the fleets considerably separated, rifle shooting was of no use, while broadsides reverberated over the waters and cannon balls whistled through the rigging too near the Indians for their encouragement; they therefore went down upon the deck. That, when the vessels closed, was a still more dangerous position, covered with dead and wounded, broken spars and dismantled equipments. The three warriors went below, where they were found concealed by the American officer who

took possession of the Detroit. Her colours were nailed to the mast, and were with some difficulty taken down by the Americans extracting the nails. There was also a large bear on board that vessel, which was found in the enjoyment of lapping the blood from her decks after the battle.

Thus by the heroism and good fortune of a young man, Oliver Hazard Perry, of Rhode Island, whose father Captain Christopher Perry, commanded the frigate General Greene in the war of the Revolution, and whose two brothers were at the time of this victory serving on board the frigate President, was the tide of American success in the northwest, turned at once from ebb to flood. Without a spar when he began to cope with a commanding British squadron on Lake Erie, Perry raised a fleet from the surrounding forests, and in a single summer extinguished forever the power of Great Britain on the American lakes, and liberated forever several of these United States from Indian molestation. The three Secretaries of the Navy during that war, Hamilton, Jones and Crowninshield, had, no one of them, adequate ideas of our commanding the lakes. General Armstrong boasted that he suggested it. Whoever did so, it was Perry by whom the achievement was performed; for his complete triumph did not stop with Erie, but shed its encouraging influences on Ontario and Champlain. Since the battle of Lake Erie, Great Britain has expended large sums; constructed the Welland and Rideau canals, and what Perry could not then conceive, steam has unlocked the waters of America to wonderful navigation. Europe and America, then a month or more, are now only a fortnight or less apart; Liverpool and Bristol draw nigh the seaports of Cleveland, Detroit and Mackinaw.

Such is reality and history. What will fiction and romance make of the lake regions for the part which their wonderful destinies hereafter are unfolding? A naval engagement, by considerable fleets, many hundred miles from the high seas, on the vast fresh water Mediterranean oceans of this continent signalized the seamanship and enterprize of two kindred people. They spoke the same language, their complexion was the same. Thousands of red warriors anxiously awaited the issue on the surrounding shores; which, for the distance of a hundred miles heard the reports of their broadsides, carried by water over that great space. While these hordes of red savages listened all around for who

should be their masters, another race, of a different colour from either, neither white nor red, but black, was also awaiting elsewhere the result as decisive of their fate. May not romance and poetry find pathos and legend in these occurrences? From the copper mines of Lake Superior, through Huron, Michigan, and Erie, to the rushing falls of Niagara, what regions for industry, for history, and for poetry! The liminary St. Lawrence, flowing north, while almost every other great river of this continent pursues a southern course, seems to declare itself a British stream; a world of magnificent waters and territories, yet to be disputed between Great Britain and the United States, but whose innumerable millions of inhabitants are all to speak English, extending from Nova Scotia to Oregon, thence to the Gulf of Mexico. As industry improves this new world, history will tell of its original inhabitants, and poetry embellish the accounts. Two hundred years before Perry and Barclay fought on Lake Erie, an Indian tradition, as narrated by Walk-in-the-water, a Wyandot chieftain, preserves the particulars of a naval engagement there, as follows —not more legendary than most histories.

CHAPTER V.

WALK-IN-THE-WATER'S TRADITION OF THE INDIAN NAVAL ENGAGEMENT ON LAKE ERIE.

THE Wyandots are considerably advanced in civilization, familiar with much of its arts, manners and customs. They are Roman Catholic Christians, converted probably by early French missionaries, to that persuasion. In 1813, they had a fine steepled church at Sandwich, opposite to Detroit. Many of their head men had been at Washington, as well as at the Canadian seats of refined life, with which they were not unacquainted. The English provincial authorities had long courted their alliance, and they were decided in adhesion to their father, the King of Great Britain, who supplied them with arms, and other objects of desire. Their language is unlike that of all the other tribes of the west, which appear to be dialects of the same tongue. But that of the Wyandots is peculiar to themselves, not a word common to the rest. One of its singularities is, that it is without labials, so that they speak always with the mouth open. In other respects, like all savages, the Wyandots resemble all mankind in attachment to roving, warring, and idle life. Like the rest, too, they are addicted to merriment, jocularity and good cheer. A vein of irony, with touches of European allusion, in the following narrative, may be ascribable to others than the Wyandot chief. The substance, however, especially the facts of an elopement, war, naval engagement and the national results are Walk-in-the-water's own story.

More than two hundred snows ago, (about the time of the earliest English settlements in Virginia and Massachusetts, before Pennsylvania, or most of the other states were occupied but by Indians), the Wyandot nation dwelt on the northern side of Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, in the portion of Canada stretching from Kingston to Toronto; at least their hunting grounds extended over that space, embracing in their range the Falls of Niagara. The Seneca Indians then inhabited

the eastern or southern side of that river and lake, in what are now the western counties of the state of New York. The Wyandots and Senecas were too near neighbours not to be enemies. They quarreled about fishing grounds, game preserves, and other subjects of dispute, which produced frequent hostilities, and continual animosity, till at the time before mentioned exterminating war broke out, and closed with the destructive naval action on Lake Erie, of which that of Perry and Barclay drew this traditionary account from Walk-in-the-water.—The cause of this fatal and final struggle, was the same which brought sin into the world with all its woes, the same which inspired Homer's Iliad, the same which led Louis the Fourteenth to ravage the fairest parts of Germany, the cause of much of the troubles of mankind—an unchaste woman. The wife of a Seneca chief enamoured a Wyandot warrior. In summer he paddled his canoe, in winter he crossed on the ice over the waters, mostly by night, to visit this squaw. Tall and straight, with long black hair, the only covering of her neck and person to the waist, a girdle of deer skin was her whole dress, bear's grease her cosmetic, bone bracelets and shells her few ornaments. Her feet were as large as those which ancient statues attribute to goddesses contrary to modern taste. She painted freely—several coats. Water was her looking-glass, and smoking her chief recreation. She was cook, gardener, nurse and chamber-maid; what little vegetable food was used in the family she sowed, gathered, boiled and dished; sewed hides with fish bones, ground Indian corn between stones in her lap, of which she had not much, as she wore no petticoats or shift. Her Wyandot lover was marked all over by figures of birds, beasts, and reptiles, indelibly burned into his skin by red hot charcoal. His ears were cut so as to be hung with much larger pendants than ladies can attach to the ear not prepared in that way. He had large pendants at his nose, too; feathers in tufts on his head, and sometimes so fastened to his person behind as to look like the tail of a pheasant or peacock. He was as vain of dress as George the Fourth, whose best years, after the vices of youth, were spent in devising ornaments either for persons, furniture, or houses. The pretext for the Wyandot's visits to the woman he had seduced, was gambling with her husband, of which high-bred entertainment they were passionately fond. With pebbles and shells for dice, they played for bear's meat and deer

skins, till at one excited bout the Seneca staked his wife, and the Wyandot won her. The Seneca refused to pay this debt of honour. The Wyandot challenged him to fight with stone tomahawks, stone headed arrows, or any other weapons at any distance the Seneca might choose, to whom belonged the choice of time, place and instruments. Instead of personal satisfaction, however, the affair took a worse turn. The lover administered philters to the unconscious female in snake soup, of which she was fond. He had besides consulted the stars and operated on her nervous system by sorcery and signs; and so undermined or overcome her fidelity, that one stormy night in the dead of winter she eloped with him. She was neither young nor handsome, had several surviving children, besides some she had drowned with her husband's help, because they were born weak or ugly; and was of that mature age when elegant and educated ladies leave their husbands and children to elope with lovers. Vagaries of love are less the resort of the young and handsome, than their elders, and increase with age in both sexes. The Queen of England lately conferred a dukedom on an old woman for clandestine union with her uncle the Duke of Sussex. The late devout kings of Prussia and Holland, both set their adult children the example of marrying contrary to law. In the illegitimate connection of the Wyandot chief with the Seneca married woman, there was nothing unusual. The lover plucked his beard with more than usual attention, so as to leave not a hair on his chin, cut the hair from his head, all except the coronal lock which gracefully fell in plaits down his back, tied up his stomach tight, so as to mortify hunger, put on snow-shoes to prevent sinking in that hindrance, and every way prepared for a long journey, carried off the squaw while her husband was abroad and the children asleep. Before his return the guilty couple were far away towards the north-west.

The flight of the lovers was through vast forests, deep paved with snow, leafless, storm shaken, and to all but lovers, might have seemed cold and dreary. But the runagates slept happily on their bear skin, and took long walks with short rests, out of reach of any combination of pursuers. They reposed one night at the Falls of Niagara. That magnificent mist was then environed by various forms of waters frozen into innumerable sparkling and grotesque crystalizations. Icicles of immense size hung from

the precipice glittering with prismatic brilliancy. The eternal roar of the waterfall was deadened by sharp cold, though the air was more resonant than usual. All was vast solitude of interminable desert, the wind moaning through the leafless branches of gigantic trees: vast solitude, and awful silence. No human being, bird, reptile, or beast was seen or heard. How long had that prodigious waste of water been tumbling, unknown to science and to admiration? Had Esquimaux, or other Northmen, ever strayed around the marvellous cascade? Had the mammoth or the mastodon drunk of the stream, or even the eagle perched on the crags? The Wyandot scarcely looked at it; he had often been there before. To the squaw it was a new scene. But amazement is an emotion which barbarism and politeness coincide in never betraying: the same rule of action exists for the stupid and the elegant. The Indian lovers spread their bear skin on the snow, and slept undisturbed by wonder, cold, or any thought but of pursuit, which they assured each other was not to be apprehended. Learning or luxury had not enlightened or unnerved them. After a short repose they set off again on their journey, keeping along the northern side of Lake Erie, with such constant swiftness, that before long they reached St. Clair, crossed the strait on the ice, were welcomed by the Potawattomies to their settlements, with whom the Wyandot had met on hunting excursions; and for several weeks the lovers did little else but sleep, the great enjoyment and chief occupation of savages after any exploit or excitement.

As soon as the Seneca sachem ascertained the flight of his spouse, his determination was taken instantly. Vengeance is the first impulse of natural man, which law and religion partially restrain: and the worse the cause generally the stronger the thirst for vengeance. The Seneca knew that he had fairly lost his wife at the gaming table; that he refused either to pay the debt of honour to the Wyandot who won her, or fight him for the refusal. Conscious of wrong he was the more resentful. He found no difficulty in rousing the Seneca settlements to war, for an act of impressment which no nation should suffer; the intolerable indignity of forcibly taking a woman away, and compelling her to serve strangers. The Senecas to a man rallied for the last resort of kings and injured people. The season was propitious;

no fishing or planting to do, plenty of jerked meat in-store. The warriors were tired of several moons dosing about wigwams, or exciting each other to exploits by recitals of achievements. They were unanimous, said Walk-in-the-water, a little sarcastically: there was no peace party, no opposition. No act of congress or declaration of war was necessary, no proclamation or manifesto; not a word and a blow, but a whoop and a massacre. Yet every thing was done in order according to invariable formalities. In preliminaries of hostilities, European statesmen do but follow the methods of American savages. As soon as war was resolved upon in council, the war feast, or cabinet dinner followed as a matter of course; at which the old were grave and dignified, the young gay and boastful. Then came the ball, or war dance. In every conceivable finery and foppery of dress, paint, feathers, beads, bracelets, and with highly ornamented weapons, the Senecas danced to music both vocal and instrumental—brandishing their arms, and howling with ecstasy. They jumped, squatted, threw their limbs into contortions, stamped, skipped, attitudinized in naked postures, far beyond the factitious graces of artificial saltation or the measured steps of its voluptuous movements. Wellington challenged from the Duchess of Richmond's ball at Brussels by the French artillery, to the sabbath breaking field of Waterloo, went forth indeed to battle and to triumph from a dance. But an Indian never would have been surprised as he was, although to surprise enemies is their first art of war. The Seneca ball was an affair of state, as much as the cabinet dinner which preceded it, both deliberately arranged by authority. The cause of war, too, on these occasions was similar. All Europe joined in coalition to expel one man from France. Such was the argument of their protocols, the stipulation of their treaties, the rallying cry of their armies. The Senecas went to war against the Wyandots for a woman. Where is the difference? Whether a troublesome man, as he was denounced, or an unchaste woman be the cause, how stand the moral and the conscience, the wisdom and the record of these two wars, two centuries and two continents apart? How will history compare them? How will justice decide? As will be seen the Senecas never got the woman they waged war for, but their enemies triumphed. The allied great powers of Europe captured their man. They

took him to far distant imprisonment, chained him to a burning rock in the ocean, and tortured him to death.

Next morning, after the war dance, the Senecas crossed the St. Lawrence on the ice, two hours before day surprised the Wyandot settlement asleep, and put numbers to cruel death. Children were spitted with darts and thrown in the fire. Women were roasted. Men were scalped, mutilated, emboweled, and otherwise tormented till they died. Slaughter was indiscriminate, and would have been exterminating but for the Indian fondness for pleasure. Victory is always their prelude to festivity, as with Europeans. No *te deum* indeed is sung, or other church ceremony performed. But a debauch is invariable. Suspending slaughter for this enjoyment, the Senecas rested awhile from that of massacre. The surviving Wyandots effected their escape with some hours start of their victors, who pursued them all the way to the strait of St. Clair, where they knew the fugitive lovers crossed. Meantime a thaw had taken place. As they passed Niagara, the ice was piled mountain high above the falls in tremendous overflow, a flood filled the channel like a deluge rushing over the precipice with fearful fury. The spray, foam, and roar of the cataract, the rushing rapids, the immense volume of water, and crash of floating timber—the whole scene might have arrested attention, and excited apprehension. There was then no horse-shoe or circular waterfall, but a straight plunge of the whole Niagara, from shore to shore. The Senecas hurried along almost without looking at it. When they got to where Sandwich now is, for the first time they came in sight of the flying Wyandots, whom the Senecas felt sure of taking and destroying, men, women and children. They shouted with savage delight and exultation. The Wyandots were dismayed. The ice had broke and was afloat on the strait, a rapid current, then violent, impetuous and irregular, swollen far above the common level, not boatable or bridged. No one could pass till the ice either sunk or fastened again, as it sometimes would; it was impracticable to get across. The jaded Wyandots had stopped on the bluff, dreading they might be overtaken there, for they had ascertained that they were pursued.—It was night; an inconstant moon shone sometimes bright, then eclipsed by dark clouds. The snow was turned to sleet and mud, an element which they found as unmanageable as Napoleon did on his Polish campaign. The tawny females, almost every one

with a child strapped at her back, looked haggard and pallid.— The children cried for hunger and restlessness. The men were despondent. It was about the last of February, as white men denominate that fitful month,

So full of frost, and storms, and cloudiness.

The French, abolishing religion and revolutionizing all things, flattered themselves that they were original in changing the Gregorian lunar names, when they only imitated the long established Indian calendar, by which the weather names months. In this predicament of February the Senecas overtook the Wyandots, paralyzed with panic at the sight of their dreadful pursuers, quadruple in numbers, centuple in spirit, unincumbered, thirsting for blood, whooping with anticipated surfeit of it. The Wyandot seducer, apprised by a runner that his whole country was expelled and flying towards him, had joined them before they reached the strait. Some words of surrendering the Seneca's wife had murmured through the dejected multitude; but that would have been an ignominious capitulation to which crime seldom submits. She was safe among the Potawattomies. As the Senecas advanced, they drew their bows to the arrow-head, and let fly a volley at the dismayed and confounded Wyandots, making no resistance. Surrender would be useless, because death was inevitable either way, and it was no worse to be slaughtered without than with that concession. Indeed, if prisoners, they would be tortured as well as killed; perhaps hanged, which, to Indians, is the worst form of death; worse than to be tied to a tree, stuck full of burning splinters, eyes nose, and ears torn out, bowels ripped open. Stupefied by despair, unresisting, they were about to be sacrificed, when consternation revealed to the Wyandot lover a mode of salvation, an expedient for passing the angry strait, nearly a mile wide, of cold angry waters. Seizing a squaw, with her child in his arms, he leaped from the cliff down upon a cake of ice floating by, calling to the rest, "follow me and save yourselves." The dejected crowd of terrified fugitives were in no mood to disobey any command or contrivance for escape. They followed as sheep do a leading leap, and were instantly huddled together on various driving islands of ice crackling along. The Senecas reached the bluff, but disconcerted by this unlooked for evasion. They must

embark on the same frail reliance or lose the prey when almost clutched. The current drove the fugitives from the shore, separated in squads on disjointed cakes of ice, with sometimes large gaps of water between. There was a struggle between the effort of despair and the love of destruction—the former triumphed. The disconcerted Senecas paused on the bluff, thought of the risk, let fly a discharge of random arrows at the chase, hesitated a precious moment—and lost their prize. The crisis was over, the prey gone. The Wyandots, with gulfs of water between them and the shore, even hurled back a shout of success and almost defiance. Captain Barclay, wounded, vanquished, mortified, but not dismayed, when a prize-master entered the cabin of his ship, after her flag was struck, sturdily, sternly, rudely, and haughtily, like a bold Briton, rather in disdain than submission, said, “when I left the deck I would not have given sixpence for your chance.” So the Senecas did not reckon the Wyandots’ chance worth sixpence, when the fortune of war turned it all at once into priceless success. Standing on the bluff, they saw their prize escape, by perilous and marvellous transportation on floating portions of ice, and safely landed on the opposite shore, just as the moon broke forth from a cloud, and lit up the gloom of midnight. The Senecas could only turn to go home through the melting snows, and for several moons of respite from action, enjoy the recreation of slumber, telling their exploits, and brooding more. Trophies in large quantities, some booty, scalps hardly to be counted by their arithmetic, the comfort of considerable increase of landed possessions on the northern side of the river and lake, where the Wyandots dwelt, and meditation of further conquests, filled the Senecas’ thoughts with as much as their minds required. For the war was only begun; its direst calamity was to come. War begets war. Hostilities were not to be confined to the land. The waters were to have their share. All the inhabitants of regions so navigable as the lake country must be maritime people, whether red or white, savage or civilized. The Hurons, Potawattomies, Wyandots and other red nations of the lakes were naval powers, with fleets and sailors, well broke to battle and the breeze. The western flanks of the United States are already almost as nautical as the Atlantic shores. Fisheries, commerce in all its occa-

sions, great opportunity of ports, every thing to develop nautical genius, exist there, always has, and always must.

The Senecas were excellent watermen, and handled craft with great dexterity. They planned a naval expedition for the summer, from the eastern end of Lake Erie into Lake St. Clair, and to Lakes Huron, Michigan, or Superior, if necessary, to compel surrender of the Wyandot woman. Violation of any vow among people who make so few, is a greater offence than with refined nations, who make, write, print, publish, and record so many. Breach of the marriage vow is one of the greatest misdeeds of an Indian. The wife is a handmaid, a serving-woman: to deprive her lord of the society and service of such a helpmate is not only an insult, but unlawful injury, as by English common law. The cause of offence, woman, has at all times been the most exciting, enduring, and implacable of all causes. Long before Helen brought on that ten years' siege which produced a poem unequalled since, *ante Helenam fuit teterrima causa belli*; before Helen's day it was the direct cause of war. The Wyandots were not unapprized of the Senecas' intention to attack them by water. They had envoys extraordinary, spies among the Senecas, with secret instructions to discover and report what could be learned. Forewarned, they resolved to be forearmed, and their hosts entered heartily into a league, offensive and defensive, with them. The Potawatemies, Ottoways, Chippeways, several of the peninsular nations, gave lands to, and shared subsistence with the Wyandot emigrants, making their cause their own. As hostilities during summer were to be translated from land to water, preparations were made accordingly, by refitting old boats, and building new. The Indians of the lakes were expert naval architects; experienced in the construction of canoes of the build of the Roman galley, which still affords the finest models for vessels, whether for sail or steam, never surpassed, while continually tried to be by imaginary improvements in Dutch, French, English, and American naval architecture. Not only wood but stone, the hardest stone, the thickest plank, have been worked without iron in as great perfection as by modern masons, smiths, and carpenters, with that metal. Copper was the tool of some of the most accomplished ancient stone-cutters, artists, and architects. Indians, too, have had their secrets of handicraft.

The Wyandot fleet was built on the upper lakes, Huron, Michigan, as far off as Superior, as rapidly and scientifically, as the American or English fleets on Erie and Ontario. The Wyandot Indian material was the bark of the birch tree, which sheds its rind every year, remarkably light, tough, hard, and water-tight; hardly inferior to iron or gum Arabic for ship-building. Thoroughly made of birch-bark, the Wyandot skiffs were patterns of workmanship, though we scarcely know by what tools so rapidly perfected by workmen without iron. Light, strong, buoyant, beautiful, they might be carried on the shoulders of men and floated in water with equal facility. The tawny tars of the lakes were amphibious animals, who walked, paddled, swam, with wonderful powers of performance.

The rendezvous for the Wyandot fleet was between Lakes Huron and St. Clair, where Malden is since built: and the time early in September. Sincerity and punctuality are ordinary savage virtues, as much as duplicity and procrastination when politic or expedient. Punctual to the appointed time and place the fleet came in, two hundred canoes strong, each manned by four men to paddle, with four more to fight, all under the command of a warrior captain, invariably promoted for meritorious service, never by favour, intrigue or purchase. Rank among Indians is a hierarchy infallible through every grade, which family influence or personal solicitation cannot change, but desert alone arranges and maintains. Walk-in-the-water declared, emphatically, that the traditional recollection or history of the fleet remains strong and clear among all the Indians of that peninsula; for its armament and achievement caused great sensation at the time, formed in fact an era in Indian annals, which, being neither crowded with events nor confused by written narratives, are like the instincts of animals, few but indelible—sentiments or sensations far more distinct and durable than common printed historical transmission of transactions. The buffalo will find a salt lick with infinitely quicker and truer tact than a man of science in search of it. All beasts and birds in their migrations and their conduct display knowledge of seasons, places, and may it not be said of astronomical indications, exceeding the best attainments of learning. The Indians insist that Perry's battle was neither the first nor greatest on Lake Erie, but that the honour of a much greater

belongs to them, preserved by tradition much truer than our typographical tales.

It was an imposing spectacle, their fleet, as it rode at anchor or moored near Malden; a scene of nautical bustle and discipline, which warmed all hearts with ardour, if not admiration, as the birch canoes bravely rocked upon the waves, with their flags of feathers, combined by handicrafts of which the art, like many others of old, no longer exists, rabbit-skins, beaver-tails, fox-tails, with various other embellishments of a diversified peltry, decorating the canoes according to the taste of each crew or commander. Young squaws sighed for such husbands as manned the fleet, their heads profusely ornamented with feathers, their ears and noses with pendants, their arms with bracelets, their brawny bodies covered with hieroglyphic figures, otherwise slightly covered—some stark naked. The cabinet dinner and fashionable ball, and other established ceremonies were none omitted: on the contrary, attended with uncommon pomp and celebrated with universal favour. The war feast was held aboard the fleet. As women never are present on these occasions, but do the family duties of the kitchen, cook and bring the viands, and otherwise wait on their husbands and fathers, only men partook of this festival, which was conducted with strict regard to conventional and luxurious conviviality. Neither lying down at table like the ancients, or sitting up as the moderns do, the Indian convenience for that purpose is his breech-cloth as he squats to take food. Into their laps, squatting in the canoes, the squaws served squirrel soup in gourds, as the first course of the entertainment: then came white fish and other delicious fishes of the lakes. Venison, bears'-meat, and tortoise-meat, formed the next course. To that succeeded game in exquisite variety, such as no monarch can spread his table with; wild ducks of all sorts, swans, wild turkies, pheasants, partridges, grouse and other fowl of the lakes, where they abounded in great quantity and perfection. The liquors were of acknowledged excellence; wine from persimmons, the black haw, elderberry, blackberry, dew-berry, strawberry, whortleberry: the latter said to be Washington's favourite fruit; with all other berries in season. Walnuts, hickory-nuts, shellbarks, filberts, hazelnuts, pumpkin pies, dressed with maple sugar, so as to make a delicious dish, composed the dessert. The feast elicited repartee, merriment, and great ani-

mation. The war-dance or ball succeeded the war feast or cabinet dinner. The Wyandots were superior dancers; an exercise which in Indian performance consists in the utmost muscular exertion, accompanied by contortions almost convulsive, and regulated by a sort of plaintive vocal music. The modern Greeks dance in much the same way. Whoever has been at Athens since liberated Greece has been crowned by the holy alliance with a German king, may have seen, if ever present at an Indian war dance, the striking similarity in the dances of these two remote people, seeming to prove that natural dancing is unlike the artificial agility of that recreation, which so long ago as the last days of Roman republicanism, Sallust says, had become a meretricious amusement, and the vanity of courtezans, when Sempronia danced more elegantly than became a lady—*saltare elegantius quam necesse est probæ*, at one of Cataline's balls. The Wyandots, Potawattomies and Hurons were given to no such abuse of it. Their dancing, though excessively violent and forcible, was not indelicate, like modern opera dancing; but seemed to have some of that solemnity, which not many years since characterized one of the most admired French dances, the minuet. In another striking particular Indian dancing—for they are exemplarily steady in their habits, free from capricious change—differs from the art, both ancient and modern. Indian women never dance, only permitted to look on, not to join the men. In France, chamber-men instead of chamber-maids make beds, and do other bed chamber work, shopmen in place of women tend shops; while many menial offices of manhood in fields, mines and other pursuits of labour, are allotted to women. In some of these respects savage and civilized manners coincide, though in others entirely different. Dancing seems to be an art in which the Athenians and Indians agree, the prevailing practice in most other countries differing essentially from both.

Mean time the Senecas had not been idle. They, too, refitted old canoes, built new, practised the paddles and warriors in naval evolutions, and by midsummer had a stronger squadron than the coalition of the upper lakes, manned, equipped, and prepared for service. But the Senecas laboured under one fatal disadvantage. Their canoes were all built of live oak cut out of solid trees; and ship timber was the standard in that war, as ship building, modification of the same thing, was two hundred years after in that

of 1812. The birch canoe was greatly the better craft for sailing, steering, and management altogether, whatever may now be thought of live oak. The Senecas were not ready quite as soon as the allies from St. Clair and Huron, who weighed their stone anchors, coiled the hide cables, or unmoored from their fastenings soon after the preliminaries before mentioned, and gallantly standing by Put-in-Bay, where the English and Americans lie buried together, coasted along the northern shore of Lake Erie till they came to off North Point, nearly opposite to the present town of Erie, where it was their admiral's opinion that they should stop, without doubling the Point, till they could send forward some light skiffs and reconnoitre. The Wyandot lover, always forward and active in every enterprize, volunteered to go in the first canoe. By singular coincidence of savage vigilance, the Senecas sent out a similar scout for like purpose about the same time. The two parties coming in distant view of each other, instantly put about and made the best of their way back to inform their respective fleets. The Wyandot lover alone remained. Before the Seneca squadron was out of sight he sprang into the water, and swam to the south shore, telling the captain of the canoe that he would return by land. The surrounding forests were then in all their aboriginal majesty and verdure. Mighty oaks, which stood on the margin of that lake long before Columbus or Vespucius, Cabot or Raleigh, crossed the Atlantic, with huge trunks sixty feet high before branching, hickories, chestnut, beech, tulip poplars and other magnificent growth of American forests, shaded the banks of the lake, and were reflected in its limpid waters. The Wyandot climbed the tallest of these towering trees, and from its top looked anxiously for the Seneca canoes, which he knew would be close in shore not far from the place of his reconnoissance near Buffalo. He had before told the chieftains, with whom he was allied, that not far from the great waterfall the Senecas would rendezvous. The few canoes he had seen at a distance were so disguised, and so soon out of view that he was not certain of their build, and besides he wanted to learn the size of the whole Seneca fleet. He rocked with joy on the high branch he stood upon when he could plainly see that they were log built, clumsy craft, quite inferior to the birch skiffs of the Wyandots. With better prognostic than Napoleon saluted the English outposts before his rout at Water-

loo, smiling to his staff, and saying, aha!—the English, I have got them at last—with as much confidence of success and better prognostic, the Wyandot instantly built castles of triumph in the air. The Seneca crews were at quarters practising a naval sham-fight, with bows and arrows, hatchets, battle-axes, and boarding pikes, all made of tough wood and sharp stone. Sweltering and grappling in a broiling sun they scuffled in counterfeit contest. The Wyandot was so intent on examining the manœuvres, situation, force and equipments of the Seneca fleet, that he had not perceived, till assailed by a black eagle, that he was perched close by a young brood of that bird in a nest on another limb of his tree. Having ascertained all he wished to know, and not caring either to fight the eagle or excite the noise it was beginning to make, which might call attention to his hiding place, he descended, passed round the south side of the lake and Seneca fleet, at a sufficient distance to be out of danger, swam the Niagara river below the falls, and by rapid running, swimming Grand river and other smaller streams, he reached the combined fleet lying near North Point sometime before day, and imparted the cheering intelligence that the Senecas were in log canoes. It acted on the Wyandot chiefs like Major Wood's report to General Harrison before the battle of the Thames, that the English infantry were drawn up in open order. The order for action was given forthwith. By break of day the Wyandot fleet was under weigh, and soon after hove in sight of the Seneca fleet, anchored at Buffalo. The Wyandots then put in practice a preconcerted stratagem. Indian battles abound with stratagems, by which they seek to superadd some advantage to the efforts of courage. The signal for retreat was given from the Wyandot admiral's skiff, and repeated on conch shells from every division of the fleet; which put about hastily with seeming trepidation, paddling off to the middle of the lake, not very wide there. Immediately the Senecas cut their fastenings and gave chase with loud whoops of triumph. The Wyandots slackened paddling till their eager enemies overtook them: then veered about and with uproar began the combat, fought for several hours of close contest, boat to boat and hand to hand, running down, boarding, tomahawking, slaughtering each other in the noonday heat of a vertical sun, within sound of the roar of the Falls of Niagara. The action was closer than yard arm to yard arm: it was hand to hand. As all history,

sacred and profane, attests, the destruction of combatants is much greater with weapons which bring them in corporeal collision than by fire arms, either musket, rifle, or cannon at a distance. No charge of cavalry or bayonets is so fatal and overwhelming as the homicidal effects of instruments which inflict death body to body: no battery of grape or canister so murderous. This memorable naval engagement proved it: for after a long and terrible struggle, in which the skiff canoes had the constant advantage, every log canoe was captured, and every Seneca either killed or wounded, and made prisoner, save one. Going through the log canoes, after the battle, crimsoned with gore, and covered with the brains, entrails, and dislocated limbs of the dead or dying, as some of the captor chiefs were directed to do, one coward Seneca—the only coward in the two fleets—was discovered. The dead were thrown overboard; and all those badly wounded; but those not severely hurt were reserved to be tortured and burned. Going these rounds one Seneca was found in the bottom of a canoe, feigning death, that he might be thrown overboard as a corpse, when he hoped to escape by swimming. Detected in his subterfuge, he was taken before the admiral, who had his nose and ears cut off, his teeth knocked out with a war-club, and in that condition put ashore to go home, and tell the tale of their disaster to the women, children and old men of the Seneca settlements. One hundred of the least severely wounded Senecas were taken ashore, together with all their canoes, by the Wyandots, for the ceremony of celebrating their victory in this memorable naval action, the first and most desperate ever fought on Lake Erie. One of Perry's acts of justice after his victory was to hang an American deserter, taken in the British fleet, much to Harrison's distress, who did not like severities. Wyandot military justice was as much more signal, as the size of the hostile fleets, number of combatants, severity of conflict, extent of destruction, and all other circumstances of the first exceeded those of the second naval engagement on that lake. With considerable labour the log canoes were carried to the upper side of the Falls of Niagara and there piled up in a large heap or funeral pyre. The hundred wounded Senecas, selected for the purpose, were tied and laid upon the top; dry bits of hard wood, rubbed together, till the friction produced fire, applied to the pyre. The weather was hot, the canoes well-seasoned, their

wood dry: the flame soon mounted to where the wounded were laid, and most of them perished in a great blaze of glory, which disturbed numberless rattlesnakes reposing in the bushes, and myriads of mosquitoes swarming in the air. The cataract at that time was broader, fuller and more direct in its descent than it has degenerated to become: it was also a quarter of a mile or more from where it now is; the rapids tumbled with greater velocity; the descent altogether of the fall exceeded half a mile; the volume of falling waters seven hundred thousand gallons a minute. The few wounded, who, as the fire burned off their shackles, attempted to escape, were shot down by arrows, pierced with darts, brained with clubs, or otherwise put to death, as the delighted Wyandots danced round the sacrifice. After all the victims were consumed, while the pyre continued to fling its blaze upon the neighbouring falls, the Wyandots concluded the celebration by a dance, such as before described, which was followed by a feast, not so profuse of viands or carefully prepared as that which preceded the departure of the fleet from Malden; yet taken with all the relish of martial *abandon*.

From that time to this, unappeasable alienation prevails between the descendants of the Senecas, who are the six nations of New York, and those of the Wyandots. The Senecas, in the war of 1812, united with the Americans; while the Wyandots were among the steadiest adherents of the English. Some of them, said Walk-in-the-water, before their naval victory on Lake Erie, descended the Ohio and took refuge among the Creeks in the south. Others after that event, went north, and established themselves among the Canewaghas of Canada. They are, as it was natural for Walk-in-the-water to assert, at the same time the most civilized and the most warlike of all the Indian nations. The only other Indian language like theirs is the Mohawk. Roman Catholic Wyandots pray and fight, with the Bible in one hand, and tomahawk in the other, under the patronage and protection of Protestant Great Britain. Such, said Walk-in-the-water, closing his story, is their toleration and our civilization.

CHAPTER VI.

HARRISON'S INVASION OF CANADA.—PROCTOR DESTROYS MALDEN AND RETREATS.—TECUMSEH'S REMONSTRANCE.—PURSUIT OF PROCTOR.—JOHNSON'S MOUNTED REGIMENT.—BATTLE OF THE THAMES.—SURRENDER OF ENGLISH.—PROCTOR'S FLIGHT.—DEATH OF TECUMSEH.—INDIAN SUBORNATION BY ENGLISH.—ENORMITY OF THAT ALLIANCE.—ITS DEMORALIZING EFFECTS.—LAW OF NATIONS THEREUPON.—HARRISON GOES TO BUFFALO—THENCE TO WASHINGTON—AND OHIO.—HIS RESIGNATION.—ILLUMINATION FOR HIS AND PERRY'S VICTORIES.—JOSEPH HOPKINSON.

HARRISON'S capture of Proctor was so dependent on Perry's defeat of Barclay, that it hardly would have taken place without that precursor. He had been busy all summer in preparations, to which the popular governors, Isaac Shelby, of Kentucky, and Return Jonathan Meigs, of Ohio, actively contributed; and by the middle of September, had collected on the southern shore of Lake Erie, an army of seven thousand men, undismayed by disasters, eager for action. Perry's fleet was entirely at their service for supplies and transport; the season was favourable; the weather delightful as American autumn, when the sun westers down genial influences. The navy and army were in high spirits. Perry volunteered his services to attend upon Harrison by land and by water. On the 20th of September, the army was embarked on board the fleet; and with prosperous gales through various stages of proceeding, landed near Malden, the 27th of that month. There our people discovered the demoralizing, and degrading effects on British soldiers, of relying on savage auxiliaries. Major General Proctor, who had obliged Commodore Barclay to risk the battle which lost the lake, was disgracefully afraid to risk one himself. The appearance of Perry's squadron off the English position, even before the engagement, struck terror: now that it transported an army, it produced the most unmanly consternation in Englishmen, guilty of excesses which they felt deserved condign punishment. Proctor's army of banditti dreaded the vengeance of the Kentuckians, whose pretended

savagism in regimentals, they had represented to be as gross as that of their allies in blankets. The English had asserted their right to set Indians on Kentuckians. They were now to be requited. Retribution came with the first reverse of such morality. Proctor was completely unmanned with fear; his troops a mere military populace, or band of robbers loaded with spoils. All they wanted was to escape with life and booty from the vengeance and retaliation they felt conscious of having provoked.— They expected to be stripped, mutilated, and massacred; to be allowed none of the mitigations of civilized war. Accordingly, they had been employed, not in preparing for resistance, for which they were strong enough in numbers, fortifications, provisions, and all other requirements; but in destroying forts, magazines, stores, ammunition, and laying waste a fertile region in the season of abundance. Manly resistance, and, if it must be, honourable capitulation, were not thought of; but to save their lives and escape with their booty. The scene presented to Harrison, was at once striking and edifying to a commander, who had been only too observant of the method of hostilities, which his unprincipled enemy did not deserve. Malden was dismantled; the navy yard and barracks burned; all the surrounding country stripped of horses, cattle, and whatever else could be carried off. Amidst desolation and fright the haughty Britons, who let loose the savages to murder and pillage in January, took to flight in October; abandoned or destroyed all they could not run away with; realized all that Chatham said would be the ruinous effects of degrading an army of soldiers into a band of marauders and assassins. In vain did the undaunted and eloquent savage chief, Tecumseh, remonstrate against such precipitate, unnecessary, unwise, unmilitary, unmanly and ungenerous flight from overrated danger. While that noble savage remained firm, too many of his profligate red companions had already turned their backs on Proctor, whose terrors were now as much excited by the well-known habits of the Indians, as Hull's had been when they were his pretext, or reason for disgraceful surrender. Several of the Wyandots and other Indians deserted Proctor as soon as they perceived that he was in peril or feared he was. They changed allegiance and affiliation with what they considered the change of fortune. Constancy in patriotism or even party loyalty is no more the virtue of common savages than other unprincipled men.

These untutored instruments of English profligacy turned from a great father over the sea to another at Washington, when they apprehended that the armies of the latter were the strongest.—Winnebagoes, Kickapoos, Hurons, and other braves of English reliance, deserted with the first reverse, while Tecumseh and apparently most of his numerous followers, remained faithful.—Proctor's fears were strange to the noble barbarian, who fell sword in hand when the English general ignominiously fled. All the martial spirit Proctor had left, was the mere energy of despair, and that undone by avarice. The spies he had dispatched to the American camp, reported fifteen thousand men, when there were but seven. But long before they landed in Canada, as soon as the lake was lost, as early as the 17th of September, when Harrison had not yet embarked, Proctor proclaimed martial law, in order that he might rob with impunity. Every one, and every place within his reach, was despoiled of every thing his disheartened myrmidons could lay their hands on, to be packed up and carried off. The torch was applied to all the rest. In the midst of this devastation, which terrified his army and their Indian dependents, and before the latter began to waver in their attachment, at a season of great plenty, when the harvests were abundant, the trees loaded with fruit, the waters swarmed with fish, the woods with game; when fifteen thousand rations were issued every day by the English commissariat to the Indians; when Proctor was strong in every thing but courage—in this scene of alarm, wanton power, and pusillanimous evasion, Tecumseh, proudly erect, and indomitable, appealed to the English general to stay and fight, not fly, like a coward and thief. "Father," said this sylvan hero to the despondent Briton, "listen to your red children. They are standing all around, ready to fight and die for you. Do not forsake, do not alarm them. In the old war your fathers deserted ours. Will you do it again? You invited, encouraged, supplied us with arms, to war on the Americans.—When I first raised my tomahawk, you told me to wait awhile, to keep my braves in readiness till you were ready. Then you gave us rifles to recover the hunting grounds we had lost, and promised we should have them always. Ever since you desired it, we have fought by your side; and when did we turn our backs to the foe? At the Rapids, indeed, we did not strike hard, for we could not get at ground-hogs who took refuge in a hole.

But at the Raisin, you know what we did. Listen to us, now, father; you are instead of our great father over the sea. The ships went out to fight on the lake—you made them go out.—Where are they? We do not know what happened; we heard the great guns. They sounded loud and far, and since we have seen you tying up bundles to carry away; you told us always that you would never run away; that the English never do. Will you now run before you have even seen the enemy? If so, let us have food and arms. Do not take every thing from us. We will stay and fight. We are not afraid. We do not like to run, at any rate till we have fought and find our enemies the strongest. We have never been beat on land; but we do not know what has happened on the water. My brother, the prophet, is among the Creeks. They are doing what you directed when I visited them. The war is prosperous. Our lives are in the keeping of the Great Spirit. You have plenty of arms and ammunition. Leave them with us, if you must go. We are resolved to fight, and leave our bones on the lands that belong to us, if so the Great Spirit wills. We cannot run away like dogs with tails down, till now proudly curled over our backs in defiance.”

Tecumseh's speech was as ineffectual to stop Proctor's flight as Chatham's had been to deter the employment of savage auxiliaries. So panic-struck, and precipitate was the English retreat, loaded with plunder, that they did not stop even to destroy the bridges to impede pursuit; but hurried off in the utmost confusion—ignoble Englishmen, forgetful

That Chatham's language was their native tongue,
And Wolfe's great name compatriot with their own.

General Harrison almost desponded of overtaking the fugitives. On the 27th September, 1813, he wrote to the secretary of war, that he would pursue them next day, but that there was no probability of overtaking them. But the Kentuckians were resolved on the revenge of, at any rate, a battle with their murderers at Raisin. Old Governor Shelby, in his sixty-third year, mounted on the only horse to be found, ardent as when he scaled the steeps of King's Mountain thirty years before, William Barry and Charles Wickliffe, both subsequently Postmasters-General of the United States, John Crittenden, now the eloquent and popular senator from Kentucky, with many more, were deter-

mined that Proctor should not escape. They were not to be disappointed by any irresolution or deterred by any obstacle. Harrison, therefore, with Commodore Perry, General Cass, General Green Clay, and an army eager for action, pushed forward without delay or hesitation, by forced marches, over rivers, morasses, through broken countries, attended by some boats and water craft; continually finding Proctor's stores, provisions, ammunition, and arms, either deserted by the way, or so weakly guarded, by small detachments of the enemy, as to offer no resistance. Seldom was flight more mismanaged than that of the English. Long before overtaken, they had given up. The whole way from Malden to the Thames, betrayed their extreme perturbation. Even the dispatches and documents, which, afterwards published in all our newspapers, betrayed their connection at once despicable and detestable, with the Indians—even these were suffered to fall into the hands of their pursuers. Instead of fighting where they were well entrenched, fortified, and provided, they were forced to encounter an attack under many disadvantages of their own making, and no raw militia were ever cowed more disgracefully than these British regulars, from the moment they abandoned Malden, to their throwing down their arms and begging for mercy on the Thames. At length, on the morning of the 5th October, 1813, near an Indian settlement called the Moravian towns, on the river Thames, Harrison came up with the English, 800 regular troops under Major General Proctor, and 1200 Indians headed by Tecumseh. By this time, Colonel Johnson's regiment of 1200 mounted men, armed with guns, without either pistols or sabres, had joined General Harrison, having, by forced marches, followed from the moment they got his orders to do so. The particulars of their march are given in Mr. McAfee's volume, who commanded one of the troops, with great fidelity and vivid description. The regiment was commanded by the member of Congress, Richard M. Johnson, who will take no umbrage at its being stated that his brother James, the lieutenant-colonel of that fine regiment, was a man, not of more courage, for that could hardly be, but of more talent than the gallant colonel himself, remarkable for the good qualities which distinguish a numerous family of western chivalry.

Armstrong, always sarcastic and contemptuous towards Har-

ri-son, says, in his Notices of the War, that if his despondency of overtaking Proctor had continued a little longer than it did, it would have verified its own reality. He acknowledges, nevertheless, that his dispositions for the attack were promptly, coolly and gallantly made, against Proctor, skilfully posted, but without the defences which a calmer mind would have provided for his protection. Conspicuous, keen for combat, and heroic, were the veteran Shelby and the two Johnsons. Johnson's regiment was at Camp Meigs the 25th September, when he received General Harrison's orders to follow him into Canada, which were obeyed forthwith, taking along some artillery. On their rapid march, they discovered, at the Raisin, the bones of the victims of the massacre, which they had piously collected and committed to the earth in June, disinterred as they had been by the savages, and lying scattered about the fields, by the time of Johnson's arrival there, entirely deserted. Another express from Harrison reached them while contemplating that abominable scene; inflamed by which they hastened in pursuit of its perpetrators, and by the 2d of October they were with General Harrison when he moved after Proctor. As our army approached his, in the first skirmishes the mounted regiment was engaged, and lost a few men killed and wounded. Governor Shelby, in 1780, commanded a North Carolina regiment at the battle of King's Mountain, in South Carolina. At that time the last and worst strife of the Revolution was aggravated by civil, almost servile, war. Major Ferguson, a British officer of uncommon enterprize and energy, had incorporated a number of resolute American Tories with his regiment, entrenched on the top of a lofty hill called King's Mountain. They were attacked and totally defeated in that stronghold, by a body of militia, setting at naught all the principles of strategy, but animated by the utmost ardour of courage. They had no commander. Each one of several colonels commanded a day in rotation. They were beholden to no government, under no orders, supplied with no arms except their own, mostly rifles; had no artillery, no stores, no food but venison caught in the woods, no salt, no drink but the water of running streams, no bread but some cake made of Indian corn or pumpkins, no tents, blankets, or tools of any kind. They were a pure and perfect military democracy. On the 7th October, 1780, nearly the anniversary of the battle of

the Thames, thirty-three years before, Governor Shelby learned his soldiership in that admirable lesson to punctilious generals, of what may be done by a good spirit, without other discipline or materials. On the top of King's Mountain, Shelby helped to plant seeds of a republic, since spread from the frozen St. Johns to the fervid plains of St. Jacinto, and destined, by similar spontaneous accomplishment, to much further extension. Of the three colonels elected to attack the English entrenched on King's Mountain, the one chosen for command that day, told his men as they mounted to the assault, not to wait for the word of command, but to follow his lead. "Every man," said he, "must think himself an officer and act on his own best judgment; stand as long, and fire as fast as he can; never run away entirely, but, if forced to retreat, get behind a tree. Finally, my friends," said this commander, "if any of you are afraid, he can withdraw before the action begins." With this exhortation and discipline every man mounted to the assault, and, after a long and bloody action, killed or captured all their several hundred enemies. These rude mountaineers celebrated their victory by hanging ten of the captured tories. Such was Governor Shelby's apprenticeship to arms, in which, perhaps, was to be seen some of the peculiar American spirit of wild enterprize and contempt of death, which, in spite of all the Old World may do, say, or think, will carry the adventurous pioneers of the New, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans.

The night before the battle of the Thames, Walk-in-the-water, with sixty followers, deserted Proctor, and threw themselves into General Harrison's arms. Large quantities of English stores fell into our possession continually. Late at night Proctor and Tecumseh descended the river clandestinely, and made a reconnoissance, with a view to attack Harrison, which was Tecumseh's desire, and probably, Proctor's best plan for escape: but the English general did not choose to risk what would have been not only less dishonourable, but much safer, than the battle he was forced to accept.

When all General Harrison's dispositions for attack, on the 5th of October, 1813, had been made, and the army was advancing against the enemy, well posted among woods, marshes and streams, Colonel Wood, who had approached close to the English—concealed to reconnoitre—returned to General Harrison, and

told him that Proctor's men were drawn up in open lines; that is, each man somewhat separated from the next, instead of standing close together, as is the strongest and safest method. With considerable felicity of prompt adaptation to circumstances, Harrison instantly changed his order of attack. He inquired of Colonel Johnson, if his horsemen could charge infantry. Certainly, said the colonel. His men had been trained and practised to charge in the woods, just as they were to do. General Harrison then gave Colonel Johnson the order to charge; and in an instant that battalion of the mounted regiment, which Colonel Richard Johnson committed to his brother, the Lieutenant Colonel, James, charged through and through the English infantry, who then threw down their arms, and cried for quarters in a much more craven mood than had yet been betrayed in that war. Their commander, after demoralizing them by guilt, and encumbering them with plunder, disheartened them by pusillanimous misbehaviour when attacked. Colonel Richard Johnson's order to charge was discretionary; to charge the enemy as they stood, infantry, artillery, and some horse. Finding that the whole of his regiment could hardly get at them between the river and the swamp where they were drawn up, while, by passing the swamp, he might reach the Indians there awaiting our onset, Colonel Johnson, in the absence of General Harrison, exercised a judicious discretion to consign the first battalion of his regiment to his brother for the English, while he himself, with the other battalion, should attack the Indians. The English infantry delivered some shots as Lieutenant Colonel James Johnson approached, and for a moment disconcerted some of the first horses, although drilled to that mode of charge. But, taking a couple of volleys as they advanced, they easily recovered composure, rushed on the infantry, pierced, broke, then wheeled upon them, poured in a destructive fire on their rear, and brought them to instantaneous submission, without much loss on either side. Quarter was at once given by the much abused Kentuckians, as soon as asked for by their calumniators, and assassins of their companions. Proctor, with a small escort of dragoons and mounted Indians, made his escape so quickly and rapidly, that no effort could overtake him. He was pursued for many miles, abandoned his carriage and sword, lost all his plunder and papers, betraying the brutal levity with which English officers entertained each other, of their habitual reliance on savage bar-

barities, and found his way, at last, through many tribulations, to Burlington heights, there to be publicly reprimanded and disgraced for cowardice and avarice, by the Governor General of Canada. The disaster of the British army, said an English historian, was not palliated by those precautions, and that presence of mind, which even in defeat reflects lustre on a commander.—The bridges and roads in the rear of the retreating army, were left entire, while its progress was retarded by a useless and cumbersome load of baggage. The defeat led to the harshest recriminations, and involved the division of brave troops serving with honour in Michigan Territory, in unmerited disgrace. To this historical reproach of Proctor, we will perceive what his commander-in-chief superadded of obloquy. Thousands of hard fought fields in every quarter, and with every people of the world, by land and sea, attest the stubborn valour of British troops. No history can deny their characteristic courage and fortitude. But English murderers and thieves became cowards in Canada: hard words, but true. To save themselves from retaliation, and their ill-got plunder from recapture, they laid down their arms to an inferior force of raw troops, while their commander fled in the first moment of encounter.

Tecumseh, with his red braves, made a very different stand against Colonel Richard Johnson. Unlike the precipitate firing of the British infantry, these gallant savages reserved theirs till close pressed, then delivered volleys with deadly aim and effect. Embarrassed by the swamp, Colonel Johnson found it necessary to dismount his men. As soon as Governor Shelby heard the musketry from his station, the old soldier, eager for action, led up his men. After some time of close, sharp, and mutually destructive fighting, the Indians were forced to give way. But not without sacrificing three times as many lives as the English, and leaving infinitely fewer prisoners as trophies to their conquerors. Active and conspicuous, invincible and exemplary, the valiant Tecumseh fought till he fell pierced with several balls, and died a hero's death. The Indian chief, on whom the savage command devolved, deplored to General Harrison, after the battle, the treacherous cowardice of their father, General Proctor, by which term of veneration, he still mentioned that recreant superior. Such were the Kentucky recollections of the massacre at the river Raisin, and the animosity it occasioned against Te-

cumseh, by no means the guiltiest of its perpetrators, when his body was discovered, after the battle of the Thames, known as he was to General Harrison, and recognized from other Indians among the slain, by pock marks, and a leg once broken and set, that pieces of his skin were cut off by some of the Kentucky soldiers, to be kept by them. Indignities to the dead are common on every field of battle. Refined military men, who might condemn these Kentucky spoils as barbarous mementos, would sack cities, during days of authorized horrors and licentiousness, which prove that war is a ferocious departure at best from the laws of humanity.

Colonel Richard Johnson's task in conflict with Tecumseh, was much longer, bloodier and more difficult, though no bolder, than his brother's vanquishing the English. Whether with his own hand he killed the Indian chieftain, is among the disputed occurrences of a conflict, in which his conduct requires no additional celebrity. He was repeatedly shot, and desperately wounded; disabled for some time, from resuming his seat in Congress, and then upon crutches, which he was obliged to use for several years. He served in that body for many years, in both Houses, during the presidencies of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Jackson; always as remarkable for his facility to be overcome by an applicant, as impenetrable resistance to an enemy. No man ever had greater difficulty in saying no, than Colonel Johnson, whose name is recorded to as many affirmative votes, as Mr. Macon's is to negatives.

The battle of the Thames was our first regular and considerable victory. I have not attempted to describe its professional, or indeed particular, features; that having been done by so many others. Truth, always difficult of attainment, is hardly a rudiment of narration when involving personal animosities and vanities, exacerbated by national prejudices. In fact, no one person witnesses much of most battles, but must be content with various reports from others. Hence the English proverb that falsehood glares on every French bulletin. But what shall Americans say of English official accounts of our conflicts in arms? Even journals of legislative bodies, records of courts of justice, which in their theory import absolute and unquestionable verity, are not only imperfect, but often deceptive reports of what really occurs. The morals and lessons of the war of 1812 should be exhibited and

explained; while much of detail must remain controverted, or unknown. The result of the north-western campaign was to relieve great regions from English power and Indian devastation. The moral of it is best told by the sentence Sir George Prevost inflicted on General Proctor, which I think proper, as the best evidence, to incorporate at large with this narrative.

HEAD-QUARTERS, MONTREAL, }
November 24, 1813. }

His excellency, the commander of the forces, has received an official report from Major-General Proctor, of the affair which took place on the 5th October, near the Moravian village, and he has in vain sought in it for grounds to palliate the report made to his excellency by Staff-Adjutant Beiffenstein, upon which the general order of the 18th October was founded—on the contrary, that the statement remains confirmed in all the principal events which marked that disgraceful day; the precipitancy with which the Staff-Adjutant retreated from the field of action, prevented his ascertaining the loss sustained by the division on that occasion; it also led him most grossly to exaggerate the enemy's force, and to misrepresent the conduct of the Indian warriors, who, instead of retreating towards Machedash, as he had stated, gallantly maintained the conflict, under their brave chief Tecumseh, and in their turn harassed the American army on its retreat to Detroit.

The subjoined return states the loss the right division has sustained in the action of the fleet on Lake Erie, on the 10th September, and in the affair of the 5th October, near the Moravian village; in the latter, but very few appear to have been reserved, by an honourable death, from the ignominy of passing under the American yoke, nor are there many whose wounds plead in mitigation of this reproach. The right division appears to have been encumbered with an unmanageable load of private baggage—while the requisite arrangements for the expeditious and certain conveyance of the ammunition and provisions, the sole objects worthy of consideration, appear to have been totally neglected, as well as all those ordinary measures resorted to by officers of intelligence, to retard and impede the advance of a pursuing enemy. The result affords but too fatal a proof of this unjustifiable neglect. The right division had quitted Sand-

wich on its retreat, on the 28th September, having had ample time, for every previous arrangement to facilitate and secure that movement; on the 2d of October following, the enemy pursued by the same route, and on the 4th, succeeded in capturing all the stores of the division, and on the following attacked and defeated it, almost without a struggle.

With heartfelt pride and satisfaction, the commander of the forces had lavished on the right division of his army, that tribute of praise which was so justly due to its former gallantry and steady discipline. It is with poignant grief and mortification, that he now beholds its well-earned laurels tarnished, and its conduct calling loudly for reproach and censure.

The commander of the forces appeals to the genuine feelings of the British soldier, from whom he neither conceals the extent of the loss the army has suffered, nor the far more to be lamented injury it has sustained in its wounded honour, confident that but one sentiment will animate every breast, and that zealous to wash out the stain which by a most extraordinary and unaccountable infatuation has fallen on a formerly deserving portion of the army; all will vie to emulate the glorious achievements recently performed by a small but highly-spirited and well-disciplined division, led by officers possessed of enterprize, intelligence and gallantry, nobly evincing what British soldiers can perform, when susceptible of no fear, but that of failing in the discharge of their duty.

E. BAYDES, *Adjutant-General.*

The last act of General Harrison's military service was a just rebuke to Generals Proctor and Vincent, for the inhuman barbarities and despicable thefts perpetrated by suborned Indians and British officers. Immediately after the battle of the Thames, Proctor sent a flag of truce to Harrison, audaciously requesting the restoration of the private property and papers captured from the English. Reserving his answer till he reached Buffalo, and then making it to General Vincent who commanded there, the American commander proudly referred the English to the report of his own officers for their treatment as prisoners, and the respect shown to their papers and property by their captors. Of the American prisoners, who fell into Proctor's hands, those who escaped the tomahawk, General Harrison justly added, had suf-

ferred all the indignities and deprivations human nature could endure. In not a single instance was the private property of officers respected. After enumerating many instances in which whole families of men, women and children, were inhumanly butchered by savages coming directly from and returning to the British camp, General Harrison solemnly threatened the retaliation due to such outrages, should any more be committed. Other commanders, like Jackson, in Florida, in 1816, would have executed the threat: for retaliation is a just and indispensable principle of modern mitigated warfare, sometimes as necessary as the execution of criminals condemned after trial by civil tribunals in profound peace. General Vincent's acknowledgment of this letter from Harrison, pleaded duty to his king and country, in justification of what no authority can command or justify. Chatham's fierce invective against employment of the savages would not endure from age to age as a model of noble eloquence, were there not a broad basis of reason and law for its support. Such employment of unwarranted and unmanly means of warfare is contrary, he argues, to the law of nature, to the law of nations, and mischievous to military discipline; extremely detrimental, therefore, to those who use, and unjust to those who suffer it. It is, he adds, an enormity calling aloud for redress and punishment; a stain on national character; violation of the constitution; against law; impairing the strength and character of our own army, infecting it with the mercenary spirit of robbery and rapine, familiarizing with cruelty the generous principles which should dignify a soldier. God and nature put no such means in men's hands; shocking to every lover of honourable war. In vain has the Protestant religion been established, if these more than inquisitorial cruelties are permitted. Excluding from this celebrated burst of indignant denunciation the declamatory and poetical embellishment, distilled to mere argument, the doctrine is unquestionable as law and authority. And it is due, not only to history, or the past, but to the future, as a rule of action, to the present and at all times, to explain as well as record the injunction. War has its regulations. In some respects, Montesquieu says, the Deity may be said to go by rule. To poison wells, slaughter prisoners, burn churches, spoliat private property, mutilate, torture or violate persons, are contrary to recognized laws of war. Publicists of repute, such as Wolff and Byrkershoech, have

asserted that war legalizes any violence; that fraud and poison may be employed against enemies; prisoners killed without necessity; that warriors may do as they will. But enlightened civilization repudiates these errors. Since Grotius, Vattel, and other standard authorities have treated the subject, a plain principle is universally acknowledged that only so much force is lawful as is necessary to accomplish the end of war, which end is peace. British officers cannot plead the orders of their superiors for employing instruments of war whose bloody barbarism is indiscriminate destruction, tortures, fire-brands, scalping knives, and other unnecessary wanton means. Both the government authorizing and officers exercising such cruelties are liable to retaliation, a principle of hostilities of universal use and acknowledgment. When savages are employed, there is a perfect right not only to punish them as murderers, but to retaliate on those who employ, abet and instigate them.

If, in the order of Providence, there is national punishment for offence, long arrears of atonement are due for the forcible and fraudulent extrusion of the aboriginal red occupants of the American soil, descendants, perhaps, of the Northmen of Europe, or the elder nations of Asia, with ancestral titles more remote than even their European conquerors. The people of the independent United States had hardly an option in this cruel policy, which, like negro slaves, was part of their inheritance from British colonization. The evil has long been past remedy. For most of two centuries we have attacked, overreached, provoked, wasted, destroyed, or driven away these unhappy tribes. In almost every instance, white men were the aggressors; till intractable animosity became the universal sentiment of the white and red, white and black races, and negro slavery and Indian oppression are too deep-seated for political remedy. Kindness to the slave and to the savage is all that can be done. Colonial and belligerent action and reaction have left nothing else practicable. The government of the United States has never been wanting in this duty to the savages. The London Gazette, during the war of 1812, furnished frequent testimonials of constant English endeavour to prevent our engaging the Indians to be neutral, or, if taking part in hostilities, to be humane. In that of the 13th November, 1813, the colonial secretary, Earl Bathurst, published the Governor-General Pre-

vost's letter, of the 25th August, reciting General Proctor's letter of the 23d of that month, congratulating England, that General Harrison's efforts and missions to the Indians to prevail on them to abstain from their cruel practices had failed. "His majesty's allies," said this dispatch, "will adhere to their great father in England." About the same time, our government was more successful with the Mohawks and other of the six nations, in July, 1813, engaged, by treaty, to make war against the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, but under express stipulation that their customary inhumanity should not be permitted. Accordingly, when a party of militia under Major Chapin, with a body of these Indians, routed an English force near Fort George, it was arranged, before fighting, that there should be no scalping, killing prisoners, or other cruelty, and several wounded prisoners were protected from harm. At least some such mitigation of their barbarous modes of warfare would have been established had not the terror of those very modes been one of Great Britain's strongest means for waging war. An act of Congress, of March, 1845, bestows more than a million of dollars in annuities and supplies to more than fifty once fierce and formidable nations of Indians, now miserable, banished fragments of brave and noble races almost extinct.

Consanguinity, colonial reverence, innumerable sympathies, and national identities should endear Great Britain to this country, and recommend her power in all its resplendent glory. Instead of which, what alienation and animosity have been engendered by selfish, cruel, and wanton conflict! We owe them love of liberty, and its enjoyments; nor should be ungrateful for such creative genius and numberless inestimable blessings. Yet two wars already, tell the estrangement of kindred but rival nations; for which the cheapest and best American preparation has been that spirit of hostility kept up among a martial people by continual malediction, aggression, and injustice; never suspended even in peace. National alienation is in the order of Providence, without which, and confusion of tongues, there would be no distinct nations. But must England, like Rome, consider all mankind barbarians but themselves? With two millions of subjects in North America, Great Britain has never ceased to encroach on the eighteen millions of her kindred, anxious to live in peace on this continent. To execute as trai-

tors, those born in England and emigrating to America with no hostile or treacherous intent, but in pursuit of tranquil happiness, to impress seamen from American vessels, to destroy American commerce for interfering with English warfare, to excite the poor but ruthless savage to cruel hostilities, to arm the slaves England left here to dreadful revolt ;—these are extreme acts of wrong, of which posterity can have but one opinion, and history will tell but one tale, whenever, in the course of things, the might and majesty of British dominion pass away.

Soon after the victories by water and land which freed the whole western frontier, and, together with General Jackson's successes in the south-west, broke down the Indian power everywhere—its most active instigator and able chieftain, Tecumseh, one of the many victims to British alliance and subornation, sacrificed—the brave Kentuckians, honourably discharged, were led home by their gallant leader, the venerable Governor Shelby, triumphant in 1813 as he was in 1783 over the arms of Great Britain. General Harrison, with most of the regular troops under his command, embarked on the lakes for Buffalo, where he landed with General M'Arthur's brigade, on the 24th October, 1813. Without having been actively employed anywhere on Lake Ontario, he left the north-west in the latter part of the autumn and pursued his progress homewards, feted at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, for his campaign victoriously concluded. Soon after, while reposing on his laurels at home, in Ohio, his military life was put an end to by the resignation of his commission, which, probably, he did not wish to part with. The military districts into which the United States were divided were necessarily very extensive. We have already seen that there was a project in the west, urged by Governor Shelby, and favoured by General Harrison, for establishing there a board of war. The president, however, thought that all the various channels of public communication centering at the seat of government, much more accurate knowledge of affairs could always be had there than by any commander of a military district, at whatever station he might happen to be. It was deemed essential that the war department should be able always to issue instantaneous commands, to every post, quarter, and officer, without delaying them to pass through the hands of the commander of that military district. The practice, therefore,

was established of transmitting them wherever the executive thought proper, accompanying them with mere duplicates to the commander of the district. In this way Colonel Croghan was charged with his unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw, in the autumn of 1812, which I have not thought it necessary to dwell upon, as it produced no result to the hostilities on either side. Other such orders sent into General Harrison's district, he protested against so vehemently that it became the subject of correspondence and executive consideration. The president finally made known to General Harrison his determination to persevere in a system which the general denounced as inconsistent with subordination, and, thereupon, tendered his resignation. As his reputation and influence at the time were imposing, he perhaps flattered himself that he would have been requested to keep his commission, and that some satisfactory arrangement would have ensued between him and the president. Mr. Madison not being at Washington when the tender of General Harrison's resignation arrived there, the Secretary of War, General Armstrong, who did not esteem General Harrison, and had the president's authority to persevere in the obnoxious system of orders, instantly accepted General Harrison's resignation, and suggested General Jackson to supply the vacancy. Thus closed the military career of William Henry Harrison; who afterwards served as a member of both Houses of Congress, on a foreign mission to Colombia, in South America, which he solicited, was elevated from the clerkship of a court in Cincinnati to the presidency, and after one short month of treacherous triumph in that office, crowned his good fortune by premature death in the presidential mansion. The house was thronged with people, even the chamber in which he died, not free from idle intrusion. He expired with incoherent words of patriotism on his lips, before difficulties and distractions, to which his administration was inevitably destined, leaving the world with most men of all parties inclined to think well of his character, to magnify his virtues, extenuate his foibles, regret his death, and celebrate his memory.

At Mrs. Madison's drawing-room, in the same mansion in which he died, in the end of the year 1813, on his triumphant return, going homeward from the north-western frontier, he was a gay, jocular, and pleasant man, vain of his success. A hand-

some and highly connected lady still living, told the president that General Harrison had received her commands to meet her at that drawing-room. But that he cannot do, said Mr. Madison, because he left Washington this morning, with his horses and attendants, all at the door of this house, and must be now some twenty or thirty miles on his way to the west. "Still," replied the lady, archly, "he must be here, for I laid my command upon him, and he is too gallant a man to disobey me." The president rejoined with his manner of gentle, but positive assurance, "we shall soon see whose orders he obeys." The question was presently settled by the general's appearance, with his military attendants in full costume, the lady smiling at her triumph over the most successful American general of that day, and the President of the United States. Steamboats were just beginning, rail-roads unknown, stage coaches extremely inconvenient, national, and even turnpike roads very rare at that time, when most journeys, particularly to the west, were performed in the saddle. The daughter of one of the Ohio senators accompanied her father five hundred miles from Chilicothe to Washington on horseback. The wife of another senator not only rode fifteen hundred miles on horseback, but passed through several Indian settlements for many nights without a house to lodge in. It may be added that her husband's colleague in the senate was born in Paris, and bred to the church in France.

Perry's and Harrison's victories gave us our first public rejoicings for a victory by a fleet, and a victory by an army. For the first time Philadelphia was illuminated by authority, in October 1813, when the city councils contained majorities of the war party. Without that preponderance, probably, there would have been no such show, as English attachments still then prevailed to so great a degree, that there were persons who declared they illuminated not for American victories, but those of the allies of England over Bonaparte. A boat on fire was dragged through the streets that night by lads, who stopped before the dark mansion of a gentleman who refused to put any light in his windows. The mayor of the city, John Barker, addressed them in his happy strain of popular oratory, to prevent violence to the house which dared to be dark on such an occasion. Wild law, as Locke calls it, lynch law, as termed in the United States, is often provoked, though it may not be justified, by some inconsiderate defiance,

like this challenge of a torch. Has an individual a moral right, when a city is illuminated, to put his veto on the proceeding? Throwing the tea overboard at Boston introduced the revolution which has lighted both hemispheres with other revolutions. The owner of the rebel house was the late Judge Joseph Hopkinson, son of a signer of the Declaration of Independence, who lived to acknowledge cordially, the advantages of a war of which he once denied the justice as sincerely; a gentleman distinguished as a member of Congress, as a judge of the federal District Court, as a writer, as an orator, and as one of many who confessed that the war of 1812, which he opposed, was happy in its influences.

CHAPTER VII.

COAST WARFARE.—ARRIVAL OF ADMIRAL WARREN WITH BRITISH FLEETS.—BLOCKADES OF THE UNITED STATES EXCEPT NEW ENGLAND.—MARAUDING EXPEDITIONS OF ADMIRAL COCKBURN.—BURNING HAVRE DE GRACE, FRENCHTOWN, FREDERICKTOWN, GEORGETOWN.—ENEMY REPULSED AT LEWISTOWN.—DEFEATED AT CRANEY ISLAND.—FEEBLENESS OF NAVAL POWER IN LAND WARFARE.—ITS ILLEGALITIES.—ATTEMPT TO BURN THE FRIGATE CONSTELLATION.—CAPTURE OF HAMPTON BY BRITISH LAND AND NAVAL FORCES.—BARBARITIES THERE.—MR. CLAY'S MOTION IN CONGRESS FOR A COMMITTEE TO REPORT ON THE SUBJECT.—COMMITTEE APPOINTED, NATHANIEL MACON CHAIRMAN.—HIS POLITICAL PORTRAIT.

As hostilities began in the north-west by Hull's invasion of Canada, and were prosecuted in that quarter from August, 1812 till October, 1813, when they closed by the expulsion of the English from nearly all places there except Mackinaw, the chain of narrative has pursued those occurrences without interruption from the beginning to the end, except by the chapter upon the first session of Congress. We now return to an earlier period, in order to give some account of the war on the Atlantic seaboard, in the year 1813.

Mr. Augustus Foster, the English minister at Washington when war was declared, was a young man of not much capacity to foresee the probability of it. Surrounded there by opponents of the war, filling his drawing-rooms and partaking of his hospitality, members of Congress and others, who discredited such an event because they hoped it would not take place, it came upon him and his government by surprise, who were, for the moment, as much unprepared for it as ours. When the orders in council were repealed on the 23d June, 1812, almost simultaneously with our declaration of war, the English expectation was so strong of its being immediately put a stop to, that Mr. Foster's first step, when he reached Halifax, on his way to England, was to send to the Governor-General of Canada, to propose to the American government terms of pacification,

rather than to accelerate at Halifax, or to send to England for, the means of hostilities. The party opposed to war encouraged the British minister's persuasion that it was impossible. They assured him, as no doubt he did his government, that it never would be declared, however much it might be threatened, and when the British orders in council were repealed, that government had every reason to be confident that it neither could nor would be persevered in. Great Britain was, moreover, at that moment, absorbed by her stupendous struggle with France, at an expenditure for that year of five hundred millions of dollars. Her statesmen had, therefore, neither time, means, nor thought to bestow upon a remote and comparatively insignificant conflict on this side of the Atlantic, with an unarmed, unwarlike, and divided people, most of whose maritime portions deprecated hostilities—for which, it was well known, the executive had no great inclination, and it was supposed even Congress were not well disposed. Nearly seven months, therefore, elapsed after the declaration of war, before England took any important step of counteraction. The English manifesto (whose argument will be noticed in another place, but which is mentioned here only to introduce its date), was not issued till the 9th January, 1813. The first of those illegal orders of blockade which Great Britain had then interpolated into at least her own version of the law of nations, blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware, was not proclaimed till the 26th December, 1812. British naval forces on the American coasts and stations did not appear in any formidable numbers, till February, 1813; on the 4th of which month and year, Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, then naval commander-in-chief, took possession of Hampton Roads, in the Chesapeake Bay, with two ships of the line, four frigates, and several smaller vessels of war. In March, 1813, Captain Beresford, in the Poitiers seventy-four gun-ship, which had been on our coast the preceding October, when that vessel recaptured the Frolic and took the Wasp, soon after the Frolic surrendered to the Wasp—the Poitiers seventy-four, with the Belvidera frigate, took possession of Delaware Bay. In the spring of the year 1813, the British fleets on the American coast and stations from Halifax to Bermuda consisted of six seventy-four gun ships, thirteen frigates of various sizes, rated from thirty-eight to thirty-two guns, and eighteen sloops of war rated from eighteen to twenty-two guns,

all under the command of Admiral Warren; most of them in the Chesapeake Bay, a few in the Delaware Bay, and others distributed along the coast as was deemed necessary. By that time the American frigate *Constitution* had taken the British frigate *Guerriere*, the *Wasp* sloop of war had taken the *Frolic*, the frigate *United States* had taken the *Macedonian*, the *Constitution* had taken the *Java*, the *Hornet* had taken the *Peacock*; and the naval prowess of the United States was established while yet their naval power was incompetent to cope with that of Great Britain. On the 20th March, 1813, the whole coast of the United States was declared to be in a state of blockade, with the exception of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Why this invidious discrimination pretermitted Connecticut, was not explained. The object of the exception of several states was obviously to sow dissension among the United States, by inflicting British vengeance on those parts which refused to make peace without relinquishment of impressment, and to favour other parts, whose people and constituted authorities were clamorous for peace upon almost any terms. England always misapprehended the force of the Union.

As soon as the first of these blockades was known in Europe, complaints of them were made by neutral powers to Great Britain; particularly by Sweden, on the 31st March, 1813, to whose minister, Kehauson, the English Secretary, Castlereagh, on the 11th April, gave assurance that neutral vessels, having sailed without notice of the blockade, would be relieved from its operation. The orders in council, and other such violations of maritime law, had begun to be generally questioned if not condemned, even in England. Still, by proclamation from Halifax on the 16th November, 1813, Admiral Warren, to what was called strict and rigorous blockade of the Chesapeake, the Delaware, and the forts and harbours of New York, Charlestown, Port-Royal, Savannah, and the river Mississippi, superadded the sea-coast from Montauk Point along Long-Island, all ports and harbours, bays and creeks, on the sea-coast of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia; declaring that he had stationed sufficient naval force to maintain and enforce these blockades in the most strict and rigorous manner. This declaration was palpably false. No such force had been or could be stationed. The proclamation of

it, as the admiral announced, by virtue of orders from London, was to revive the orders in council in one of their most illegal and offensive breaches of the laws of nations.

Till the overthrow of Napoleon disengaged more of their navy and all their army, there were few land forces with the ships-of-war sent to this country early in 1813 : none sufficient to attempt to subdue any part, or make a serious impression. Some two or three thousand foreign renegades, called *Chasseurs Britanniques*, enlisted in Spain, from among the prisoners and vagabonds taken or found there, if not intended, too well calculated for marauding and despicable incursions, came with Warren's squadron, whose second in command was a notorious freebooter, Admiral George Cockburn. With these materials, of no doubt considerable annoyance and expense to the general government, some of the States, and many localities, extending from Frenchtown in Delaware to Portsmouth in North Carolina, but effecting no great injury, and even doing some good by their brigandage, the British naval means were employed all the spring, summer and part of the autumn of 1813.

War, if one of the ways of Providence, and scourges of mankind, though lawfully to be waged with intense and dreadful severity, is nevertheless always mitigated by recognized acts of governments, by which certain exceptions to its rigours with courtesy and clemency infuse a generous indulgence into its transactions, softening some of their rancour and ruin. For more than thirty years of highly prosperous peace, a hostile foot had never trod the American soil, except the Indians on the frontier ; and since the famous Spanish Armada in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, excepting civil wars, our English kindred were even less accustomed to personal experience of war's calamities. It may be that long exemption rendered us peculiarly sensitive to such distresses. Yet hostilities between Great Britain and the United States seem to be more than others bereft of humanity. Indians and slaves are always employed in them, and in amphibious warfare there is necessarily more licentiousness in the assailant, and annoyance to the places attacked, than when either great armies or fleets meet in general engagements, whose effects are commonly to compel whole regions to submission, rendering it the interest of conquerors to do as little harm as possible to their conquests. War between this country and that has always been

civil war, Indian war, at least threatened servile war, war by land, war by sea, and war by both sea and land together. Armed vessels seizing unexpectedly on unarmed places, armed enemies landing under their protection, to enforce ashore the more licentious hostilities of the ocean, to seize, spoil, and devastate, not to conquer and remain, but to plunder and escape as soon as the mischief is done;—these vexatious and expensive inroads are war's most odious and despicable terrors. Freebooters, stealing by night from their vessels, to plunder, ravage, and then retreat before defenceless places can resist them, while exercising indisputable rights of war, yet perpetrate its worst inflictions. The effect of the war of 1812 and 1813, its moral effect on the United States, was to surprise this country at the unlooked-for hostilities of Great Britain. Till war was declared, it was, as the president's war message argued, waged in fact by England alone, without retaliation by the United States. Throughout the year 1812 both countries were amazed to discover, that on the ocean, where not a sail was said to spread but by English permission, the American marine, both commercial and military, suffered less injury, and inflicted more than that of Great Britain. On the land, where our power was so much the greatest, her superior officers, skill and intrepidity, with savage reinforcements, everywhere worsted American attacks. Till war had continued nearly a year, Great Britain was not the assailant. In 1813, when her forces became such, nothing was more unexpected than the paltriness of their capacity for harm, and the meanness of their attempts to do it. British character by sea sunk as low and as fast as American character rose by sea and fell by land. It was not only on the high seas, in sea fights there, that this result took place: which was as forcibly realized from British futilities and barbarities, with land and sea forces combined in coast warfare. The arrival of British fleets in our defenceless waters, bringing with them undefined but fearful impressions of British naval enterprise and power, was the signal for a series of little marauding attacks, by no means as considerable or formidable as those of the buccaneers in the tropical regions of America two centuries before. Lewistown, a small fishing place on Delaware Bay, Frenchtown, a hamlet of three houses in the State of Delaware, Havre de Grace, a village of some fifty or sixty houses, Fredericktown and Georgetown, small villages in Maryland,

Hampton, an insignificant outport of Norfolk in Virginia, Portsmouth in North Carolina, and Norfolk, the only town of any importance, in all this range of wretched mischief, together with divers barns, stables, mills, foundries, bridges, cottages, and other isolated and extremely humble objects of unworthy molestation, were surprised by night, ravaged, burned, plundered and deserted by British officers of high rank, whose renown preceded them as seamen of great exploits, and gentlemen incapable of such paltry malfeasance. Market shallops, oyster smacks, pleasure boats, whatever in customary and civilized hostilities is left undisturbed, became the prey, not of boatswains, or midshipmen, but of commanders and admirals, headed by one of soldierly air and gentlemanly manners, Admiral Cockburn, afterwards the companion and intimate of the profligate prince regent of Great Britain, called by his courtiers the first gentleman of Europe. Nothing in the whole war, not their naval defeats, left so unfavourable an idea of English maritime capacity as the degrading hostilities of these little better than piratical incursions, which must have tended as much to lower the tone of English seafaring pride, as they did to elevate the strongly contrasted character of that of American mariners, whose very privateers never descended to such unworthy acts. In very few instances was the supposed character of British seamen kept up by them anywhere. In the coast warfare, their boasted trident was trailed in the dust of extremely contemptible warfare. At some of the places attacked they succeeded indeed to rifle them of furniture, or burn people's dwellings. But for the most part their pillage was as harmless as it was unmanly.

On my way from Philadelphia to Washington, I found the whole country excited by these depredations. Cockburn's name was on every tongue, with various particulars of his incredibly coarse and blackguard misconduct. At Frenchtown and Havre de Grace, and in various other places, they showed me the vestiges of his wanton vexations: a henroost robbed, (I state this fact as literally true,) the panes of glass in a church window broken to pieces, Commodore Rogers' residence at Havre de Grace defaced, and many other remains of little spite and contemptible hostility. Since a large British army landed in that neighbourhood in 1777, under Lords Howe and Cornwallis, defeated Washington at Brandywine and Germantown, and took

Philadelphia, there had been no marks of war there till 1813. Then cannon planted as posts were dug up to be mounted, squads of militia and volunteers were under exercise along the roads, gentlemen of distinction serving as dragoons and privates: the whole region roused to self-defence against invasion, which caused universal feelings of execration. About two years afterwards, on my return home from Congress, that road was one continued blaze of illumination for peace just ratified.

Not one of these derogatory little invasions succeeded in making any injurious impression. Some of the burglarious attacks were so far successful, that barns, boats, or other insignificant objects were destroyed by the seamen before they could be overtaken, and prevented escaping to their shipping. But in every case of considerable effort, especially those by land forces, combined with marines and sailors, particularly at Craney Island and Norfolk, the enemy was signally repulsed, and driven back to his ships of war with much loss. At Lewistown, Colonel Samuel B. Davis and Major Hunter withstood a bombardment of some severity from the Poitiers and Belvidera, wantonly inflicted on a harmless village, as the English said, to compel our people to supply them with fresh provisions. After firing a great number of cannon balls and bombs upon the village, with no effect, they were beaten off, and withdrew without accomplishing any other purpose than convincing the country how easy it was to repel such attacks, and that its thanks were due to Colonel Davis for his good conduct in proving it. The president conferred on him the commission of lieutenant-colonel of a newly-raised regiment of regulars. Colonel Davis had been a midshipman in the French fleet defeated by the English on the first of June, 1794, afterwards served as an officer on board of a privateer commanded by Captain Barney, was at one time a member of the legislature of Pennsylvania, and is still living at advanced age.

The frigate Constellation, commanded by Captain Stewart, blockaded at Norfolk, was a legitimate object of English capture; and they made several attempts to effect it, which were all defeated by her crew under Captain Tarbell, and the Virginia militia under General Robert Taylor, a gentleman of the bar, much distinguished by the skill, judgment and success he displayed in command of the troops in and about Norfolk; a few regulars, the rest militia and volunteers, together with the crew of the

Constellation. Her defence was arranged with the usual ability of Captain Stewart, though neither he nor Captain Gordon who succeeded him in command of that frigate, was present at the several attempts of the enemy to take her, which were completely defeated.

On the 22d of June, 1813, (the anniversary of the capture of the unlucky frigate Chesapeake, in those waters in 1807, by a British squadron,) while Congress was in session at Washington, Admirals Warren and Cockburn, with between two and three thousand land forces, under General Sir Sidney Beckwith, joined to the seamen and marines of the fleet, made a serious and regularly planned attempt to take Craney Island, a small out-post of the sea-port of Norfolk, with but few inhabitants and frail defences. They were totally defeated with considerable loss; loss not only of lives, but of credit, for their attack was neither vigorous nor well sustained. About twenty-five hundred troops, with fifty boats full of men, landed from the enemy's squadron on the island. A few cannon under Major Faulkner, and Captain Emmerson, Captain Tarbell, with one hundred and fifty seamen from the Constellation, altogether not more than between five and six hundred men, with batteries of not much force, but perfectly well served, sufficed to repulse the English, who lost about two hundred in killed, wounded, and deserted, besides sinking several of their barges, among the rest, a very large one called the Centipede, full of men, well armed, nearly all of whom were killed or taken. This was legitimate warfare; but one of those feeble performances for which all the English amphibious hostilities were remarkable; with the single exception of the capture of Washington. None of the experience of the whole war was more consolatory or unexpected, than the great difference between the naval character and deeds of Great Britain. The English soldiery always proved more enterprising and formidable than their seamen; and for reasons which will appear in my chapter on naval affairs. The boasted marine of Great Britain, much overrated at any rate, was in 1813 far below the standard of power universally ascribed to it, except by the American navy. Admiral Warren's official account of the repulse at Craney Island, dated on board the ship *San Domingo*, the 24th of June, 1813, acknowledged the failure of the attempt, made, he said, to get at and destroy the Constellation, and dockyard, and repulsed by the militia and seamen of that vessel.—

Captain Hanchett, of his Majesty's Ship *Diadem*, said Admiral Warren's dispatch, who volunteered his services, and led the division of boats with great gallantry, was severely wounded by a ball in the thigh. This Captain Hanchett was a natural son of George the Third, born some time after his marriage to the queen, by whom he left so numerous a progeny, among them three kings, George the Fourth, William the Fourth, and the King of Hanover. Not long from the time when the regent of Great Britain congratulated his kingdom on the pitch of grandeur it reached by dictating peace to France, in the French capital—a brother of that regent was repulsed by a handful of militia, in an attempt to capture a miserable island in the Chesapeake.

The repulse at Craney Island on the 22d of June, 1813, was outrageously revenged on the 25th of that month at Hampton, by brutalities not less disgusting or inhuman than those which disgraced the British army at the River Raisin in January. A combined land and naval force under Admiral Cockburn, and General Beckwith, stormed Hampton, a small fishing place in the chops of the channel of Hampton Roads, too far from Norfolk to be supported from there, and no irreparable loss to its defence, which the enemy was never able to overcome. Early in the morning, from thirty to forty British barges filled with men, approached the mouth of Hampton Creek, from the direction of Newport's Noose. Our troops were formed on their encampment, divided from Hampton by a narrow creek, over which there was a slight bridge. After a cannonade for some time, the British showing no inclination to advance from their barges, one man moved forward to meet theirs: our company of riflemen, led by Captain Servant, and a troop of dragoons by Captain Cooper. The enemy continued firing grape shot and rockets. The action was kept up with spirit for some time, till the superior numbers of the enemy compelled Major Crutchfield, the militia officer in command, to order a retreat, which was, however, deliberately conducted, in good order, and frequent firing with execution on the advancing column of the enemy. Major Corbin, throughout the engagement gallantly exposed, was severely wounded. Captains Shield, Herndon, Ashby, Brown, Miller and Carey, of the militia, Adjutant Anderson, Lieutenant Armistead, Captain Goodall of the regular artillery, every officer, and all the men engaged, especially Captain Pryor, with his lieutenants Lively and

Jones, and their brave matrosses, behaved with becoming spirit on this occasion, which cost the enemy more than two hundred men, while the Americans killed were but seven. The enemy landed, and had in the battle not less than twenty-five hundred men. Our force fell short of four hundred and fifty.

Whether from exasperation at former defeats, and the obstinate resistance experienced with such disproportion of loss on this occasion, or from the ordinary wantonness of English marine warfare, their partial success at Hampton was attended by abominable misdeeds, of which not only Norfolk, Richmond, Virginia, the neighbouring newspapers, particularly the National Intelligencer, but Congress and the whole country were filled with details. It was universally said, and generally believed, that Admiral Cockburn promised the men as inducement to this capture, the contents of the banks at Norfolk, of whose fall that of Hampton was to be the preliminary, three days plunder of the inhabitants said to be very rich, and free use of all fine women. A correspondence respecting the enormities committed took place between our General Taylor and General Beckwith, in which the latter, without denying, justified them as provoked by our firing on a flag of truce, which was not true, and as perpetrated by the French, Spanish, and other banditti, foreign renegades enlisted into the British army, known as Chasseurs Britanniques. Unused as our people were to the horrors of war, exaggerated reports of these excesses may have been circulated. But, making deductions and allowances, the truth remained in shocking proof of unwarrantable barbarities. Women, who could not escape, were hunted down by perpetrators of every indignity on their persons. No help was given to the wounded. The dead were left unburied. The females were not only violated by these wretches, but they encouraged the slaves to violate their own mistresses. The sick were murdered in bed; the maimed and the decrepid from age. Silver plundered from dwellings, was perhaps not illegitimate spoil. But the pulpit and communion table of the Episcopal church at Hampton, (the Church of England, as commonly called in this country,) together with all the plate, although the donor's name was engraved on it, together with the parish to which it belonged, were sacrilegious booty. Shirts and shoes stripped from aged persons, indiscriminate rape, one woman ravished by many men—these, and many more such outrages, undoubtedly

committed, it would wrong history not to record, and civilization not to probate.

Committees of citizens were appointed to verify and report the facts, and to proceed to the British fleet on the occasion. Two respectable gentlemen, Thomas Griffin, who had been a member of Congress, opposed to the war, and Lieutenant Robert Lively, on this duty, reported that from all the information they could procure, from sources too respectable to permit them to doubt, they were compelled to believe that acts of violence were perpetrated disgraceful to the age. The sex, hitherto guarded by the soldier's honour, escaped not the rude assaults of superior force, nor could disease disarm the foe of his ferocity. The apology that these atrocities were committed by the French soldiers, attached to the British forces in our waters, is no justification." The town of Hampton, and the adjacent country, were given up to the indiscriminate plunder of a licentious soldiery. In many houses, not a knife, fork, or plate was left. British officers plundered the stores. Medicines from apothecaries' shops were thrown into the street. The sails were stripped from a windmill. Trunks, closets, drawers, were broken open and rifled.— Much of the plunder was deposited in the yard of the house where Admiral Cockburn and General Beckwith lodged. A man long confined to bed by extreme illness, was shot in his wife's arms, to revenge, as the monsters said, our militia refusing quarters to Frenchmen shot at in a barge after it surrendered; a slander, which, even if true, afforded no justification. A lady was seized and stripped naked by five or six ruffians in scarlet regimentals, who spoke good English, and her body subjected to the most abominable indecencies. At one instant, escaping, she fled, with her female child, to the water, from which she was dragged by these ruffians for further abuse. An official report to the Governor of Virginia, confirmed these indelible blots on English manhood. It was then, too, for the first time, that Cockburn and his followers began to steal slaves; not to emancipate, but sell them in the West India Islands. A company of slaves was also formed, uniformed, officered, and incorporated with the English troops. Colonel McDowell wrote to the Governor of Virginia, that the gentlemen sent with a flag of truce on board Admiral Warren's ship, the *San Domingo*, and Admiral Cockburn's ship, the *Marlborough*, in order to reclaim the slaves, (admitted by treaty

after the war, to be unlawful prizes,) ascertained, after some shabby evasions, that they had been forwarded to Bermuda.— These indefensible and dishonourable proceedings were accompanied by Admiral Warren's election to be vice-president of the Bible Society of Halifax. He was an old man, too prominent in such misconduct, but not so audaciously so as Admiral Cockburn, who set the English navy an example as pernicious on the sea-coast, as Proctor's, near the same time, to the English army on the western frontier.

These violations of national honour and usage deserve exposure, not only as part of the history of their transaction, but because of their denial or apology by disaffected and unpatriotic Americans then. They declared that men in the pay and employ of government imputed unusual and unexampled cruelty to the officers and soldiers of the enemy, in order to alienate Americans from a nation with which they said we were more naturally connected by the ties of common origin, language, religion, freedom, laws, manners and interests, than with any other people. They appealed to British character, the establishment of many successive centuries, of which generosity and humanity were the brightest traits, to refute such calumnies. It was impossible that British naval and military officers could be other than magnanimous and humane. The reports of their brutal conduct at Hampton are unfounded, said these apologists for monstrous enormities. Yet were they too true, and too well attested, to be contradicted. Their effect was gradually to disenchant this country of colonial reverence and party disaffection. Every day the conviction gained ground that the lesson of the Declaration of Independence is wise, to consider the English as enemies in war, in peace friends, like other nations.

The massacres at Frenchtown in January, and at Hampton in June, had salutary influences on the operations of war, the proceedings of Congress, and the sentiments of the United States. The lesson was severe; but it required inhuman English misconduct to eradicate the deep-seated feeling of national attachment, which prevailed on the Atlantic seaboard, to a mother country. In the west, beyond the Alleghany Mountains, the yeomanry and rural inhabitants, generally, of the United States, were more independent. They nearly all sustained the war. But those who traded with England, and their dependents, the merchants,

lawyers, brokers and shopkeepers, together with many of the New England clergy, long persisted in disbelief of English wrongs, and disaffection to the government' undertaking to avenge them. The permanent, as well as immediate, effects of the enemy's outrages were providential remedies of an inveterate distemper. While throughout the country at large they operated to remove prejudices and promote patriotism, their influence was beneficial at the seat of government, in all its departments. Congress they inspired to strong and united reaction; while they cured the executive of lingering hope that peace was attainable without the utmost efforts and sufferings of war. The fleets and land troops that sailed up the Potomac and Chesapeake towards Washington and Annapolis, were the same of whose enormities every one had heard at Hampton. In another respect the effect was excellent. The enemy taught us not only to detest, but to despise him. The failure of his attempt at Craney Island, of his repeated attempts to take the Constellation, the transient and timorous nature of his incursions, their paltry destructiveness, their amazing want of enterprise and boldness, relieved an unarmed country of much of its preconceived apprehension, by making known a truth, told by all history, that naval operations begun and sustained from a distance, are seldom to be feared.

After those British fugitive amphibious inroads had taken place at Frenchtown, Havre de Grace, Fredericktown and Georgetown, but before the before-mentioned occurrences at Craney Island, Hampton and Norfolk, on Monday, the 24th of May, 1813, in the midst, therefore, of these scenes of marauding and plunder, the session of Congress began. The president's message reminded us of the obligation of adapting measures on the supposition that the only way to peace was vigorous employment of the resources of war. And painful as the reflection is, it said this duty is particularly enforced by the spirit and manner in which the war continues to be waged by the enemy, who, uninfluenced by the unvaried examples of humanity set them, are adding to the savage fury of it on one frontier, a system of plunder and conflagration on the others, equally forbidden by respect for national character, and by the established rules of civilized warfare.

Next day Mr. Clay was elected speaker, and the oath admi-

nistered to him by my venerable colleague, William Findley, one of the oldest men and members of the House of Representatives. The day after, Peterson Goodwyn, of Virginia, submitted the customary motion for the appointment of the standing committees, which were then much fewer than since. Mr. Clay, placing Mr. Macon in the chair, with the promptitude and decision of his character, forthwith called the attention of Congress and the country to the outrages at the river Raisin, the incursions as conducted in the Chesapeake, and the enemy's general unwarrantable conduct, by moving a resolution that so much of the president's message as related to the spirit and manner in which the war had been waged, should be referred to a select committee. Raising his fine voice in the splendid hall, surrounded by representatives of the country, most of them strangers to him and to each other, with great animation and force, the speaker, with bitter recollections of the defeat and destruction of his Kentucky companions, expressed his abhorrence of the enemy's inhumanities, not only the massacre of our citizens on the western frontier, but the conflagrations of hamlets, villages and farm-houses on the maritime border. The latter outrage has not been denied, said he; but apologized for on the pretence that we had first fired on their flag. Although he believed the allegation false, he was glad it was thought necessary to make any apology. There ought to be inquiry. If the facts were as reported, they called for the indignation of all Christendom, and should be embodied in an authentic document. Mr. Clay enjoyed Mr. Madison's confidence: and it is probable that this motion was made by preconcert with him. No opposition was made to it, unusual as it was for the presiding officer to leave the chair, as soon as the House was organized, take the floor, and present a motion for the appointment of an important select committee, the composition of which would be his own act. But Mr. Clay was not a man to be deterred by such considerations. Soon after, however, the matter appeared to be settled, Mr. Thomas Grosvenor, of the New York delegation, the readiest and boldest debater of the House, one of the strongest opponents of the war and administration, made a motion to reconsider, which motion is apt to open what seems to be closed. He desired to amend the resolution, by adding to it the words, *and by this nation*, after the word enemy: that is, that the spirit and manner in which we

had carried on the war, should be authenticated, as well as that of the English. As the president's message, said Mr. Grosvenor, contrasts our humanity with their barbarity, I wish to see the evidence of the former. This, a specious intimation, was warmly repelled by Robert Wright, of Maryland, an elderly gentleman, quick with retort of all kinds, whether with tongue, pen, or pistol, for he had fought some desperate duels. The amendment, he objected, cast imputation, a libel, on our land and naval officers, who had distinguished themselves as much by humanity as valour. After a short discussion, Grosvenor's motion was rejected, but by only a majority of twelve: and the speaker announced the special committee, without putting Mr. Grosvenor upon it, according to common parliamentary usage to place those members on committees, who take an active part in debating the subject matter. The war members of the committee were Nathaniel Macon, John Forsyth, Robert Wright, James Clarke and Perry W. Humphreys: the federalists were William Gaston and Thomas Cooper. Mr. Gaston was one of the ablest and most pleasing speakers of the House, a leading member of the opposition, afterwards Chief Justice of North Carolina. James Clarke was afterwards Governor of Kentucky, John Forsyth, Governor of Georgia, Senator of the United States, Minister to Spain, and Secretary of State. Mr. Wright had been Governor of Maryland, and had represented that State in the Senate of the United States. This select committee did not make their report till the following December, 1813; when it appeared, and was printed in a volume of 200 pages; written by John Forsyth. Of course it required time to procure the evidence and digest it. Under several heads the report explained: first, the bad treatment of American prisoners; secondly, their detention as British subjects, as natives, or naturalized; third, detention of mariners as prisoners found in England when war was declared; fourth, compulsory service of American seamen in British ships-of-war; fifth, violation of flags of truce; sixth, ransom of American prisoners from Indians in British service; seventh, pillage and destruction of private property in the Chesapeake Bay and neighbourhood; eighth, massacre and burning of prisoners, pillage and shooting of citizens, and burning of houses after surrendering to British and under their protection; ninth, outrages at Hampton—the last thus mentioned in the report. The shrieks of

the innocent victims of infernal lust at Hampton were heard by the American prisoners, but were too weak to reach the ears or disturb the repose of British officers, whose duty as men required them to protect every female whom the fortune of war had thrown into their power. Human language affords no terms strong enough to express the emotions which the examination of the evidence has awakened. In the correspondence between the American and British commanders, will be found what is equivalent to an admission of the facts by the latter. No punishment has followed conviction of the guilty. The power of retaliation being vested in the executive, no measure is proposed by this report. Such enormities, instead of inspiring terror, as was probably intended, being calculated to produce the contrary effect, the committee close with a resolution that the president be requested to collect and present to the House evidence of every departure by the enemy, during the war, from the ordinary mode of conducting it among civilized nations.

Mr. Humphreys, of Tennessee, and Mr. Cooper, of Delaware, were not, I believe, in public view after that Congress. The other members of the select committee from whom this report emanated, were all conspicuous in various public stations, as governors, judges, foreign ministers, and secretaries. But none of them reached the posthumous celebrity which their chairman's name has come to, no doubt without his either expecting or desiring it; and as a remarkable specimen of American democracy, it merits full exhibition. Representative democracy is a modern experiment in politics which has never yet been fully carried out. None of its disciples was more disposed than Mr. Macon for the trial:—so that candid portraiture of him is as curious as it may be edifying.

Nathaniel Macon was a practical apostle of a sect of politicians radically democratic, invincibly opposed to that small majority of the American people, who organized the federal constitution, modified to republican institutions, on the English model of regulation. Mr. Macon was opposed to it, as by far too monarchical. Hamilton dreaded anarchy, and deemed the English government the mildest form of republicanized monarchy. Jefferson dreaded monarchy, and thought that the American government should be original. Washington, perhaps, doubted the republican experiment, but was resolved to make it in

good faith, though, as he said, it cost him the last drop of his blood. Macon had full faith in the most democratic institutions, willing to trust the people, further perhaps than Jefferson would have ventured, far beyond Washington, and to an extent which Hamilton considered anarchical. Madison, the disciple of Jefferson and admirer of Washington, took middle ground between them all. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Macon all proved the sincerity of their professions, by practising them through life, and to the last, when beyond life's common climacteric, when no selfish or improper motive could induce it; calmly dying as they lived, entirely faithful to their respective principles. Hamilton was cut off by an untimely death in the prime of life, killed in a duel at forty-seven years of age, by Burr, on the same spot and about the same time where and when his eldest son, was also killed in a duel. He, too, no doubt cherished to the last the politics he professed. Selecting from the government of the Old World, ranging from the bowstring despotism of Turkey, to the democratical royalty of a mother country, the founders of an American constitution chose the latter as a model, reduced it to republicanism, confederation and much enlarged suffrage. Mr. Macon, a soldier of the American Revolution, the native of a state where English tories were most vindictive and mischievous, and born, as he must have been, an innate republican, detested English monarchy, despised English aristocracy, and never could have been reconciled to the turbulence of English democracy. He was a man of middle stature, between fifty and sixty years of age, when I first knew him, with a round, shining, playful countenance, bald and gray, always dressed in the same plain but not inelegant manner, and so peculiar in his ideas and conversation, that one of the Jersey members, told him, that if he should happen to be drowned, he should look for Macon's body up the stream instead of floating with the current. Of a distinguished family, brought up to riches and accomplished education, he left Princeton College in the Revolution, not for an epaulette and small sword, but the musket and knapsack of a common soldier, as such enlisted and re-enlisted in the American army, served long in the ranks, at one time as a private under the command of his own brother, never, it is said, desiring to be commissioned as an officer. Lest this strange perversion of common

ambition should seem to imply any dissolute vulgarity of disposition, it should be added that his habits, tastes, and associations, were all gentlemanly, perfectly temperate, and without the slightest touch of unsocial, gloomy or coarse propensity. Elected to the House of Commons of North Carolina, he unfurled there his radical banner in the same quiet and inoffensive way that always marked his singular career, opposing the adoption of the federal constitution with all his ability. In 1791, chosen to the House of Representatives of the United States, he remained there five and twenty years by continual re-elections, having filled the great station, for a time, of Speaker of that House. But neither his principles nor his habits fitted him for its industrious, onerous, and absolute, if not arbitrary, functions. To rule or govern was disagreeable to him, or to labour. As a speaker he practised the principles he always professed, of the utmost freedom; letting the House alone to keep itself in order, without the presiding officer's interposition; a principle, in theory, so true that seldom does a newly-elected speaker return thanks for that honour without reminding his suffragans of the House that he is but their reflected image, and that unless they keep themselves in order, it will be vain for him to attempt it.

In 1816, Macon was translated to the Senate, as a representative of North Carolina, in that body. In 1823, he voluntarily retired from public life, and spent the rest of his days at home, a planter and sportsman, to the last, fond of his game of whist, the chase and other recreations. Beloved by his family, neighbours and slaves, in charity with all mankind, at peace with himself, he died at a good old age, with much more veneration and influence than fall to the lot of many more conspicuous personages. His system of government was to govern as little as possible. Extensive dissension, and little legislation, he held to be the policy and duty of Congress. Let alone, was his policy for nations, for parties, and for individuals; his strong preference in this respect, being probably strengthened by plantation life and property, which beget intractable independence, and embolden proprietors to claim a sort of Polish veto against whatever crosses their homestead, or requires their submission. Six years' service for a senator, were in his opinion five too many, and one enough for a representative in Congress. Tyranny begins where annual elections end, was one of his maxims. Nothing is more miserable than

a splendid and expensive government, was another. He was a constant advocate of frequent elections, that all offices should be elective, and for short terms of office, not as the only democratic, but likewise as the most durable tenure. High salaries he considered mere baits for irregular, and ungovernable ambition. I have often heard him triumphantly argue, that the annual and even semi-annual judicial elections in parts of New England, were the best guarantee for faithful and permanent service; and he would mention families kept in office from generation to generation by such elections, as irrefutable proof of his opinion. Armies, navies, cities, and all coercive authority, including taxes, he opposed, as well as the good behaviour tenure, and political authority of the judiciary. Unbounded confidence in popular virtue was the religion of his politics. As during most of his life British power and influence were the monsters of republican aversion, he was invariably set against those Jefferson called Anglomen, looked with contempt upon all the imported aeries, and what many consider refinements of fashionable life, and with a stronger feeling than contempt on that American idolatry of England, which predominated till the war of 1812, and is not yet extinct. Jefferson, a free thinker, would level up to the doctrines of Franklin, Penn, Locke and Milton, and extirpate aristocratic, and regal encroachments, which have usurped the place of aboriginal liberty and equality. Macon, not so deep in thought, literature or science as Jefferson, would have outstripped him in actual reform. But he was a passive, not active, radical, except by example. Negation was his ward and arm. His economy of the public money was the severest, sharpest, most stringent and constant refusal of almost any grant that could be proposed. Every one, with legislative experience, knows that many, if not most public donations, bounties, indemnities, and allowances are unjust, often unconstitutional, to individuals, commonwealths, corporations, or companies. It requires courage, however, and fortitude to vote against pensions, compensations for alleged wrongs, and the various other demands on congressional charity. Mr. Macon had no such charity, disclaimed it altogether, and kept the public purse much more stingily than his own. With him not only was *optimum vectigal parsimonia*, parsimony the best subsidy, but *unicum*, the only one. No device or contrivance could seduce his vote for such objects, which

are the common contrivances for local popularity of most members of Congress, but were with him repudiated to the great gratification of a North Carolina constituency, not rich, and sharing few national favours of the kind. In the nearly forty years he served in Congress, no ten members gave so many negative votes. He was in opposition throughout much of the eight years of Washington's, and all the four of John Adams' administration; did not coincide with all of Jefferson's, and part of Madison's; preferred restrictions and measures of passive suffering, that he thought might prevent war, which he considered dangerous to republican institutions, though he voted for it as a necessary evil, and then against most of the strong acts proposed to carry it on. Though supporting the war with all his heart according to his own peculiar politics, when Monroe, as Secretary of War, called on Congress for conscription to raise an army, and Dallas, as Secretary of the Treasury, required all the taxes to be much increased, and others superadded, Macon voted against all these measures. It was alleged, however, by others besides him, eminent supporters of the war, that some of these measures, especially conscription, were of rigour beyond law. When Mr. Eppes, the son-in-law of Jefferson, chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, during the war, had constitutional scruples as to some of these measures, Monroe said that we should look to the constitution after war; but that with the capital sacked, and the enemy threatening us at all points, from Plattsburg to New Orleans, we must put forth the whole force of the nation, without too scrupulous regard to what was constitutional. When in patriotic effort, Dallas poured out a flood of paper in treasury notes, one of Macon's maxims was, that paper money was never beat. Without ever losing the confidence of his party, no member of it so often voted against them. Tenacious and inflexible, remonstrance availed nothing with him. He never quarreled about his frequent nays, but never abandoned or reduced them. Not taciturn or austere, he was a frequent speaker, always good-humoured and jocular, but always self-opinionated. Macon had ingrain preference for the advantages of rural over city life, to form the faculties both mental and bodily for distinction; for courage, eloquence, endurance, and every kind of eminence. No man should live, he said, where he can hear his neighbour's dog bark. Sometimes when a city member addressed the House to

his satisfaction, he would jocosely say, I liked that: what a pity you were born and brought up in town; but for that, you might have come to something. Towns he thought unfavourable to the fervour and fortitude which stimulate excellence. Frivolous occupations take place of earnest contemplation and enterprize. Reading is not of the right sort, if there be not even too much of it. Rural life is less stagnant, more racy, more thoughtful, and self-dependent. When it is not only rural, but border life, full of exposure, adventure, and exploit, it obviously conduces to greater strength of character. Some savagism may become mixed with it, which does not detract from the strength, however it may occasionally tarnish, the civilization. Not one of the greatest Presidents of the United States laid the basis of his elevation in a city. Washington, Napoleon, Jackson, were sylvan born—born to effort and endurance. I believe Macon never held any office by other than popular election. Indeed, he was too fond of ease for the laborious responsibility of executive place. He is an illustrious example of the eminence and celebrity attainable by faithful service in Congress, with moderate abilities, constant integrity, and no ulterior or untoward ambition.

Few public speakers, secretaries, ministers, or judges, aspirants or incumbents of place by executive choice, fill, with posterity, so large a space in public esteem as Nathaniel Macon, or exercised as much influence while in any office. Born and educated among what Jefferson calls natural aristocracy, the aristocracy of virtue and talents, Macon's distinction is that he loved the people. Learning, eloquence and action were not his merits. During his nearly forty years of life in Congress, he hardly ever proposed any measure; but sincerity, simplicity, moderation, forbearance and integrity gave him titles to respect which make even his memory influential. Artificial aristocracy, by birth or wealth, Jefferson deemed a mischievous ingredient in government, whose ascendancy should be prevented. But natural aristocracy, by virtue and talents, he regarded as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, trusts and government of society; and that form of government the best which provides most effectually for their pure selection into the offices of government. Some think that the aristocracy should be put in a separate chamber of legislation, where they may be hindered from doing mischief by co-ordinate branches, and

be a protection to wealth against the agrarian and plundering enterprizes of a majority of the people. "That," wrote Jefferson to Adams, "is your opinion; while I think that the American constitution provides a better remedy by leaving the free separation and election of the natural aristocracy from the mass, who will, in general, choose the good and the wise. Wealth will take care of itself. Cabals in the Senate of the United States furnish many proofs that to give an elevated class power to prevent mischief is to arm them for it." Macon's equality and radicalism went beyond Jefferson's. But he was an inactive reformer and merely by the force of example, as the American republic acts on the rest of the world. A planter, of moderate fortune, coveting no more, disliking the labour-gained wealth of professional life, and the chances of trade, he disregarded the vexatious vanities of riches or office, except that of serving the people as one of many law-makers, among whom, too, his rule was to do as little as possible. After serving a quarter of a century in the House of Representatives, what most would consider promotion to the Senate, was, perhaps, departure from his principles. Did he deem it rotation in office? a principle of republican government, of which Macon's twelve re-elections to the same seat in Congress, proved that he did not consider it applicable to elective places. Men grow insolent, said Tacitus, in a single year's public trust. Doubtless they should, by frequent recurrence of popular election, be continually subjected to that ordeal. But when incumbents of elective posts, like Macon, are faithful, they are not often supplanted without detriment to the constituency. When one party vanquishes another, it is but just that the principal places should be filled by the victorious. But abuse of this unquestionable principle as to others demoralizes communities by pampering morbid thirst, and insatiable yearning for emolument, substitutes avarice for ambition. Does not Macon's success demonstrate that no American statesman can be successfully both ambitious and avaricious? That he can no more prefer himself to the people, than serve mammon before God? To be of the aristocracy of the democracy is common ambition; but Macon's desire was to be of the democracy of the aristocracy.

Whatever, says Burke, writing of the French National Assembly, the distinguished few may have been, men of known rank

or shining talents, it is the substance or mass of the body which constitutes its character, and must finally determine its direction. In all bodies, those who will lead must also, in a considerable degree, follow. Macon was a leading follower, not a summit, but part of the mass of Congress; not a commanding actor or writer, no demagogue, hardly communing with his constituents but by the monosyllables of votes, always before them in print, but taking no undue means for soliciting their good will. Yet his popularity never failed, his success was transcendent, and the influence of his example is still enduring and increasing. The centralism of Hamilton has almost disappeared. The federalism of Washington and the constitutionalism of Madison have been, in a measure, superseded by the republicanism of Jefferson, which may be swallowed up in the radicalism of Macon. Will that be declining or advancing?

The most frequent disparagement cast by Europeans on American republicanism, is its alleged tendency to degenerate, a downward tendency, which is to swallow up learning, wealth, liberty, and refinement, and establish a despotism of mere vulgarity; that public life is less sought by respectability than elsewhere or formerly, and that talents avoid it. Whether this be so in America, is it more so than elsewhere? Great talents are the creations of great conjunctures; and the tranquillity of the United States has been almost stagnant under the present forms of government. In such circumstances commercial, professional, and other lucrative pursuits, are more attractive than politics; and with the growth of luxury, which has been prodigious since the introduction of paper money, there will always be a large class preferring fashionable idleness to political notoriety. Mme. de Staël says, in her considerations on the French Revolution, that many of the old nobility of Europe despised the Emperor Alexander as an upstart, not to be received into good society. Social and ancestral distinction, a strong desire, more prevalent in Europe, is not without acknowledgment in America. Descendants of celebrated Americans are often chosen into political life for that reason. Congress and the state legislatures abound with members boasting some family merit, such as kindred with soldiers of the Revolution; and it is common to meet with Americans who preserve their ancestors' certificates of service in the revolutionary army, as if they were

patents of nobility. Besides the merits of personal pedigree, Burke eloquently vindicates those of honourable national lineage. Yet the country attorneys, village lawyers, notaries, brokers, traders, and clowns whom he enumerates as the majority of the third estate of the French National Assembly, inferior, in his judgment, to the noblemen and gentry he extols as hereditary legislators, enacted laws which reformed the crumbling basis of society, and reconstructed France so as to render that declining kingdom not only freer, but incomparably happier, richer, and greater than it was before the days of what Burke calls its downfall. If De Tocqueville's idea be true, that American democracy is irresistibly swallowing up everything else American, and such be the decline which Europe imputes to this country, at all events Great Britain, France, and all the freer kingdoms of Europe, are passing down the same declivity with more violence and precipitation than this country, one of whose consolations is Jefferson's maxim, that government, at best, is but relative good, and that, with all the faults of which it is accused, democracy is at least a less injurious and more durable state than royalty, since one of the unquestionable consequences of the American Revolution is that revolutionary movements, with equality and liberty, have begun throughout the Old World. Be that as it may as to public bodies and national stability, Macon found public life not more precarious or unprofitable, and less toilsome or irksome than private pursuits; and if American legislatures had more of such men, faithfully representing a sovereign people, public life would be reasonable support, and the most honourable occupation. For state legislatures and Congress, in most instances, are the mere chrysalis between worm and butterfly; where insect members perish after a short flight. But such is not legitimate rotation in office, nor the public service Macon performed. With him a place in Congress was the ultimate, not penultimate or intermediate stage; the goal, not the stepping stone, to some more profitable place or speculation, but that to which he dedicated all the faculties of all his life.

If there is romance of politics, or fancy in this sketch of an American political apostle, at least the experiment of both may not be unworthy of general consideration. We must endeavour to divest ourselves of the influences of Europe, and stand on American independence, in order to appreciate such an experiment.

Let it be borne in mind that in estimating what may be thought relapse to vulgar barbarism, or advance to true wisdom, according to the judgment or the prejudice of the reader, while Macon lived, such was the change, whether retrograde or progressive, that representative government, open legislation, religious toleration, and political equality, were first introduced among mankind. The wisest, therefore, may misjudge, the wildest be too tame in theory. At all events, Macon's passive example has had powerful influences. The book of John Taylor, of Carolina, proves it even in literature. Doing nothing, saying little, what a space Macon fills! Constructive and aristocratic excesses, as he calmly denounced them, banks, tariffs, taxes, rapid improvements, much government, armies, great expenditures, paper money, high pay, resisted by him, with a very few adherents, are now rejected by large portions of the American people. An executive Macon could hardly be; a Congress filled with them, especially in time of war, might not be practicable. Yet large infusion of his doctrine already affects all our institutions, and may act still more thoroughly on American government, should America become a world by itself, entirely independent of European pupilage. Already have chief magistrates of the United States proclaimed much of Macon's principles as standards for their administration; at least one of them, Mr. Van Buren, visited his peculiar homestead as a shrine to worship at; and others may follow in his footsteps of peace, moderation, severe economy and radical democracy. The experiment has not yet been made how far liberty may be carried. Not only in the United States, but in England, too, the tendency is to go farther. What has not the free principle done for Great Britain, in spite of feudal fetters upon all her institutions! What has not equality done for France, almost without liberty? Are not Russia, Turkey, Egypt, India, South America much freer than before Macon lived? The laws and intercourse of nations, the laws of commerce and trade of different parts of the same nation, the laws of religious worship, the modern philosophy of all politics, own that the world has been governed too much, and that a great trial is to be made of cheap self-government.

CHAPTER VIII.

TAXES.—DIRECT TAX.—TAX ON REFINED SUGAR.—SALES AT AUCTION.—RETAILERS' LICENSES.—STAMPS.—CARRIAGES.—STILLS.—PRODUCE OF TAXES UNDER WASHINGTON'S, ADAMS', AND MADISON'S ADMINISTRATION.—SELECTION OF COLLECTORS.—COST OF COLLECTION.—REDUCTION OF TAXES AFTER WAR.—DALLAS'S SYSTEM.—MONROE'S ADMINISTRATION.—TAXES REPEALED.—CRAWFORD, SECRETARY OF TREASURY.—TABULAR STATEMENTS OF TAXATION.—DEBATE AND VOTES ON REPEAL OF SYSTEM OF INTERNAL REVENUE.—EFFECT ON IMPOST.—TARIFF OF DUTIES.—WAR LOANS.—PAPER MONEY.—AMERICAN AND ENGLISH NATIONAL DEBT AND CREDIT.—SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS BY BANKS.—EVILS OF IRRESPONSIBLE BANKING.—EFFECTS OF WAR ON RESOURCES OF UNITED STATES.—COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE.—SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH.—PRESIDENT MADISON.

THE great need of the country, and business of Congress in 1813, were to provide money for war declared in a state of total unpreparedness. The only fiscal measures of the twelfth Congress were a loan of eleven millions of dollars, doubling the duties on importations, and authorizing five millions of treasury notes. War was declared the 18th of June, 1812, by that Congress; and it was not till the 22d of July, 1813, that the thirteenth Congress passed the act for the assessment and collection of direct taxes and internal duties; soon followed by acts imposing duties on refined sugar, sales at auction, retailers' licenses, stamps, carriages for conveyance of persons, licenses to distillers of spirituous liquors, and a direct tax of three millions of dollars a year. On the 24th July, the office of Commissioner of the Revenue was established. By these laws, sugar refined within the United States, was to pay four cents per pound, subject to drawback on importation; sales at auction, one per cent. on goods, and one quarter per cent. on ships or vessels, payable by the auctioneer on obtaining a license, subject to deduction of one per cent. on the amount of duties, for his trouble; licenses to retailers of wines, spirituous liquors, and foreign merchandize for one year, as follows: viz. retailers of merchandize, including wines and

spirits, if in cities, towns, or villages, containing within the limits of one mile square more than one hundred families, twenty-five dollars; of wines alone, twenty dollars; of spirits alone, twenty dollars; of domestic spirits alone, fifteen dollars; of merchandize, other than wines and spirits, fifteen dollars; retailers, if in any other place than before stated, for merchandize, including wines and spirits, fifteen dollars; wines and spirits, fifteen dollars; spirits alone, twelve dollars; domestic spirits, ten dollars; merchandize, other than wine and spirits, ten dollars; on notes of banks or bankers, an average of one per cent., subject to annual composition, in lieu thereof of one and a half per cent. on the amount of their annual dividend; on any bond, obligation or promissory note, discounted by any bank, company, or banker, and on any foreign or inland bill of exchange, graduated duties on their several amounts, varying from about a fifteen-hundredth to a two-thousandth part thereof. These duties were collected through the medium of stamps sold by the collectors, deducting seven and a half per cent. to purchasers, to the amount of ten dollars or more; on carriages for conveyance of persons, every coach, twenty dollars; chariot and post-chaise, fourteen dollars; phaeton, and coachee with panel work, ten dollars; other four wheel carriages, hanging on steel or iron springs, seven dollars; every four-wheel carriage, hanging on wooden springs, and two wheel carriage hanging on steel or iron springs, four dollars; licenses to distillers of spirituous liquors from domestic materials, for employment of a still for two weeks, nine cents per gallon of its capacity, for one month, eighteen cents, for two months, thirty-two cents, for three months, forty cents, for four months, fifty-two cents, for six months, seventy cents, for a year, one hundred and eight cents; one half only of these sums to be paid on stills employed wholly in the distillation of roots; for employment of a still on foreign materials, twenty-five cents per gallon a month, sixty cents for three months, one hundred and five cents for six months, one hundred and thirty-five cents a year; for every boiler double the amount of these sums; these duties not exceeding five dollars, to be paid in cash, more than five dollars to be bonded with one or more sureties for payment four months after expiration of the license. The acts relative to direct taxes laid them agreeably to the assessed value of the lands, dwelling-houses, improvements and slaves, dividing

the United States into one hundred and ninety-nine collection districts, with one principal collector and one principal assessor for each, to appoint as many assistants as either saw fit. The principal assessor received two dollars for every day employed in hearing appeals and making out lists, and four dollars for every hundred taxable persons, the assistant-assessor one dollar and fifty cents for every day employed in collecting lists, and making collections, and three dollars for every hundred taxable persons. The principal collector received on direct taxes eight per cent. when the quota of his district did not exceed ten thousand dollars, seven per cent. when between ten and fifteen thousand, six per cent. when between fifteen and twenty thousand, five per cent. when between twenty and thirty thousand, four per cent. when between thirty and fifty thousand, three per cent. when above fifty thousand; for collecting internal duties the commission was six per cent.; but no collector was allowed more than four thousand dollars a year; twenty-five thousand dollars were allotted for collectors whose emoluments did not exceed one thousand dollars a year; the collectors paid their deputies out of their emoluments, but were allowed for measuring stills, and for books, stationary, printed forms, certificates and other documents; six months allowed for collections, but states were allowed deduction of fifteen per cent. for advancing their proportions. Without explanation now of the extraordinary causes and circumstances of it, I add by anticipation as a fact in this connection, that on the 9th of January, 1815, the direct tax was increased from three to six millions, and on the 5th March, 1816, it was imposed for the last time for that war to the amount of three millions. The duties on carriages were also changed in January, 1815, from specific to *ad valorem*, occasionally by a radical mistake of the first law in graduating the scale of duties, which caused deficiency in the revenue. It was an error of the latter law to put the lowest rate at one dollar instead of two; also in taking the actual instead of the original cost of the carriage. On the 21st December, 1814, the duties on stills were considerably increased; on the 23d December of that year, fifty per cent. was added to the duties on licenses to retailers of wines, spirituous liquors and foreign merchandize, and one hundred per cent. to the duties on auctions. On the 15th January, 1815, a duty of one dollar a ton was laid on pig iron, one dollar and fifty cents on castings, one dollar on bar iron, and rolled or split iron, one cent

a pound on nails, brads and sprigs, other than those usually denominated wrought, five cents a pound on candles of white wax or in part of white and other wax, three cents a pound on mould candles, or tallow, or wax not white, or in part of each, eight per cent. *ad valorem* on hats and caps, in whole or part of leather, wool, or fur, and bonnets in whole or part of wool or fur, if above two dollars in value, eight per cent. *ad valorem* on umbrellas and parasols, if above the value of two dollars, on paper, three per cent. *ad valorem*, fifty per cent. *ad valorem* on playing and visiting cards, six per cent. *ad valorem* on saddles and bridles, five per cent. *ad valorem* on boots and bootees exceeding five dollars a pair in value, six per cent. *ad valorem* on beer, ale, and porter, twenty per cent. *ad valorem* on tobacco, manufactured cigars and snuff, five per cent. *ad valorem* on leather, including all kinds and skins, whether tanned, tawed, dressed, or otherwise made, on the original manufacture; these duties, payable by the owner or occupier of the building or vessel in which, or of the machine, implements or utensils where-with the articles were manufactured, or by the agent or representative thereof; bonds given for a regular accountability upon license to employ the building, &c., for a term not exceeding a year. On the 18th January, 1815, duties were laid of two dollars on every gold watch, and one dollar on every silver watch in use per annum; on household furniture used, except beds, bedding, kitchen furniture, family pictures, and articles made in the family from domestic materials, not exceeding two hundred dollars, whose value did not exceed four hundred dollars, one dollar, and graduated up to exceeding seven thousand dollars when the maximum tax was one hundred dollars. On the 27th February, 1815, a duty was laid of six per cent. *ad valorem*, on all gold, silver and plated ware, jewelry and pastework, except time pieces manufactured within the United States. These additions of 1814 and 1815 were made after Dallas's accession to the treasury, on the retirement of Campbell in October, 1814, as will be circumstantially noticed at that time. The last one took place after peace, tidings of which reached Washington the 15th February, 1815, one of the last acts of the thirteenth Congress, on the 3d March 1815, intended to fix the compensations of collectors, and increase their responsibility, as suggested by the com-

missioner of the revenue ; requiring each collector, under penalties, varying from four hundred dollars to ten thousand dollars, within ninety days from the end of every year, to draw out statements exhibiting alphabetically the names of all persons having paid any internal duties during the preceding year, with their aggregate amount annexed to each name, and forthwith cause one hundred copies thereof to be printed, transmit one of them to the Commissioner of the Revenue, lodge one with the principal assessor, one with the clerk of each town, county and district within his collection district, post up one copy at each of the court-houses in his district, and the other copies at the remaining public places therein. This check on abuse was suggested to correct the extreme liability to abuse, to which the laws as enacted were liable ; and being faithfully complied with, produced perfect accountability as to the sums collected, removing one of the greatest objections to a system of internal taxation. Such publicity in the collection of impost by the United States, and of taxes by the States, might have similar benefits. But is it not severe and odious policy thus to expose every one's property to common animadversion, envy and misrepresentation ? It certainly would be an important item of statistics ; exposing, however, the property of the rich to the poor, and the want of it by the poor to the rich, so as to foment the feeling always sufficiently acrid of the one class to the other.

Taxation is difficult and detestable, requiring war to introduce it, and itself a kind of war on the community, especially intolerable where the sovereignty is popular, and frequent elections render representatives fearful of burthening a formidable constituency, who are, however, mostly more willing to be taxed than their representative to vote taxes. The first American Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton, by whom it was organized, a bold and enterprising genius, yet reverencing and imitating English government, disturbed the outset and popularity of Washington's administration, by English excises imposed on a poor, sparse, and licentious population. Though Johnson argued against America, that taxation was no tyranny, yet he defined excises in England, as hateful taxes levied on commodities, and adjudged not by the common judges of property, but wretches hired by those to whom excise is paid. Mr. Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, when war was declared, was opposed

to it, deprecating a trial of strength, which he did not believe American institutions would bear. He was the Secretary of the Treasury in Jefferson's administration, when all the external revenues were abolished; and like Jefferson and Franklin, probably considered any peace preferable to any war. In 1813, when war taxes came to be enacted, he was gone on the mission which was to begin at Gottenburg, and ended at Ghent, to put an end to hostilities under the mediation of Russia. Recriminations between the committee of Ways and Means, of the House of Representatives of the twelfth Congress, and the executive, censure and excuse each other for the lapse of a whole year, from the beginning of war before taxes took place, when the Secretary of the Treasury was absent on a foreign mission. The commissioner of the revenue was not appointed till after the tax bills became laws, on whom devolved the duties of establishing, and beginning the collection, including the selection and appointment of nearly two hundred collectors, and as many principal assessors. Owing to such causes, the system of taxation was not as well devised as it should have been, being little more than that attempted at the outset of the American government, which lingered on till Jefferson repealed the whole. The duties repealed and revived, embraced domestic spirits, snuff, refined sugar, retailers of wines and spirituous liquors, sales at auction, carriages and stamps, imposed between the years 1791 and 1798, and repealed in 1802. Their entire duration then was eleven years, and the average of the whole about eight. The whole amount of proceeds realized by them from payments into the treasury, up to the year 1812 inclusive, was six millions, four hundred and sixty thousand dollars, yielding an average revenue of about six hundred thousand dollars a year, for the eight years, during which they might be considered in full operation. Their net yield for the year 1800 did not exceed eight hundred thousand dollars. Their collection cost about twenty per cent. These facts seemed to justify repealing the whole in 1802, when the impost income was upwards of sixteen millions of dollars, collected for about five per cent. The expenses of collection of the revenue from customs, on the average of ten years, from 1791 to 1800, both included, was 3.79 per cent; on the ten years, from 1801 to 1810 inclusive, the average was 4.19 per cent; the average of the twenty years from 1791 to 1810 inclusive, 4.04 per cent. Although the taxes

of 1813 began under unpropitious circumstances, their operation was favourable, compared with that of taxes in any other country, and particularly with this, from 1791 to 1800. With population scarcely doubled, the taxation was three millions a year, instead of six hundred thousand; more than six times as much as the first year, and considerably increased afterwards, showing great improvement in the wealth of the country, as also in the administration of the system of internal revenue. The entire duration of the taxes of 1813 was four years; their average duration about three. Their entire net yield to the treasury was about sixteen millions of dollars, averaging about five millions, three hundred thousand dollars a year. If all the duties as laid in 1813 had been continued in operation, they would have yielded about eight millions of dollars a year in 1816, and about twenty millions a year by 1840.

The principal causes of the administrative success of the system of 1813, were, first, the direct responsibility of all the officers (excepting deputy collectors) to the treasury; secondly, a judicious and careful selection of those officers, many, perhaps most of them, influenced more by zeal for the country and the war, than by hope of gain, not being selected from hackneyed office hunters; thirdly, their moderate compensation; experience proving that official duties of an administrative character are most faithfully performed by those moderately paid for them.—Moderate salaries satisfy men taken from middle classes, whose numbers admit of good selections, from working men used to industrious pursuits, not apt to be led astray by allurements of pleasure, or ambition. Fourthly, the publicity required, obliging the annual collection, in each collection district, of the amount received from every individual paying a tax; lastly, the practice of the commissioner, of not merely answering specific inquiries from his subordinates on doubtful points, but issuing and disseminating frequent printed circulars, tending to establish a uniform and improving system throughout the whole country.

To its honour it may be averred that never were taxes, especially new ones, more promptly or cheerfully paid: nearly the whole amount accruing within the four years being paid within that period, when the currency was deranged, without national bank, or other general regulation, and what was called money, little more than state bank notes, most of which, during the latter

part of the war, were not convertible into coin, but mere promises to pay. The cost of collection never exceeded six per cent.

The war ceasing early in 1815, it became a question whether direct taxes and internal duties should be abolished or reduced. That war cost a national debt of about eighty millions of dollars, which, added to prior debt, made more than one hundred and twenty millions. The income of 1815, from customs, was thirty-six millions of dollars; and there was no doubt of revenue enough from that source, to discharge the current expenses of government, and pay the interest, gradually reducing the principal of the public debt. The internal taxes of 1813, and subsequently, were mostly at first limited in their duration to one year after the termination of the war, but afterwards pledged for payment of the public debt of the war, until Congress provided an adequate substitute. As the productiveness of the customs removed all difficulty in this respect, the Secretary of the Treasury, Dallas, in an elaborate report in December, 1815, recommended reducing the direct tax, from six to three millions, the reduction of some, and abolition of other duties; but that the duties on stamps and refined sugars should be rendered permanent, which was accordingly done by act of Congress of 1st of February, 1816. An act was passed the 22d February, 1816, abolishing duties on articles manufactured in the United States, which, having been taxed by act of the 18th April, 1815, were subject to taxation for only nine months. On the 5th of March, 1816, the annual direct tax of six millions was repealed, and a direct tax of three millions laid for that year. On the 9th April, 1816, the taxes on watches and on household furniture were repealed. On the 19th April, 1816, the duties per gallon on spirits were abolished, and the existing duties modified after the 30th June following. Corresponding with these reductions, the compensation of collectors by act of the 27th April, 1816, was fixed at six per cent. per annum, on all moneys not exceeding \$40,000 paid into the treasury, three per cent. on all between forty and one hundred thousand, and two per cent. on all above one hundred thousand, provided that no collector should receive more than \$5,000 a year.

The secretary suggested that the establishment of a revenue system not exclusively dependent on foreign commerce, claimed particular attention. The almost entire failure of the customs in

war, and increasing necessities of the treasury, rendered it necessary to seek for supplies in internal duties, in respect to subjects, and amount of which peace had always been looked to for revision and relief. Pursuant to that policy, inconvenient and unproductive taxes were repealed, above all, domestic manufactures were exonerated from whatever might retard their progress.— But there still remained sufficient scope for the operation of a permanent system of internal duties upon principles of national policy which he had suggested. Had this suggestion been adopted by Congress, there would have been after the year 1816, a net annual revenue of seven millions of dollars, derived from internal duties, and increasing with the growth of the country. The committee of Ways and Means, on the 9th January, 1816, by their chairman, William Lowndes, reported that it was indispensable in any arrangement of revenue, and expenditure in peace, to provide for the rapid extinguishment of the public debt. To no one is the Union more indebted than to William Lowndes, for this most desirable and honourable consummation. To attain it, his report proceeded, a considerable revenue will be requisite. In selecting the taxes to compose it, the duties upon imported articles might furnish the principal supply. Cheap and easy in their collection, paid like all indirect taxes when convenient to pay them, under a system of prudent moderation, they would discourage no branch of national industry. Duties on importation or exportation, seem to be the natural resource of thinly peopled countries, which, exporting a large amount of their agricultural productions, receive in return the manufactures of other states, distance rendering evasion of payment more difficult than among adjoining countries. But as agriculture finds markets at home, and wealth spreads over inland countries, imports and exports must bear a constantly lessening proportion to the wealth of the nation. Even while the principal reliance is impost, it could not be so increased as to provide for extinguishment of the debt, and for necessary expenditures, without danger of illicit trade: moreover, the objections to entire reliance on importations had been too fully shown by recent experience, to recommend them as constituting the whole income of the country. Their liberal provision in peace disappears, when war requires larger contributions; when government is left to explore new systems of taxation, to discover

and draw into public service men capable of filling the different departments of revenue, reduced to a condition in which zeal, bravery and resource can but imperfectly produce their natural effects. The committee of Ways and Means, therefore, concurred fully with the Secretary of the Treasury, in approving the establishment of a revenue system, not entirely dependent on the supplies of foreign commerce.

Soon after that session of Congress the administration of Madison ceased by his voluntary retirement, and James Monroe was elected president. In his first annual message, December, 1817, estimating the customs for the next year at twenty millions, internal revenue at two millions and a half, public lands at one million and a half, bank dividends and other incidental receipts at half a million, altogether twenty-four millions and a half, he considered it his duty to recommend the repeal of the internal duties; it appearing in a satisfactory manner, said the message, that the revenue arising from imposts and tonnage, and from the sale of the public lands would be fully adequate to the support of the civil government, of the present military and naval establishments, including the annual augmentation of the latter to the extent provided for, to the payment of the interest on the public debt, and extinguishment of it at the times authorized, without the aid of the internal taxes. To impose taxes when the public exigencies require them, the president pronounced an obligation of the most sacred character, especially with a free people. The faithful fulfilment of it is among the highest proofs of their virtue and capacity for self-government. To dispense with taxes when it may be done with perfect safety, is equally the duty of their representatives. In this instance we have the satisfaction to know, he said, that they were imposed when the demand was imperious, and have been sustained with exemplary fidelity. However gratifying it may be, regarding the prosperous and happy condition of our country, to recommend the repeal of these taxes at this time, the president added that he should nevertheless be attentive to events, and should any future emergency occur, be not less prompt to suggest such measures and burthens as might be requisite and proper. On the 8th December, 1817, the Secretary of the Treasury, Crawford, estimated the annual income

for 1818 at twenty-four millions and a half, and the expenditure at not quite twenty-two millions, leaving something more than two millions and a half surplus. Next day the committee of Ways and Means recommended repealing all the internal duties. William Lowndes, chairman of that committee and reporting its opinion, as before mentioned, during the preceding Congress, was again chairman of it at this time. The report of the committee gives the amount accrued to government on account of internal duties, exclusive of the direct tax, from the 1st January, 1814, to the 31st December, 1817, at more than seventeen millions, and the receipts for the same time at upwards of fifteen millions, as follows: 1814, accrued, \$3,262,197 12, received, \$1,910,995 01; 1815, accrued, \$6,242,503 55, received, \$4,976,529 86; 1816, accrued, \$4,633,799 34, received, \$5,281,121 98; 1817, accrued, \$3,002,000 00, received, \$3,000,000 00. Expenses of collection, in 1814, \$148,991 78; in 1815, \$279,277 67; in 1816, \$253,440 42; in 1817, \$180,000 00—that is, $7\frac{7}{8}$ per cent. in 1814; $5\frac{6}{10}$ per cent. in 1815; $4\frac{8}{10}$ per cent. in 1816; and 6 per cent. in 1817.

In their report, the committee, stating that the charges of collection on internal duties have been higher than on imposts, declared that the latter had been very different at different times. Mr. Gallatin, in 1810, estimated them at something less than six per cent. on moneys collected from the people. Mr. Dallas supposed them, including fees, to be about five per cent., and still lower in the last three years. The difference between the expense of collecting internal and foreign duties will not appear extraordinary, when we remember how few are the domestic products subject to duty, and of foreign exempt from it; how long and regularly the impost has been acquiring maturity, and improvement; how frequent the changes and short the duration of the system of internal revenue. In abandoning that portion of the taxes considered most inconvenient, neither Congress nor the nation would form so exaggerated a notion of these inconveniences as to deter them from again applying to the same resource when the necessities of the state shall require. It is the duty of Congress to provide revenue from such resources as shall not permit the fate of war and the most important interests of the nation to depend on precarious and often extravagant loans. The committee concluded that on all future emergencies, the

people will be disposed to pay internal taxes and the House of Representatives to impose them on a scale suited to the occasion.

On the 23d December, 1817, Congress repealed the duties after the 31st of that month, on licenses to distillers, refined sugars, licenses to retailers, sales at auction, carriages and stamps; and promoted their collection by further allowances to collectors. These duties were in force on refined sugars, sales at auction, carriages, licenses to retailers and to distillers, and on stamps, four years; on spirits by the gallon, one year and five months; on manufactures about nine months; on watches and household furniture, one year.

The annexed tables exhibit many curious and instructive statistical details, for which I am indebted to Mr. Smith, the commissioner of revenue. From them may be selected the following important results. From 1814 to 1818 inclusive, the tax on stills from domestic materials produced nearly \$4,000,000, and from foreign materials not quite \$400,000; on spirits, from domestic materials, upwards of \$3,000,000, and from foreign materials about \$218,000; on carriages more than \$650,000; on licenses to retailers, more than \$3,000,000; on sales at auction near \$2,400,000; on stamps, \$1,500,000; on bank notes by composition, upwards of \$400,000; on household furniture, about \$50,000; on watches, \$175,000; on refined sugar, \$392,000; on manufactures, \$991,000. Of the direct tax, when \$3,000,000 per annum, the several States paid, New Hampshire, \$97,060; Vermont, \$98,000; Massachusetts, \$318,000; Rhode Island, \$34,000; Connecticut, \$118,000; New York, \$435,000; New Jersey, \$108,000; Pennsylvania, \$365,000; Delaware, \$32,000; Maryland, \$152,000; Virginia, \$369,000; North Carolina, \$220,000; South Carolina, \$151,000; Georgia, \$94,000; Kentucky, \$168,009; Tennessee, \$111,000; Ohio, \$104,000, and Louisiana, \$31,000. These sums are given without the fractions, which in every instance somewhat increase the amount. The total was, in 1813, something more than \$3,000,000, and in 1815 above \$6,000,000. In 1816 it was again \$3,000,000. According to the acts of Congress, any state paying its contingent into the treasury at designated times, was entitled to a deduction of fifteen per cent., which South Carolina and Ohio received each of the three years by advancing their respective quotas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Kentucky in 1813, and New York in

1815. Georgia was allowed ten per cent. in 1815. There were errors of assessment allowed \$26,284 17, and persons insolvent, \$17,225 43. The whole direct tax for three years exceeded \$12,000,000; of which states advanced more than \$3,700,000, leaving upwards of \$8,300,000 to be collected. Individuals paid these taxes without delay or hesitation, to the amount of near \$8,000,000, leaving but about \$400,000 in arrear, of which a large portion consisted of taxes on lands purchased by the United States in consequence of not selling for the amount of taxes, and of small taxes which did not equal the extraordinary expenses of sale. More than \$10,700,000 were paid into the treasury in 1813, '14, '15, '16, '17 and 18, and from 1818 to 1830, about \$210,000. The deductions for the advancing states exceeded \$532,000. The expenses of collection exceeded \$473,000. And the loss by non-payments fell short of \$100,000. The expenses of collection were about \$76,000 in 1814, about \$51,000 in 1815, about \$201,000 in 1816, about \$125,000 in 1817, and about \$21,000 in 1818; altogether \$473,116 34: which on \$7,932,864 29 collected by collectors in those years, is about six per cent.

In some later treasury statements, especially that of 17th June, 1831, pursuant to a call of the House of Representatives of 29th May, 1830, the duties derived from spirits are erroneously charged to licenses for stills, and the deductions from the direct tax for prompt payments, are not only included in the expenses of collection, but charged as compensation paid to collectors. The collectors had nothing to do with those payments by the states. Such mistakes, therefore, lead to extremely erroneous conclusions as to the cost of collections.

Internal Duties which accrued on Stills and Boilers.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1844.		1845.		1846.		1847.		1848.	
	Domestic materials.	Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.	Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.	Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.	Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.	Foreign materials.
New Hampshire	3,992 50	313 90	888 69	3,015 90	148 82	1,935 02	318 00	3,292 88	19 80	
Massachusetts	31,735 64	39,272 28	22,381 83	57,959 11	7,501 92	74,681 01	9,065 98	74,147 43	167 19	
Vermont	6,915 73	9,246 50	14,263	8,440 80	4,894 68	10,433 45	2,892 46	14,071 18	5 22	
Rhode Island	50,067 34	6,201 45	50,807 06	3,324 65	1,702 02	5,488 91	23,340 72	4,833 87	445 97	
Connecticut	223,979 31	6,201 45	120,322 93	10,289 23	25,079 72	22,123 49	43,473 37	22,889 73	674 20	
New York	54,543 67	66 70	22,033 92	4,933 90	77,313 22	2,451 16	12,018 32	3,283 06	3,190 43	
New Jersey	392,328 23		225,194 11		39,462 12	689 35	170,018 39	619 43		
Pennsylvania	4,857 14		3,377 52		3,377 52		9,016 09			
Delaware	60,355 10	3 50	98,010 57		35,317 20		97,329 13	125 28	19 28	
Maryland	26,735 07		67,729 63		11,117 21		64,593 51	1,118 52	1,250 77	
Virginia	57,732 22		13,283 91		94,288 92		58,822 12		1,773 67	
North Carolina	75,598 82		53,819 18		63,558 41		73,013 76		1,089 00	
Ohio	141,157 50	1,426 00	67,807 62	2,550 77	54,175 84		101,184 79	340 00	2,220 31	
Kentucky	66,041 27		12,615 54		12,909 40		15,207 92		564 39	
South Carolina	77,001 59	925 00	34,244 77	864 00	49,657 02		54,931 26		268 43	
Tennessee	20,262 24		14,020 56		16,717 85		9,767 05		64 89	
Georgia	7,741 84		6,109 72		10,138 02		15,283 80	190 65	730 80	
Alabama	605 35		214 01		367 43		1,024 78		7 20	
Illinois Territory										
Michigan "										
Indiana "	2,355 50		923 20		704 00		9,846 56			
Missouri "	2,033 95		1,631 08		1,125 17		1,322 66			
Mississippi "	1,862 41		888 48		1,083 73		2,204 22	19 80		
District of Columbia	279 27									
Total	1,621,542 86	57,444 33	700,504 22	91,606 36	284,442 77	123,090 54	722,740 79	134,631 98	11,909 68	

Internal Duties which accrued on Spirits distilled in the United States.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1815.			In 1816.			In 1817.		In 1818.
	Domestic materials.		Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.		Foreign materials.	Domestic materials.		Foreign materials.
	At 20 cents per gal.	At 25 cents per gal.	At 20 cents per gal.	At 20 cents per gal.	At 25 cents per gal.	At 20 cents per gal.	At 20 cents per gal.	At 25 cents per gal.	At 20 cents per gal.
New Hampshire	831 81	137 05	4,840 81	334 71	105 95	1,845 18			
Massachusetts	29,577 84	1,544 14	110,147 27	11,902 62	499 40	41,277 01	31 40		
Vermont	1,017 56	816 14		5,297 79	313 99		130 60	2 50	
Rhode Island	6,097 71		12,185 97	2,951 85		4,018 04	7 80		
Connecticut	52,496 04	3,692 09	5,645 20	16,596 94	530 54	976 60	29 40		
New York	190,645 92	5,672 31	15,519 65	77,437 92	6,716 03	7,047 02	14 20		
New Jersey	69,071 42	10,329 74	5,477 20	24,030 14	5,495 00	1,075 20	4,591 20	1,451 37	
Pennsylvania	351,474 71	38,383 24		271,911 62	28,514 17	408 60			
Delaware	690 35	22,285 38			156 62				
Maryland	66,177 25	32,425 34		41,284 68	4,967 05		299 20	41 94	
Virginia	179,357 95	201,590 82		111,952 59	48,223 03	413 50		14 25	
North Carolina	21,991 11	175,922 07		10,710 53	61,163 20		549 49	116 37	
Ohio	56,633 68	15,125 83		34,274 30	18,538 91		1,530 91	754 41	133 70
Kentucky	114,644 40	39,569 10		50,549 71	24,763 57				
South Carolina	19,640 77	64,107 41	3,391 30	4,446 96	21,588 64	1,461 00			
Tennessee	55,274 66	56,573 59	2,021 60	24,391 62	29,360 37	530 00	58 80	291 76	
Georgia	17,593 00	66,162 75		6,038 22	5,959 45			852 55	
Illinois Territory	12,756 54	177 35		5,535 60	92 11				
Michigan "	549 23	701 20			566 96				
Indiana "	641 50	2,595 17		662 85	2,544 87				
Missouri "	833 50	622 50		1,838 35	495 97				
Mississippi "	563 37	1,045 90		306 00	1,407 14				
District of Columbia									
Total	1,305,340 30	749,308 57	150,289 00	723,644 40	292,949 57	50,013 21	7,843 00	3,555 15	133 70

Internal Duties which accrued on Carriages.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1814.		1815.		1816.		1817.		1818.	
	Number.	Duty.	Number.	Duty.	Number.	Duty.	Number.	Duty.	Number.	Duty.
New Hampshire	3,279	6,463 51	3,337	4,514 06	1,904	2,610 03	1,502	2,242 88	388	465 67
Massachusetts	14,934	33,965 64	14,184	21,748 49	10,301	15,850 39	10,145	15,455 31	53	129 29
Vermont	1,227	2,890 24	1,628	2,443 06	940	1,438 00	904	1,328 32	2	2 83
Rhode Island	1,252	2,577 50	722	1,121 03	600	938 37	636	1,069 00	33	40 52
Connecticut	5,392	13,419 50	6,319	10,292 46	5,048	8,178 21	4,588	7,601 03	18	53 06
New York	6,499	22,834 15	7,715	18,675 91	3,386	11,024 37	4,036	11,887 18	16	19 64
New Jersey	4,392	16,781 26	4,592	14,790 02	6,380	11,325 88	5,311	9,234 65	17	70 56
Pennsylvania	7,849	26,800 80	8,861	20,076 29	5,969	17,122 42	5,332	16,884 02	6	30 06
Delaware	2,261	6,228 21	2,081	4,018 58	1,717	3,666 90	1,669	3,736 16	9	45 16
Maryland	5,014	17,070 78	4,550	13,283 87	4,084	13,072 07	3,921	13,512 93	31	97 46
Virginia	8,067	30,401 90	7,047	20,147 24	5,770	18,348 01	5,049	19,177 65	6	30 06
North Carolina	5,766	14,147 44	4,859	8,907 95	3,568	7,332 19	2,672	6,680 04	9	45 16
Ohio	190	628 36	219	782 45	155	450 52	140	502 67	15	61 94
Kentucky	610	3,025 77	546	3,192 46	377	2,459 19	417	3,076 70	8	24 59
South Carolina	4,590	15,411 58	4,178	11,345 94	2,967	7,996 57	2,619	6,877 78	16	61 94
Tennessee	209	778 22	154	781 43	108	600 65	99	685 00	8	24 59
Georgia	2,917	7,159 75	1,944	6,065 60	1,204	4,408 71	1,302	5,634 02	6	13 00
Louisiana	495	1,436 53	430	1,257 27	247	1,443 58	260	1,561 90	6	13 00
Illinois Territory	19	66 62	18	58 75	8	21 74	6	13 00	8	24 59
Michigan "	31	76 00	28	60 00	21	42 00	24	103 00	165	1,171 74
Indiana "	4	6 00	5	17 44	2	8 35	8	16 00	626	1,031 25
Missouri "	18	70 00	6	47 00	6	31 00	7	57 00		
Mississippi "	78	371 00	73	371 98	69	383 40	45	290 00		
District of Columbia	353	2,171 21	316	1,747 57	280	1,513 68	165	1,171 74		
	77,095	225,156 47	76,616	165,717 31	55,679	130,476 62	50,961	128,467 58		

Internal Duties which accrued on Licenses to Retailers.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.
New Hampshire	18,449 00	24,535 64	20,316 53	15,473 93	292 96
Massachusetts	86,211 12	113,906 95	107,507 92	81,134 71	2,042 55
Vermont	14,417 00	22,337 54	16,519 27	12,888 43	103 59
Rhode Island	16,058 00	10,093 53	11,408 78	13,311 87	76 64
Connecticut	32,820 26	42,616 04	36,104 29	24,918 40	24 93
New York	174,748 76	201,757 84	173,192 37	128,522 49	430 16
New Jersey	29,701 00	35,607 87	32,611 75	20,877 85	136 91
Pennsylvania	160,939 21	153,018 84	139,035 73	101,732 44	629 99
Delaware	10,102 88	8,093 12	10,863 56	4,978 95	
Maryland	49,256 20	58,747 36	50,348 09	37,923 94	45
Virginia	52,038 68	69,620 64	58,603 16	47,961 82	198 81
North Carolina	23,985 00	32,967 98	28,221 83	21,121 17	116 27
Ohio	20,574 00	26,923 23	23,394 59	21,213 17	228 77
Kentucky	19,255 00	23,789 71	20,141 62	19,757 84	403 21
South Carolina	26,599 00	28,142 91	25,316 11	21,757 19	144 14
Tennessee	10,462 00	13,280 54	9,499 92	9,506 00	
Georgia	13,908 00	24,454 33	14,039 49	16,450 38	142 46
Louisiana	7,497 00	9,773 09	11,821 27	8,998 75	50 00
Illinois Territory	1,115 00	1,248 80	776 95	1,090 00	115 00
Michigan "	1,405 00	1,817 10	1,694 13	2,150 00	
Indiana "	2,191 00	3,139 59	1,860 00	1,920 00	
Missouri "	1,540 00	1,861 46	1,981 75	1,383 75	
Mississippi "	3,692 00	4,837 74	5,499 42	4,940 25	200 00
District of Columbia	10,140 00	14,872 62	11,888 64	10,113 48	
	786,005 11	927,444 47	812,647 17	630,126 81	5,336 84

Internal Duties which accrued on Sales at Auction.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.
New Hampshire	776 07	2,245 79	1,283 93	808 96	
Massachusetts	35,359 04	87,643 63	95,708 94	58,704 30	14,298 09
Vermont	14 25	75 20	106 42	69 35	
Rhode Island	6,274 82	452 01	2,640 44	4,497 26	651 62
Connecticut	283 89	635 55	322 67	394 82	24 74
New York	48,480 35	332,841 64	300,510 99	234,053 26	1,158 73
New Jersey	3,384 32	949 84	448 58	66 46	
Pennsylvania	34,630 74	229,764 45	160,493 43	152,895 22	23,509 59
Delaware	116 25	453 82	61 73	61 50	
Maryland	9,623 15	102,758 79	69,407 84	52,834 38	
Virginia	4,079 37	20,003 64	20,996 12	28,475 38	8,758 39
North Carolina	1,237 62	3,734 47	4,844 26	2,913 73	49 12
Ohio	549 31	636 22	1,014 90	2,363 93	922 86
Kentucky	270 92	1,371 29	813 53	1,600 56	1,370 77
South Carolina	2,631 39	18,401 94	30,203 26	20,049 42	46 97
Tennessee	63 31	291 06	287 77	641 34	55 09
Georgia	1,346 34	4,133 92	7,052 03	6,526 41	786 19
Louisiana	4,832 24	13,504 09	23,217 92	27,092 10	6,772 13
Illinois Territory					
Michigan "	80 04	71 05	39 59	140 98	
Indiana "				6 44	47 34
Missouri "				188 66	
Mississippi "	210 13	750 47	1,053 58	1,590 72	392 20
District of Columbia	385 65	4,413 96	8,601 07	6,118 67	1,473 27
	154,629 20	825,132 83	729,109 00	602,093 95	60,317 10

Internal Duties which accrued on Refined Sugar.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1814.	1815.	1816.	1817.	1818.
New Hampshire					
Massachusetts	3,542 36	4,394 17	15,182 74	18,445 45	4,244 93
Vermont					
Rhode Island			238 75	672 39	235 74
Connecticut					
New York	7,468 12	40,279 69	57,065 07	60,180 25	
New Jersey			22 38		
Pennsylvania	157 03	6,127 41	33,634 65	39,237 90	7,686 99
Delaware					
Maryland		18,619 48	27,024 48	24,640 27	
Virginia	23 40	980 32	1,900 29	1,556 28	
North Carolina					
Ohio			406 42	1,419 95	
Kentucky					
South Carolina					
Tennessee					
Georgia					
Louisiana	479 00	408 05	164 66	147 01	90 17
Illinois Territory					
Michigan "					
Indiana "					
Missouri "					
Mississippi "					
District of Columbia		4,413 96	5,695 50	4,606 28	740 63
	11,669 91	75,223 08	141,334 94	150,905 78	12,998 46

Internal Duties which accrued on Stamps and in lieu of Stamps by Banks.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1814.		1815.		1816.		1817.		1818.	
	On paper and Bank Notes.	Banks in lieu of Bank Notes.	On paper and Bank Notes.	By Banks in lieu, &c.	On paper and Bank Notes.	By Banks in lieu, &c.	On paper and Bank Notes.	By Banks in lieu, &c.	On paper and Bank Notes.	By Banks in lieu, &c.
New Hampshire	773 62	120 21	646 70	1,020 28	542 01	1,125 97	433 52	1,110 75	27 06	211 27
Massachusetts	20,741 47	2,680 00	5,220 74	9,659 73	4,562 18	10,463 33	11,457 34	9,030 00	362 30	4,430 54
Vermont	19 60		35 75		25 75		10 25		11 70	
Rhode Island	5 625 07	97 28	1,120 42	1,461 01	3,264 07	1,534 35	6,392 50	2,307 30	52 45	708 23
Connecticut	11,132 07	2,435 44	9,126 97	3,015 91	5,538 20	3,069 07	8,354 44	5,152 37	169 71	248 69
New York	57,971 51	8,259 31	67,725 72	18,061 45	20,552 14	22,000 67	20,140 00	19,945 04	1,419 41	8,440 28
New Jersey	5 005 22	1,639 04	4,488 00	2,015 66	4,226 30	2,215 76	4,050 06	2,246 02	722 85	627 54
Pennsylvania	50,570 65	2,574 80	74,470 96	15,634 22	63,770 50	20,325 43	83,068 64	16,656 97	3,141 96	46,245 21
Delaware	5,570 10	669 43	3,769 01	2,753 54	11,455 01	1,575 99	26,981 72	1,200 52		442 50
Maryland	35,364 07	7,716 21	47,590 18	6,166 19	4,133 51	9,584 62	45,108 20	9,175 23	2,934 62	3,758 71
Virginia	36,308 41	2,516 94	33,275 84	6,061 96	21,139 66	5,061 54	30,551 80	5,214 50	1,276 86	960 00
North Carolina	6 731 47	1,455 94	11,000 15	2,552 40	12,022 26	3,460 90	11,505 67	6,769 35	1,869 21	1,676 34
Ohio	1,824 60	273 79	4,984 22	1,870 65	12,000 60	2,224 86	11,690 64	3,227 97	1,951 37	3,385 58
Kentucky	8,284 60		7,037 97	1,531 19	13,964 30	2,153 71	18,962 34	2,942 64	22 70	719 33
South Carolina	18,916 53	4,055 44	18,156 65	4,693 51	17,041 24	3,455 34	13,408 75	3,570 00	5 90	
Georgia	1,619 85		2,114 02	347 77	3,520 56	1,689 39	3,919 28	4,714 84	611 27	2,521 68
Tennessee	5,726 75	900 37	6,302 92	1,070 69	10,040 86	1,380 55	19,719 71	1,875 48	51 40	
Alabama	11,151 21	384 66	10,221 53	1,920 00	10,202 07	1,545 48	13,265 70		16 80	
Illinois Territory	7 85		4 50		2 40		19 60			
Michigan "	26 10		16 35		21 65		104 04	16 34		
Indiana "					06 05					
Missouri "	84 10	138 26	1,191 02	4,507 92	167 70	420 00	2,184 63	315 00	504 85	2,676 11
Mississippi "	643 03	2,713 05	93 90		1,390 73	5,423 41	43,992 14	7,115 71	149 45	
District of Columbia	18,453 90		28,560 31		63,555 90					
	370,945 27	30,571 25	334,209 70	84,418 10	362,537 37	99,448 32	400,374 74	103,177 14	14,772 38	67,368 65

Internal Duties which accrued on Household Furniture.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1815.	In 1816.	In 1817.
New Hampshire	376 00	25 50	
Massachusetts	677 50	2,778 50	2 00
Vermont	211 50	3 00	
Rhode Island	782 50		
Connecticut	807 00	153 00	
New York	10,877 00	66 50	
New Jersey	1,527 50	287 50	6 00
Pennsylvania		11,364 00	
Delaware	434 50		
Maryland	580 50	4,278 00	
Virginia	168 50	6,013 00	
North Carolina		1,387 50	
Ohio	104 50	276 00	
Kentucky		72 00	
South Carolina	2,854 50	611 00	
Tennessee		179 00	31 00
Georgia	1,050 00	1,493 50	
Louisiana		368 00	
Illinois Territory			
Michigan "			
Indiana "			
Missouri "			76 50
Mississippi "		194 00	
District of Columbia	1,174 00		
Total	21,625 50	29,550 00	115 50

Internal Duties which accrued on Gold and Silver Watches.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1815.	In 1816.	In 1817.
New Hampshire	3,377 00	718 00	
Massachusetts	4,385 50	12,738 00	250 00
Vermont	2,766 00	142 00	
Rhode Island	2,876 00		
Connecticut	5,457 00	1,165 00	
New York	30,449 50	1,100 50	4 00
New Jersey	7,784 00	1,060 00	85 00
Pennsylvania		38,709 50	345 50
Delaware	2,943 00		
Maryland	2,408 00	12,020 00	
Virginia	33 00	14,243 00	
North Carolina		4,585 50	
Ohio	3,104 00	1,114 00	
Kentucky		543 00	
South Carolina	5,380 00	1,230 00	
Tennessee	252 50	2,005 00	169 00
Georgia	2,472 00	5,755 00	
Louisiana		1,349 00	
Illinois Territory		126 00	
Michigan "		72 00	
Indiana "			
Missouri "			156 00
Mississippi "		473 00	
District of Columbia	1,636 00		
Total	75,322 50	99,148 50	1,009 50

Internal Duties which accrued on sundry articles manufactured in the United States.

STATES OR TERRITORIES.	In 1815.	In 1816.	In 1817.	In 1818.
New Hampshire	4,540 76	2,486 07		
Massachusetts	56,784 89	31,269 46	576 25	112 47
Vermont	9,250 40	2,408 39		10 05
Rhode Island	910 00	543 78	79 48	10 51
Connecticut	20,504 80	4,241 53		
New York	157,176 79	38,693 33	58 35	
New Jersey	28,546 87	7,032 81		
Pennsylvania	228,188 88	41,370 28	207 68	
Delaware	10,803 31	1,690 47		
Maryland	70,746 17	16,997 89	23 04	
Virginia	88,154 31	19,272 54	17 50	
North Carolina	12,801 23	4,518 92	1 33	
Ohio	23,270 60	5,016 34		
Kentucky	33,184 46	7,086 12		
South Carolina	10,156 58	2,670 53		
Tennessee	15,373 43	2,450 17		
Georgia	8,993 25	2,019 24		
Louisiana	1,283 03	1,192 05		
Illinois Territory	220 14	103 23		
Michigan "	39 46	19 08		
Indiana "	1,064 44	132 06		
Missouri "	162 68	282 48		
Mississippi "	1,158 61	2,356 84	6 56	
District of Columbia	10,309 97	2,447 98		
Total	793,625 06	196,301 59	970 19	133 03

Aggregate of internal Duties which accrued.

DUTIES ON	In 1814.	In 1815.	In 1816.	In 1817.	In 1818.	Total.
Stills, from domestic materials	1,621,152 86	760,804 22	824,443 77	722,740 79	11,909 58	3,941,051 22
“ “ foreign	57,444 33	91,608 36	123,990 54	124,831 98		397,875 17
Spirits, from domestic materials		2,047,738 96	995,294 27	11,398 15	133 70	3,054,565 08
“ “ foreign		159,229 00	59,012 21			218,241 21
Carrriages	225,158 47	165,717 31	130,476 62	128,467 58	1,031 25	650,851 23
Retailers	786,005 11	927,444 47	812,647 17	630,126 81	5,336 84	3,161,560 40
Sales at auction.	154,629 20	825,132 83	729,109 00	602,094 05	60,317 10	2,371,282 18
Stamps	370,945 27	334,209 70	362,537 37	409,374 74	14,772 38	1,491,839 46
“ Bank notes, composition	39,571 25	84,418 10	99,448 32	103,177 14	87,368 85	413,983 66
Household Furniture		21,625 50	29,550 00	115 50		51,291 00
Gold and Silver Watches		75,322 50	99,148 50	1,009 50		175,480 50
Refined Sugar	11,669 91	75,223 08	141,334 94	150,305 78	12,998 46	392,132 17
Articles manufactured in the U. States		793,625 06	196,301 59	970 19	133 03	991,029 87
Total	3,266,576 40	6,362,099 09	4,603,294 26	2,885,212 21	194,001 19	17,311,183 15

Direct Taxes.

3,000,000 dollars imposed on the several states on the 2d of August, 1813.

6,000,000 dollars, January 9, 1815.

3,000,000 " March 5, 1816.

These taxes were assessed to the respective states as follows:

STATES.	Tax of Aug. 3, 1813.	Tax of Jan. 9, 1815.	Tax of March 6, 1816.
New Hampshire	97,049 21	193,755 99	97,178 54
Vermont	98,534 52	196,789 29	98,411 16
Massachusetts	318,154 84	632,065 00	317,059 39
Rhode Island	34,758 86	69,431 78	34,761 83
Connecticut	118,533 63	236,507 38	118,401 08
New York	435,028 35	860,283 24	430,141 62
New Jersey	108,871 83	218,252 77	109,921 90
Pennsylvania	365,479 16	733,941 09	374,336 02
Delaware	32,294 76	63,847 32	32,229 30
Maryland	152,327 64	306,708 81	153,381 42
Virginia	369,018 44	739,738 06	370,728 80
North Carolina	220,962 98	440,321 11	225,240 57
South Carolina	151,905 48	303,810 96	151,905 48
Georgia	94,936 49	189,872 98	94,936 49
Kentucky	168,928 76	341,316 24	173,455 01
Tennessee	111,039 59	221,567 44	110,239 38
Ohio	104,150 14	208,300 28	104,150 14
Louisiana	31,621 43	57,519 22	29,852 43
District of Columbia		20,605 86	10,297 84
Total	3,013,596 11	6,034,634 82	3,036,628 42

Agreeably to the acts imposing these taxes, any state that paid its quota into the treasury at designated times was entitled to a deduction of 10 or 15 per centum thereon. Such payments were made by the following states.

STATES.	Tax of 1814.	Tax of 1815.	Tax of 1816.	Total.
New York		860,283 24	430,141 62	
New Jersey	108,871 83			
Pennsylvania	365,479 16			
Virginia	369,018 44			
South Carolina	151,905 48	303,810 96	151,905 48	
Georgia	94,936 49	189,872 98*	94,936 49*	
Kentucky	168,928 76			
Ohio	104,150 14	208,300 28	104,150 14	
	1,363,290 30	1,562,267 46	781,133 73	3,706,691 49

* Deduction of 15 per cent. except in case of Georgia, - - 532,269 60 which was allowed only 10 per cent. on tax of 1815, and paid her whole tax of 1815. Paid into the treasury by these states - - - - - 3,274,421 89

The total amount of taxes were—

In 1813	-	\$3,013,596	11	
In 1815	-	6,034,634	82	
In 1816	-	3,036,628	42	
				<u>\$12,084,859 35</u>

Exceeding those laid about \$55,000.

Deduct errors of assessment allowed by treasury	-	-	\$25,284	17
Deduct insolvencies of individuals taxed	-	-	17,225	43
				<u>42,509 60</u>
				<u>\$12,042,349 75</u>

And if there be deducted the quotas paid by the states, as above	-	-	-	3,706,691 49
				<u>3,706,691 49</u>

There remained to be collected by the collectors \$8,335,658 26

These taxes appear to have been paid by individuals with great promptness, and to have been accounted for by the collectors with general fidelity.

The payments by individuals were—

In 1814	-	\$1,258,871	55
In 1815	-	833,111	41
In 1816	-	3,768,545	02
In 1817	-	1,839,447	86
In 1818	-	232,888	45.

\$7,932,864 29

Which, deducted from the above amount of - \$8,335,658 26

Leaves balance of taxes remaining due December, 1818

- - - - - \$402,793 97

A large portion of which consisted of taxes on lands which were purchased by the United States in consequence of not selling for the amount of taxes, and of small taxes, which did not equal the extraordinary expenses of sale.

During the above years there were paid into the treasury by the

states and collectors - - - - \$10,728,968 28

And from 1818 to 1830 - - - - 209,768 42

\$10,938,736 70

To which, if there be added the amount deducted from the payments by the states	-	532,269 60
And the expenses of collection, as stated below,		473,116 34
Leaves unpaid into the treasury only	-	98,227 11
		<hr/>
		\$12,042,349 75

The expenses of collection were as follows—

In 1814	-	\$75,996 53
In 1815	-	50,665 19
In 1816	-	200,765 66
In 1817	-	124,911 73
In 1818	-	20,777 23

\$473,116 34

Which is about six per centum on \$7,932,864 29 collected by the collectors in those years.

From these statements it appears that—

The accruing duties amounted to	-	\$17,311,183 15
Being on account of refined sugar, sales at auction, carriages, retailers, stamps, and licenses to distillers, for four years; on distilled spirits for one year and five months; on manufactured articles, nine months; and on watches and household furniture, one year. It appears from treasury statements that of these duties there were refunded in the years 1814, 1815, 1816, and 1817	-	\$438,481 69
And debentures paid on spirits and refined sugar	-	57,947 20
		<hr/>
		496,428 19

\$16,814,754 96

The duties refunded, consisting principally of payments made for duties beyond the period of the repealing acts.

That the sums received by the collectors amounted, in the above years, to	-	16,270,846 46
That the moneys drawn into the treasury in the five years 1814, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818, by warrants, amounted to	-	15,122,848 10
That there has been paid to the year 1830, inclusive	-	646,116 75

\$15,786,964 85

That this amount is exclusive of the expenses of collection, which were as follows :—

Commissions and allowances to collectors for the years 1814, 1815, 1816, 1817, and 1818	-	-	-	\$847,395 21
Contingent expenses, same period,	\$76,260	86		
Measuring stills	-	-	-	17,107 86
				<hr/>
				\$93,368 72
Deduct moiety of fines and penalties	41,986	40		
				<hr/>
				51,382 32
				<hr/>
				\$898,777 53

Being about $5\frac{1}{4}\%$ per centum on the amounts received by the collectors.

If the collectors' receipts and compensations be taken for the years 1815 and 1816, when the system was in the fullest operation, it will be found that the expenses of collections do not quite amount to five per centum.

Although the taxes at first laid were much heavier than ever before experienced by the American people, soon doubled, then added to, and always paid with remarkable alacrity, yet their existence proved the Union's want of statistical information easily and cheaply obtained, and of inestimable importance, on which depend the best mode of devising taxes and their productiveness. During and after the projection of some of them, it was necessary, before they could be organized, to gather information from the remotest parts of the Union, which came alloyed with the biases and obliquities of self-interest. The inevitable consequences were erroneous duties, and still greater mistakes as to their productiveness; sharing the incapacity of government, either executive or legislative, to attain just results. The secretary of the treasury estimated the revenue from manufactures at \$3,500,000, which gave less than \$1,000,000; from household furniture, at more than \$2,000,000, which yielded but about \$51,000; from watches, at \$750,000, when less than \$176,000 was the fruit. Altogether the treasury got but about \$1,200,000 on what was estimated to produce \$6,500,000; deficit signaling that the means of ascertainment, arrangement, and execution were extremely imperfect. No tax can be imposed which will

not affect agriculture, commerce, or manufactures, directly or indirectly; and they should, as far as possible, be impartially and benignantly distributed among these elements of national wealth; for which the best, most extensive, and particular information should be obtained, and systematically embodied at the seat of general government; which has never been done, hardly attempted. Is it the infirmity of free and confederate states to neglect such lessons, till taught by adversity and distress? Mr. Smith, the commissioner of the revenue, thought that there should be a department or board charged with this supervision. Young members of Congress at the seat of government, with mostly little knowledge beyond rudiments of law, enact laws often based on erroneous information, involving national interests, including expenses of millions which might be saved by a few thousands of provident economy. The expense of internal duties has been a fruitful theme of animadversion and mistake assumed as one of the strongest objections to the system. The duties of 1791 and thereafter cost enormously owing to the smallness of the whole amount and administrative inexperience. Hamilton, though a master mind, was inexperienced. The collection of six hundred thousand dollars from territories so widespread and poor, was hardly possible without great charges or frauds. The two insurrections which broke out in Pennsylvania in 1794 and 1798, and required military force to extinguish their resistance to the whisky taxes, are not taken into account in reckoning their expenses which they largely increased.

On the 13th December, 1817, when the report of the committee of Ways and Means, pursuant to the president's recommendation for the repeal of the internal duties, came for consideration before the House of Representatives, the measure was strenuously opposed by Joseph Hopkinson and Henry Baldwin, the former of whom contended that revenue would be wanted which it was impolitic to discard, on general principles, and the latter undertook to show that it would cause an early deficiency of revenue, besides proving injurious otherwise, however popular it might momentarily be. Mr. Hopkinson did not believe in perpetual peace, or overflowing treasuries. "Besides," said he, "if we have really too much money, why not remove the impost from salt, reduce the tonnage, the duties

on sugar, coffee, tea, and other articles, no longer luxuries, but necessities of life, for the poor as well as the rich?" He feared Congress were treading the downhill course to lead again to slaughter. Mr. Baldwin reminded the House of the facts that these taxes were not laid till the third session after war was declared, and before their proceeds got into the treasury the stock of the government had been hawked about to any bidder, and the government had become the prey of every shark and usurer in the stock alleys. He was unwilling to trust the assurance of the committee that the tax would be laid again whenever necessary. He believed that the repeal would be unpopular; the people were no longer to be misled by names, but knew that it was better to pay their taxes directly than indirectly. On the other hand, Mr. John Sergeant insisted that, without any view to popularity, these taxes ought to be immediately repealed, because most of the system of internal revenue had been removed and the particulars left were extremely objectionable; duties on refined sugar, a domestic industry formerly favoured by drawbacks, on retailers and on stamps, operating oppressively on meritorious and industrious classes and persons. You arm for battle and disarm afterwards. By fostering the interests of citizens, relieving them from burthens in peace, you enable them to prepare for war. Mr. John Holmes hoped never to see either a surplus in the treasury or a system of internal duties, which should be reserved for emergencies, when only would the people endure it. To maintaining the military and naval establishments of the country he had no objection, but could not consent to a broken system of internal taxation. Mr. Philip Barbour remarked that the theory of our government does not contemplate internal revenue as its permanent policy. Taxes on imports are to be the principal resource. Of the two systems one is voluntary, the other compulsive; and it is obvious that the latter are not wanted now. If so, it is both duty and policy to repeal them. Internal duties are war taxes, imposed for that exigency, and then cheerfully paid. But when not wanted, why take their money from those who can best employ it, to let it lie idle in the treasury? There is energy enough in the people to call out the public resources when needed, and it is worse than useless to do it unnecessarily. James Johnson, Timothy Pitkin,

and J. S. Smith also advocated immediate repeal by cogent arguments, Mr. Pitken particularly condemning the carriage tax, and Mr. Smith the whisky tax, as oppressive and unjust. Felix Walker said, as the House was about to take leave of an old acquaintance, the internal taxes, on which he heartily congratulated his fellow-citizens, he called for the yeas and nays on the passage of the bill, which were 161 yeas to five nays. These five were Joseph Hopkinson, afterwards judge of the District Court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, Henry Baldwin, afterwards judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, Henry Middleton, once governor of South Carolina, and afterwards minister of the United States in Russia, Jeremiah Nelson, a merchant of Massachusetts, and Henry R. Storrs, who died an eminent lawyer of New York. When five members, of various politics, record their names against a measure recommended by the executive, and voted for by one hundred and sixty, their sincerity and resolution are conspicuous. The objection to internal duties founded on their expense is not sustained by those of the war. Although the measure was new, the administration inexperienced, without statistical information, and the taxes small in amount, the cost of collecting the internal duties did not exceed five, nor that of the direct tax six per cent.; much less than the same amount of impost could be collected for, or than it is, without adverting to the large expenses of the light house establishments, and revenue cutters. There are many more persons employed by government in collecting the customs, than internal duties; and more executive patronage lavished. If internal duties break in upon the dwellings and privacy of individuals, household furniture and watches alone were attended with that consequence. Nine-tenths of the revenue were derived from stamps, refined sugar, stills and distilled spirits, retailers of licenses and goods and carriages, all objects either palpably exposed to public view in stores or factories unconnected with private dwellings. The odious name and idea of excise, originating with the corrupt ministry of Walpole, and said to be corruptly used by it, prejudice men of English lineage against this imposition. The deranged and degraded currency of the United States, rendering the tax unequal in different parts as the precious metals are found

or scarce, is a more substantial objection; not less applicable, however, to the customs than to internal duties. The direct or land tax should be reserved for exigencies of war. The value of the land and slaves of the United States, estimated at six thousand millions of dollars, at ten cents in the hundred dollars, would yield six millions of dollars. But this is a fund to be left to the states in peace, and only drawn upon for the Union in war. Internal duties on the same objects, to half the amount of those laid in the late war would afford ten millions a year; a certain revenue independent of foreign commerce, varying but little, yet always increasing with the growth of the country; in practical and habitual operation, always susceptible of improvement or enlargement according to emergencies; rendering resort to loans, when necessary, as they probably always would be for hostilities, easy at reasonable rates and securing their repayment. The influence of internal duties on the perpetual controversy of a tariff of customs, would be highly beneficial; rendering them susceptible of easy and satisfactory adjustment, reduced to a general average, upon which all parts of the United States might agree, reserving high duties for a few articles of indispensable national necessity, and preventing the sectional strife which has convulsed the Union with alternate surplus and deficiency of revenue. Great development of foreign commerce would ensue, to insure a constant balance of trade with all the world in our favour. Stability, the vital need of all industry, of commerce, manufactures, agriculture and income, would take place of fluctuations, equally hurtful to private and public wealth, individual character and national credit.

The kindred subjects of commerce, manufactures and finance are all one—they are but currency. Three or four millions from internal duties, eighteen or nineteen from customs, one or two from lands, passing through the medium of coin or its equivalent, would bring constant tranquillity and constant progress. Some internal duties would serve to check the growing tendency of Congress to extravagant and unwarrantable disbursements. Revenues liable to little fluctuation, would lead to administrative economy, a more saving process than violent reduction or excision, the gage of popularity thrown down by contending parties to be redeemed by neither.

Notwithstanding the assurance of the President Monroe, and the chairman of the finance committee of the House of Representatives, as well as other members, that both the executive and legislative may always be relied upon, for recommending and voting taxes whenever necessary, the proof by experience was, that neither did so when war was declared, much less before it. One third of it elapsed in years of defeats and disasters, before Congress taxed their constituents. Meantime a presidential election took place, till which event no party in power likes to risk a conflict with the party out of power in this republic. Taxes are compulsory, palpable and annoying; customs optional and imperceptible. In other countries, those particularly with which we are most acquainted, excessive taxation terrifies us. All the real property of France, is held by its seeming owners only in trust for government, into whose coffers, the proceeds of all of it are drained every third generation. Proprietors have but one-third of their rents left for themselves: two-thirds are every year taken by the treasury. Such impositions levied for standing armies, regal executives, and other appropriations offensive to Americans, disgust and deter us from beginning a system liable to such abuses. The peace budget of France amounts to two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, nearly one half land taxes, or burthens on the real estates of that country; and less than ten millions derived from impost.

That is far short of the peace budget of Great Britain, the bitter fruit of unrestricted taxation, credit, paper money, and representative government. Including tithes, poor rates, and local expenses, (not figuring in the Parliament exhibits,) the annual expenditures of Great Britain in peace, exceed three hundred millions of dollars, an amount of burthens which no people ever bore before; and with a national debt, which it is not easy to represent in dollars, so enormous is the sum, mostly accumulated since Walpole introduced excises. These are portentous growths, to caution against planting their seeds, which the calm observer of national development may contemplate without exaggerated apprehensions.

The heaviest pecuniary burthens laid on the United States by the war, were not taxes, but ninety-eight millions of loans authorized by various acts of Congress, in the years 1811, '12, '13,

'14 and '15, none at an interest less than six per cent., some at great discount, and all paid in depreciated currency: five millions in 1811, reimbursable in not less than six years, eleven millions in 1812, twenty-three millions and a half in 1813, thirty-four millions in 1814, twenty-four millions and a half in 1815, all reimbursable in not less than twelve years, except those portions, which, anticipating taxes laid, were to be paid by the taxes as soon as collected. By acts of Congress of the years 1812, '13, '14 and 15, treasury notes to the amount of forty millions of dollars, all but the last emission of twenty-five millions, respecting which it was optional with the president whether the notes should bear interest—bearing interest at five and two-fifths per cent. a year. By several acts, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue treasury notes instead of parts of the loans before mentioned. Thus considerably more than the whole war debt was borrowed for it, and paid in paper money. Treasury notes fell as low as seventeen per cent., and the public loans to thirty per cent. below par during the war. The sinking fund and the taxes were pledged for punctual payment of the principal and interest of the sums borrowed. The public faith was also pledged in the terms of the acts of Congress; if such expression adds to the inherent obligation, which it is as easy to break with, as without it, if so dishonestly disposed. The war of 1812 was carried on by paper money, almost as much as that of the Revolution. But more perfect union, better government, and greater resources enabled the country to pay the debt of the last war, while the three hundred and sixty millions, which the first cost, remain unpaid, till partially repaid by Congress by that system of profuse pensions to the soldiers of the Revolution, which is some atonement for continental money and national insolvency, crowning that era of national independence with national dishonesty.

No such blot disfigures the war of 1812. Its large debt has been paid, every cent of it; and with it, a remnant of the old debt of the confederation. The striking and effectual difference between the two, is, that by the present constitution, the federal principle acts directly on the taxables; not indirectly through a state by its authority, or liable to any state, sectional or local counteraction. The power radiated immediately from the federal government throughout the whole United States, in every town,

village and field, lighting upon every person outright, without intervention, all as citizens of one and the same nation. Federal superintendents collected it. The federal judiciary administered the law to regulate and enforce the assessment and collection. The taxes were paid forthwith, into the federal treasury. That provision of the constitution saved the war from nullification. For if any state, on any pretext, could have withheld its proportion, that fatal hinderance would have been interposed. It was the avowed object of the Hartford Convention, on the plea that the federal government did not afford adequate protection to several of the eastern states; its avowed object was such a change as would allow them to collect and expend their own proportion of federal taxation. Effecting that change would have disorganized, probably annulled the union of states, and brought the war to disastrous conclusion. In this respect it may be questioned whether the bounty by act of Congress proffered to the states for advancing their direct taxes, as several of them did in the best spirit, was not a dangerous anti-federal expedient. The militia power, divided as it is between Union and State, endangered hostilities. The tax power so divided, would have brought them to naught. In their utmost need, however, when federal government was much exhausted, the states, as states, proved the war's efficient reinforcement.

The method of taxation was excellent and completely successful. But the medium of payment was as bad as paper money, irredeemable in coin, could render it. In a future chapter, when relating the enactment by Congress, in 1814, under Dallas' administration of the treasury department, of a bill chartering the second Bank of the United States, there will be occasion for full explanation of the banking principle, with which England has adulterated money. The United States, with their inherent proneness to exaggerate all facilitation of progress and acquisition, have abused even English principles of currency. The war of 1812 first afflicted this country with that greatest of all public evils, that adulteration of the blood of the body politic, a debased currency, by means of what is called suspension of specie payments by banks. In 1797, England had recourse, by act of Parliament, to this most revolutionary of all bloodless violations of due course of law, and the natural order of things, under the pressure of

war. Going beyond that fatal precedent, the same system of ruin was introduced in this country, without law, in defiance of it, on the plea of necessity, by common tacit, passive submission of the people and federal government to the worst licentiousness of state power and privileged fraud. Brokers' shops, called banks, cheated the community in every way, by paper circulated as money. Steam is not a more prodigious impulse to locomotion by land and water, than this most ruinous of all England's inheritances by her American colonies, has proved calamitous to the morals, property and prosperity of the United States. In vain did Madison protest against it in the *Federalist*, and the federal constitution, as was believed, provide against it. The French guillotine of Robespierre's terrorist anarchy destroyed fewer lives than the English gallows, under Pitt's dictatorship, sacrificed to the remorseless security of paper money. Act of Parliament making it a tender, was as great an imposture, as setting up the goddess of reason to be worshipped. Universal demoralization has ensued in this country, so imitative and idolatrous of that undermining liberty, abolishing equality, sanctioning and systematizing luxury, knavery and crime. Every village, every street in every town, has an incorporated bank, where the neighbourhood must pay toll to get its food ground, as at the lord's mill of old; the country deserted for cities: cities become bloated sores, with populace either ragged or gilded, living like the Roman, on alms and shows, furnaces of corruption, anarchy and mobs. The insignificant jacobin minority of terrorists, who governed France by assignats, gave that country infinitely better paper money than the bank of England, and the banks of the United States, during what is called suspension of specie payments, that is, stoppage of all payments—for the assignats rested on large and valuable real estate, pledged for their redemption, and sufficient for much of it. It was by paper money that the English national debt was increased beyond all hope of payment. Paper money renders sinking funds mere delusion, commerce a lottery, industry a shame, deprives manufacturers of all protection, reduces agriculture to penury, is the fuel of incessant wars, the great scourge of modern civilization and improvement. In any three years of the ten, from 1835 to 1845, it cost the United States incalculably more than the three years of war with Great Britain, from 1812

to 1815. Partial recovery from the prostration it inflicted on England, during the twenty-three years of suspension, from 1797 to 1822, agonized that mighty empire more than twenty years of tremendous warfare with France.

By this denunciation of the paper money, which the last year of the war of 1812 let loose upon the United States, paper promises to pay money, as the principal medium of all large commercial transactions, are not disowned. Individual promissory notes and bills of exchange are indispensable; as necessary and useful in their places as the precious metals: redeemable bank notes too are in the habitual dealings of the American people. It is the privilege conferred by government to substitute them irresponsibly for coin that has unhinged it and demoralized communities. The privilege to be irresponsible, while performing as individuals this primary function of government, without individual responsibility to government or individuals, is vastly greater and more pernicious than any prerogative of nobility. Paper, as the means of payment, is as useful as coin; but all paper should be issued and transferred upon personal obligations to be answerable for its value. The English prime minister, Sir Robert Peel, the same pre-eminent reformer of economy to whom his country owes her recovery from paper money, and restoration to coin standard, has reformed the Bank of England by such near approximation to the true principle as can hardly fail to produce ultimate complete revival of it. With the immense influence of that English example, this country may perhaps be led to perceive that cocoa, tobacco, skins, corn, and other primitive substitutes for money were much nearer to it than paper, privileged by charter of incorporation to make it irredeemably. No religious infidelity, no pagan mystery is more preposterous than the foolish belief that money can be made of paper. The precious metals, by whatever mysterious exclusiveness of right, are as much money in London when paper is by law made to pass for it, as they were when it took a cartload of iron in Sparta to pay a tradesman's bill. The bank parlour postulate of one dollar in the vault to answer for three in circulation, is as gross an absurdity as any other refuted by science, common sense and experience.

Never was metropolitan arrogance so flagrant as when England put this country out of the social, as well as political pale

for what is termed repudiation of public debts: the fatal lesson she taught us. For three-and-twenty years she never paid one. Her king, lords, and commons, bench of bishops, courts of justice, Westminster Hall and Guildhall, taught the incorporated broker shops of the United States how easy it is to defraud by means of paper money. The English statute book groans with acts of Parliament reducing either the principal or interest of national debts. The whole of the national debt can never be provided for but by the sponge of a revolution. Deluded to the extravagances which paper money always engenders, states, corporations, and individuals in this country, contracted debts to England, mostly for manufactures, charged at a third or more beyond their value. The day of responsibility came with transient inability to pay in money. We paid precisely as the British government during a quarter of a century paid all its debts, in promises to pay: and, unlike English promises to pay, American promises to pay will all be redeemed by payment in money, while English promises to pay never will or can be. Not only so; but the sentiment of probity is less loosened here than there. While practical repudiation was long the law there, it never was law here. Bank notes never were, could not be made, legal tender in the United States. The day must come, cannot be distant here, when all debts will be paid in money: in England that day for the national debt can never come. Not a State of the American confederacy has ever failed to disown repudiation, while to a certain practical extent it is of frequent recurrence in English government, and must be the only eventual resort there where repudiation or revolution is the national option.

For superintending the collection of the direct tax and internal revenue, Congress, on the 24th of July, 1813, created an office in the treasury department, to be filled by an officer called Commissioner of the Revenue, charged under direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, with preparing all forms necessary for collectors and assessors, distributing licenses, and generally superintending all officers employed in assessing and collecting taxes; authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer the collection of impost and tonnage duties, if he should be of opinion that it promoted the public interest, from the comptroller of the treasury to the commissioner of the revenue. The president conferred this laborious and important place on Mr. Samuel

Harrison Smith, to whom I am beholden for most of the details concerning it. Mr. Smith is still living at the city of Washington, where he was appointed President of the Branch Bank of the United States, some time after his function as commissioner of revenue ceased in 1818, by the repeal of the whole system. On the removal of the seat of federal government from Philadelphia to Washington, he accompanied it, and was editor of the *National Intelligencer* during Jefferson's administration, and till succeeded in that employment by the present editors, Messrs. Gales and Seaton. The tone of moderation and decorum, for which that leading journal has always been remarkable, began with Mr. Smith, who enjoyed the confidence of Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and John Quincy Adams. He is a gentleman of respectable literary and scientific attainments, much respected by all who know him; especially for his excellent management of an important fiscal dependence of government during the war of 1812. The rude presidential reform, which shook so many from their positions, on the political revolution of Jackson's advent to chief magistracy, displaced Mr. Smith with his bank. Government which Jefferson inaugurated, Madison mitigated, and Monroe melted into an era of good feelings, Jackson revived to radical democracy, beyond that which Mr. Smith and others of the adherents of the three former democratic presidents deemed right. It required the rough edge of a soldier's broadsword to hack out the gangrene with which paper money, under colour of bank abuses, state and federal, diseased America. Jackson's detestation of that scourge was not more implacable than Madison's, as his eloquent reprobation of it testifies in the *Federalist*. His mode of extirpation would, no doubt, have been different: but his determination to effect it the same.

Paper money will be treated more fully in another part of this historical sketch, when the creation of a national bank as a war measure and suspension of coin payments by certain state banks come to be considered. To return now from a digression or anticipation which this topic may have provoked into the narrative appropriate to the year 1813:—the war of 1812, notwithstanding a diseased currency, was far from disadvantageous to national resource eventually.

The annexed tabular statements will show that by commercial vexations, the income of the United States was almost as much

reduced before as during the war, that it was less in 1809 and 1810 than in 1812; reduced one half from 1808 to 1809 and 1810; very little more in 1811 than in 1813; and so much increased in 1816 as to prove that then, far from any permanent injury, it caused a spring to the national wealth on the return of peace. The average and total of the years 1812, '13, '14, '15 and '16, that is, during the war and one year after, were greater than during the five years preceding war. The sales of public lands increased year after year every year during war. So did the postages: although the receipts from taxes and internal revenue were scarcely perceptible till 1814, the third year of the war, and then they scarce exceeded one million and a half of dollars. The evils of the war were as much magnified as its advantages, hereafter to be more fully shown, are apt to be undervalued.

The tabular views annexed of—1. The income of the United States; 2. The customs from 1808 to 1816 inclusive; 3. The internal revenue, while in operation; 4. The expenses of collection; 5. The war loans; and, 6. The treasury notes issued for the war are full of instruction as to its effects. These tables have been prepared with great care, from the best materials.

No. 1.—*Income of the United States annually from 1808 to 1816.*

Year ending 31st Dec.	RECEIPTS INTO THE TREASURY FROM					RECEIPTS FROM OTHER SOURCES.				
	Customs.	Internal Revenue.	Direct Tax.	Public Lands.	Total.	Loans.	Treasury Notes.	Postage.	Miscellaneous.	Total Receipts.
1808	16,363,550 58	8,190 23	19,159 21	647,939 06	17,038,839 08				21,822 85	17,060,661 93
1809	7,257,506 62	4,034 29	7,517 31	442,252 33	7,711,310 55				62,162 57	7,773,473 12
1810	8,583,309 31	7,430 63	12,448 68	696,548 82	9,299,737 44	2,750,000			84,476 84	12,134,214 28
1811	13,313,222 73	2,295 95	7,666 66	1,040,237 53	14,363,422 87				59,211 22	14,422,634 09
1812	8,998,777 53	4,903 06	859 22	710,427 78	9,674,967 59	10,002,400	2,835,500	85,039 70	41,125 47	22,639,032 76
1813	13,224,623 25	4,755 04	3,805 52	835,655 14	14,068,838 95	20,089,635	6,094,800	35,000	236,571	40,524,844 95
1814	5,998,772 08	1,662,984 82	2,219,497 36	1,135,971 09	11,017,225 35	15,080,546	8,297,365 79	45,000	119,399 81	34,559,536 95
1815	7,282,942 22	4,678,059 07	2,162,673 41	1,287,959 28	15,411,633 98	14,857,423 40	20,406,897 38	135,000 10	150,282 84	50,961,237 60
1816	36,306,874 88	5,124,708 31	4,253,635 09	1,717,985 03	47,403,203 31	1,357,586 91	8,136,849 25	149,787 74	123,994 61	57,171,821 82

No. 2.—*A statement exhibiting the gross and net revenue which accrued annually from customs, during the years 1808 to 1816 inclusive, and also the payments into the treasury and expenses of collection during the same period.*

Year ending 31st Dec.	Gross revenue from customs.	Debentures issued, bounties & allowances to fishing vessels.	Expenses of collection.	Net revenue.	Payments into the Treasury.	Rate per cent. of expenses of collection.
1808	11,284,939 44	409,548 55	543,227 14	10,332,163 75	16,363,550 58	4.99
1809	11,777,714 40	4,755,548 18	494,998 02	6,527,168 20	7,296,020 58	7.04
1810	16,794,300 95	3,841,428 05	439,382 87	12,513,490 03	8,583,309 31	3.39
1811	10,571,513 21	2,228,029 13	440,924 46	7,902,559 62	13,313,222 73	5.28
1812	15,160,469 51	1,542,622 19	475,838 95	13,142,008 37	8,958,777 53	3.49
1813	7,699,177 31	580,327 16	410,483 94	6,708,366 21	13,224,623 26	5.76
1814	4,632,306 81	26,082 37	355,862 85	4,250,361 59	5,998,772 08	7.72
1815	38,477,783 05	1,706,744 96	465,015 58	36,306,022 51	7,282,942 22	1.26
1816	33,216,104 92	4,915,631 06	816,373 50	27,484,100 36	36,306,874 88	2.88

No. 3.—*A statement exhibiting the gross and net revenue which accrued under the several acts laying internal duties, and also the expenses of collection and payment into the treasury under the said acts.*

Year ending 31st December.	Gross Revenue.	Deduct		Net Revenue.	Payments into the Treasury.	Rate per cent. of expenses of collection.
		Duties refunded, debentures paid, and other charges.	Expenses of Collection.			
1814	3,311,112 61	12,208 59	138,825 06	3,160,078 96	1,662,984 82	4.19
1815	6,423,490 34	129,172 88	277,628 92	6,016,688 54	4,678,059 07	4.41
1816	4,725,842 44	23,389 33	311,313 26	4,391,139 85	5,124,708 31	6.62
1817*	3,324,853 67	366,314 37	368,772 85	2,589,766 45	2,678,100 77	12.46

* The expense of collection was increased this year by additional allowances to collectors, authorized by the Act of 23d December, 1817, which abolished these duties. The average expense of collection for the years 1814, 1815 and 1816, may be estimated at $5\frac{1}{10}$ per cent.

No. 4.—*A statement exhibiting the gross and net revenue which accrued under the several acts laying a direct tax, and also the expenses of collection and payments into the treasury under the same respectively.*

Years ending 31st December.	Gross Revenue or Assessment.	Deduct		Net Revenue.	Payments into the Treasury.	Rate per cent. of expenses of collec- tion.
		Errors in assessment and sundry other charges.	Expenses of Collection.			
1814	3,026,989 96	14,106 62	300,754 79	2,712,128 55	2,219,497 36	9.98
1815	6,091,625 42	43,300 77	475,566 37	5,572,758 28	2,162,673 41	7.86
1816	3,099,419 49	51,529 01	236,756 53	2,811,133 95	4,253,635 09	7.77

No. 5.—*Loans of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815.*

The Secretary of the Treasury, in his report of December, 1815, *estimated* the whole amount of the funded debt, in reference to the late war, at - - - - - \$63,144,972 50

The amount actually funded, as appears by the public accounts, is stated at - - - \$62,661,228 87

The expenses incident to these loans amounted to \$121,361 18, which is equal to $0\frac{19}{100}$ per cent.

No. 6.—*Treasury Notes issued in 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815.*

By the report of the Secretary of November, 1818, it appears that treasury notes were issued under the several acts of 1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815, amounting to - - - \$36,680,794 00

The expenses incident to their issue were \$63,630 32, which is equal to $0\frac{17}{100}$ per cent.

The President of the United States, during the war of 1812, without either military or popular talents, was, nevertheless, fitted for the crisis by calm, tenacious, honest and superior intelligence, intimate knowledge of the constitution, and inflexible adhesion to its requirements. James Madison was a small man,

with nothing imposing in his appearance, and shy, cold, manners, circumspect and reserved without being taciturn, his face wrinkled and wilted, his dress plain, his conversation luminous and edifying; his political discriminations and analysis nice even to subtlety. His youth, after good education, was spent in close miscellaneous study. Though just of an age to embark in the revolution, of which he was an advocate, he took no military part, but retiring, contemplative, and feeble in health, devoted himself to mental cultivation. His life, from first to last, was passionless and thoughtful; though his affections were kind and his attachments constant. Most of his politics coincided with Jefferson's; but with some modifications, taking nothing for granted, by sentiment or sympathy; rather adopted than natural offspring; at any rate the offspring of thought, not impulse. He was a constant opponent of all union of politics with religion; thoroughly read in the Scriptures, but inscrutably reserved in his religious opinions. At twenty-five years of age, in 1776, elected to the Virginia House of Delegates, he voted for instructions to Congress to declare independence; but made no speech or figure, and at the next election was superseded by a more forward competitor. The year after, however, his county chose him again; and the legislature elected him in 1779 a member of the council of the state, in which he continued till elected a member of Congress in 1784, uniformly modest, and retiring, but useful, industrious and instructive. During his service in the council, Patrick Henry and Jefferson were successively Governors of Virginia; both of whom experienced Madison's knowledge, wisdom and probity; not shining, but sure, and constantly improving. Jefferson, who delighted to extol him, used to mention his amiable behaviour, his readiness and facility at drafting reports or bills, and the gratuitous help he was always willing to give to members of the legislature, and his talents for business. Governor Henry, not understanding French, for which there was much occasion in communication with the officers of the French army, Madison was his interpreter, and otherwise so serviceable to Henry, that he was called his secretary. He did not, however, learn from Henry the art of public speaking, in which Madison was so backward from extreme bashfulness, that Jefferson thought Madison would probably have never become the eminent public speaker he did, but for accidental training, first in the council of

Virginia, consisting of only ten persons, so that to speak was little more than conversation, and then in Congress, under the confederation, with only fifty-six gentlemen in secret session without public audience. The conspicuous part he performed is known to all in what is called framing (meaning forming) the federal constitution, of which from his large contributions and his surviving the thirty-nine members of the convention who accomplished it, he was called the father. From 1776, when as member of the Virginia legislature, he contributed to the Declaration of Independence, for forty years till 1817, when he voluntarily retired from the presidency, as member of the public councils of a leading state, as member of Congress, as Secretary of State during eight years, and chief magistrate during eight years more, no mind has stamped more of its impressions on American institutions than Madison's. Not a man of genius, like Jefferson, he did not strike the raw material of public sentiment from crudity into currency. Not a hero like Washington, he did not fill the public administration with his own impression. Without towering talents to command other men, his ascendant was gradual and intellectual. Yet he was nearly always a leading man, and his midway republicanism adopted at first, though somewhat affected by the flux and reflux of time, is likely to maintain the even tenour of its way. The papers of the *Federalist* are a text-book, of which, without odious comparison of Madison's numbers with Hamilton's and Jay's, it may be said that the great authority of the work is due to their sustaining by it doctrines which Madison above all asserted. As soon as the present constitution was adopted, Madison was elected to Congress in 1789, and re-elected till 1793; during which eight years his part was so prominent and pervading in all deliberations and acts, that none took place without his important agency, and in most of the leading measures his was the leading part. In the formation of parties he sided with the republicans, particularly on the cardinal divisions of the bank and the British treaty. But he continued on kind and confidential terms with Washington, and always acknowledged the talents, services and integrity of Hamilton. In Congress he was a frequent debater, seldom without full preparation, exhausting subjects, so that his arguments suggested and refuted those of adversaries which they had not thought of. All his speeches and state papers are calm, respectful and forbearing, while earnest,

candid and forcible, the diction chaste and elegant, seldom impassioned, though his oft-quoted denunciation in the *Federalist* of paper money is one of the most eloquent appeals extant against that modern monster. The resolutions of the Virginia legislature of 1798 against the alien and sedition laws, are his production, though not then a member of that body, to which he was chosen next year, and drew the celebrated report in their vindication, which report and resolutions have ever since been standards of politics.

As Jefferson's Secretary of State, at a period when that department, substituting the moral force of reason and international law for violence—Jefferson inflexibly resolved on peace at every hazard, Madison as cordially convinced of the wisdom of keeping this growing and feeble country out of the vortex of the ruinous warfare by which Europe was devastated, and the ocean pillaged—Madison's masterly exertions as the advocate of peaceable freedom and maritime rights were intense, incessant and superior. All the great disputes on municipal and national law evolved by the relative rights of war and peace, colonial trade contraband, search, impressment, blockades, embargo, countervailing restrictions, non-intercourse—he argued before the world, and vindicated for his country, with a depth of research, power of argument, and force unsurpassed by any state papers. On the question of impressment, the most exciting and difficult of all, involving direct conflict of British and American law as to subjection and citizenship, Madison's correspondence with the American ministers in England, and the English ministers in America, excels every other discussion of that subject. Every year public sentiment was enlightened and encouraged by his admirable logic, and ripened for that appeal to arms which, after exhausting forbearance, and not till then, was the last resort against such wrongs. In the subsequent correspondence between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton, the former and his many admirers seem to suppose that he brings forward new and striking views of this topic. But Madison had preceded and exceeded him in every one of them, with the consummate ability of a statesman compared to a great lawyer. And while the United States and Great Britain were in 1842 controverting the merely revived dogmas of search and visitation, as if they were for the first time enunciated, Madison's presidential message to Congress in May,

1813, covered the whole ground as conclusively as comprehensively. Free ships, free goods, was a principle deemed by him a legitimate and demonstrable part of the laws of nations, and the best guarantee of permanent maritime peace. Peace and good will, equal commerce and international justice, are, according to his doctrine, the paramount policy as well as right of states; and, beyond Jefferson, who partly yielded the great American doctrine of free ships, free goods, Madison maintained their conformity with the established laws of nations. When the evil of war became unavoidable, after being by all possible means averted as long as possible, he thought that it was to be mitigated and abridged as much and as soon as possible. With these impressions deeply fixed in his conscience and reason, it was his fate to be executive chief magistrate of war; and among the torrents of abuse which enemies and opponents showered upon him, not one accused him of selfish ambition or arbitrary power. The law never lost its supremacy by his administration, which is much more than equivalent for the want of military talents imputed to him. When the British government resolved by the severest trial of that war to assert perpetuity of allegiance by the execution of a number of American naturalized citizens taken prisoners of war, the crisis found in Madison a champion of the American principle, not to be deterred or alarmed by any sacrifice. Undertaking chief magistracy bequeathed to him by his more salient predecessor with a complication of difficulties, he went through the war meekly, as adversaries alleged shrinkingly, no doubt with anxious longing for the restoration of peace, but without ever yielding a principle to his enemies or a point to his adversaries; leaving the United States, which he found embarrassed and discredited, successful, prosperous, glorious and content. A constitution which its opponents pronounced incapable of hostilities, under his administration triumphantly bore their severest brunt. Checkered by the inevitable vicissitudes of war, its trials never disturbed the composure of the commander-in-chief, always calm, consistent and conscientious, never much elated by victory or depressed by defeat, never once by the utmost emergencies of war, betrayed into a breach of the constitution. Exposed to that licentious abuse which leading men in free countries with an unshackled press cannot escape, his patience was never exhausted; nor his forbearance deprived of dignity by complaint,

retort, or self-defence, but in the quiet serenity of rectitude, he waited on events with uninterrupted confidence. At the close of one of the sessions of Congress, before the present constitution, when Madison was a member, taking leave of a friend, he said he should never be in public life again: on his friend's saying that he would be in the next Congress, "Not I," replied Madison; "I would rather be in an insane hospital." Yet, thenceforward, during thirty years, he was never out of public life, (though, like all its followers, he felt momentary disgust,) till sixty-six years old, when he at last laid down the presidency, and withdrew to pass nearly twenty more on his estate in the neighbourhood of his birth-place in Virginia, surviving detraction, and soon becoming a shrine to which Americans of all parties, and respectable foreigners fondly repaired, to enjoy the hospitable home of a model for American statesmen. Except a short residence at Richmond, in 1829, as a member of the convention assembled there to reform the constitution of Virginia, or an occasional visit to his neighbour, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison hardly left his own plantation from the time of his retirement to his death in June, 1836. During life he traveled but little, never having seen much of the country which he so largely contributed to make one nation, nor any part of any other. His sympathies, tastes, habits, and preferences were domestic and purely American; there was no European idolatry mixed with them. Hence, perhaps, the ill bred of Europe, who visit and decry America, might disparage the figure, manners, furniture, equipage and other externals of the residence and appearance of this American chief magistrate and gentleman, as inferior to their arbitrary standards. Nor need we deny the superior splendour of greater wealth or its influence, though in matters of taste the most refined of different nations disagree. The substantial and elegant hospitalities of Madison's house, both on his large estate in Virginia, and in the presidential mansion at Washington, consisted with polished life, and might be advantageously compared with more sumptuous entertainment. Elegance does not consist in opulence, as vulgar persons are apt to imagine: otherwise French and Italian excellence in all attractions of the table, the drawing-room, the public spectacle, music, sculpture and painting, would be eclipsed by what at best is inferior British imitation of them. At forty-three years of age, Mr. Madison married a lady brought up in the strictest self-denials

of the Quaker sect, to whom frivolous accomplishments, together with elegant clothing, were forbidden : yet she proved the graceful companion of his elevation, with manners noble and gracious, the nicest sense of the most refined good-breeding, and certainly better fitted for courts than many of those frequenting them : for good manners and refined civilization do not depend on mere wealth or mere titular rank. Jefferson and Madison attempted to reform the proneness of their countrymen to titles by dropping excellency, honourable, and esquire from names. Yet the attempt almost ended as it began with them : candid Americans must confess that titles and wealth are worshiped by too many in this country.

During Madison's long retirement, company, correspondence, agriculture, and the University of Virginia, of which he was regent, with exercise in the saddle, were his recreations. Like Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, and all the Virginia gentlemen of that day, he was an expert horseman, and addicted to horse-back recreations. He was fond of table-talk ; and, though temperate in all things, enjoyed not only wine, but the lively, and even the sometimes more than lively freedom it produces.— Jefferson, with uncommon colloquial powers, was constitutionally modest, and would blush at any indelicate allusion. Madison, more diffident of opinion, was fond of free chat, and rather enjoyed what his instructor would have shrunk from. On a visit I paid Mr. Madison, about six weeks before his death, I found him extremely weak, so that he never left his chamber, and seldom a couch ; but while life was at the lowest ebb, his fine mind was bright, memory clear, and conversation delightful. Avoiding, with impervious retention, all judgment of men or things that might in any way identify him with the politics, the parties or the persons of the time, he conversed without reserve, and with surprising intelligence, even subtle discrimination, of constitutional or any other open topics ; asserting his long-cherished midway opinions with unabated attachment. On the 28th of June, 1836, he died, at the age of eighty-five. His mother died in his house nearly a hundred years old. The President, General Jackson, announced Madison's death to Congress by a brief message, that measures might be adopted testifying respect due to the memory of one whose life contributed so essentially to the happiness and glory of his country, and the good of mankind. Mr.

Patton, the member from his district, moved the resolution of condolence, which was seconded by Mr. Quincy Adams, the only surviving ex-president, then a member of the House of Representatives, brought together as he said, by emanations from Madison's mind, to address each other by the endearing appellations of countrymen and fellow-citizens.

. What then is the shading of this seeming strain of panegyric? No one has been more abused than Madison. But not only did it all die away, but died before he died. He was charged with subserviency to France, with timidity, incapacity for great deeds, with inebriety, and other unworthiness of which the specifications are since forgotten. A statement of the multiplied detraction showered on him, would instruct and console as to the futility of abuse without truth, when uttered and registered by licentious presses. Retirement and seclusion, death, and time pass amnesty on all that is not unpardonable ; while better instincts exalt the praiseworthy actions. The evil goes into oblivion. The good is consecrated. There exists a remnant of inveterate, respectable federalists, who still deny Madison's merits. But the great body of his countrymen are unanimous in awarding him immortality. Much more than Jefferson, he enjoys undivided favour. He was no hero, not a man of genius, not remarkable for the talent of personal ascendancy. But his patriotic services are parcel of the most fundamental civil, and the most renowned military grandeur of this republic, and his private life without stain or reproach.

CHAPTER IX.

NORTHERN CAMPAIGN.—EUSTIS RESIGNS THE WAR DEPARTMENT.—ARMSTRONG APPOINTED SECRETARY OF WAR.—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN TO ATTACK KINGSTON.—GENERAL PIKE.—TOWN MEETING AT PHILADELPHIA.—GENERALS DEARBORN AND PIKE CAPTURE YORK.—PIKE'S DEATH.—INDIAN SCALP IN CANADIAN PARLIAMENT HOUSE.—REVOLUTIONARY INDIAN BARBARITIES.—CAPTURE OF FORT GEORGE BY THE AMERICANS.—REPULSE OF THE ENGLISH BY GENERAL BROWN AT SACKETT'S HARBOUR.—ENORMOUS EXPENSES OF BORDER AND LAKE WAR.—GENERALS CHANDLER AND WINDER SURPRISED AND CAPTURED BY GENERAL VINCENT AT FORTY MILE CREEK.—COLONEL BURN RETREATS.—GENERAL LEWIS ORDERED TO REINFORCE HIM.—RECALLED BY GENERAL DEARBORN.—COLONEL BOERSTLER'S SURRENDER AT THE BEAVER DAMS.—GENERAL DEARBORN REMOVED FROM COMMAND OF THE NORTHERN ARMY.—SUCCEEDED AD-INTERIM BY GENERAL BOYD.—ORDERED NOT TO ACT OFFENSIVELY.—COOPED UP IN FORT GEORGE ALL SUMMER.—GENERAL WILKINSON TAKES COMMAND THERE IN SEPTEMBER.—STATE AND NUMBER OF THE FORCES AT SACKETT'S HARBOUR, FORT GEORGE AND CHAMPLAIN.—EXPEDITION AGAINST MONTREAL.—GENERALS ARMSTRONG, WILKINSON AND HAMPTON.—THEIR PLANS AND FEUDS.—HAMPTON INVADES CANADA—IS REPULSED IN SEPTEMBER, AND AGAIN IN OCTOBER.—CHAUNCEY GETS COMMAND OF LAKE ONTARIO.—WILKINSON'S DESCENT OF THE ST. LAWRENCE TO ATTACK MONTREAL.—DESCRIPTION AND DISASTERS OF THAT VOYAGE.—BRAVE AND SUCCESSFUL RESISTANCE OF THE ENGLISH.—BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HAMPTON AND WILKINSON.—HAMPTON REFUSES TO JOIN WILKINSON, WHO ABANDONS THE EXPEDITION.—PUBLIC OPINION RESPECTING IT.—NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS.—GENERAL M'CLURE DESTROYS FORT GEORGE, AND RETREATS TO FORT NIAGARA.—BURNS QUEENSTOWN.—BRITISH RETALIATE.—SURPRISE FORT NIAGARA, AND LAY WASTE WESTERN NEW YORK.—IMPRESIONS AT WASHINGTON.—BLUE-LIGHTS REPORTED BY DECATUR, AS SEEN TO GIVE NOTICE OF HIS MOVEMENTS.—ENGLISH TRIUMPHS IN EUROPE, AND AMERICA EMBOLDEN THEIR WARFARE.—DISASTROUS CLOSE OF NORTHERN CAMPAIGN IN 1813.

WHEN General Hull's surrender fell upon the executive at Washington, like a thunderbolt, the Secretary of War was of course the person most severely scathed. On General Dearborn's resignation of the war department, at the close of Jefferson's administration, President Madison conferred it on William Eustis,

who had represented Boston, in the House of Representatives, and was an honest, intelligent, worthy gentleman, without commanding talents, called upon in the outset of the war, with an unprepared country, a divided people, reluctant Congress, and a factious senate, for the exercise of talents, which miracles could hardly have rendered successful. His sacrifice to public indignation was deemed indispensable; not by the president, but by members of Congress of his party, particularly the New England democrats, of whom a self-created deputation waited on Dr. Eustis, and, without the slightest hesitancy on his part, prevailed on him forthwith manfully to resign. His letter of resignation immediately submitted to the president, was answered by him in the kindest and most soothing manner, that while yielding to the necessity of their parting, Dr. Eustis would carry with him every assurance of Mr. Madison's unalterable good will, which was afterwards proved by his sending him minister to Holland: as Eustis persevered in attachment to Madison, in spite of attempts by the disaffected to draw him into opposition.

The war department was then offered to Crawford, always and justly a favourite with Madison, but he had the good sense to decline it, as he had no military experience, and though little given to fear, apprehensive that he might prove unequal to so arduous a task. Many other persons were thought of for the post. But, upon the whole, Madison satisfied himself that General Armstrong would be the best selection, who was at that time a brigadier-general, in command at the city of New York. Madison did not like him, nor did his confidential secretary Monroe, who held Armstrong in aversion. He had been aid to General Gates, in the war of the Revolution, and served with some distinction; was the reputed author of the reprobated Newburg letters on disbanding the army, married into the Livingston family of New York, was President Jefferson's minister to Napoleon, whose military and arbitrary government, Jefferson strongly disapproved, and whose injustice to this country Armstrong boldly denounced, to the French emperor's great annoyance. General Armstrong was rather tall and slender, about fifty years of age when secretary of war, thought clearly, acted with decision, and was an epigrammatic writer, but indolent. It was said, that like several others, he coveted the chief command of the American army, with the title of Lieutenant General; and it is possible that

when he transferred the war department from Washington to Sackett's Harbour, in 1813, he may have entertained such aspirations. If so, they could not have been realized, because Madison never would have given him such a place, which, if given by him to any one, would probably have been intrusted to Monroe. It is but just, however, to Madison, to qualify this mere conjecture with the acknowledgment that no man with the executive power of appointment, more honestly controlled his personal predilections in executing the trust.

It was General Armstrong's plan, as secretary of the war department, that the Canadian campaign of 1813 should begin by an attack on Kingston, where the English naval armament on Lake Ontario harboured, and the head quarters of the army were concentrated. Commodore Chauncey then held command of the lake; we had force enough under General Dearborn, near Lake Champlain, at Sackett's Harbour, our naval rendezvous, and along the St. Lawrence to Niagara, to warrant such an attack, which, with enterprising commanders, would have been undertaken and probably succeeded in the destruction of the English fleet, if not the capture of Kingston. Indeed, a winter invasion in sleighs had been suggested, but never seriously contemplated; an exploit, however feasible and striking, beyond the enterprise of those with whom the honour of our arms was then held in abeyance. The officer, in that region, of most promise, more looked to for achievement than any other, was General Pike, whose extremely untoward commencement at the affair of Odeltown, in November, 1812, has been mentioned. Zebulon Montgomery Pike, of New Jersey, was a regular and thorough bred soldier, nearly all his life spent in the little army of the United States, and one of the very few officers not spoiled by its slow advancement, long service in low grades without active duty, or opportunity of actual distinction, the degeneracy of mere drill and garrison routine. He entered the army a youth when it consisted of only a few hundred men, under Washington's presidency. That veteran general, with all the executive authority of infant government with difficulty sustained it against the western Indians, protected by British posts and supplied with British arms, year after year defeating our insignificant forces, though commanded by such experienced officers as Generals Harmer and Sinclair, till at length one of

the heroes of the Revolution, General Wayne, succeeded in worsting the savages and intimidating their English supporters to the great relief and joy of the whole country. Wayne, Wilkinson, and other officers of those petty campaigns, were welcomed at Philadelphia, then the federal metropolis, as commanders who had nobly rescued our borders from invasion. Not many years before, Washington himself served his apprenticeship with Braddock in similar but yet more deplorable conflict; and Dr. Franklin, with the epaulettes and commission of colonel, sword in hand, was called out to do like duty against Indian invaders, alarming the inhabitants of Philadelphia by their terrifying incursions. Indian conquest and massacre at Wyoming, receding, but fighting step by step, through Pennsylvania, New York, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan, and the far west, were forced from extreme east to extreme west, beyond Chicago, and driven to the shores of Lake Superior. English blood had done it, delighting in aggression and malediction and the hatred of different races, adventurous, rapacious by sea and land, animated by love of liberty and love of gain, whose enjoyments are often ferocious, and recreations the destructive chase, the fatiguing journey, the perilous voyage, the storm, the battle, the explosion by steam, restless movements, insatiable covetousness, the trinodal power, pleasure and impulse of activity, energy, and conquest. After serving in frontier garrisons through twenty years of Washington's, John Adams', Jefferson's, and Madison's administrations, and, at the end of that long period, getting no further than a majority, Major Pike began at last to see in the war of 1812, some prospects of the more rapid renown he sighed for. On the 20th May, 1812, there was a great public meeting at Philadelphia, to embolden government, then supposed to be—both the executive and legislative, vacillating and apprehensive, not only of the English, but of the federal opposition—to embolden them to declare war and cast the die. It was a numerous and enthusiastic popular meeting held in the State House yard, close to the hall in which independence had been declared in 1776, a meeting which talked of a second war of independence and resistance to British oppression, by maritime wrongs pronounced intolerable. William Jones, soon after appointed secretary of the navy, having represented Philadelphia in Congress, presided.

John Binns, editor of the Democratic Press, then the principal newspaper of Pennsylvania, was among the most active at that meeting. He was the intimate friend and confidential adviser of Simon Snyder, Governor of Pennsylvania, a state nearly unanimous for the war. Of the twenty-three members of the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress, during the war, all but one were elected to support it, and both the senators. The resolutions for war at that town meeting were unanimously adopted with great enthusiasm by a large concourse. Near the stage stood Major Pike, in a plain dress, intently listening to the proceedings, which he seemed to regard as his summons to promotion and the glory he had for many years in vain aspired to.

Within a twelvemonth, Major Pike was a brigadier-general, and regarded as one of our best commanders. On the 25th of April, 1813, with about sixteen hundred picked troops, Commodore Chauncey's fleet sailed from Sackett's Harbour, to transport Generals Pike and Dearborn, as was supposed towards Kingston. On the 27th of that month and year, instead of Kingston, the troops were landed about three miles from York, the provincial capital of Upper Canada. Kingston, at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, with an excellent harbour, contained their dock-yard and naval armaments. York or Toronto, so called from an old French fort near the western end of the lake, was a more considerable town than Kingston, but without so good a harbour. Commodore Chauncey's ship, the Madison, could not therefore approach near enough to fire upon York: but the commodore in his boat was constantly at hand, superintending wherever he could be of service, while his flag captain, Elliot, with the schooners of the squadron, beat up against a gale of head wind, within six hundred yards of the town, and covered the landing, effected in spite of brave resistance by the English. Mr. McLean, speaker of the Canadian assembly, was killed while fighting gallantly as a volunteer in the ranks, with a musket on his shoulder; Captain McNeal, of the grenadiers, was also killed, and his company annihilated. Our troops were headed by Major Forsyth, of North Carolina, with his riflemen, a bold and dashing soldier, always forward for action, who on this occasion sustained it with great spirit for a long time. General Pike headed the attack. General Dearborn's well-composed official account of it, said that to General Pike he had been induced to confide the immediate attack,

from a knowledge that it was his wish, and that he would have felt mortified had it not been given to him. General Sheaffe, says the same letter, commanded the British troops in person, collected in a wood near where the head wind compelled ours to land, suffering much, says Christie, from a galling fire. The Americans, however, Christie adds, accomplished their landing, and compelled the British to retire with loss, after a desperate contest; and retreat to their works. The Americans formed under Pike where they landed, and pushed through the woods, carrying the first redoubt by assault, and were moving upon the principal entrenchment, when the magazine house was blown up with terrible explosion and slaughter, destroying between one and two hundred of our men, and some of theirs. In this magazine there was a much larger quantity of powder than for the defence of the place. The explosion was tremendous; not only scattering destruction about where it took place, but affecting even the American vessels on the lake, which covered the landing of our men. Both General Pike's aids were killed: as Montgomery and his two aids fell at Quebec. The English commander, Sheaffe, said to be a Bostonian by birth, denied this vile stratagem, alleging the death of several of the English, as proof that it was merely accidental.—But Christie is explicit in confession of it. The stones and rubbish were thrown as far as the decks of our vessels near the shore, and the water shocked as with an earthquake. Pike was literally stoned to death, after victory bravely won: his breast and sides were crushed, and he lingered in great agony till he expired. Just as he was lifted from the ground, hearing a shout, he inquired what it was for. An American serjeant near him answered, the British union jack is coming down, the stars and stripes are going up on the fortifications. He was revived by this; and our men, necessarily thrown into some confusion by the destructive explosion, were immediately brought to order, by Colonel Cromwell Pearce, of the 16th regiment of infantry, on whom, by Pike's fall, the command devolved. Carried on board the commodore's ship, General Pike was laid on a mattress, asked for the British captured flag to be placed under his head, and in a few hours, nobly breathed his last upon it without a sigh. His heroic death the 27th of April, Captain Lawrence's, after the loss of the frigate Chesapeake, on the first of June, Lieutenant William Burrowes' on the deck of the schooner Enterprise, while

capturing the brig *Boxer*, on the first of September, and General Covington's the 10th of November, at the battle of Williamsburg, that year, were events which made great sensation; one and all, they were impressive instances of that noble patriotism which elevates men and corroborates nations. Pike and Covington, at the head of their troops, Lawrence and Burrowes on the decks of vessels of war, self-sacrificed to their country by noble deaths, were among the first and greatest contributors to the national power and long-enjoyed prosperity of the United States. For in vain is peace solicited and cultivated without aptitude for war. Effort, hardship, exploit, are national as well as individual wages of repose and respect.

General Dearborn let the English General Sheaffe escape with the regular troops, who made good their retreat, when, if either Pike or Dearborn had been present, the whole of them might and should have been taken prisoners. Before the attack Pike urged Dearborn, and he consented to let Pike command, and the commander-in-chief remained three miles off, on board Commodore Chauncey's ship, the *Madison*. His official dispatch reported that the attack was within his view: which must have been a distant and, for all the purposes of assistance or counsel, useless view. The consequence of his absence was that, by Pike's fall, the command devolved on Colonel Pearce, a brave officer, but uninformed as he was, of the plan of operations, he thought proper, after rallying the troops from the momentary effect of the explosion, to send for General Dearborn, before whose arrival at the scene of action, Sheaffe, with his soldiers, had effected their escape, leaving, says Dearborn's report of the affair, the commanding officer of the militia to make the best terms he could. By the capitulation then agreed upon between that officer, Colonel Chewitt, and Lieutenant-Colonel George E. Mitchell, Major Samuel Conner, General Dearborn's aid, Major William King, and Lieutenant Elliott of the navy, some hundred Canadian militia, most of them natives of the United States, were surrendered, but paroled on the spot. A large quantity of stores were taken, which, soon after, by another mistake, were burned at Sackett's Harbour, and a large vessel on the stocks was reduced to ashes at York. But, excepting these hardly equivalents for our loss, the account of that day was 300 Americans lost for 500 of the enemy, not many killed, the rest wounded

or taken. With the English general's musical snuff-box, which was an object of much attention to some of our officers, and the scalp which Major Forsyth found suspended over the speaker's chair, in the parliament house, we gained but barren honour by the capture of York, of which no permanent possession was taken. After two or three days spent there embarking the booty, among which there was a quantity of wine, Chauncey's squadron re-shipped the troops, and left York with the scalp taken as suspended, with the mace of the sergeant-at-arms, near the speaker's chair (killed in the action) in the parliament house of the provincial legislature. This atrocious ornament of such a place was sent to the secretary of war, General Armstrong, who refused to receive or suffer it to remain in his cabinet. The fact of its discovery and where found, were certified by the following official dispatch:—

“ UNITED STATES SHIP MADISON, SACKETT'S HARBOUR, }
4th June, 1813. } ”

“ SIR: I have the honour to present to you, by the hands of Lieutenant Dudley, the British standard taken at York on the 27th April last, *accompanied by the mace over which hung a human scalp*. These articles were taken from the *parliament house* by one of my officers and presented to me. The scalp I caused to be presented to General Dearborn, who, I believe, still has it in his possession. I also send, by the same gentleman, one of the British flags taken at Fort George on the 27th May.

“ I have the honour to be, very respectfully, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

“ ISAAC CHAUNCEY.

“ HONOURABLE WM. JONES,

“ *Secretary of the Navy, Washington.* ”

In the Prince Regent of Great Britain's formal manifesto to the world of the causes of war, and vindication of it from what that authentic document denies as American misrepresentations, there is a peremptory denial of reiterated complaints of this country, that England instigated the Indians to inhuman warfare. Proof of the contrary, that manifesto averred, had been offered by the English minister, Foster, to our government, and of the opposite policy uniformly pursued by Great Britain. Yet

the Canadian parliament, taken with the scalp, was far from being the only one of numerous convictions of monstrous and unnatural inhumanity, solemnly denied by the British government.

English subornation of the Indians to exercise their barbarous brutalities on the Americans were the chief reliance and most effectual arm of Great Britain, throughout both the first and the second wars, waged by her for subjugation of the United States. That unnatural inhumanity fomented evil and incurable animosity between the white and red races which have caused the Indians to be nearly exterminated. In both those wars, England had a greater number of Indians in arms than Europeans employed against the Americans. Subjoined is an account of the Indian nations employed by the British in the revolutionary war, with the number of warriors attached to each nation, as published at Philadelphia in August, 1783, by Captain Dalton, superintendent of Indian affairs, viz.:—

Choctaws	600	Onondagas	300
Chickasaws	400	Cayugas	230
Cherokees	500	Jenscawks (Senecas)	400
Creeks	700	Sacs and Sothuse	1300
Plankishaws	400	Putawawtawmaws	400
Oniactmaws	300	Tulawin	150
Kickapoos	500	Muskulthe (or nation of	
Munseys	150	fire)	250
Delawares	500	Reimes or Foxes	300
Shawanaws	300	Puyon	350
Mohickons	60	Sokkie	450
Uchipweys	3000	Abinokkin or the St.	
Ottaways	300	Lawrence	200
Mohawks	300		
Oneidas	150	Warriors	12,690
Tuscaroras	200		

Indisputable proof abounds to convict British agents and military officers of that guilt. The defeat and flight of General Proctor's army on the 5th October, 1813, placed in the possession of the American commander, the correspondence and papers of the British officers. Selected from the documents which

were obtained upon that occasion, the contents of a few letters characterize the whole mass. In these letters, written by Mr. McKee, the British agent, to Colonel England, the commander of the British troops, superscribed "on his Majesty's service," and dated during the months of July and August, 1794, the period of General Wayne's successful expedition against the Indians, it appears that the scalps taken by the Indians were sent to the British establishment at the rapids of the Miami; that the hostile operations of the Indians were concerted with the British agents and officers; that when certain tribes of Indians, "having completed the belts they carried with scalps and prisoners, and being without provisions, resolved on going home, it was lamented that his majesty's posts would derive no security from the late great influx of Indians into that part of the country, should they persist in their determination of returning so soon;" that "the British agents were immediately to hold a council at the Glaze, in order to try if they could prevail on the Lake Indians to remain, but that without provisions and ammunition being sent to that place, it was conceived to be extremely difficult to keep them together;" and "that Colonel England was making great exertions to supply the Indians with provisions." The language of the correspondence becomes at length so plain and direct that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion of a governmental agency on the part of Great Britain, in advising, aiding and conducting the Indian war, while she professed friendship and peace towards the United States. "Scouts are sent (says Mr. McKee to Colonel England), to view the situation of the American army, and *we now muster one thousand Indians*. All the Lake Indians from Ingana downwards, should not lose one moment in joining their brethren, as every accession of strength is an addition to their spirits." And again: "I have been employed several days in endeavouring to fix the Indians, who have been driven from their villages and cornfields, between the fort and the bay. Swan eek is generally agreed upon, and will be a very convenient place for the delivery of provisions," &c. Whether, under the various proofs of the British agency in exciting Indian hostilities against the United States, in a time of peace, presented in the course of the present narrative, the prince regent's declaration, that "before the war began a policy the most opposite had been uniformly pursued," by the

British government, is to be ascribed to a want of information, or a want of candour, the American government is not disposed more particularly to investigate, says Dallas's exposition of the causes and character of the war, from which this part of my statement comes. At all times, in war and in peace, from the commencement of hostilities, in 1776, to the peace of 1783, from that time throughout the period of withholding the western posts, in violation of that treaty and the reiterated expostulations of President Washington; throughout the war of 1812 to the treaty of Ghent, which was nearly frustrated by the English commissioners insisting on Indian reservations, jurisdiction and sovereignty; at all times this odious interference and unworthy reliance have never ceased. Further proof of a character so disgusting as to seem incredible, is derived from the English respectable publication, in London, by Almon, of authentic state papers, as follows:—

Extract of a letter from Captain Gerrish, of the New England militia, dated Albany, March 7th:—

“The peltry taken in the expedition will, you see, amount to a good deal of money. The possession of this booty at first gave us pleasure; but we were struck with horror to find among the packages, eight large ones containing scalps of our unfortunate country folks, taken in the three last years by the Seneca Indians, from the inhabitants of the frontiers of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and sent by them as a present to Colonel Haldimand, Governor of Canada, in order to be by him transmitted to England; they were accompanied by the following curious letter to that gentleman:

“*TIOGA, January 3d, 1782.*

“May it please your excellency—

“At the request of the Seneca chiefs, I herewith send to your excellency, under the care of James Boyd, eight packages of scalps, cured, dried, hooped and painted, with all the Indian triumphal marks, of which the following is invoice and explanation:

“No. 1.—Containing 43 scalps of Congress soldiers, killed in different skirmishes; these are stretched on black hoops, 4 inch diameter, the inside of the skin painted red, with a small black spot, to note their being killed with bullets; also, 62 of farmers,

killed in their houses; the hoops painted red, the skin painted brown, and marked with a hoe, a black circle all around, to denote their being surprised in the night, and a black hatchet in the middle, signifying their being killed with that weapon.

“No. 2.—Containing 98 of farmers killed in their houses: hoops red, figure of a hoe to mark their profession, great white circle and sun, to show they were surprised in the day time, a little red foot, to show they stood upon their defence, and died fighting for their lives and families.

“No. 3.—Containing 97 of farmers: hoops green, to show they were killed in the fields; a large white circle, with a little round mark on it, for the sun, to show it was in the day time; black bullet mark on some, a hatchet on others.

“No. 4.—Containing 102 of farmers, mixed of several of the marks above, only 18 marked with a little yellow flame, to denote their being of prisoners burnt alive, after being scalped, their nails pulled out by the roots, and other torments: one of these latter, supposed to be an American clergyman, his hand being fixed to the hoop of his scalp. Most of the farmers appear by the hair to have been young or middle aged men, there being but 67 very gray heads among them all, which makes the service more essential.

“No. 5.—Containing 88 scalps of women; hair long, braided in the Indian fashion, to show they were mothers; hoops blue, skin yellow ground, with little red tad-poles, to represent by way of triumph, the tears or grief occasioned to their relations; a black scalping knife or hatchet at the bottom, to mark their being killed by those instruments; 17 others, hair very gray, black hoops, plain brown colour; no mark but the short club or coup-tete, to show they were knocked down dead, or had their brains beat out.

“No. 6.—Containing 190 boys' scalps of various ages: small green hoops, whitish ground on the skin, with red scars in the middle, and black marks, knife, hatchet or club, as their death happened.

“No. 7.—Containing 211 girls' scalps, big and little: small yellow hoops, white ground; tears, hatchet, club, scalping knife, &c.

“No. 8.—This package is a mixture of all the varieties above mentioned, to the number of 122, with a box of birch bark, containing 29 little infants' scalps, of various sizes; small white hoops,

white ground, no tears, and only a little black knife in the middle, to show they were ripped out of their mothers' bellies.

"With these packs, the chiefs send to your excellency the following speech, delivered by Corniogatchie in council, interpreted by the elder Moore, the trader, and taken down by me in writing.

"*Father.* We send you herewith many scalps, that you may see we are not idle friends. (A blue belt.)

"*Father.* We wish you to send three scalps over the water to the great King, that he may regard them, and be refreshed, and that he may see our faithfulness in destroying his enemies, and be convinced that his presents have not been made to an ungrateful people. (A blue and white belt with red tassels.)

"*Father.* Attend to what I am now going to say, it is a matter of much weight. The Great King's enemies are many, and they grow fast in numbers. They were formerly like young panthers, they could neither bite nor scratch, we could play with them safely, we feared nothing they could do to us. But now their bodies have become as big as the elk, and strong as the buffalo; they have also got great and sharp claws. They have driven us out of our country for taking part in your quarrel: we expect the Great King will give us another country, that our children may live after us, and be his friends and children as we are. Say this for us to our Great King; to enforce it, give this belt. (A great white belt with blue tassels.)

"*Father.* We have only to say further, that your traders exact more than ever for their goods, and our hunting is lessened by the war, so that we have fewer skins to give for them. This ruins us: think of some remedy—we are poor; and you have plenty of everything; we know you will send us powder and guns, and knives and hatchets; but we also want shirts and blankets. (A little white belt.)

"I do not doubt but that your excellency will think it proper to give some further encouragement to those honest people. The high prices they complain of, are the necessary effect of the war.

"Whatever presents may be sent for them through my hands, shall be distributed with prudence and fidelity. I have the honour of being your excellency's most obedient and most humble servant,

"JAMES CRAWFURD."

With such memorials in print, of the use made by England of the American Indians in one war, it is no wonder that their barbarities were for a long time the most potent English offensive means in another. Dread of the scalping knife and tomahawk did more to save Canada for England, than the equivocal loyalty of her Canadian subjects, the skill, valour, and admirable tactics of her best officers and soldiers. To dread of the savages alone Hull gave way when he first faltered. That dread took him back from Sandwich to Detroit; overcame him to surrender Detroit, much more than hostile attack by civilized men in arms. They do but capture, wound, or kill enemies. But Indians torture, mutilate, murder, put to death with aggravations, far worse than mere homicide. Dread of the Indians struck the militia with panic, when they dared not pass over to rescue their countrymen at Queenstown. Dread of them induced Colonel Boerstler to surrender, as we shall soon see, to an inferior force which he might have resisted. Dread of the Indians multiplied their numbers and powers so fearfully to American recollections, that Indian barbarities were by far the most formidable of English means of hostility against the United States.

Attacking York instead of Kingston was a departure from the plan of the secretary of war which had no good results. Dearborn was easily persuaded by Chauncey, who expected, by destroying or taking a large English vessel at York, to secure the naval command of the lake. But that vessel had left York before the arrival of our troops: and, instead of rendering Chauncey the strongest, gave the superiority to a new British commander, Sir James Lucas Yeo, transferred from his frigate, the Southampton, on the West India station, and arriving early in May at Kingston with 450 seamen and several naval officers. Yeo proved a prudent, skilful and able commander, who at least kept pace with our commodore in the race of ship-building, prosecuted at Sackett's Harbour and Kingston, and, after dividing the command of the lake with Chauncey all summer, at last had the good fortune to save the English fleet from destruction by flight when, perhaps, Chauncey might have destroyed it by boldness. General Armstrong preferred beginning at Kingston, at the east end of Lake Ontario, instead of York and Fort George at the west, where General Dearborn and Commodore Chauncey made their first assault. After stripping York of the booty, soon to be sacrificed at Sack-

ett's Harbour, Chauncey landed Dearborn with his troops near Fort George, returning with his captured stores to Sackett's Harbour, thence to transport General Chandler's brigade and Colonel McComb's regiment to the Niagara to serve with Dearborn in capturing Fort George.

A month of precious time was consumed before the attack of Fort George, and then again the commander-in-chief remained on board a vessel, while his army, 6000 strong, attacked and carried that place. Again the defeated enemy was permitted to escape. The capture of Fort George was the first extensive military operation of the war, though expended upon an insignificant object: a combined assault, as at York, by army and navy, in which Generals Lewis, Chandler, Boyd, and Winder were with their brigades, Colonels Scott and McComb with their regiments, and many other meritorious officers of the army; together with Commodore Chauncey, Captain Perry, and Lieutenant Elliott, with other naval officers. Courage, enterprise and skill were displayed, without adequate combination or execution. Vincent, the British general, after stout resistance, completely defeated, with considerable loss, effected his retreat, as Sheaffe had done from York, probably without Dearborn's even knowing it, for he stayed on ship-board, till it was too late to prevent Vincent and Sheaffe shaking hands in the mountain passes of that region, where they were enabled to employ the British soldiers which ours might have captured—to employ them in attacking, defeating and capturing ours during all the rest of that year of discomfitures.

By singular coincidence, within forty-eight hours of the capture of Fort George, the Governor-General Prevost, with Commodore Yeo, Adjutant-General Baynes, and about 1000 soldiers, undertook to retaliate on Sackett's Harbour for our attack on York. Their selection of our naval rendezvous showed that we should have selected theirs for attack. The inconsiderable force they led from theirs proved that with the force we misapplied in the useless capture of Fort George, as it turned out to be, we should have struck a blow with 6000 men at Kingston, which might have been fatal to British power in Canada, and opened a way to Montreal in June, instead of the wretched attempt Wilkinson and Hampton made to get there in November. The genius of mismanagement seemed to lead our armies for the

conquest of Canada. Prevost and Yeo, with ships, boats, and other means of assault, except adequate artillery, proceeded from Kingston to Sackett's Harbour, while Dearborn and Chauncey were on the Niagara, and on the 29th May, opened the English campaign with a defeat. The American force there was extremely weak. At first the English had some success, driving in the militia and exciting such alarm that a naval officer burned all the stores captured at York, and our ship, the General Pike, on the stocks, was in danger. But the few regular troops at the place, headed by General Jacob Brown, a neighbouring militia officer, requested by the regular officers to take command, repulsed Baynes and compelled the British to retreat, after losing a good many men, whom they left both dead and wounded to the care of their enemies, which was a common thing with them during the war. General Brown, no soldier by profession, was one of those natural offsprings of war, who seem born to excel in it, a man stout of person, strong of nerve, bold, brave, sagacious, full of resource, indefatigable, whose exploits, after this introduction to them, were among the most brilliant of that war. His own account of his first essay under fire arms, short and characteristic, deserves incorporation entire with this narrative.

“ *May 29th*, 1813.

“ We were attacked at the dawn of this day by a British regular force of at least 900 men, most probably 1200. They made their landing at Horse Island. The enemy's fleet consisted of two ships and four schooners, and thirty large open boats. We are completely victorious. The enemy lost a considerable number of killed and wounded, on the field, among the number several officers of distinction. After having re-embarked, they sent me a flag desiring to have their killed and wounded attended to. I made them satisfied on that subject. *Americans will be distinguished for humanity and bravery.* Our loss is not numerous, but serious from the great worth of those who have fallen. Colonel Mills was shot dead at the commencement of the action; and Colonel Backus, of the first regiment of light dragoons, nobly fell at the head of his regiment, as victory was declaring for us. I will not presume to praise this regiment; their gallant conduct on this day merits much more than praise. The new ship, and Commodore Chauncey's prize, the Duke of,

Gloucester, are safe in Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost landed and commanded in person—Sir James Yeo commanded the enemy's fleet.

“ In haste, yours, &c.,

“ JACOB BROWN.”

General Brown was a Pennsylvania Quaker, a village school-master not far from Philadelphia; and soon rose, like Greene in the war of the Revolution, to military eminence; two men of genius for military affairs, only second, if that, to the first military commanders of this country; Greene and Brown, of whom it was jocularly said that both proved *true blue*. That roving spirit of frontier adventure which naturally grows from the American mother earth, dislodging so many enterprising men from the homes of their nativity, took Brown to the borders of Canada. The clouds of disrepute through which nearly all men must make their way to distinction, discredited him as having acquired his familiarity with that region as a contrabandist, before his superior talents were displayed there as a warrior. If so, illicit gain by such means may be more ignoble, but is it more unwarrantable than extensive pillage and depredation such as those practised who perhaps first uttered this disparagement of a brave man, to be disseminated by the enemies of his country?

The British repulse at Sackett's Harbour was the last American success in 1813, on Lake Ontario or the St. Lawrence, where the enemy's good fortune afterwards never failed, except in Chauncey's partial success on the lake. On the land the English defence of Canada was conducted with much more courage, enterprize and ability than American attempts at invasion, which failed after a long series of delays and reverses. The most considerable expedition undertaken during the war, with an army of at least 10,000 or 12,000 regular troops, led by veteran commanders, proved an abortion as discreditable as Hull's, with militia, the year before. Not only so, but in all the preliminary engagements, our troops were worsted; and the campaign of that quarter ended in disgraceful and terrible retaliation in west New York.

Small border warfare, the worst of all, most wasteful of men, money and character, was our resort during two, for the most part disastrous years. Nowhere in the world were such costly

and fruitless hostilities, as those carried on over many hundreds of miles from the swamps and wildernesses of Michigan to the mountain gorges of Canada. Armstrong insisted that if his plan had not been departed from, success would have followed. But even though Kingston had been attacked, as he desired, instead of York and George, and attacked early in the spring, or even in the winter, the whole plan of operations was radically wrong. In 1812 England had not five thousand reliable troops in both the Canadas, with inconsiderable numbers farther north east. We recruited armies to be wasted on the borders of the lakes, built and equipped fleets upon them, at monstrous expense, to wage small, border war. The sum expended in building vessels for Lake Ontario was nearly two millions of dollars, \$1,869,077 45; that expended on Lake Erie \$106,603,16: and that expended on Lake Champlain, \$296,320 32: almost two millions and a half for mere ship building. The expenditures for the conquest of the lakes would have paid for the transportation of a large army from Maine to Halifax.

The waste of money was enormous. It was estimated that it cost a thousand dollars for every cannon conveyed to Sackett's harbour. The flour for Harrison's army was said to cost a hundred dollars per barrel. The multiplied incidental but inevitable charges of travel over wilderness regions without roads, required, among other things, thousands of pack horses, each of which could carry only half a barrel of provisions, and must be attended by trains of other horses, with forage for those laden with provisions. The distances were hundreds of miles over trackless deserts. Few horses survived more than one trip; many sunk under one. Of 4000 pack horses to supply Harrison's small army, but 800 were alive after the winter of 1812, '13. Large quantities of flour were buried in mud and snow, from inability to carry it any farther: large quantities damaged when arrived at the place of destination. Two-thirds of that deposited at Fort Meigs was spoiled and unfit for use. Fluctuations and increase of prices were so great, that many contractors were ruined, and it became necessary to purchase of other persons, when disappointed of regular supplies by contractors. The enemy's sufferings from war in Canada were still greater. Commissioners were appointed by government there, as in times of dearth in Europe, to say how

much food a family should be allowed. Flour was thirty dollars a barrel at Kingston. There was a great scarcity of salt, in fact hardly any. It was sold for as much as a dollar per quart, Canada before the war having been supplied with salt from the United States. The English forces were on shorter allowance than the American, whose unwholesome and scanty meat was often cattle killed to prevent their starving to death. The waste of life in the American armies was also great from want of competent surgeons, instruments and medicines, and from the diseases caused by all these privations in insalubrious regions.

Instead of protracted encampment, any active employment, winter or summer, would have saved life, health, treasure, character, economized and increased all the resources and energies of war. Stagnation in camps and garrisons, on frontiers, bred disease, discontent, desertion, thinned the numbers, soured the tempers, demoralized both men and officers. As many as six soldiers were shot in one day at one place for desertion. The English system of what is called voluntary enlistment, that is inveigling dissatisfied, worthless or intoxicated men to enlist, and then disciplining them by cruel and degrading corporal punishments, lashing them into good behaviour, was the only method of replenishing and marshaling our continually wasting armies. The commissariat, the provisions, the clothing were bad: the medical department worse. The want of surgical instruments, of skill and knowledge in this essential comfort of the soldier, was deplorable. The cost of ship building on the lakes, an incessant struggle between Sackett's harbour and Kingston, Erie and Malden, Plattsburg and its rival ship yard; the cost of conveying artillery and other bulky materials from distant places; the transportation of supplies by land, on pack horses, through hundreds of miles of wilderness or unpeopled regions, all these charges were enormous. Immense expenditures of public money for these purposes were irresistible temptations to those claiming commissions on funds spent through their agency, to make unjust charges, undue outlays, and ruinous delays. From May till November, 1813, there was no movement on Lake Ontario. The many thousand men near Fort George, commanded first by Dearborn, finally by Wilkinson, several thousand more commanded by Hampton at Plattsburg, were all stationary from May till October. During

most of this period of inaction, Chauncey was in port with his fleet, ship building at Sackett's harbour. After Dearborn was removed from command, our isolated conquest, Fort George, was left useless in command of General Boyd till General Wilkinson got there, which was not till the 4th of September. Boyd meantime was ordered to undertake no offensive operations. Attempts to master the lakes by operations on their shores and waters consumed two years, which, as was afterwards thought, might have been better employed by an expedition elsewhere. Hostilities, begun wrong in 1812 and wrongly persevered in through 1813, as wrong beginnings are apt to be pursued, kept our armies and fleets either unemployed or misemployed around and upon the five lakes, Huron, Michigan, Erie, Ontario and Champlain, at great loss of labour and character, exhausting national patience, when less force and funds might have carried the war to strike a bold and fatal blow at the root of the territorial and maritime power of Great Britain in America.

After the capture of Fort George, General Dearborn landed, and next day ordered Vincent to be pursued when it was too late. He was unwell, suffering, as many of our officers and soldiers did, with diseases prevalent in the army, which accounts in part for his inactivity. Commodore Chauncey was in Sackett's harbour most of the summer, if I am not mistaken, also ill. General Dearborn, thus deprived of the fleet, which he deemed necessary for pursuit of the enemy, nevertheless detached General Winder, a zealous and active officer, with a small brigade in pursuit of Vincent, who had posted himself at Burlington heights. Finding his force inadequate, Winder sent back for reinforcement, which Dearborn gave him in Chandler's brigade on the 3d of June. By this, the American force commanded by Chandler was about 1300 men, the British under Vincent some 800, only a few miles off, so that it was impossible for them to escape, if our inexperienced general had not first adjourned the attack till another day, and then pitched his camp for the night in a careless, and exposed manner. The English general discovering this, resolved on the first principle of military wisdom to attack rather than be attacked. At midnight he surprised and took our picquet guard, and by means of the demonstration of a false attack, concentrated his force upon a real one. It was led by Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, the officer whom we long after knew as Sir John Harvey,

Governor of New Brunswick, negotiating with General Scott to prevent the troubles in Maine, when there is reason to believe the English would have forcibly occupied the ground afterwards ceded to them by treaty, had not General Harvey found the militia of Maine too numerous and well posted to be attacked by his inferior force. At Forty Mile creek, on the 3d of June, 1813, Harvey gallantly assaulted the American centre in the dark, took some of our cannon, and both our unlucky generals, Chandler and Winder. Their encampment was confounded by a surprise, which nevertheless their officers beat off, all behaving well, and many of the young officers, Hindman, Towson, Thomas Biddle and others displaying the ardour which wanted only occasion and good commanders. In the confusion of the night, the English commander, Vincent lost his way and wandered some distance off, where he was found next day, without sword or hat. But Generals Chandler and Winder both prisoners, the army was left, as at York, without a commander acquainted with the plans of the general or the grounds of its predicament. The command by seniority fell on Colonel James Burn, who was there without a colonel's regular accompaniment, his own regiment, only a small part of which was with him; he being in fact a volunteer in the campaign. He resorted to a council of war with some of the other commanding officers: and when the British force was not more than half of his, and they had suffered more in the action, so that attacking them would have probably recaptured our generals with General Vincent too, and most of his bold followers, the untoward determination of Colonel Burn's council was not to renew the attack, but fall back and wait for further orders. To that bold attack of the English, and our lamentable diffidence, Christie with some reason ascribes the rescue of Canada, which we lost by the moral influences and unfortunate consequences of that small check. Colonel Burn, who, under the influence of an evil star, which then seemed to predominate against us, committed that mistake, by advice of his officers, was a South Carolina gentleman of fortune, educated, and having spent many years in Europe. He commanded a troop of horse in the army raised against France in 1798, and was appointed colonel of one of the two regiments of cavalry raised for the war of 1812: a fine horseman, and intrepid soldier, who that night, as always, proved his cool and unquestionable self-possession in battle. But

he lacked what perhaps less courageous men would have shown in his exigency, fearlessness of responsibility: and fell back when a bold advance would probably have gained him a brigade, with the applause of his country and his own confidence. In like manner, Lieutenant Colonel Harvey, having lost his commander, drew off the English troops and retreated, without waiting even to carry off his wounded. Both these extemporaneous commanders, after bravely fighting the battle, seemed afraid to continue it: Harvey, with his inferior force, rightly enough probably; but Burn, who had taken one hundred of the English, most unhappily for himself and the character of American arms.

As soon as Dearborn was informed of this check, he sent forward General Morgan Lewis with more troops, to join Burn, and bring Vincent to action, which Lewis was well disposed for. But some English vessels of war just at that time hove in sight on the lake, near our positions, and Dearborn ordered Lewis to return to Fort George. During another fortnight of his inaction there, the English commanders had time to station troops along the passes from Queenstown to York, in which General Vincent and Colonel Bishopp were indefatigable. At last, on the 23d of June, 1813, the final mishap of our campaign that summer in Canada occurred. Colonel Charles Boerstler, then lately promoted to the command of the fourteenth regiment of infantry, was permitted to take six hundred men to a considerable distance, contrary to obvious injunctions of prudence, six hundred men out of reach of support, to destroy a British lodgment at some distance; and arrived on the 24th of June, 1813, within two miles of the Beaver dams, some seventeen miles from Dearborn at Fort George. Boerstler, when about to attack a stonehouse in which Colonel Bishopp was entrenched, was suddenly beset by between five and six hundred Indians, on one side, and by a small party of English under Lieutenant Fitzgibbon, on the other. After fighting a good while, alarmed by threats of the savages, and deluded by offers of capitulation, out of reach of succour, Boerstler, with tears in his eyes, surrendered his whole detachment.

Congress had been in session a month when this occurred, the climax of continual tidings of mismanagement and misfortune. On the 6th of July, 1813, therefore, when news of Boerstler's surrender came, after a short accidental communion of regret, and

impatience in the lobby of the House of Representatives with the speaker and General Ringgold, of Maryland, I was deputed a volunteer to wait on the president, and request General Dearborn's removal from a command which so far had been so unfortunate. The president was ill abed when I called: but promised an early answer, which soon followed me to the capitol, in a message from Mr. Monroe, that General Dearborn should be removed: the order went at once. Probably our remonstrance to the executive might not have been quite so readily complied with, but that General Wilkinson had been ordered to the north in March, some months before I waited on the president for General Dearborn's removal. The good military reputation he had acquired by distinguished service, bravery and activity, in the war of the Revolution, was earned when he was in robust health, much younger, and had no responsibility to assume, but simply orders to obey. Exfoliation of veteran commanders was one of the processes which the young army of that war had to suffer before becoming fit for action. On the 15th of July, 1813, by a general order Dearborn took leave of the army at Fort George, pursuant to orders from the secretary of war, to retire from command till his health should be re-established. Brigadier-general Boyd, and the colonels and majors, there addressed him in a warm remonstrance against his departure, which he answered by referring them to the command of their superiors. The northern army, relieved of a veteran leader, whose age and health disqualified him for active and enterprising services in his successor, General Wilkinson, did not get a younger, healthier, or more competent commander.

After Dearborn left Fort George, things were in a bad condition there, and at Sackett's Harbour, owing to inaction, the rawness of the troops, the want of officers, and various other causes. No attempt to act offensively was made after Boerstler's capture.— General Boyd's orders were to remain in Fort George, where our army was cooped up from May till October, thus losing the whole season of usual operations. Meantime the enemy was as active as we were the reverse. By the first of July, he advanced so far beyond the scene of Boerstler's surrender, as to fortify a line from Twelve Mile creek on the lake, across to Queenstown, on the Niagara. There were occasional skirmishes, and little combats of

border warfare, but no action of magnitude. The most enterprising and effectual took place on the 11th of July, 1813, when the English Colonel Bishopp, an active officer, and I believe a member of Parliament, commanding at fort Erie, dashed over the Niagara, and surprised our post at Black Rock. There was a militia force there more than sufficient to repel this daring invasion; but they ran away without resisting it. The block house, barracks, dock yard and stores, were destroyed, except such as the enemy wanted. But while employed in loading their booty in boats to carry back with them to Canada, a small force of regulars, militia and Indians were got together from Buffalo, attacked and killed Bishopp, with some of his men, and compelled the rest to fly with precipitation. Before General Wilkinson took command, our forces in Canada, about four thousand strong, were shut up in Fort George, by about half that number of enemies belcaguering it under General Vincent. Our commander there was General Boyd, a good soldier and brave, who would have gladly fought, if not peremptorily forbid. He had served among the Mahratta troops in India, was colonel of the fourth regiment of infantry which bore the brunt of the onslaught at Tippecanoe in 1811, when General Harrison was surprised there by Tecumseh, but beat him off. The Secretary of War did not consider General Boyd fit to be trusted with more than a brigade, or authority to act offensively as commander-in-chief.

When Eustis's eastern friends, at the meeting of Congress in December, 1812, reproached him with Hull's surrender and the wretched failure of the projected conquest of Canada, his ready and good-humoured answer was, "Gentlemen, it is all the fault of New England, (Dr. Eustis was from Boston;) if you in New England had been well-inclined, we could easily have taken Canada *by contract*." General Armstrong was bent on taking it by force, and, though Madison did not much like him, Monroe still less, appeared to be able, energetic and patriotic in his labours as secretary of war, which was next to the treasury department, the most difficult undertaking of the crisis. On the 8th February, 1813, Armstrong, as secretary, submitted to President Madison, who approved it the 10th of that month, a plan for the first enterprize of a second campaign, in which he said nothing should be left to chance. Computing the

British troops at Montreal and its dependencies at 12,000 men, one-sixth militia, (probably much more than they amounted to,) he thought we should be able to open the campaign on Lake Champlain, by the 15th May, with sufficient force to dislodge them. The alternatives were, entire inaction or some proceeding secondary to the main design of conquering Canada: that is, capturing Kingston, York, Erie and George, preparatory to that of Montreal, and ultimately Quebec. General Armstrong's project reckoned 2100 regular British troops in Upper Canada; distributed at Prescott 300, Kingston 600, George and Erie 1200. Our force should, in his opinion, be not less than 6000, act upon Lake Ontario by the 1st April, when it is free from ice, and on the St. Lawrence before the 15th May, till when it is not navigable, and the enemy could not be reinforced, as was to be expected after that time. Part of Armstrong's plan of campaign was that, instead of Dearborn, Wilkinson should command the proposed conquest of Canada.

Wilkinson was born in Maryland, bred a physician, a gentleman of good education, manners and address, pompous, pleasing, methodical, debonnaire, fond of writing, served with distinction in the army of the Revolution, particularly under Gates in the memorable conflict with Burgoyne, which ended by his capitulation at Saratoga, the first overwhelming blow England received in that struggle, which procured for America the aid of France. Wilkinson was sent by Gates with his official account of that great victory to Congress, at Philadelphia. He was too old a soldier not to be fully aware of the burden assumed by placing himself at the head of so momentous an operation as the invasion of Canada, with raw levies; which, when he fell ill with fever, weighed him down with morbid anxiety. His first general order issued at Sackett's Harbour the 23d August, 1813, deprecated the *dread* responsibility of the trust for which, when disabled by disease at the crisis of its utmost need, he was, as General Boyd on Wilkinson's court martial testified, totally disqualified in body and mind. In a letter of the 13th August, 1813, to General Armstrong, from Sackett's Harbour, Wilkinson complained, that with 3000 troops there he had but one colonel and twenty-five captains, a sad condition, said he, in which to lead raw troops to battle.

In April, 1813, the United States were divided into nine mili-

tary districts, commanded, the first, by Brigadier-General Thomas H. Cushing; the second by brevet Brigadier-General Henry Burbeck; the third by Brigadier-General George Izard; the fourth by Brigadier-General Joseph Bloomfield; the fifth by Major-General Wade Hampton, with Brigadier-General Thomas Parker; the sixth by Major-General Thomas Pinckney; the seventh by Brigadier-General Thomas Flournoy; the eighth by Major-General William H. Harrison, with Brigadier-Generals Lewis Cass and Duncan M'Arthur; the ninth by Major-General Henry Dearborn, with Major-Generals James Wilkinson, Morgan Lewis, Brigadier-Generals John P. Boyd, John Chandler, Zebulon M. Pike, and William H. Winder, and Adjutant-General Lieutenant-Colonel Winfield Scott. District No. 1 comprehended Massachusetts and New Hampshire; No. 2, Rhode Island and Connecticut; No. 3, New York from the sea to the Highlands and part of New Jersey; No. 4, the rest of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; No. 5, Virginia south of the Rappahannock; No. 6, the two Carolinas and Georgia; No. 7, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee; No. 8, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and Missouri; No. 9, New York north of the Highlands and Vermont. In July a tenth district was created, consisting of Maryland, the District of Columbia and Virginia, between the Potomac and Rappahannock. Pike had been killed, Chandler and Winder captured, Dearborn withdrawn from Fort George before Wilkinson's transfer north.

On the 23d of July, the Secretary of War renewed, and the president again approved, the secretary's original plan of campaign, to deflection from which, by Chauncey and Dearborn, may be imputed much of the subsequent failure of the whole. Armstrong's plan was always to strike first, and with all our might at Kingston, there to destroy the hostile ships, which would have ensured the success of the lake campaign. For this purpose he suggested collecting our whole force at Sackett's Harbour, and thence making the attack, which, if vigorously done, would in all probability have succeeded, so much greater was our force. Even after the mistaken captures of York and Fort George, this was feasible and the best plan. Another of Armstrong's projects, as an alternative, was, to take and fortify Madrid on the St. Lawrence, whence, with Lakę St. Francis, occupied by a few gun boats and barges, Wilkinson's army could easily march on Montreal,

in concert with Hampton. Neither of these designs, however, could be carried into effect before Wilkinson's arrival from the south, which was not till August. On the 8th of that month, the secretary urged the general to attempt Kingston, as well on grounds of policy, as military principle, that being the great depot of the enemy's resources, the first and chief object of the campaign. Any plan, said Armstrong, carrying our operations wide of Kingston, but wounds the lion's tail, without hastening the termination of the war.

The raw troops, ill supplied with officers, of which General Wilkinson complained, were not to prove the chief cause of his total failure in leading the important expedition confided to him as the fittest leader. Implacable enmity between him and General Hampton, who commanded the right wing of that expedition, and did not choose to serve under his senior officer Wilkinson, proved another fatal hinderance, which the Secretary of War in vain attempted to remove. Misdirected, as perhaps the whole was, when Canada was attempted at all, instead of carrying the war into Nova Scotia; then begun wrong at York and Fort George, instead of Kingston; procrastinated from spring till autumn, by these and other delays; the whole deplorably failed at last, through discord superadded to illness and incapacity of the commanders. Discord, the worst of evils, which mars so many operations, as faction sacrifices a country to malice and envy, and makes men destroy themselves to gratify their hatred of other men. Not only did the commanders Wilkinson and Hampton hate each other, but their recriminations infected their followers; the army was split into factions; officers fought duels in these feuds; and it is difficult from conflicting accounts of the operations of that deplorable campaign to discover or tell the truth. One thing is plain, that a genius to control and combine the whole was wanting. General Armstrong did not accomplish it. There was no controlling genius to subdue controversies and difficulties, and command fortune. Dearborn, if left, would have hardly done better than he had done before. Under him and Wilkinson and Hampton, all veteran officers, all disabled by illness, and otherwise disqualified, from first to last everything went wrong: and it is painful to state what occurred, lest injustice is done to officers, none of whom can be mentioned without censure, while some may be less deserving of it than others in their

tardy, contentious, apparently puerile, and certainly deplorable misconduct.

General Wade Hampton had served in the army of the Revolution, and was a gentleman of large possessions in South Carolina and Louisiana, where he owned thousands of slaves. At his time of life, and with his affluence, he could not have been encamped in a northern wilderness but for fame. On the 16th of August, 1813, Wilkinson from Albany sent his first orders to Hampton; who forthwith on the 23d, addressed a strong protest to the Secretary of War, insisting that Hampton's was a distinct and separate command, not to be taken from him before the end of the campaign, or encroached upon by a superior in rank; especially not to depend on the orders of an individual 200 or 400 miles off. He therefore tendered his resignation, and asked for a discharge. On the 25th of August, 1813, Armstrong wrote to Hampton, endeavouring to reconcile him to a distinction between separate and independent commands. On the 31st of August, Hampton wrote to the secretary that his preparations would be complete for a movement with 3000 effective men in good spirits, on the 20th of September; 4000 effectives, allowing one-fourth for sick. Official accounts at Washington, the 2d of August, 1813, the day Congress adjourned, from the inspector-general's return of troops, gave a total of 14,356 regular soldiers in the ninth military district, viz: at Sackett's Harbour 3,668, at Fort George 6,636, and at Burlington, 4,053. After Harrison's success, he left the west, with about 2000 more, accompanied by Captain Perry, (going home to Rhode Island,) and Captain Barclay, recovering of his wound.—They landed at Black Rock, the 24th of October, expecting to join Wilkinson's expedition: which, after deducting sick and the usual allowances, could not be less than 12,000 strong, including Hampton's division: a larger army than the United States had together during that war.

At a council of war held at Sackett's Harbour, the 26th of August, 1813, the whole present effective force of the army was estimated at 7400 combatants, exclusive of the naval department. Generals Wilkinson, Lewis, Brown and Swartwout, (the quarter-master-general,) with Commodore Chauncey at that council, reckoned that by recruits and convalescents, the force might amount to 9000 men by the 20th of September, exclusive of militia, on whom no solid reliance could be placed. The army

was then at Fort George and Niagara 3500, at Oswego, 200, at Sackett's Harbour, 2000, at Burlington, 4000. The season is wasting rapidly, adds the minute of that council; the honour and interest of the nation imperiously demand that a deadly blow shall be struck somewhere. It was therefore resolved to rendezvous all the troops in the vicinity of Sackett's Harbour, in co-operation with our squadron, make a bold feint on Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, and in concert with General Hampton's division, take Montreal. General Wilkinson took command at Fort George early in September, 1813. A council of war held by him there the 20th of that month, with Brigadier-General Boyd, eleven colonels and lieutenant-colonels, and ten majors, resolved to rase and abandon that place, and transfer the troops to the vicinity of Kingston, for junction with the division at Sackett's Harbour, commanded by Major General Lewis. The aggregate of that division on the 24th of August, 1813, was 3483, 2400 fit for duty, unfit 549, convalescent 427. There was, however, but one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, and a deficiency of officers of every grade. The sick among raw recruits in that region were always numerous: on the 18th of September, the hospital report was 681 for that week. Generals Armstrong, Dearborn, Wilkinson, Hampton, Lewis, Izard, Commodore Chauncey, with many other officers, suffered from illness. The weather during the autumn was extremely inclement, superadding many difficulties to an enterprise hazardous at best, too hard of accomplishment, probably, to justify its imputation altogether to the incompetency of leaders. Yet, when every department of government had done its part, and the belief of that day is confirmed by subsequent assurance that the English force in Canada was so much less than ours, as, with the lukewarmness of the French population, to render it nearly certain that bold and vigorous invasion must have succeeded, posterity will condemn the commanders under whom the attempt miscarried. Uncertainty is the lot of all human affairs, and admonishes forbearance of censure. But if success be ever the standard, it is for war. Military men are tried for want of success as a crime, not only by public judgment, but according to their code of law. Wilkinson was honourably acquitted indeed: but he demanded trial. Hampton resigned soon after the campaign. Stern condemnation of the unfortunate in war, is like the rest of its philosophy, however severe,

not unjust in dealing with commanders, by whom the campaign of 1813, in the north, was brought to a close scarcely less ignoble than that of Hull's in the west the year before.

The failure of that expedition, and many other misfortunes ending with the terrible catastrophe of the capture of Washington, clouded General Armstrong's career, as Secretary of War, of whom it was said, among other aspersions, that his transfer of the war department to the St. Lawrence in autumn of 1813, was from improper motives of personal ambition; but had he not reason to flatter himself that his presence at the theatre of action would be important in quelling discord, animating exertion, and urging dispatch? Neither Madison nor Monroe approved the movement, which, tried by the military standard of success, may be condemned.

On the 5th of September, 1813, he arrived at Sackett's Harbour, whence he wrote in familiar terms to General Wilkinson, that General Hampton would go through the campaign cordially and vigorously, but resign at the end of it; be ready to move by the 20th with an effective force of 4000 men, and militia detachment of 1500. On the supposition that Prevost had taken post and chosen his *champ de bataille*, I had, adds Armstrong, ordered Hampton to the Isle Aux Noix. Wilkinson's jealousy of Armstrong's authority was as sensitive as Hampton's of Wilkinson's. On the 24th of August, Wilkinson wrote to Armstrong, I trust you will not interfere with my arrangements, or give orders within the district of my command, but to myself, because it would impair my authority and distract the public service. Two heads on the same shoulders make a monster. Unhappily for the country that deplorable campaign was a monster with three heads, biting and barking at each other, with a madness which destroyed them all, and disgraced the country. Discord was a leprosy in the very marrow of the enterprise, worse than all its other calamities. Armstrong was on good terms with both Wilkinson and Hampton till it failed: but thenceforth the enmity became as bitter between him and both of them, as between the two themselves.

After chasing Yeo into harbour, and leaving him there, Chauncey sailed to the west end of the lake, and informed Wilkinson on the 1st of October that he was ready to escort the army down the St. Lawrence. Soon after Wilkinson embarked

from Fort George for that destination. Colonel Scott, with his regiment, was left there with General McClure, of the New York militia, to do whatever was necessary to prevent the enemy getting useful repossession of that inglorious prison of our forces. Instead of the 1st of April, which the Secretary of War indicated to the president in February for the outset of operations on the lake, they did not begin till six months later. Instead of the 15th of May designated for the capture of Montreal, we were destined to total discomfiture in November, without battle or deadly blow, except the equivocal affair at Williamsburg, on the 10th of that month. General Armstrong said, after this failure, that the heavens, rather than the strongholds and prowess of the enemy, had before Hampton's defection, defeated Wilkinson's enterprise; the storms of October were his conquerors. He did not take his departure from the Niagara till the most inclement autumnal weather prevailed; rain, snow storms, cold, uncomfortable and dangerous navigation, worse than the high seas, uncommon severities of an inhospitable region, since well peopled and provided. Winter would have been a more favourable season, with its turnpikes of snow, salubrity of air, and occlusion of supplies from England to Canada.

Throughout the war, of course, the press was not silent, but reigned supreme as ever in this the country of its prepotency. The *Aurora*, edited by Colonel William Duane, was then one of our most accredited newspapers. Mr. Duane had published works on military tactics, and was commissioned by President Jefferson, a colonel in the army. In 1813, he was adjutant-general of the fourth military district, then commanded by General Bloomfield: and on confidential terms with the generals and other officers of the old army. Extensively read in military learning, a rapid and able editor, Colonel Duane probably had confidential information, enabling him to anticipate the news of the day, and speculate as to events on the frontiers. When Generals Dearborn, Bloomfield and Pike tried their invasion of Canada, in the latter end of 1812, the *Aurora* anticipated the success of an expedition, which the editor thought must succeed, though it totally failed.

The *National Intelligencer* then, if not the organ, the mouth piece of government at Washington, whose pages secretaries, comptrollers and other functionaries contributed to, and the pre-

sident himself, like Napoleon in the *Moniteur*, at least by suggestions, republished in October from the *Aurora* what was calculated to aggravate disappointment for Wilkinson's and Hampton's failures, by proclaiming their success with untoward confidence. The semi-official prediction was headed—our armies have entered Upper Canada, and it is ours.

“ Letters from Fort George (viz. Wilkinson) of the 3d October, Chateaugay (Hampton) of the 6th, and Sackett's Harbour (Armstrong) of the 4th, show that the general of the enemy has found his superior in the field, and been completely out-generated. The war minister (Armstrong) and commander-in-chief (Wilkinson) concur in opinion that in order to fell the tree, we must not begin at the top branches, but strike at the stump : which discovery, it is added, had been imparted to the former Secretary of War (Eustis) without the least effect. By this time it is probable our troops have thrown themselves between Kingston and Montreal. The war by land has assumed a new character in consequence of the presence of able men who understand their profession, in the war department and at the head of the army. The division under General Hampton moved from Chateaugay on the morning of the 4th October, destination unknown but to himself, the troops having left behind all baggage except one change and five days provisions, their position prior to the march not more than forty miles from Montreal. We may expect that General Prevost (British) intends to make war like Proctor at Malden, and Kutusoff at Moscow, to give up everything to conflagration which he cannot rule. The ensuing week settles the fall of Upper Canada forever. The fall of Quebec in the ensuing spring will give our youth experience to ward against evils of thirty years neglect of military knowledge. The siege of Quebec, though severe, will not be more so than the actions of our naval heroes. Canada once ours, we shall have no enemy but a few domestic traitors and foreign emissaries on our soil.”

To appreciate now the disappointment then, of what these confident assurances occasioned, and the conflict of public sentiment between the advocates and opponents of the conquest of Canada, it is necessary to contrast such publications from the *Aurora* with others of an opposite character. Among the journals deprecating war, one of the most respectable was the *American Daily Advertiser*, of Philadelphia, edited by Mr.

Zachariah Poulson, who, perhaps, lived, like many others, to acknowledge that it did not prove so great an evil as it was denounced for. Mr. Poulson's paper luxuriated in the delays, blunders, defeats, expenditures, disasters, mishaps, calamities, freighting every mail from Canada. It had a column, almost stereotyped, with the caption of *more disasters*. While the Aurora promised magnificent conquests, the Advertiser fed that greedy monster, public sentiment, with superabundance of abortive performance and distressing calamities. The capture of Montreal, which was many months in agitation, with contradictory accounts of its backward progress, afforded lasting replenishment to this morbid maw, of more and *more disasters*. Generals Armstrong, Wilkinson and Hampton were three heads prolific of frightful reports.

Duane's ominous predictions were soon followed by tidings of our first reverse near Lake Champlain, which, in Mr. Christie's account of it, is that on the 20th September General Hampton entered Canada at Odeltown with upwards of 5000 men, where he was worsted by less than as many hundred provincial militia, with a handful of regulars under Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry. Had Hampton sent forward a body of riflemen through the woods, he might without much difficulty have obtained a footing in the open country near St. John's; which, if he could have succeeded in occupying, must have led to the surrender of the Isle Aux Noix. He, however, seems not to have been aware of our weakness, says Christie, or to have placed little reliance in the discipline and perseverance of his troops. On the 22d September he evacuated Odeltown, and moved toward the head of Chateauguay river, under the pretext of the impracticability of advancing through the Odeltown road, for want of water for his cavalry and cattle, owing to the extraordinary drought of the season.

After this miscarriage, General Hampton returned to his former position on the American side of the lines, at Four Corners, and waited there till the 21st October. By odd enough concert of action between two commanders, two hundred miles apart, so jealous of each other that they coincided in nothing, but disagreed about everything, on the same day, the 21st of October, that the one launched his expedition at Grenadier Island near Sackett's Harbour on Lake Ontario, the other broke up his

encampment on Lake Champlain, each to march upon Montreal; as the third leader of their disastrous expedition, the Secretary of War, insisted to see which could get there first, lest either should precede the other, and monopolize all the credit of success, without either Wilkinson or Hampton being apprized of these simultaneous movements of the two wings of the same army, under the command of three separate generals, but the control of neither. This is Christie's account of General Hampton's second attempt, that closed his military career, which it is well to adopt, in order to show what the enemy said of our strange discomfitures. On the 22d October, he reached the junction of the Outarde and Chateauguay rivers. On the night of the 25th he dispatched Colonel Purdy with a light brigade and strong body of infantry to fall on De Salaberry's rear, while the main body was to attack it in front. Purdy, misled and bewildered in the woods, did not gain the point of attack as directed. General Hampton advanced next morning with about 3,500 men under General Izard, expecting to hear of Purdy's success, and drove in a small piquet. De Salaberry hearing the musketry, advanced with his few men as Izard did, steadily in open column, till within musket shot. The retreat of a few skirmishers, mistaken by the Americans for a flight, raised a shout from them which was re-echoed by the Canadians. De Salaberry, as a *ruse de guerre*, ordered the bugles placed at intervals to sound an advance, which had the desired effect of checking the ardour of the Americans. The noise brought up Colonel Purdy's division on the opposite side of the river. The Canadians drove back the American advance guard upon the main body until a company of the provincial militia hitherto concealed, at the word of command, opened so unexpected and effectual a fire as threw the Americans into the utmost disorder, and occasioned their tumultuous and precipitate retreat. General Hampton, finding his arrangement disconcerted by the total route of Colonel Purdy's division, withdrew his forces in good order without a single effort to carry the English entrenchments at the point of the bayonet, leaving Colonel de Salaberry, with scarcely 300 Canadians, masters of the field. Toward the close of the engagement, Sir George Prevost, with Major-General de Wattleville, arrived on the ground.

With due allowances for common national hyperbole, what Mr. Christie adds of encomium on the prowess of Colonel de Sala-

berry and his Canadian countrymen, is probably well founded. It is too true that a few hundred of them worsted an army of between 4000 and 5000 American regulars, whom General Hampton had been for some time assiduously preparing for active service, and appeared anxious to lead to the capture of Montreal. For his intrepidity and coolness in this unfortunate affair, Brigadier-General George Izard was promoted to be a major-general; a man of extensive attainments, elegant education, having been at the military college of Liege, in Flanders, entering the army very young at the lowest grade, and elevated by his merits to the highest. Such officers, and there were many such, could not withstand the adverse tide, which seemed to set against our military progress, throughout most of the year 1813, when the defeats and dishonour of the regular army under veteran commanders exceeded those of the volunteers and militia, to whom it was indispensable to confide the first operations of hostilities the year before. Daring and discipline constantly sustained the navy through an unbroken career of victories, while the regular army, without discipline or daring, sometimes, as in these affairs of General Hampton without courage, was undergoing a continual series of mortifying defeats. Even the Aurora could not deny, or the National Intelligencer, that one of our generals who was to out-general his opponent, had wofully failed to perform his promise. The American Daily Advertiser might head its columns in capitals with *more disasters*; the advocates of war were compelled to endure throughout a tedious and anxious month of disappointed expectations, daily renewed editions of *more and more disasters* by every northern mail, till the bubble of Canadian conquest burst and evaporated, if not forever, at any rate for that war.

After lingering between Sackett's Harbour and Fort George from the middle of August till the latter end of October, with no doubt many difficulties, privations and mortifications to make head against; what commander of an army has not? infinitely less, however, than Greene in Carolina, or Jackson in Louisiana; General Wilkinson, at last, on the unlucky 21st of the latter month, embarked his army at Grenadier Island, near Sackett's Harbour. By a general order of the 9th, issued by Adjutant-General Walbach, it was formed into four brigades and a reserve; the first brigade composed of the fifth, twelfth and thirteenth regiments under Brigadier-General Boyd; the second, of

the twenty-second and fifteenth regiments under Brigadier-General Brown; the third, of the ninth, twenty-fifth and sixteenth regiments under Brigadier-General Covington; the fourth, of the eleventh, twenty-first, and fourteenth regiments under Brigadier-General Swartwout; the reserve under Colonel Macomb, consisting of his regiment and the detachments ordered to join him; Major Harkimer, with his volunteers, among them; and the artillery under Brigadier-General Moses Porter; the dragoons and rifles to be disposed of according to circumstances and special orders. The Secretary of War was at that time moving about the neighbourhood of Lake Ontario, at Sackett's Harbour, Denmark, Antwerp, Watertown, and elsewhere, as occasion required, endeavouring to urge the dispatch and success of the expedition by constant efforts to preserve harmony among its leaders. General Harrison also arrived about the same time with M^r Arthur's brigade from the west, and sanguine inhabitants of distant places were flattered with the hope that he would perhaps add the capture of General Vincent, at Burlington heights, to that of Proctor's army on the Thames, as he was preparing to do when ordered to Sackett's Harbour to supply the vacuum there. The National Intelligencer, the National Advocate, of New York, the Baltimore Patriot, even some of the New England newspapers, abounded with arguments and reasons for the conquest of Canada, why and how. We were told early in November, upon semi-official authority, that Wilkinson's army was concentrated with Hampton's, at Montreal, the 15th October, and would take Quebec probably in May, certainly before the 4th July. The inhabitants of Montreal were said to be moving their valuables to Quebec. Hampton was only waiting for fair weather to sit down before Montreal and there wait for Wilkinson. Lateness of season, severity of weather were no reason to fear disappointment, for Montgomery fell at Quebec the 12th November, 1775. "The plan of the campaign," said that cautious court-journal, the National Intelligencer, on the 20th November, more than a week after its utter failure, but when we were still deluded with assurance of its success, "now that it is fully developed, is the subject of universal praise in the army, deep, exact and comprehensive." (The plan was certainly not so bad as the execution.) Wilkinson's letter to the Secretary of War of the 15th November, assured him, as a fact, that, on the 4th of that month,

the force at Montreal was but 400 marines and 200 sailors sent up from Quebec. But *more disasters* were at hand; until disaffection was delighted by intelligence of the defeat of what seemed to be the last effort of the war.

The secretary left the lake country for Albany and Washington: General Harrison soon followed the same way home to the west. On the 26th October, the president returned to Washington from his Virginia residence, restored to health, awaiting advices of Canadian victories for his forthcoming annual message to Congress, in December, just before the session opened heralded by accounts of the total and inglorious failure of another year's Canadian conquest.

Embarking at Grenadier island in more than 300 boats, protected by some of Chauncey's squadron, Wilkinson committed his fortune to the waves from the 21st October to the 5th November, which fortnight it consumed to get out of the lake and into the river. During three long weeks, as long as it requires by sail, near twice as long as by steam, to go from America to Europe, the flotilla, with General Wilkinson, ill and morbid, crawled, not vigorously or confidently, but despondingly, as the order in council of war at Sackett's Harbour proposed, to *slip* down to Montreal. The Odyssey of a calamitous voyage was written every day in the general's boat; mostly bedridden, getting continually worse, he was nearly invisible to his tempest-tossed followers. There were not boats enough even at first; and one-third of what there were, were stranded, sunk, wrecked, or otherwise cast away in the transit; the clothing unfit for an inclement and boisterous, wet and tempestuous autumn; the navigation extremely difficult and hazardous; large numbers of officers and men, like their general, prostrate by illness; continually assailed by vigilant and skilful enemies on the water and the shores from batteries at every turn; with shoals, rapids, fogs, storms; provisions unwholesome; clothing soaked with water; ammunition damaged; unfaithful or ignorant pilots—an endless catalogue of misfortunes. As early as the 24th October, the general's diary recorded irreparable injuries, deplored blasted hopes, and prayed for relief from jeopardy. When the explosion afterwards took place between him and Hampton, Wilkinson acknowledged that had Hampton joined him as ordered, Wilkinson intended to relinquish the command to his rival, so

conscious was he of his own inability for it. Sometimes, though seldom, he landed and slept on shore, but always disturbed by the fire of arms which, in the vigour of health and age, would have been music to animate him. On the 6th November, when the English batteries at Prescott were to be passed, he debarked the whole army, except such as were left with General Brown to pilot the flotilla through that peril. The enemy's brigs, schooners, gunboats, and galleys, led by the gallant Captain Mulcaster, gave our frailer craft no repose or respite from attack. Brown commanding the advance, familiar with the country, adroit to elude, and bold to face dangers,—passed the boats through in the night, without injury, but not without infinite uneasiness to the commander-in-chief, whose febrile prostration unfitted him for such occasions. His diary noted of that terrible but harmless night, that of 300 cannon shot fired at 300 boats, not one struck, and only one man was killed. Meantime Hampton, on the 1st November, wrote from Chateauguay to Armstrong to recall his attention to Hampton's letters of the 22d and 31st August (which tendered his resignation) and to add that events had had no tendency to change his opinion of the destiny intended for him, nor his determination to retire from a service where he could neither feel security nor expect honour. The campaign I consider substantially at an end, said this letter. Acceptance of my resignation so soon as the troops are put into winter quarters, is what I trust you will not refuse to send me by return of Colonel King. Colonel King was General Hampton's adjutant-general. Not finding General Armstrong at Sackett's Harbour, as he expected, Colonel King visited General Wilkinson on the 6th November, whom he found seven miles below Ogdensburg. From that place Wilkinson wrote by King to Hampton that Wilkinson was destined to, and determined on Montreal, for which the division under General Hampton's command must co-operate. The point of rendezvous was left to him; but St. Regis indicated as the place of meeting, in the opinion of Wilkinson's officers, if Hampton was not in force to face the enemy. Of provisions, Wilkinson had bread for fifteen days and meat for twenty; a battering train and plenty of fixed ammunition; but was deficient in loose powder and cartridges of which Hampton must bring his own. The Secretary of War had informed Wilkinson that ample magazines of provisions were laid up at Chateau-

guay. On the 8th November Hampton answered this letter, deeply impressed with the responsibility of deciding upon the means of co-operation. St. Regis was most pleasing until the amount of your provisions was disclosed. In throwing myself upon your scanty means, I should be weakening you where most vulnerable. Consulting my principal officers, I did not hesitate upon the opinion that by throwing myself back on my main depot, and falling upon the enemy's flank, straining every nerve to open a communication from Plattsburg to Conawhaga, or any other point you may indicate on the St. Lawrence, I should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at St. Regis. I hope to be able to prevent your starving. Besides rawness and sickness, my troops have endured fatigues equal to a winter campaign in the late snows and bad weather, and are sadly dispirited and fallen off. What can be accomplished by human exertion with these means, I will, with a mind devoted to the general objects of the campaign.

On the 7th, 8th and 9th November, Wilkinson moved down the St. Lawrence, as if still expecting to meet Hampton, and march on Montreal; never without constant interruptions from the indefatigable enemy, whom he never turned upon and crushed as he might and should have done. Macomb, Eustis, Forsyth, McPherson were sent ashore to beat him off, and effected it.—Drawing near the current of Rapids called the Sault, the leap of waters, a cataract of eight miles descent, the general's order of the day declared his uneasiness at proceeding where it said there was no retreat, no landing, no turning to the right or left, and added that the movement of yesterday was a reproach to the service.

From this time it is painful to pursue the adventures of this ill-starred voyage, where both commanders were incapacitated by temper or disease. There was no hope of success, but the enterprise was doomed to unavoidable defeat.

The battle of Chrystler's fields, near Williamsburg, which took place on the 10th of November, 1813, was the last act of the drama. Accounts of it, as of most battles, vary largely, according to the wishes of the respective reporters. We had them from Colonel Morrison, the English commander's dispatch, from General Boyd's, the American commander, from General Wilkinson's diary, and Mr. Christie added his afterwards.

According to Christie, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, with gun boats, on the 29th November, took possession of a considerable quantity of provisions and stores belonging to the American army, with two pieces of ordnance. Next day he pressed so close upon it, as to compel Boyd's brigade to concentrate their forces and give battle. The battle of Williamsburg, or Chrystler's field, which he describes at large, and from Colonel Morrison's official dispatch, claims the victory—he pronounces, the handsomest affair during the war, from the professional science displayed by the adverse commanders during the course of the action; and when the prodigious preparations of the American government for that expedition are considered, with the failure of which their hopes of conquest vanished, the battle of Chrystler's field may be classed as an event of the first importance in the defence of these provinces. General Armstrong animadverted severely on Wilkinson's omission to take, turn, scatter or crush that attempt of an enemy's force in his rear, to retard, impede or annoy his march, as palpable violation of an obvious maxim in the practice of all great captains. General Wilkinson, who knew no more of the affair than was announced to his pillow by the distant cannonade, put it down in his diary as a drawn battle in which our raw troops behaved with great spirit. General Boyd, who commanded them, in his official report, claimed a decided victory, having driven the English from the ground, of which he remained in possession, after two hours close conflict, the enemy not venturing to renew the engagement next day, but suffering our army to pursue its way unmolested. Christie says that Morrison had but 800 men with him. English prisoners reported 2,170. Wilkinson made them 2500. Boyd had 1600; led by himself, General Covington, who was mortally wounded, General Swartwout, (Covington and Swartwout volunteering for the action,) Colonel Pearce, Colonel Isaac Coles, Colonel Preston, severely wounded, 236 of our people were wounded, and 100 killed, at Williamsburg; the English loss by their account much less, by our account much more. Towards evening they withdrew to their camp, the Americans to their boats. That battle was one of those dear-bought lessons in the hard noviciate of our army, which, if well commanded, might have inspired the confidence, and insured a victory to carry it to Montreal. Instead of that, as Chrystie justly

boasts, it disconcerted, discouraged, and frustrated the most extensive undertaking of the war of 1812. Without odious comparison, posterity may ask how a twelvemonth afterwards Jackson, as ill as Wilkinson, without a sixth of his regular force, and much greater hinderances, conquered a vastly more formidable foe. From his triple posts at Mobile, Baton Rouge and New Orleans, he watched with eagle eye the lion's approach, penetrated his design and crushed his movement. The battle of Williamsburg was to Wilkinson what Jackson's admirable onset of the 23d of December was to Pakenham. The English in Canada, like the Americans in Louisiana, struck the first blow, contended for every inch, confronted every advance, harassed, disconcerted, demoralized and thus defeated their assailants. Clamorous exultation awards to the victory of the 8th of January the applause more due to the drawn battle of the 23d of December, which was the first step to that consummation. So, at Williamsburg, unless Wilkinson was in bodily health and mental vigour personally to command complete repulsion of the English attack, defeat his enemy there, and follow him everywhere till he had crushed him, further proceeding was in vain. His invasion of Canada was defeated. The British and Canadian troops deserve great credit for the persevering and invincible spirit in which they met that formidable invasion, fortified every pass on the St. Lawrence, siezed every opportunity of harassing, impeding, and assailing our army, until at last they, more than storms and casualties, more than Hampton's defection, forced it to dishonoured defeat; when every officer engaged in the battle of Williamsburg gave assurance of conduct, which, well led, was the pledge of victory. The battle of Williamsburg was the first of those Canadian tournaments between the regular armies of the United States and Great Britain, which, next year, without adequate combination or plans on our part, a talent yet wanting to the brave commanders of the northern army, nevertheless, co-operated with the naval victories, to produce the peace of Ghent. Colonel Pearce, who took command of the third brigade when Covington fell, Swartwout, Gaines, Ripley, Morgan, Grafton, Wallack, Beebee, Chambers, Johnson, Cummings, Worth, Whiting, were mentioned with distinction. General Boyd's indefinite order from General Wilkinson, was to *beat back* the enemy. If Wilkinson had been in health and spirits to head his troops, and not only beat back but follow up the

enemy till demolished, he might probably have gone to Montreal, even without Hampton's reinforcement.

The continual discomforts, annoyances and alarms of an enterprise for which General Wilkinson was incapacitated by disease, completely demoralized the commander-in-chief. Rejoicing not that he had vanquished but escaped from the enemy, from the rapids, the storms and the various sinister casualties of the protracted voyage. Wilkinson, at last, with more than three-fourths of his way won to Montreal, was without any considerable force to prevent his getting there, even without junction with Hampton, whose corps would at any rate have served as a reserve to that of Wilkinson, who believed that there were but few English troops between him and the goal of his race. On the 12th of November, Colonel Scott serving under General Brown in the advance, fifteen miles ahead of Wilkinson, routed the English under Colonel Dennis, each party about 800 strong, at Hoophole creek, and took many of them prisoners. The opinion of both those gallant officers and most others with the best opportunity of knowing, was, that Montreal was within their reach and power. The toils, risks, losses, mortifications of the campaign were all to be gloriously made amends for, when the expedition was blasted on the 12th of November, the anniversary of Montgomery's fall at Quebec, nearly forty years before.

On that unlucky day, Inspector-General Atkinson arrived at General Wilkinson's head quarters with a letter from General Hampton, refusing to join the expedition or proceed further into Canada. On these, there is too much reason to apprehend, from Wilkinson's morbid prostration, to him not unwelcome tidings, which relieved him from all further suspense, he forthwith resorted to that panacea for such predicaments, a council of war, by which it was unanimously resolved, that the conduct of Major-General Hampton, in refusing to join his division to the troops descending the St. Lawrence, to carry an attack against Montreal, rendered it expedient to remove General Wilkinson's army to French Mills' on Salmon river. Brown and Scott were recalled, and that resolve was at once put in effect the next day. Arrived there and established in winter quarters, Wilkinson wrote to Armstrong for permission to proceed to take the Isle aux Noix, and for leave of absence from the army

to recruit his strength and spirits, after his inglorious campaign. Soon after, he ordered Hampton to be arrested and brought to court martial, whose resignation was again tendered and finally accepted in March following. Wilkinson was tried and acquitted. But history will recollect his failure and forget his acquittal; although English accounts at that period represented their forces in Canada as imposing. Halifax Journals mentioned 15,000 regular soldiers there, and threatened a winter campaign against the United States. The King's Son, Captain Hanchett's ship, the *Diamond*, arrived with others, landing 1600 marines, and 400 seamen at Quebec. It may be, therefore, that General Wilkinson's estimate of the enemy's weakness was erroneous. But according to his own belief a bold and fortunate general would have afforded the many brave young men in that army, the opportunity they sighed for, of at least striking the deadly blow somewhere, which the council of war presided by Wilkinson at Sackett's Harbour, on his arrival there, resolved was due to the honour and interests of the country. In his memoirs, Wilkinson ridicules the ten thousand huts which the Secretary of War had ordered for his army's winter quarters in Canada. Yet as a striking proof of what may be done in winter, it may be mentioned that when Wilkinson's army left French Mills the 13th of February, 1814, the second regiment of artillery performed a march of sixty-nine miles, with their cannon on sleds, from nine o'clock one morning to eleven o'clock the next. The Florida war, after many inactive campaigns, at length brought to a close in one conducted during summer, in a climate much more fatal in summer than winter in Canada; the exploit of General Worth, is another to be added to numerous demonstrations, and indeed the philosophy of military power, that movement, action, boldness, what Shakespeare calls *industrious* soldiership, is the great method of success in war.

Overruling Providence ordered it otherwise, by means of our inefficient leaders in 1812 and 1813. The first year of volunteers and militia, the second with regular soldiers, only raw recruits, indeed, but led by veteran commanders, were the noviciate which nations sometimes undergo in arms, however severe, yet salutary, if the martial spirit is not extinct. The *Aurora* and *National Intelligencer* comforted the public in December, with recollections that it cost Great Britain four unfortunate campaigns

to wrest Canada from the French, and that tribulation was the wholesome trial of our republican arms. The president did not even allude in his annual message to Congress, at our second session the 7th of December, 1813, to the terrible blows just then inflicted on the war by the northern army. That task was prudently left to the public press. The National Intelligencer, Baltimore Patriot, Democratic Press, National Advocate, Boston Patriot, New Hampshire Patriot, Niles' Register, and other well-disposed northern public journals, with difficulty apologized for our disgraceful mishaps, of which the last and worst that year, which took place on the Niagara, remains to be told, and which dark columns of *more disasters* in the many disaffected newspapers, overshadowed all attempts to varnish. The Boston Gazette, prominent in opposition, published in strains of thanksgiving: "Every hour is fraught with doleful tidings: humanity groans from the frontiers. Hampton's army is reduced to about 2000; Wilkinson's cut up and famishing; crimation, and recrimination the order of the day. Democracy has rolled herself up in weeds, and laid down for its last wallowing in the slough of disgrace. Armstrong, the cold-blooded director of all the military anarchy, is chopfallen.

'Now lift, ye Saints, your heads on high,
And shout, for your redemption's nigh.'

These deadly blows of disaster and ridicule struck Congress in session at the seat of government, shooting from all parts of the north and east. Generals Harrison, Hampton and Boyd, with General Armstrong, were there when complete ruin from Champlain to Erie marked the retrograde of our arms, and closed the year 1813 with a destructive invasion of New York.

My sketch of these events is extremely imperfect: unavoidably so. Many gallant officers are yet living who served in Wilkinson's or Hampton's divisions in 1813, who owe their country fuller and better accounts than a distant observer can give of those memorable transactions. The romantic scenery of their adventures, the mad conflict of their commanders, the forlorn fortunes of their enterprise, the wild uncultivated regions then where now great sea-ports and cities flourish, canals, railroads, noble establishments, the resort and delight of innumerable travelers from Europe as well as America, attracted by the Falls of Niagara, the beauties of the lake country, and the facilities of traveling—invite the pens of many educated and accom-

plished survivors of the American army of 1813, regular and volunteer, to the patriotic and pleasing duty of rescuing from oblivion the circumstances but faintly presented in this sketch.

Colonel Scott was left by General Wilkinson in charge of Fort George, our only foothold, after nearly two years effort, in that part of Canada. Eager to share the honours of the capture of Montreal, Scott, as permitted, left the fort under command of General McClure, of the New York militia, and hastened by flood and field to overtake his leader to glory. Soon after his departure the fatal catastrophe of our border warfare completed its abominable mischiefs. Prevost, always alert and able, ordered Lieutenant-General Drummond, a portly Englishman, to command Upper Canada, in place of Major-General de Rottenberg, and Drummond resolved with his 1200 men to retake Fort George. Both sides of the Niagara had been from April till December distracted by the disgraceful hostilities of border warfare, in which the Americans were the aggressors, and doomed to be the greatest sufferers. Western New York was, before the year ended, desolated by British reaction, transcending American aggression, which we cannot deny provoked, however severe, that retaliation.

McClure proved no match for Drummond in spirit, if in force, or for Colonel Murray who brought on the English advance. After a vapouring proclamation to the Canadians, as if they were a conquered people, our general, on the defeat of one of his scouting parties, called a council of war, which resolved to abandon Fort George as untenable; though Colonel Scott left it well garnished with artillery, and provided with ammunition, with open communication to our side of the river, and complete for resistance. A council of war nevertheless resolved to dismantle and abandon it, and remove the garrison to Fort Niagara on the American side. There would have been no great harm in that, however disreputable, without firing a gun. But it was furthermore resolved in this the most reprehensible of all our war councils, to destroy such Canadian villages and places in front of Fort George as might afford the enemy shelter during the winter. Accordingly, says Christie, pursuant to directions of the American Secretary of War, (which was not the fact,) McClure precipitately evacuated Fort George on the 12th of December, after dismantling it, set fire to the flourishing village of Newark, containing about 150 houses,

reduced to ashes, leaving the wretched inhabitants, including more than 400 women and children, to the accumulated horrors of famine and a Canadian winter. That was not all: after McClure retreated over the river, and took shelter in Fort Niagara, perceiving the enemy in considerable force on the opposite side, deprived of a shelter at Fort George, and therefore seeking it at Queenstown, McClure had red hot shot fired at that place to deprive them of shelter there also. The British, under Murray, 500 men, mostly militia and Indians, the Indians now to have an occasion in which their savage nature would be indulged to the uttermost, immediately occupied Fort George. The barbarous policy, says Christie, of the American *government*, exasperated the army as well as the inhabitants of the frontier, of whose impatience for retaliation General Drummond promptly availed himself, by adopting the resolution of carrying the American Fort Niagara by surprise. Signal, though atrocious, vengeance was taken of American misconduct, perhaps the first, certainly the worst of the kind that occurred during the war, contrary to the manner in which it was uniformly waged on our part, which became the subject of long correspondence between the Secretary of State, Monroe, and the English defenders of it, and was pleaded in justification for attacks on Washington, Baltimore and New Orleans, threats of them on New York, Philadelphia, and even Boston next year. Everything conspired to disgrace our arms in that affair. Aware probably of the shameful negligence of the garrison at Fort Niagara, at any rate bursting with indignation, it was made known on both sides of the river that the enemy intended to surprise it. Strange as it may seem they almost gave notice of their design. Our general retired from the fort to Buffalo, without cautioning the regular officers in charge of it, that it was to be surprised and taken. Those officers were a captain of artillery, and two captains of infantry, all having companies of regular soldiers there; but not one of the officers in the fort or near it when assaulted. Those unworthy sentinels of a deserted post were somewhere else on business or pleasure, instead of where they were bound to be. Publicly preparing for the enterprise, deliberately waiting some days for bateaux brought by land from Burlington, as there were but two boats on the English shore of the Niagara, on the night of the 18th of December Colonel Mur-

ray crossed with 550 men, landed a few miles from the fort, quietly approached, cut off the picquets, surprised the sentinels on the glacis and at the gate, and effected an entrance at the main gate. After a feeble resistance, the garrison, without a single commanding officer, surrendered at discretion; which renders what ensued worse than if the place had been carried by storm instead of surprise. The British lost one lieutenant and five men killed, Colonel Murray and three men wounded. Sixty-five of our men were put to death with the bayonet, many in bed, some in the hospital, two officers and twelve men wounded by enraged militia and Indians, whom Colonel Murray perhaps would hardly, or was not anxious to restrain, for it was an inroad of revenge and extermination, of which these homicides were only the beginning. Murray took in the fort 300 soldiers of the regular army, an immense quantity of commissariat stores, 3000 stand of arms, several pieces of ordnance, and a great number of rifles. Worse than all, he took and the enemy kept Fort Niagara and our soil thenceforward as long as the war lasted. This, however, was only the beginning of the abominations, brought on ourselves in that quarter, where in the so-called patriot outbreaks latterly, the burning of the steamboat *Caroline* and other gross irregularities, there seems to be a fatality in the intercourse between the two countries, too near to be good neighbours.

At Washington, just before tidings of these frontier disasters, on the 28th December, Decatur's official letter from New London was published, declaring, on the authority of the honest editor of a federal newspaper there, that blue-lights were distinctly seen burning on both points of the harbour, as signals to the British blockading squadron, whenever ours attempted to go to sea; the creation of that party, as it was claimed, the glory of the country, the terror of England and the admiration of the world, the navy, to be sacrificed to the fell spirit of faction. The same day, together with the authentic report of that traitorous disaffection, came tidings that pursuant to orders from the Secretary of War, Fort George, being untenable, had been razed and abandoned. And that gloomy day, too, the House of Representatives was adjourned by the clerk soon after it met, because of the Speaker, Mr. Clay's, absence, preventing, with Mr. Rufus King and other friendly mediators, a duel apprehended from a challenge by Mr. Grosvenor, accepted by Mr. Calhoun, for words

some days before spoken between them in the House. That was the day, also, of Mr. Hanson's renewal of Mr. Webster's motion of the session before, accusing the administration of French influence. Next day it was published, semi-officially, that our militia-general had been obliged to destroy Fort George because the time of his men was out and they refused to stay longer. Others called out had not come, nor volunteers, for whom efforts were ineffectually made. The Secretary of War had not authorized the burning of Queenstown, it was said, unless it became necessary in defending Fort George; and the policy of the whole proceeding was questioned. The day after, a paragraph headed "*Disastrous and Shocking*," stopped the press to tell part of the whole truth; an express had arrived stating that the Sunday before 3000 British regulars stormed Fort Niagara, murdered the whole garrison, burned the villages of Lewistown and Manchester, together with every building between there and Niagara, massacred several families named, and were on their way to Buffalo, laying waste everything they fell in with. All this and more, much more, turned out to be too true. General Lewis Cass, dispatched to the scene, officially reported, from Williamsville, that, having visited the ruins of Buffalo, he had never witnessed such distress and destruction; though he had seen much the year before at Detroit, Malden, and on the Thames, when Hull surrendered and Proctor fled from the flames he lit up. Our loss of character was greater than that of life and property. General Cass ascertained that the troops reported to have done the devastation, were but 650 men, regulars, militia, and Indians; the Indians, superhuman for stratagems, spoils, and slaughter, but helpless for taking a fort, except by surprise, the militia not much more to be feared; so that our nearly 400 regulars in the fort had been easily conquered by an equal, perhaps less number; to oppose whom we had between 2500 and 3000 militia, all, except very few of them, behaving, said General Cass, in the most cowardly manner. Major-General Riall followed Murray over the Niagara, with reinforcements, ten days after, crossed again, on the 28th December, attacked Black Rock and Buffalo, burned both those places, with three of our vessels, captured a good many cannons; killed or wounded some hundred men and took 130 prisoners, among the

rest, Major Chapin, who had acquired notoriety by his activity as a partisan in that vicinity.

While this little war was waging in Canada, the mightiest of all modern wars was drawing to a close by the winter's campaign of the Emperor of the French, defeated and driven out of Germany, deserted by his conquests and married alliances, both his own and his imperial consort's families, bravely and inflexibly, but in vain contending for the throne, he was compelled to abdicate in April, 1814, at Fontainebleau. Great Britain dictated her own conquering terms in the French capital: and was enabled to turn against the United States, without European diversion, her thousand ships of war, thousands of soldiers, and five hundred millions of dollars of annual revenue. An elaborate letter of the Secretary of State, Monroe, to the English naval commander-in-chief, Cochrane, explained our alleged misconduct in Canada—at all events amply atoned for by British retaliation, immediately desolating a hundred-fold the places and the property; destroying life and inflicting misery in still greater proportion. But the decree of Great Britain's mighty vengeance had been pronounced—that the United States should be not only punished for audacious hostilities against their mother country, declared at the dictation of the French usurper she had overthrown; but that furthermore, parts of the American states should be subdued to their former allegiance; the Indians restored to all the lands they had been driven from; and the slaves not set free; (for the fever of abolition had not then begun to burn in English bosoms) but captured and taken to the West India Islands, there to be sold as property to new masters. Emboldened by the continual series of American discomfitures, without much interruption, from the beginning of the war, during the first eighteen months of its progress; and intoxicated with her own successes at the same time everywhere in Spain, Germany, Italy, France, and America, England conceived plans of American punishment and conquest just when American organization and discipline were becoming formidable; the army soon purged of senilities, filled with young commanders thirsting for renown; and that naval ascendancy which was the pure result of superior discipline and seamanship so completely established, both morally and physically, that every American sailor fought the English, as the English theretofore fought the French, sure

that to fight was to conquer ; while every English sailor apprehended, as the French had done, that no fighting could prevent defeat. The years 1812 and 1813, excepting the sea-fights, were almost always annals of American defeats. During the years 1814 and 1815, the full tide of success, with one or two momentary counter-currents, constantly flowed in our favour ; and every battle by land and by water, was an American triumph, till the war closed in a blaze of victory on shore, with brilliant corruscations illuminating the ocean. All these final battles took place sometime after a mere cessation of hostilities, by treaty, without the settlement of a single principle in conflict, or the slightest influence from the Russian mediation, (so much relied upon by the American government,) but attributable mainly, if not altogether, to the successes of the navy, of American armies in Canada, and to the upraised spirit of the nation everywhere, gloriously crowned by victorious conclusion at New Orleans after the peace.

On the 20th of December, 1813, a motion was submitted to the House of Representatives, that a committee should be appointed to make adequate and permanent provision for the support of all officers, soldiers and marines, disabled by wounds in the military service of the United States, also, for the support of the widows and education of the children of all officers, soldiers and marines fallen in the service, naval or military. This motion was laid upon the table, and never called up again : perhaps too extensive and premature, at least till the soldiers of the revolution were provided for, or those of the war of 1812, who long survive it, shall come to the advantages of interval between their services and their rewards.

CHAPTER X.

SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CREEK INDIANS.—ACT OF CONGRESS FOR TAKING POSSESSION OF THAT PART OF LOUISIANA WHICH SPAIN WITHHELD AS PART OF FLORIDA.—MOBILE SEIZED BY GENERAL WILKINSON.—TECUMSEH AND HIS BROTHER, THE PROPHET, VISIT THE CREEKS TO ROUSE THEM TO WAR.—SPANISH CONNIVANCE WITH ENGLAND FOR THIS PURPOSE.—CREEK REVOLT AND CIVIL WAR.—FORT MITCHELL.—INDIAN PATRIOT AND PEACE PARTY, THE YOUNG FOR WAR, THE OLD OPPOSE IT.—OUTBREAK.—DESULTORY MURDERS.—MASSACRE AT FORT MIMMS.—GEORGIA AND TENNESSEE UNDERTAKE THEIR OWN DEFENCE.—GEORGIA MILITIA.—GENERALS FLOYD AND FLOURNOY.—TENNESSEE MILITIA.—GENERALS WHITE, CLAIBORNE, COFFEE, CARROLL, JACKSON.—BATTLES OF TALLUSHATCHEE, TALLEDEGA, ECCONOHACCA, AND HILLABEE.—MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS OF TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA IN-SUBORDINATE.—MANY OF THEM GO HOME.—CAMPAIGN SUSPENDED FOR WANT OF TROOPS.—CHARACTER OF SUDDEN LEVIES FOR SHORT SERVICE.—REINFORCEMENTS.—ANDREW JACKSON.—BATTLE OF EMUCHFAU OR THE HORSE-SHOE.—INDIANS SUBDUED—DISPERSED—SUE FOR PEACE.—WEATHERFORD SURRENDERS HIMSELF TO JACKSON.—MEETING OF GENERALS PINCKNEY AND JACKSON AT TOULOUSE.—SPANISH TREATY OF 1795.—NEGOTIATED BY PINCKNEY, ENFORCED BY JACKSON.—REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST AND FUTURE ACTIONS OF THOSE TWO GENERALS—AS TO THE EFFECTS OF THE CREEK CAMPAIGN.—PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT.

WE have seen in the first chapter of this Historical Sketch, that the war was premised by the admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union in April, 1812, preceding the declaration of war in June. A future chapter, in another volume, will show its conclusion by the total defeat of the enemy at New Orleans, the capital of that state, in the latter end of 1814 and beginning of 1815, during negotiations for peace, at Ghent, in Flanders. At present, our narrative takes us far from the banks of the great northern lakes to those magnificent southwestern regions of the United States, where the modern master of staples, cotton, flourishes, with sugar, also, once a luxury, now become a necessary of life. Going from Michigan and

Vermont to Alabama and Mississippi, in the great change of place, fifteen hundred miles from north to south, the theatre of action to be examined still consists of what were then territories sparsely peopled; now states filling with population; then occupied by Indians with their towns or for their hunting-grounds; now filled with fine cities inhabited by many of the most opulent, refined and advancing portion of this great republican empire and North American continental power. The prodigious communication and intercourse, by steam, from New Orleans and Mobile to Michilimackinac and St. Josephs, Chicago and Detroit, thence to Cleveland, Buffalo, New York, and Boston, whether by land or water, are evidence of its union, progression, power, and prosperity, which Americans have but to know to rejoice in the enjoyment of.

The final, most concentrated, reiterated, desperate, and ungenerous blows of Great Britain, were struck at these bountiful regions, with great fleets and armies, savage help in its utmost ferocity, and her utmost efforts to aggravate those blows by servile war, of which the preliminary conflict, the Indian campaign of 1813, will be the subject of this chapter. American vengeance was provoked to humble the Creek Indians for the horrible massacres with which they were instigated by English agency, and Spanish subserviency, to begin hostilities.

On the 27th January, 1813, apprized of these menacing perils, the president, in a confidential message to the Senate, sent them a report of the Secretary of War, complying with their resolution of the 7th of that month, which led ultimately to an act of Congress authorizing him to take possession of a tract of country lying south of the Mississippi Territory and west of the Perdido. When the confidential proceedings on this act were made public, in October, 1813, it was justly said that the horrible and indiscriminate butchery of men, women, and children at Tensaw (or Fort Mimms), with instruments of death derived immediately from Pensacola, and the exposed state of the southern frontiers, afforded abundant testimony of the error and misfortune attendant on the Senate's decision of this very important question. The opposition to Madison in the Senate, by uniting the opponents of the war with those of his administration, frequently prevented steps he deemed important. Constitutionally averse as he was to all illegal measures, he never was even charged or suspected of

attempting them. And for how many imperfections of energetic executive action does not this pure observance of law atone? Having at last got, in February, 1813, the permission of Congress, though not to the extent he desired, to dislodge the Spanish authorities from a corner of Louisiana, which they held as part of Florida, in April, 1813, by order of the president, the present city of Mobile was taken from them: then a Spanish fortress overlooking northern Florida on the bay of that name, at the mouth of the noble river Tombigbee, flowing from settlements of the Chickasaw Indians, in Mississippi, nearly the whole length of Alabama, due south, till it empties, through Mobile Bay, into the Gulf of Mexico. The Bays of Pascagoula, Mobile, Perdido, Pensacola, Santa Rosa, St. Andrews, St. Joseph's, and Apalachicola skirt southern Alabama, along the Gulf of Mexico, east. Another chain of bays on that gulf, Chandeleur, Black Bataria, Timballier, Atchafalaya, Cote Blanche, Vermilion, stretch south as far as the Sabine Lake and river, in that aquatic region; thence disputed ground beyond to the Nueces, the Grande del Norte, and those prodigious mountain barriers between Texas and Mexico, which fix by nature's most stupendous impediments, the boundaries between the North American Anglo-Saxon, and the mixed Mexican and Spanish-Moorish races. St. Marks, on Apalachicola Bay, Pensacola, on the bay of that name, both opening on the Gulf of Mexico, the fortified city of St. Augustine, one of the oldest of American towns on the Atlantic ocean, and Condé, at Mobile, were Spanish strongholds in Florida, convenient of access from sea to the English, and by land to the various Indian tribes, roving over immense territories, with their settlements and hunting-grounds, stretching from the Gulf of Mexico, through Alabama, Missouri, and Illinois, to Lakes Michigan, Huron, and Superior. All this vast country is connected by gigantic links, of land and water, in natural configuration, juxtaposition, and easy intercourse. A glance on the map shows it, but, without attentively examining the map, it is impossible to appreciate its integral nationality. The permanent treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United States, fixing the southern limits of this country in Florida, and its western boundary in the bed of the river Mississippi, provides that Spain shall maintain peace among the Indians adjacent to the boundaries of Florida, and restrain, by force, all hostilities on their part, so as

not to suffer them to attack citizens of the United States, nor the other Indians in their territory, and shall make no treaties but of peace with the Indians.

The president, being authorized by Congress, directed General Wilkinson, commanding nearest to Florida, who accordingly, on the 15th of April, 1813, with Commodore Shaw's flotilla of gun boats, and 600 soldiers, took possession of Mobile. The expedition left New Orleans the 29th of March, General Wilkinson on board the armed schooner Alligator, by the Bayou St. John, and Pass Christian, arrived at Heron, the 10th of April. Captain Atkinson was sent to bring off the Spanish guard and pilot from Dauphin Island, who were removed, the corporal and six men, to Pensacola. Meantime, Colonel Bowyer descended the Tensaw, with the diligence always characterizing that gallant officer, and encamped opposite the town of Mobile, with five pieces of brass ordnance—Commodore Shaw, making good his way round by sea with his flotilla of transports. The music of our drums was the first intimation the Spanish commandant of the ancient Fort of Condé, near Mobile, had of the design to dislodge him, the American troops having been landed and formed at night. That venerable fort had been once, indeed, was then, a strong place; built in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth, in 1780 it resisted for several weeks with a small garrison, an army 2000 strong under the Spanish General Galvez, before it honorably capitulated. At noon on the 15th of April, General Wilkinson advanced with a column of 600 men, took post in a neighbouring wood in front of the fort, and sent his aid-de-camp Major Pierre, to demand its surrender, to which the Spanish commandant yielded, when the American flag was hoisted there for the first time. On the 17th of April, Colonel Carson dislodged a small Spanish post, consisting of a serjeant and seven men from the east bank of the Perdido, who moved to Pensacola. Thus the authority of the United States was established, as by the treaty of Louisiana, it was right it should have been ten years before, to the Perdido bay and river in Florida, which peninsula did not follow Louisiana into the American Union, till nearly ten years afterwards, when taken possession of pursuant to treaty with Spain, by the extraordinary offspring of the war of 1812, whose first campaign is to be the subject of this chapter—Andrew Jackson. Don Gayetano Perez, the Spanish governor, and the garrison

of Mobile surrendered at Fort Condé to General Wilkinson, were forthwith sent in transports to Pensacola, whence Spanish connivance with English hostilities against the United States, especially by arming and instigating the Indians, was suppressed twenty months afterwards by General Jackson capturing that Spanish fortress, preparatory to his memorable repulsion of English invasion of Louisiana. Shortly after Wilkinson's seizure of Mobile, he marched with a considerable detachment to the Perdido river, to overawe the Indians encouraged by the Spaniards, to acts of hostility against Americans. Fort Condé, or Mobile, was well supplied with munitions of war and military stores, and presented a frowning battery of sixty-two pieces of ordnance when surrendered to Wilkinson by too small a garrison to have made effectual resistance. An express arrived there just at the evacuation, advising Wilkinson that the Spanish governor of Pensacola had sent out runners to the Creek and Seminole Indians, with offers of arms, ammunition and presents if they would attack the American frontier settlements on the Tombigbee and Alabama. To prepare for this, Wilkinson deposited a number of muskets with the colonels of the militia. The people, much alarmed by rumours of Indian aggressions, were erecting numerous block houses to retire to, as places of retreat and security. Soon afterwards General Wilkinson received his orders dated at Washington, in March, to repair to, and take command of the northern army: the south by the good genius of America being through a series of providential military changes, hereafter to be particularized, reserved for the command of General Jackson. Wilkinson left with regret places with which he had become familiar by long command and much experience there, to try his fortune as a veteran, where it began as a young man, in the north, as General Dearborn's successor in command of the army, destined for the invasion of Canada. The south-western Indian campaign, to which Jackson was about to be called, was the overture to his not more complete or substantial, but better known and more celebrated campaign of next year against the flower of the English armies which chased Napoleon's marshals and brother out of Spain, followed them to the capital of France, and there dictating peace, left the United States not only single-handed, but deserted, if not detested, by nearly all Christendom, to make head against Great Britain. Among the

good fortunes of this country, not the least was that which under these circumstances inflamed a mighty enemy, intoxicated with triumphs, to wage unwarrantable war, that Providence enabled us to resist, repel and overcome by a year of victories consummated by the great success which the commander in the Creek campaign was there learning the art to achieve.

The south-western campaign of 1813 was carried on mainly by volunteers and militia of Georgia, Tennessee, and the Territory of Mississippi, against only Indian foes; instigated, indeed, and armed and supplied by English government and Spanish connivance, but without British soldiers till next year, as their allies. The remote inhabitants of countries almost without a mariner, and then with little foreign commerce or navigation, were inflamed to bloody combats against orders in council concerning maritime affairs and impressment of seamen. As parts of the American republic, the people of those south-western states and territories, with little or no local interest in the issue, fought the national battle with unwavering constancy; while as instruments of a small island in the midst of the North Sea, three thousand miles away, the deluded savages bravely and recklessly performed their ruthless part in exterminating hostilities. Humanity shrinks not less at their butcheries and brutalities at the time, than at their consequence, in the expulsion of all the fierce aboriginal inhabitants of those beautiful and teeming regions, to banishment of tribes inimical to each other, compelled to live together far from their native homes, in others provided for them beyond the Arkansas and Mississippi. History must condemn the English cruel policy which for gain and dominion sacrificed thousands of noble savages in that shocking conflict. Nor can it excuse Spanish instrumentality in those ungenerous hostilities. The red and black races still in Mexico, Cuba, and the United States, are subjects of much apparent transatlantic sympathy. But for millions of African slaves pullulating in the cotton growing regions, where their labour seems indispensable, cultivating lands which, in 1813, were covered with Indian cornfields and settlements, and devoted to their hunting-grounds, England and Spain are answerable, who first naturalized them in America. The red race might be living in communion with the black and the whites in Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi, but for European interfer-

ence. The American Declaration of Independence, more recited than its doctrines are generally remarked, forty years before the campaign of 1813, excited by English agents and acts among the Creeks and Cherokees, to both savage and servile outrages, reproached a kindred country with exciting domestic insurrection among us, and bringing on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is undistinguishing destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions. It has been, on the contrary, the constant endeavour of every administration, the obvious policy of the United States to conciliate and domesticate, enlighten, harmonize and naturalize the Indians.

To-cha-lee and Chulioa, chiefs of the Cherokees, published in behalf of the Cherokee nation, an address prepared in council at Highwassee, the 6th of March, 1813, to the citizens of the United States, particularly to the good people living in the states of Tennessee, North and South Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi Territory, in which they said, that in former wars the Indians were of necessity under the influence of your enemies. We shed our blood in their cause. You compelled them by arms to leave us; and they made no stipulation for our security. After years of distress, we found ourselves in the power of a generous nation. You forgot the past, established our boundaries, provided for our improvement, and took us under your protection. We have prospered and increased, with the knowledge and practice of agriculture and other useful arts. Our cattle fill the forests, while wild animals disappear. Our daughters clothe us from spinning wheels and looms. Our youth have acquired knowledge of letters and figures. All we want is tranquillity. This simple recital of Indian improvement proceeds with strong expressions of goodwill to the government and people of the United States, and hopes of their success in the contest with Great Britain.

Such was the argument of these unhappy savages, and if content to be incorporated in American society, with its arts, religion and enjoyments, if qualified, but civilized independence, which is all that we enjoy, was preferable to their wilder and more vicious state; it was the earnest desire of American government to ameliorate and adopt them. Confessing and deploring the colonial abuses which provoked Indian aversion, every effort since American independence, has been to quiet and domesticate these

magnanimous children of the forest. England in both her wars on the United States, betrayed her savage allies to ruin. By reviving and fomenting animosity much assuaged, and which might have been removed, she provoked reaction from this country by which more than fifty nations have been subjugated, driven from their desert homes, and forced to abide together in odious circumscription. An English ministry was once reproached by censorious opposition, for not resenting French interruption of British slave trade, which the maritime world is now disturbed by England to suppress. Yet what African slave now cultivates tropical products, in Spanish, Portuguese, or American possessions, but by act of Parliament? What untutored savage has been expatriated from this country but by reaction of English intermeddling?

The Creek nation, twenty-five thousand strong, inhabited a region of surpassing fertility, salubrity and beauty, from the southern borders of Tennessee, between the Chatahouchee and Coosa rivers, as far south as near the Florida line: the Seminoles south of the Creeks, in southern Georgia, and northern Florida, ranging through impervious swamps to boundless marshes on the Gulf of Mexico; the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the Yazoo and Pearl rivers in Mississippi, numbering from thirty to forty thousand; the Cherokees north of the Creeks, on the south frontier of Tennessee. Indian civilization was marked by proximity to American power, savage barbarism by distance from it. Nearly all the North American Indians speak kindred tongues, and are otherwise, though frequently at war among themselves, yet reducible by overruling domination to the same people, one and indivisible by war against the United States. They were one and all cultivated as English stipendiaries, and in 1813, supplied by or through Spanish authorities in Florida, Spain being then in alliance offensive and defensive with Great Britain, occupied by British armies, and governed by British councils, if not generals and ministers. At the same time there was no recognized minister of Spain in the United States, nor of the United States in Spain, owing to the distracted state of that ancient kingdom, then disputed between Ferdinand the Seventh, and Joseph Bonaparte. That controversy, according to a principle of American government, the disadvantage of which at that moment has been adverted to in my first chapter, deprived the United States of any

public agent in Spain, when several ministers there would have been useful, if they were not indispensable. According to the best information we had, however, and universal southern impression, the war in the south was ascribable to instigation by the united influence of Great Britain and Spain, operating upon the Indians. But for that clandestine combination, the war might have been confined to the northern and navigating states, for whose relief it was undertaken. As soon as Great Britain was menaced with it, the southern Indians began to move. When declared, the storm broke forth at a point contiguous to her instigating power. As defeat or victory in Canada fluctuated, southern hostilities assumed the hues of British vengeance and Indian ferocity. Supplies of all arms and munitions were discovered on their way from Pensacola to the Indians. Councils of war were held, attended by British and Spanish agents officiating together. Immense expenditures, tragical disasters, on new theatres of war ensued. Colonel Benjamin Hawkins had been for sixteen years Indian agent of the United States in the south-west, and flattered himself as well as his constituents, that he had not laboured in vain to wean them from savagism. The Creeks and Cherokees had many of them farms, wore clothing, professed Christianity, spoke English, and the most respectable and influential of them were well inclined to civilization till British agents interloped, and put an end to that peaceable and prosperous state of things. A chief instrument of England for this purpose, was Tecumseh, whom we have seen bravely fighting at Tippecanoe in 1811, at Detroit in 1812, and as bravely dying in arms in 1813, at the battle of the Thames. He performed a patriotic and praiseworthy journey from the north to the south, after the massacre at Raisin, deemed by him and his employers the proper time to rouse the Indians of Alabama, Georgia, Florida and Mississippi, to another effort at emancipation. In him it was patriotic and praiseworthy to liberate them, if possible, from the yoke, however gentle, which American government imposed. He can hardly be blamed for the last attempt of a noble chieftain, who seldom, if ever, practised the enormities which English agents stimulated: we cannot deny Tecumseh the merits of a generous effort and a glorious death. Addressing himself to the Creeks especially, he plied them not only with all the arts of eloquent excitement, but with the irresistible power of superstition and

sorcery over ignorant people, barbarians most of all. He took with him a fanatic called the Prophet, Tecumseh's brother, by whose incantations and those of many other such impostors, the savages were roused to madness, for a war which was to reinstate them in all their possessions and rights. There is something to all men, even the most refined, elevated and enervated, attractive in adventurous life, the chase, the woods, the risks of exposure, shooting, hunting, the dangers and fatigues of killing wild beasts, the mimicry of war. Much more seductive is war itself: and still much more to those whose ancestors knew no other recreation so delightful. Necromancy and superstition to charm savages to such enjoyments were artifices which Tecumseh, his brother the prophet, and other demons, working with mystic and oracular influences over wild enthusiasts, wrought to the highest pitch of savage excitement. They enlisted too the noble aspirations of patriotism. The war was for the long-lost rights of Indian freemen: to restore them to liberty, emancipate them from bondage. Like the Americans of 1776, the French of 1790, the Spanish colonists of South America, the war party of the Creek nation, in revolt against their elders, assumed the much-abused name of patriots, and came to be known by it in the bloody controversy, which in a few months closed with the extermination of most, and the subjugation of all the rest of them.

The map must be consulted for Fort Mimms, a stockade or blockhouse, on the Alabama river, not far from the Tombigbee, in south-western Alabama, at no great distance from Mobile, where, on the 30th August, 1813, by which time the untiring Tecumseh was again at the head of his followers in Ohio, occurred one of those dreadful Indian tragedies which have so often retaliated the cruelties inflicted by white men on red, by them horribly retorted. The massacre at Fort Mimms, in August, like that of the river Raisin in January, 1813, will long be remembered in the chronicles of American wrongs; for wrongs they are, although our treatment of their perpetrators may seem to justify, as no doubt it provokes, such enormities.

Soon after we were assembled in Congress, the latter end of May, 1813, Mr. Elijus Fromentin, one of the first elected senators from Louisiana, who traveled to Washington by land, through the Indian country, as there was then no better way,

the English being all powerful by sea, and not a steamboat plying from New Orleans, Mr. Fromentin reported that in the Creek nation, he fell in with a party of warriors under McQueen, king of the Upper Towns, who had been to Pensacola for arms from the Spanish Governor of West Florida, who informed the deputation that his instructions were to arm the nation generally, and, provided a majority applied to him, he would furnish them with arms. Meetings of the Indians were therefore to be held in their different towns to ascertain that war was the sense of a majority, that being the Spanish postulate. At the House of Manac, a chief of property and influence, numbers of runners from the north-western Indians were constantly resorting, from the seat of war, with much earlier intelligence of events than the white neighbours of the Indians had.

There was probably not a majority of the Creeks for war. Most of the aged, the experienced, and the prudent were against it. But, as was the case in this country, the young, the ardent, the ambitious, the restless, were its champions. Perhaps the American, certainly the French, revolutions were begun against the sense of majorities, by resistance to not insufferable wrongs. Tecumsehs in all countries, not only move, but master majorities, and often through minorities. Urged by English and countenanced by Spanish authorities, besides their own sense of the comparatively less independent condition they enjoyed, than before the Americans put some restraints on their wild indolence, the war party, the patriots of the Creeks, precipitated measures by violence and civil war between themselves and the peace party. Agents, white and red, from Canada, to excite and supply them, went to Florida. Through the instrumentality of Indian runners and chiefs, the belief was general, if not universal, in that country, that the Governor of Canada made known his wishes to the Governor of Florida: and at all events, in Colonel Hawkins's opinion, the commotions in the south-west were attributable to English intrigues with the Indians there. The alarm was general. Milledgeville, in Georgia, on the Altamaha, Columbus, on the Tombigbee, Nashville, in central Tennessee, on the Cumberland, Knoxville, in east Tennessee, on the Holstein, were all alarmed and assailable. Generals Pinckney and Flournoy, commanding the regular troops in that military division, were put on their guard, and ordered out some inadequate forces. In April, however, General Flournoy wrote to the Governor of Georgia

from the Creek agency that he found the reports respecting their hostility unfounded or exaggerated; the chiefs are in council, said he, respecting the late outrages, and it is expected the offenders will be brought to justice. Colonel Hawkins, Indian agent, thinks there is no danger in passing to Fort Stoddart. This confidence soon proved mistaken. In July Colonel Hawkins in vain strove to prevent the outbreak long premeditated. The difficulties of the friendly Indians continued to increase. Nine of them were murdered, one a woman; a chief was missing, another sent on a friendly errand was doomed by the prophet to destruction. The old King, Talebee, boasted of his war-clubs, bows, arrows, and magical powers. By satisfying the United States the well-disposed angered the war-party, who were resolved on resentment. The work of death and destruction began. Colonel Hawkins sent messengers to soothe them and to warn. "I hear," said he, "you have broken the treaty, danced the war-dance, made your clubs, but for what? You threaten Kialijee, Toohawbatchee, and Cowetan. Take care how you make American soldiers your enemies. You cannot frighten them. Their cannon and muskets will be more terrible than the words of your prophets." The war party returned no answer to this expostulation. Bent on mischief, nothing but calamity would tame them. Colonel Hawkins dispatched McIntosh, a celebrated Indian chief, for Toohawbatchee, and requested the Governor of Georgia for arms for the friendly Indians; an express was also sent on whose report the agent intended to act, and the governor, if necessary, was to risk the consequences of attempting to crush the hostile Indians.

The regions doomed to devastation by these malignant hostilities, were of surpassing beauty, salubrity, and productiveness. What was called the Aulochewan country abounded in the finest lands. The woods were filled by herds of fat cattle plentifully subsisting on rich natural pastures, without housing or other food than they found themselves. No care need be taken of them. Fort Mitchell, the agent's residence, was not far from a beautiful lake, abounding with fish, and communicating with other lakes and rivers affording excellent navigation to the hearts of the settlements. The orange tree grew spontaneously there; melons at almost any season. The sugar-cane, the cotton plant, Indian corn, the richest products of a

genial soil and climate might be cultivated in luxurious abundance. Fort Mitchell stood on one of those singular configurations of parts of the United States, a prairie, seven or eight miles wide by twenty-three miles long, like the placid lake in its neighbourhood, an uninterrupted expanse of productive earth. The Creeks had their well-built towns and villages, schools, flocks, tools, clothing. They were fast weaning from barbarous habits and propensities, when, in evil hour, they were by evil spirits persuaded to cast aside all the enjoyments, tokens, and morals of civilization; to destroy their implements of husbandry, desecrate their places of worship and education, despise their decent clothing; seize the tomahawk, the rifle, and the scalping knife, and under the dark influences of necromancers, recur, with fanatical frenzy to the almost forgotten outrages of the war-club, and brutal gratification of a passion for destruction.

After many isolated devastations, at length, on the 30th August, was perpetrated their most fearful and fatal outrage at Fort Mimms. Indians were supplied at Pensacola, by direct English agency, with ammunition distributed there to leaders in that attack, which was to be made, as rumoured, about the full of the moon. There were as many as twenty stockades or forts scattered along both sides of the river Tombigbee, for the seventy miles of thinly peopled country, from Fort Stoddard to the upper settlements; too great a number of forts for concentrated action in which the inhabitants were left off their guard in the belief that no serious aggression would take place. An excellent officer, Major Beasley, of the Mississippi Volunteers, commanded at Fort Mimms, which was nearly opposite to Fort Stoddard. The greatest number of families and property were collected in Fort Mimms; though there was another fort at Pierce's Mills, about a mile from it, and another mill at which a few soldiers were stationed a few miles further. A negro, taken by the Indians, but escaping, fled to Fort Mimms and gave the first information of the intended attack. Next day a half-breed and some white men, who had discovered the Indian trail, repeated the alarm. But none of these warnings were much heeded; though some preparation was made to guard against a surprise. Another negro sent out to tend the cattle, again reported that he had seen twenty Indians. He was chastised for misreport. A third who saw other Indians afterwards, fearing the same unwelcome reception, went to

Pierce's Mills, instead of returning to Fort Mimms. On the night preceding the massacre, the dogs of the garrison, supposed to have smelt the Indians, by peculiar growling, gave their instinctive notice of danger. Had the men been as watchful and, may it not be said, wise? as these animals, with instinct exceeding knowledge, they might have been prepared for the attack. A few did leave the fort and escaped. But nearly all remained in that strange confidence which often betrays to destruction. So far did this error go, that an officer was in the act of preparing to punish another negro for insisting that he had seen Indians, when, all at once, they appeared, contrary to their custom, approaching openly by day, about eleven o'clock in the morning, and had advanced, through an open field, one hundred and fifty yards, to within thirty feet of the fort before they were discovered. So fatal was the incredulity of its doomed inmates. So well-devised, bold, and fortunate the plan of their blood-thirsty assailants. The gate, too, was open. As the sentry gave the alarm, the warriors, with a terrific whoop, darted in before it could be closed, rushed up to the port holes, and by fearless intrepidity, but not till after a desperate struggle in which sixty of the assailants were killed, in the course of several hours of murderous combat, hand to hand, took and burned the place. Our people surprised, confounded, and crowded, had not time to organize for resistance; otherwise Indian valour could do nothing against a well-prepared fortification. The commander, Major Beasley, was one of the first victims, shot through the body. He retired into the kitchen, calling to his men to take care of their ammunition and retreat into the house. The fort, originally square, had been enlarged by pickets from within, which outward enclosure the Indians fired. Several hundred of them, computed from four to seven hundred, surprised, overpowered, surrounded our people, encumbered by women and children, who, seeing the Indians in full possession of the outer fort, began to falter, despond, and try to escape. The savages mounted the block-house near the pickets, and shot down on the people within, firing from port-holes at their enemies in the field, who shooting arrows set on fire at the building which put one near the kitchen in a blaze, soon consumed it, and, as is supposed, the wounded commander, Beasley, lying there. His loss early in the action was a great misfortune. Our people fought with the courage

of despair. But seeing the Indians in full possession of the outer court, with the gates open, the kitchen burning, and other buildings on fire, despondency prevailed. Yet the few survivors, towards the end of the conflict, collected the guns of the killed and all the remaining ammunition and threw them into the flames to keep them from falling into the hands of the savages. The women and children took refuge in the upper story of the dwelling house, and there perished in the flames, the savages dancing round with shouts of exultation. They were all stark naked, except a flap or small clout. After women were slaughtered, their bodies were subject to every indecent indignity which the most infernal refinement of cruelty could conceive; pregnant women were cut open, unborn infants tomahawked, some women scalped several times, many savages contending for the gratification of mutilating and murdering one helpless individual. The scene presented to the party, which, after the Indians were gone, went to the place and buried the dead, exceeded all description of horrible excesses. Hundreds of these Indians spoke English and were believed to have been reclaimed from barbarism.

About an hour before sunset, the work of extermination ceased, and the Creeks, as usual, had their festival for a glorious victory. Seven commissioned officers, with about one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates fell, all of the first regiment of Mississippi Volunteers; 24 families of men, women and children, altogether about 160 souls, a few of them half-breed Indians, and seven friendly Indians, with 100 negroes, were in Fort Mimms, most of whom perished in the action, or in the flames. Between three and four hundred men, women and children, white, red, black and mulatto, were butchered; not more than from 25 to 30 of the whites and half-breeds escaped, and many of them wounded.

Such was the work of a nation of Indians, whom the administrations of Washington, John Adams, Jefferson and Madison, had been from the foundation of our government for sixteen years sedulously engaged in civilizing. Colonel Hawkins continually reported that they were much improved in the arts and sentiments of humanity. Without the slightest provocation, they took up arms with the English to assail us; seized moments of unguarded liability to perpetrate diabolical outrages of English contrivance. English vessels with ammunition frequently at that time arrived at Pensacola, where the Creeks and Seminoles were

supplied. A British armed schooner from the Bahamas, with clothing, blankets and ammunition for the hostile Indians, came to Pensacola soon after the massacre at Fort Mimms, when the Creek war began. But for the senate's resistance, Madison might have prevented this, and perhaps the disaster at that fort. Next year, without orders, Jackson, before he repaired to the defence of New Orleans, seized Pensacola by virtue of that self-preservation which belongs to all mankind, nations and individuals, without reference to the law of treaties which forbade Spain her subserviency to England in those inhuman violations of all law.

The mournful tale of the disaster at Fort Mimms reached the cantonment near Fort Stoddart, sixteen miles off next night at ten o'clock, and found that ill-provided place encumbered with women and children, who had fled affrighted from their habitations. It had before been suggested that they should be removed to some securer retirement. The moment the sad tidings were known, all took to flight at midnight, in such trepidation and confusion, that few carried food or clothing enough for their escape to Mobile. Some went by water, others by land, all bewailing the calamity at Fort Mimms, where nearly all had relatives and friends, of whose fate the most dismal apprehensions justly prevailed. The river from Stoddart to Mobile was strewn with boats, the intermediate wilds with fugitives by land, hastening for succour to an asylum, which might not be able to protect, and certainly had not subsistence enough for them. It was feared that the Indians would soon attack Mobile: the only hope was that plunder and their usual debaucheries after victory might afford a short respite. Without prompt and unlooked-for assistance from Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi, the whole country from the Choctaws to the sea must be a desolate waste, abandoned to the savages, and not a white man venture to raise his head beyond the limits of a military garrison. Help from the government at Washington was out of the question. Relief must come from the people themselves and neighbouring states, in such an emergency, or not at all. But for the seizure of Mobile, by Wilkinson, in the spring, there would have been no place of refuge for our people.

Tecumseh's first blows in the south, more than a thousand miles from the place of his north-western warfare, were terribly successful. Prevost, Brock, the Indian favourite, and Proctor,

did not confine their Indian subornation to Canada. It reached Pensacola, Bermuda and Jamaica, whence arms and ammunition, clothing, stores and other necessaries were exported and imported, for the Seminoles, and the Creeks as well as their northern savage allies. The long arm of Great Britain extended from the Raisin to the Tombigbee. The cruelties at the latter in August, were part of the system and scale of hostilities, which, in January, sacrificed hundreds of brave Kentuckians at the former. It was after the massacre at the River Raisin, that Tecumseh made his pilgrimage of superstitious enthusiasm to arrange another massacre at Fort Mimms: and thus far his constant assurance to the savages everywhere, that they could if they would conquer the Americans, had been wonderfully successful. Why not vanquish them and free ourselves, said Tecumseh, from their yoke, their spinning wheels, ploughs, schools and clothing, emblems of our subjugation and disgrace, fetters on our limbs and our freedom? Why doubt our ability to vanquish them? We have done it in the north; at Detroit, and at the river Raisin we conquered them with ease and with glorious slaughter. Driven out of Michigan, their only remnant of a defeated army is hiding in Fort Meigs, besieged by our English allies, who assure us of its fall. My followers are at hand, whenever the great guns reduce that last retreat of the long knives to surrender, as they did at Raisin, my followers are at hand to repeat our enjoyments and vengeance at Fort Meigs. Our great father over the great water will never enslave or disturb us. Our villages will be undisturbed, our hunting-grounds unlimited by him and his people. They supply us with arms, with drinks, with blankets, with tobacco, and ask nothing in return. They do not try to convert us to their customs, or drive us from our homes. It is the Americans we have to contend with, not the English, but a rapacious people, our eternal foes, with whom the English are again at war, and whom with our help they can and will drive from all the lands usurped from us by their never-ending encroachments. When England resolved on a war of unwarrantable severity, and sent Tecumseh on this mission, the south-west was the place deemed most vulnerable. That was always Jackson's sagacious opinion, realized next year by the grand invasion of Louisiana. While we were waging border war by little incursions on frontier forts and detached places in Canada, Great Britain resolved on *continental* and terrific operations. Indians and slaves were her

fulcrum, from the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Champlain, on which the lever of transatlantic force was to work, to dispossess the United States of their southern and western territories from Florida, including all Louisiana, to the shores of Ontario. From that human fulcrum, Great Britain wielded inhuman war, so proclaimed by herself, against a kindred people, large numbers of whom nevertheless revered her as the bulwark of piety and civilization. Such was the enormous magnitude, enormous in the means and in the end, the great scale of operations, by which England was to throw back the United States to the period of Washington's administration, when she withheld the frontier posts, in violation of the peace of 1783. In 1803 the United States purchased Louisiana by what the conquerors of France might pronounce a fraudulent title to Spanish property. The Indians and the slaves were to be instruments for restoring all those vast dominions to former owners, at any rate to dislodge the United States. Who can read the modern history of Poland, Italy, Flanders, the East and West Indies, and doubt the design of Great Britain to hem this country within the Ohio, west, bounded by hordes of savages under English protectorate, and by the sea, east, commanded by British fleets? It was the belligerent right of Great Britain to do so, as it is the duty of American history to expose the daring and dreadful policy by which that right was to be realized. The war of 1812 provoked and defeated that great attempt. Thirty years of peace, the gain of that war, have enlarged, enriched and strengthened the American Union with many states, carved out of the regions then contended for, with many millions of masters and slaves to cultivate the exuberant soil, till now a war of staples and slavery is threatened by the Texas question, instead of the war of savages and slaves which then laid waste those regions.

The massacre of Fort Mimms at once precipitated these designs to a crisis. The people and the governments of the contiguous states, Georgia and Tennessee, and of those convenient, South and North Carolina, instantly acted with excellent decision, before it was possible to furnish the means, hardly to give orders from the seat of federal government. In war, the well-being of popular government requires that each sovereignty act in its own sphere, and perform the constitutional duty prescribed to it. Irregularities of action betray infirmities which are not inherent in the system. The communities and governments of the states

of Georgia and Tennessee faced the emergency with alacrity and energy, similar to what was displayed in Ohio, Kentucky and Pennsylvania. If Massachusetts had done so, British power would have disappeared from this continent. At the same time, however, without disaffection, popular or military refusal to march anywhere, the difficulties and delays of hasty levies for short terms, with still greater insubordination than at the north, disturbed the southern operations. Yet such is the power of popular good will that the greatest commander of that war, General Jackson, sprang from a spontaneous meeting of the people at Nashville, on the 17th of September, 1813; immediately seconded by act of the legislature of Tennessee, on the 27th of that month, one week after the popular impulse, appropriating \$200,000 and 3,500 militia or volunteers, placed at Jackson's disposal to carry war wherever he might deem proper to inflict condign punishment on the enemy who perpetrated the massacre at Mimms, ravaged and threatened their borders. The federal government soon adopted the men and reimbursed the money. Riddance of the country from savages theretofore the terror, if not the masters of it, was mainly effected by local, popular and state action, consummated by operations of the federal government. The part each one performed, the appropriate function of each, are lessons of that conflict which cannot be too durably impressed on the American mind. While it is one of the most unquestionable and gratifying demonstrations of the war of 1812, that the states saved the United States in several emergencies, it is equally true that excessive state or popular action embarrassed and endangered the Union; and that it is by the harmonious adjustment of all the elements, popular, state and federal, that national safety, dignity and vindication are accomplished. If obliged to wait the orders, forces and contributions of the federal government, the Creek war would never have been crushed as it was in one victorious campaign. Yet that campaign proved, even without state or popular disaffection, that something more than six months militia and volunteers is indispensable to general safety and welfare. In the fiscal operations of American confederated government, its direct and unobstructed action produced revenues which paid not only the expenses of the war, and all its debts, but prior obligations. In military operations, the American force, although divided between federal and state sovereignty, is adequate to every exigency, when well administered by the federal, and not

unconstitutionally resisted by state authority. The war of 1812 exhibited to advantage that balanced and complicated machinery of popular government, which, least understood and most disparaged in Europe, is apt to be contemned where it is incomprehensible. The defects and hinderances which appeared, both east and south, in the war faculties of American government, were not in the machinery, but the workmen, whose deficiencies were often glaring, whether governors or soldiers.

On the 3d of November, General Coffee, detached by General Jackson to the Tallushatchee towns, with his brigade of 900 men, crossed Coosey river at the fish-dam ford not far from Tenislands—the mounted riflemen under Colonel Cannon, the cavalry commanded by Colonel Allcorn, the action commenced by Captain Hammond and Lieutenant Patterson's companies—attacked the savages near their town, soon after sunrise, routed and either killed or captured 200 of them, who fought with savage fury, and met death without shrinking or complaining, no one asking to be spared, but fighting around and in their dwellings, to which they were driven, as long as they could stand or sit. In consequence of flying to their houses and mixing with their families, some of their squaws and children were unintentionally killed or wounded, to the great regret, said General Coffee, of every officer and soldier of the detachment. Not a single warrior escaped to tell the news: eighty-four women and children were captured. The American loss was five killed and forty-one wounded, a number with arrows, which the Indians shot in the intervals between firing and reloading their guns. On this first blow, General Jackson wrote to Governor Blount: We have retaliated for the destruction of Fort Mimms. On the 7th of November, 1813, he followed up' this by another severe blow. Learning that Lashly's fort (Talladega) about thirty miles below his encampment, was threatened by the Creeks encamped near it, the general, leaving his baggage-wagons and all other impediments behind, crossed the Coosa at Ten Islands, and resting for the night within six miles of the enemy, without waiting for General White, whom he had dispatched an express for, at sunrise next morning attacked the Indians within a quarter of a mile of the fort. After a sharp conflict they were totally routed, two hundred and ninety slain, and Jackson thought that his success would have equaled Coffee's by killing every one of them, but for a momentary *faux pas* of his militia, quickly made

good, however, by a reserve of cavalry kept in hand by General Jackson, and soon after atoned for by good conduct of the militia themselves. Nor was General White idle. On the 18th November, 1813, with 300 of his mounted Tennessee volunteers under Colonel Burch, and 300 Cherokees under Colonel Morgan, he surprised, surrounded and captured 251 Creeks at the Hillabee towns, killing sixty-five with the bayonet, but sparing all who held up a white flag of surrender, without losing one of our men. The troops under General White visited the very heart of the Creek nation where the red sticks for war were first distributed. On the 29th November, 1813, General Floyd, with 950 Georgia militia, and between three and four hundred friendly Indians, attacked the Creeks at Autossee on the Tallapoosa, their largest and best town, the Creek metropolis, containing four hundred regularly built houses, constructed on consecrated ground, according to their barbarous rites, for which they fought with great but unavailing valour, presenting themselves at every point with fanatical bravery. The friendly Indians, the Cowetans under McIntosh, and Toohabatchians, under Mad Dog's son, also fought at that battle with dauntless intrepidity. Warriors from eight to ten towns, like the Greeks in nations before Troy, headed by kings and princes, contended for Autossee; where one king and another king's brother were among the slain, and four hundred houses, filled with valuable contents, reduced to ashes. The Indians, in order to rescue their dead from falling into the hands of the Americans, threw them piled in heaps along the bank of the river, thence to be carried away or otherwise saved, if possible: more faithful to decent solemnities than the English, who repeatedly left their dead unburied to the care of their enemies. The American loss in that affair was eleven killed and fifty-four wounded.

On the 23d of December, 1813, Brigadier-General Claiborne attacked Econochaca, on Holy-Ground, a town of 200 houses, occupied by a large body of Creeks, commanded by Weathersford, a half-breed chief, prominent at the massacre of Fort Mimms, who, being aware of our approach, chose his own position, but was put to flight, with the loss of thirty men killed, and the town burned, containing very large quantities of stores and provisions. Next day General Claiborne burned another Indian town of sixty houses, the residence of Weatherford, Francis and the Choctaw Siquister's son, who were all three prophets; the

conflagration of their consecrated towns, and devastation of their crops, serving to disenchant the victims of these impostors. What was much more important here, however, was the capture of written evidence of Spanish interference in the war at this charmed town. It was one of those sequestered nearly inaccessible fastnesses in the centre of swamps, environed by ravines, which it was extremely difficult to approach, on the Alabama, above the mouth of the Cahawba, about eighty-five miles above Fort Stoddert. Three Shawnees were killed, a number of boats burned, and an important letter from Manrique, the Governor of Pensacola, to the Creeks, dated there the 29th of September, 1813, taken and sent by General Claiborne to Governor Blount. The Spanish governor writes to the savages that he had heard with great satisfaction by their letters of August, of the advantages the brave warriors had gained over their enemies; and had represented to the captain-general at Havana the request they made of him for arms and munitions, which I hope, wrote the governor, he will send me. As soon as he does, you shall be informed. I am thankful for the provisions and warriors you have generously offered with which to retake Mobile, which you ask me if we have given up to the Americans. I answer no: but at present I cannot profit by your kind offer, as we are not at war with them. They did not take Mobile by force, but purchased it from the wretch in command. As it does not belong to the Americans, their possession gives them no title to it. Wherefore your proposal to burn the town would injure not them, but the Spanish owners. I have directed presents to be given to the bearers of your letter, and remain for ever your good father and friend. With Proctor's baggage, captured on the Thames, were found numerous letters from various British officers, written in the north at the same time that this Spanish treachery was in progress in the south, all this detected correspondence, north and south, turning chiefly on the English reliance on Indian help. One of the letters from Robert McDouall to Proctor says, "our Indians prove themselves right worthy and right useful auxiliaries. Macbeth says, 'tis the eye of childhood that fears a painted devil." But it is so far lucky that our opponents are mere infants in the sublime art of war. As you are, perhaps, encumbered with too many mouths, you might prevail on two or three hundred more of your swarthy warriors to

join us here. They would be invaluable under our present circumstances." Another such letter from the half-breed Elliot to Proctor says, "eight Munceys left us to reconnoitre at the Miami Rapids, and yesterday returned with a scalp." What may be called this cross fire between the English Canadian, and Spanish Floridian authorities, was unintermitted. On the 26th of November, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowyer wrote from Mobile to General Claiborne, "I have this moment received a letter from Captain Alexis, commanding at Mobile Point, stating that a large British expedition has arrived at Pensacola, consisting of seven sail of vessels and two bomb vessels; some of the brigs have 200 men on board. The communication to Pensacola by land is cut off by a large body of Indians."

This scarcely concealed concert of action between the Spanish colonial and English authorities was continued throughout all the years 1813 and 1814, until broken up by General Jackson, as part of his plan for preserving New Orleans. Not only did the United States stand alone in the contest with Great Britain, without aid or even the good will of any other nation; but Spain was in offensive alliance with England against us, at least as far as lending her ports and governors, with supplies of arms, to minister to the most flagrant annoyance England inflicted.

Disabled by a broken arm, from a wound received in one of those murderous quarrels of common occurrence on motley peopled frontiers, where men, women and children lived under arms, whose constant use occasioned their frequent abuse, Jackson, panting for martial adventure, having long been the commanding-general of the Tennessee militia, when nearly fifty years old started from his couch to overtake renown. From a sick chamber, mounting his horse, he plunged, at the head of undisciplined bands, into untrodden deserts and swamps, known only to the wild landlords of those haunts; whence they issued to terrify the borders of several states, holding their towns and seats of government in perpetual alarm of Indian marauding forays. Marching his troops over mountains and great rivers, penetrating deep morasses and savage sequestrations, Jackson outstripped in speed the marvelously swift, and in stratagem the wiliest of barbarians. He chased from their hiding places, crushed in their consecrated towns, vanquished, humbled, and annihilated the fighting men of the fiercest clan of more than fifty Indian tribes, and reduced the

remnant to abject submission, breaking the Indian power on this continent forever. Three prophets were killed, one Monohoe, by a bullet in the mouth, as if to falsify his vaticination, and punish an impostor, who promised invulnerability to all his followers. Warriors, princes, and kings fell under grapeshot and the bayonet. Many large and well-constructed, consecrated towns, the abodes of kings and prophets, flourishing settlements, with all their cornfields, crops and abundance of provisions, were conflagrated. The torch consumed the homes, a conqueror's hoof trampled upon the ashes of a vanquished people, driven at last to their admirable entrenchment at the Horse-Shoe, or Emuchfau, where in desperate encounter their fort was stormed and they were extirpated, some in cold blood the day after the battle. The barbarous but sonorous words of Taladega, Autossee, Emuchfau, Enotichopo, Tokopeka, more euphonious than most English names of places, gave titles to battles: towns called Oakfuskee, Hillabee, Eufalle, Coweta, Touchabatche, Haithlawalee, on noble streams designated as Tombigbee, Coosa, Cahawba, Alabama, Apalachicola, were the scenes of these campaigns, where now hundreds of thousands of white masters and black slaves cultivate the cotton that clothes the world, holds the Eastern and Southern United States together, and colonizes Great Britain to their staples, commerce, products, navigation and manufactures.

The Creek or southwestern campaign, which lasted about six months, from the massacre at Fort Mimms, the 30th August, 1813, to the storming of the Horse-Shoe the 28th March, 1814, was conducted mostly by the volunteers and militia of Georgia and Tennessee. But few regular soldiers took part in it. Nearly the whole service was obtained from fluctuating and irresponsible levies, eager for enterprise and fond of exploit, but averse to obedience, intractable to discipline, incapable of fortitude, disdainng patience, defying control. Militia are like the feudal parade by knights' service, before war became a modern science with gunpowder, firearms, and standing armies, when every man was bound to serve his quarantine of forty days, equipped and mounted at his own expense, and choosing their own dukes or leaders. Such was the only legitimate feudality, upon which royal encroachments and usurpations continually trespassed, till the primitive militiaman became a mercenary and veteran soldier under leaders not of his choice. It was a sort of revival of the

first military tenure which, at the outbreak of the French Revolution, attracted enthusiastic volunteers to the field, who, from their own ranks, selected and promoted future marshals, several of them with more courage and talents than their vanquisher, who, at the great battle of Waterloo, crowned his fortunate career by conquering their immense emperor. Such was war at first, and such it will always be. The splendid and squalid chivalry of the middle ages intervened, the admiration of modern romance and burthen of song. Between the slight beginning and arbitrary end of military tenure, which is the happy republican American mean? Volunteers and militia for short terms, imperfectly organized, all, according to the judgment of Washington and Jackson, are infirm of purpose and unfit for reliance. Yet, like juries in courts of justice, they are the basis of the whole. With these raw materials, Jackson achieved his bright career. Without probably having ever heard a volley of musketry, or knowledge of arms beyond a duel, a brawl, perhaps an Indian surprise; without any knowledge but from the tuition of mother-wit, but without fear either physical or moral, bold to desperation, yet wary to the utmost discretion, ferocious as a tiger in battle, gentle as a lamb in victory, serious, studious, indefatigable, and infinite in precaution, that extraordinary man was capable of prodigies of prowess. History hardly records two such sanguinary triumphs within twelve months, as Jackson's at Emuchfau and New Orleans. Much more numerous armies have fought with much greater slaughter. But, in the first, to use his own words, he exterminated his red enemy, and in the last routed his white enemy, with disproportion of destruction unexampled. The ratio of deaths when he stormed the Indian entrenchments, and when the English attempted to storm his lines, was nearly three hundred of his enemies killed to a single one of his soldiers. Assailant and defendant, he had this transcendent success. Indian wars schooled him for European; his untried sword, fleshed in the blood of red men, was dyed deep in that of whites. Nothing was wanting to his amazing triumphs, but that Wellington instead of Pakenham, as was at first intended, should have headed the invasion of Louisiana, that Jackson might tear from the brow of Napoleon's conqueror, the laurels of Waterloo. The Creek campaign of 1813 brought forth those striking features of masculine and even mighty character, after-

wards, through life and death, so powerfully developed ; a combination of wisdom without learning, passion with gentleness, animosity with benevolence, devotion with destruction, homicide with homily, seldom, if ever, seen in any man, and forming one of Roman or remote antiquity. Jackson wore the helmet with the cowl, like some mitred warrior of the darkest age, or, still further from present temperaments, like the Roman dictator, first as high priest, sacrificing to the gods, then as military chief destroying all enemies. Description is unequal to represent either the wild scenery of this campaign, or the wilder exploits of the man, without a relative and without a fear, a solitary man of faith, like the Roman centurion's faith, greater than all other men's, entire faith in God and in his country, incapable of doubt, insensible to danger, triumphant over every obstacle, not excepting death, and accomplishing undertakings for which science or ordinary talents would have proved of no avail. The general of such troops, in such hostilities, must be his own aid-de-camp, adjutant, commissary, clerk and composer of constant written appeals to the passions of his own camp, often more formidable than his enemies. Sharing all their privations, cheerful in hardship, cultivating, in every way, the regard of his men, Jackson, nevertheless, was condemned to perpetual commotions, revolts, and jeopardy. Individuals, companies, regiments, brigades, deserted in open day and in open defiance of his authority. After every resort to perilous attempts at control, he was forced to try the unheard-of severity of executing a militiaman, sentenced by court martial to death, in the midst of the wilderness. Even that fatal rigour did not intimidate the soldiery, whose masses melted almost into dissolution, leaving hardly more than the general and other officers, at the mercy of the remorseless savages in the desert. Before the volunteers and militia quite disappeared, Jackson contrived to make another excursion into the Indian settlements, where, by a series of attacks on the 22d and 23d January, 1814, he routed them again with the loss of 189 warriors left dead on the field, besides many more killed and wounded. It was in these actions that his most distinguished pupils, Generals Coffee and Carroll, with a few other noble-spirited officers, deserted by their men, large numbers of whom had gone home in spite of every exertion by persuasion or force to retain them, or to supply their places in time—Generals Coffee and Car-

roll, with a few other officers, embodied themselves and fought in a corps of volunteers, without privates. It was there that Lieutenant Armstrong ejaculated those words of heroic inspiration, which, like Lawrence's on ship-board, become national rallying terms. After, with his own hands, assisted by his men, dragging cannon to the top of an eminence, and there gallantly serving it, Armstrong, when shot down, called to his comrades, "My brave fellows, some of you must fall, but you must save the cannon." An expression somewhat similar, applied to the Union, was, long after, Jackson's happy inspiration. To fall or even to speak well for a country, seldom fails to be remembered, but is almost always rewarded, whether the patriot be living or dead, by national plaudits, favours of government, historical memorials, and the admiration of mankind.

By all these reverses the Creeks, deprived of large numbers of their warriors, many of their towns and settlements, much of their confidence in themselves and their false prophets, were reduced to great distress, and took refuge at last in intrenchments, where their final overthrow was completed in the following March by Jackson's storming their fortress at the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers.

Not till they were nearly extirpated, did the brave savages, seduced from partial civilization back to their horrid lives, begin to perceive the madness which tempted them to European alliances, much worse than to be conquered by Americans. As long as they were of any use, England and Spain persisted in this cruel instigation. Without the least cause for dissatisfaction, the northern and southern Indians, over a space of 1500 miles from Toronto to Pensacola, were confederated in shocking hostilities, which ended in their subjection, dispersion and extinction or deportation. The gallant and indignant south-west succeeded not only in humbling the savages, but eventually in the signal discomfiture at New Orleans of those who put the tomahawk and scalping knife in the hands of ignorant barbarians, till then, by many years of assiduous culture, soothed to tranquillity and progressive in civilization. The second seizure of Pensacola from Spain, in 1817, and execution of two British subjects, hung by Jackson for intermeddling with the Florida Indians, without either Great Britain or Spain retaliating for such extreme measures, the justice of which could not be gainsaid, were but parts of the

sequel and retribution for English and Spanish misdemeanor there in 1813. It was not only Jackson's design, but he had made the preparatory reconnoissance, and taken the necessary steps, for carrying this reaction as far as the capture of Havana. His bold and far-sighted schemes, few of whose most desperate enterprises ever failed, to deprive both Spain and England of the finest island in the world for their united instigation of savages and slaves to ravage the United States, may yet be penalty to be paid for European injustice to America in the year 1813.

After the battles of Tallishatchee and Talladega, the army of General Jackson crumbled to pieces. Nearly the whole of his volunteer infantry returned home, insisting that their time of service expired on the 10th of December, two months after their rendezvous at Nashville. The general did not discharge them, but left the decision with the Governor of Tennessee. The force remaining at Fort Strother, Ten Islands of Coosa, amounted to about 1500 men, chiefly drafted militia; nearly the whole entitled to discharge in less than a month. Not more than 150 or 200 (attached to the general personally, and remaining through motives of affection) were left with him. The brigade of cavalry volunteers and mounted riflemen, under the command of Colonel Coffee, being ordered into the settlements to recruit their horses for a few days and procure new ones, only half, perhaps 800, appeared at the day and place of rendezvous; and of these not more than 600 would consent to stay: about *half* of this last number *old* volunteer cavalry, the rest newly-raised mounted men. Yet General Jackson was ordered by General Pinckney to garrison and maintain every inch of ground he gained, while thus all the active exertions of the campaign were paralyzed.—General Cocke returned to east Tennessee, to collect a new levy; General Roberts from west Tennessee, marched out about 250 men. Colonel Carroll, inspector-general of the army, five or six hundred: but to serve not longer than three months. With this system of short service, wretched, inefficient and expensive above all others, Jackson still hoped to occupy till spring the ground he had won; but had no army sufficient to effect the complete discomfiture and prostration of the Creek power, becoming every day a work of greater difficulty. The English had appeared in force at Pensacola; seven sail, having troops on board, besides two bomb vessels. Orleans was menaced; Mobile in great

danger. The force on the Tombigbee remained stationed there, the 3d regiment of regulars ascending the Alabama, was called thither also, which gave the Creeks breathing time, and reduced the force necessary to crush them. There was every reason to apprehend that Augustine would be occupied by British troops, and from all points arms, ammunition, men and leaders pushed to the aid of the upper and middle Creeks; and that the Seminoles with runaway negroes among them, would be turned loose upon the sea coast of Georgia. About the end of the year 1813, General Jackson was also extremely short of provisions, which General Claiborne was transporting to him. General Floyd was on the Tallapoosa about 80 miles from Jackson, who had few reliable men left with him besides Captain Gordon's company of spies, and Captain Deadrick's artillery; altogether not more than 150 old troops. He called loudly for men enlisted for the campaign, or at least for six months' service. At last, Colonel William's regiment, the 39th regulars, twelve-month's men, were ordered to his assistance.

The south-western campaign of constant and complete victories was no series of either cheap, rapid, or easy conquest. The resistance of the Circassians to Russia, in Caucasus, of the Afghans to Great Britain, in India, of the Florida Indians, a few of whom for many years foiled the United States, and in the year 1813, Spanish guerilla resistance to the armies of France, which well-informed Spaniards believe would have been more effectual without English assistance, when the best French troops and officers were withdrawn for the invasion of Russia, show what a united and exasperated people can do, however comparatively few, unskilled in war, and unprovided with its materials, against the most imposing invader. Handfuls of martial men, defending wild, wooded and mountainous regions, are as effective and formidable in little warfare, as great and combined armies for great warfare. The downfall of the Creek Indians was attributable, like Napoleon's, to indomitable and overweening confidence. If content to roam the wilderness in small bands, and be assassins instead of warriors, they would have been longer invincible, might indeed have been crowned with success, and at all events could have protracted hostilities till another year, when a large British army landed upon their shores. And it was uncertain where its attack would take place.

Jackson's high temper was much excited by the difficulties he encountered : not those of the battle or even the camp, so much as from the inherent vice of short levies, frequent changes, and the never-failing disadvantages of reliance on mere voluntary soldiers. In his first general orders, issued before he left Nashville, strongly inculcating subordination, obedience and discipline, he endeavoured to rouse southern pride by holding up northern militia misconduct to reprobation. But he found his own career arrested by the same infirmity, though it appeared in a somewhat different form. The high standing of Tennessee for patriotism is tarnished, said he, by miscreants, whose sole object is popularity and aggrandizement. In these unmeasured terms did he denounce following popularity in the first stage of a career, which endowed him with more of it than fell to the share of any other man of his time.

In a letter to General William Cocke, a venerable gentleman of sixty-five, who attended Jackson in his roughest encounters, you have seen, said the indignant general, how these would-be patriots, these town-meeting boasters, men who will not act themselves, but find fault with everything, have been destroying their country. I find that those who talk most of war, and make the most bustle about injured rights at home, are the last to step forward in vindication of those rights. Patriotism is an appendage which they wear as a coquette does a ribbon, merely for show, to be laid aside, or applied, as necessity may require. In this language lay the germs of personal enmities, which all his triumphs could not soften ; but which he wisely defied with as little hesitation as he did firearms in battle. With these views of the difficulties of that campaign, corresponding with the experience of all military enterprises by raw troops, especially those whose time of service elapses before they can be disciplined, yet the basis, if not the bulwark of national defence, we may pass to its conclusion. It became indispensable to strengthen Jackson with militia, drafted from North and South Carolina, before offensive operations could be resumed in Alabama. 1200 men from North Carolina, commanded by Colonel Pearson, brother of Joseph Pearson, one of the members of Congress from that state, with part of the 8th regiment of regular infantry, one rifle company, and two troops of dragoons, were stationed at Fort Hawkins, and at the different forts erected by General Floyd in other parts of the Creek nation. Still, supplies were deficient on which the

best and bravest soldiers are dependent for success; and which were extremely difficult of procurement and transportation in those rude regions, without roads or other common means. At length, however, all General Pinckney and General Jackson's arrangements were completed: and shortly before Congress adjourned that session, we received at Washington the characteristic dispatches of both these generals, with the joyful, though dreadful end of the Creek war. While the sigh of humanity, said General Pinckney in his official letter to Governor Peter Early, of Georgia, while the sigh of humanity will escape for profuse effusion of human blood, which results from the savage principle of our enemy, neither to give nor accept quarter—with acknowledgment to the military talents of General Jackson, supported by the distinguished valour and good conduct of the troops he commanded, we have ample cause of gratitude to the Giver of all victory for thus continuing his protection to our women and children, who would otherwise be exposed to the indiscriminate havoc of the tomahawk, and all the horrors of savage warfare. In such humane, yet determined terms, wrote one of these excellent officers. From the battle-ground in the bend of the Tallapoosa, the other, General Jackson, wrote, I reached the head near Emuchfau, called by the whites the Horse-Shoe, on my expedition to the Tallapoosa yesterday. I found the strength of the neighbouring towns, Oakfuskee, Oakehoga, New Yaacau, Hillibeets, the Fish-pond and Eufalee towns, to the number, it is said, of 1000 collected, expecting our approach. It is difficult to conceive a situation more eligible for defence than they had chosen, or rendered more secure than by the skill with which they erected their breastwork; extending from five to eight feet high across the point, so that a force approaching it would be exposed to a double fire, while they lay in perfect security behind. *Determining to exterminate them*, Jackson attempted to carry the place by other means than storming it, before he gave the order for assault, for which the men were waiting with impatience and hailed with acclamation. The history of warfare furnishes few instances of more brilliant attack; the regulars, led by their intrepid and skilful commander, Colonel Williams, and the gallant Major Montgomery, the militia of the venerable General Doherty's brigade, with a vivacity and firmness which would have done honour to regulars, the whole in the midst of

a tremendous fire, stormed the works. 557 Indians were left dead in the peninsula, a great number killed by the horsemen attempting to cross the river, who concealed themselves under its banks. The fighting continued five hours, till night. Sixteen Indians were killed next day who had concealed themselves. Not more than twenty escaped: 250 prisoners, all women and children but two or three men, were taken. Our loss was 25 killed and 106 wounded. Thus, as Jackson wrote, the massacre at Fort Mimms was retaliated, the Creek warriors exterminated, their power forever broken. In order to get to Emuchfau he had to open a passage from the 24th to the 27th of March, of more than fifty-two miles over the ridges, dividing the two rivers, before he reached the ground of his former battles on the 22d and 23d of January. Nature seldom affords such a place for defence, nor did barbarians ever render one more secure by art than Emuchfau. Their works were compact, strong and high, with double rows of port holes artfully arranged in their wall, commanding a peninsula of from eighty to a hundred acres. They maintained the contest through the port-holes, muzzle to muzzle, welding some of their balls to the bayonets of our muskets, fighting to the last with the bravery of despair. The whole margin of the river was strewed with Indians slain, as at New Orleans the front of Jackson's lines was covered with English.— Among the dead was found Monshoe, the prophet, killed by a grape shot in the mouth. Two other prophets were also killed. The Cherokees with Jackson had 18 killed and 36 wounded, the friendly Creeks 5 killed and 11 wounded; for their civil war endured from first to last of this contest. Williams' regular regiment had 53 wounded and 19 killed, among them Major Montgomery, Lieutenants Somerville and Moulton. Captain Bradford, of the 17th regiment of regular infantry, officiating as chief engineer, superintended the firing of the cannon. The militia, orderly on march and in encampment, were as brave as the bravest in this battle.

In a few days, Jackson marched his victorious troops to the Hickory grounds. The country at large acknowledged the bravery and good conduct of all of them, regulars, volunteers, and militia, Georgians and Tennesseans engaged in the campaign thus terminated, though parts of the United States, perhaps the opposition generally, imputed ferocity and cruelty to the southern

and western soldiery. But what hostilities are without ferocity? or battle without cruel homicides? Desperate fanaticism stimulated the Indians to terrible excesses, and just principles of retribution required retaliation. As General Pinckney's dispatch stated, they neither give nor take quarter, nor make prisoners. Extermination is their rule, and with tortures. The savage spirit is at once barbarous and heroic, detestable and admirable. In their only southern triumph, at Fort Mimms, not a soul was saved alive but the few that escaped: women, children, and all, were atrociously put to dreadful death. Hundreds of families, those ingrates, in return for kind treatment, drove from their homes and hunted like wild beasts, covered with mourning or with rags. An excited people flocked from all parts to revenge these monstrous wrongs, regretting that at least till another year, they could not punish their instigators. When it was said then that the south-western Americans behaved as ill as the English on the north-western frontier, by murdering the wounded and prisoners, it was forgotten that the unhappy victims at Raisin had surrendered and were shielded by capitulation, when sacrificed. Not only the rules of civilized war, but the plighted faith of British officers protected and should have saved, when they were permitted to be massacred in cold blood. The battle of Emuchfau was no doubt terrible vengeance for the massacre at Fort Mimms, and many other cruelties which it was necessary to retaliate. The only part of the execution obnoxious to censure, however, was killing the sixteen Indians found concealed the day after the fort was stormed, who, if they could have been safely secured, might, as prisoners, have added more lustre to our arms than as slain.

Immediately after the storming of Emuchfau, the great body of the hostile Creeks, not garrisoned there, dispersed and fled precipitately towards the Spanish forts of St. Marks and Pensacola. Many were killed in their flight by Colonel Russell's detachment, among them the prophet Francis. At the Hickory grounds, they fled from Jackson's approach and sent proposals of peace on unconditional terms, on the 18th April, being then driven to great distress. McQueen, with still 500 adherents, fell back on the Escambia river, near Pensacola. A number of towns surrendered unconditionally. The chief of Cowetan,

with Marshall, a half-breed, repaired to Washington early in May, to consult the president as to the disposition of the Creek lands, forfeited by their misconduct. The most striking, however, and characteristic circumstance of the submission of these unhappy savages was Weathersford's immolation of himself for the rest of his countrymen. He led the attack at Fort Mimms, and was one of the chief perpetrators in its atrocities. After the storming of Emuchfau, General Jackson required that he should be surrendered for execution, as is always customary, in fact the rule, when Indian murders are committed. The Creek war began by our agent insisting on the surrender of some of the first to commit outrages on our people. The question whether they should be given up, was the issue of war or peace between the patriot and peace parties. The vanquished but fearless chieftain, Weathersford, still reeking with the blood of the Mimms massacre, disdaining to be taken captive for surrender to the conquerors of his country, and escaping all General Jackson's efforts to take him, nobly resolved on a much bolder alternative, which proved, as such resorts often do, the means of his security and honour. Contriving to elude all Jackson's sentinels and guards, he made good his entrance unperceived to the general's presence; amazed at such a guest, but always collected and, as with savages is especially necessary, betraying no movement of surprise. "General," said the brave barbarian, "I have fought you with all my might, and done all the harm I could. But you have conquered. I am in your power, to do with as you will. I have only to lament the misfortunes of my people. For myself I am prepared for any fate. Behold me in your presence, but not at your feet; your captive, but no supplicant." Jackson was too generous, too wise, too politic, to take the life of such a prisoner, or do him any harm. He treated him with respect, won him by kindness, and made good use of him in engaging others of his nation to throw themselves on the victor's mercy.

As Marius overthrew his swarthy foes in Numidia in frequent battles, and with prodigious disparity of internecion, Jackson exterminated the Creeks, capturing their chief, as Jugurtha was at last made prisoner. The names of the Numidian battlegrounds are wild and barbarous, like those in Alabama. And when Weathersford abruptly appeared in Jackson's tent at midnight, the general, undisturbed by so alarming a visitor, calm,

collected, commanding, reminds us of Marius and the assassin sent to put him to death, awed by his stern countenance and lofty inquiry whether he dared kill Caius Marius, retiring, unable to execute his office.

Early in May the Tennessee troops returned home, after completing their triumphant campaign, proud of their exploits. The North and South Carolina militia, together with some of the regulars, remained to garrison the Creek country, termed the Nation, at the fork of Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers, where once stood one of the few antiquities of that uncultivated region, an old French fort called Toulouse. In place of it General Pinckney who, by this time, joined General Jackson, caused a new fort to be built there and called it after the brave Tennessee commander, Jackson. About the same time that these arrangements were making at that American Toulouse, the last of the French armies driven out of Spain, was bravely, under Marshal Soult, but in vain, fighting the battle of Toulouse, in the south of France, where the Duke of Wellington effected his triumphant entry into that country, and overthrew the greatest of modern commanders. On the 18th April, 1814, Jackson wrote to Governor Blount, from the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa : The campaign is drawing to a prosperous close. We have scoured the Coosa and Tallapoosa and intervening country. Part of the enemy escaped over the latter and fled in consternation to Pensacola. But many of the former have come in, and others are hourly coming to surrender. We will overtake the fugitives and make them feel that there is no more safety in flight than resistance. They must supplicate for peace if they wish to enjoy it. Many negroes taken at Fort Mimms, and one white woman are delivered up, with her two children. The Tallapoosa king is here confined. The Tostahatchee king of the Hickory ground, has delivered himself up. Weathersford has been with me, but I did not confine him. McQueen was taken but escaped. Hilinghagee, their great prophet, has absconded, but we will catch him. Such is the situation of the savage instigators of the war.

Part of the regular troops under Colonel Russell, being stationed at Fort Jackson, (the first time of many hundreds that name began to be gratefully conferred on places and persons,) the rest were marched to the seaboard, and some of them fixed at Mobile, where General Jackson's head-quarters were after-

wards established. The Carolina militia, garrisoned the intermediate places till their term of service expired. General Pinckney and Colonel Hawkins arrived about the 20th of April, 1814, at Fort Jackson. The once happy and haughty Creek nation presented a melancholy and distressing spectacle. Their sufferings are indescribable, most of them never witnessed by any but themselves, draining the dregs of humiliation, many reduced by famine to mere skeletons; others, through hunger and fear, became lunatics. The face of the country and the people was changed from plenty and peace, to poverty, starvation, wretchedness and ruin. The humanity of American government was conspicuous on this sad occasion for it. Every effort was made to mitigate the sufferings of the dejected savages. To such a pitch was their madness of fanaticism carried, that they had thrown away their hoes and other agricultural implements—taught to regard civilization as their greatest calamity, every trace of it was destroyed. The humane and intelligent of England could not have been aware of the distress of these abused savages.

The splendid vernal daylight of Alabama, clearer than even Italian sunshine, was contrasted at the period of these events by accounts of one of those dismal days in London, which so strongly contrast with American atmosphere. A fog so dense and oppressive shrouded that great metropolis, that very few persons ventured out, except on pressing business; and no sound was heard out of doors but the voice of the watchman, or the noise of some solitary carriage, cautiously feeling its way through the gloom. It extended as far as the Downs, a distance of 70 miles, and far in other directions. The wind in the interval blew uniformly from the north-east. There had been nothing like this fog since the great earthquake at Lisbon, half a century before. The fog then lasted eight days. To a person who went up to London from a clear open country, during two or three days, it seemed as if descending into a coal-pit, to see persons walking with a little torch or a candle at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, trying to find out in their own street, their own habitation, and some of them so bewildered as to knock at their neighbours' doors, to ask where their own houses were. Some of the public stages and coaches were obliged to be left in the road, and their horses taken out—many were overturned and several people injured. Several persons having missed their way, fell into the rivers and canals,

and were drowned. The mail coaches which reached London were many hours belated, the passengers obliged to get out, and the drivers to lead their horses.

Soon after the first successes of Generals Floyd, White and Jackson, there were appearances of a favourable change in the conduct of the Spanish authorities of Florida. In February Colonel Hawkins had advices from a runner sent to the Seminoles that the Governor of Pensacola, in a talk with the chiefs of their villages, had said to them, that being an uninformed people, they ought to be advised by their elders, and help them to put down the prophets, who were injuring them by falsehoods. They had deceived, divided and ruined the nation. It had misapplied the powder he gave them to hunt provisions with. If the English came, they would be driven away by the Americans. They had deceived the Indians before, and would again. The deception practised on him, this Spanish governor said, was through the fears of his under officers, who urged him to alliance with the prophet's party, and to supply them with ammunition.

Perhaps the Spaniards were never more than passive instruments of England in these hostilities. But toward the conclusion of the Creek campaign, the British fleets and forces began to threaten that formidable descent which was effected in the autumn. Though their reliance on the savages had failed then, that on the slaves remained in full belief of its realization. General Pinckney was kept throughout the summer of 1813, continually alarmed by English designs on the slave population. Proclamations were sent ashore by Admiral Cochrane, obviously addressed to the blacks; stating that all *persons* desirous of removing from the United States to Europe, or the British West Indies, upon letting it be known when and where they would embark, would find English vessels ready to receive them, with option whether to enter the army or navy, or settle wherever they chose in his Britannic majesty's dominions. On this unusual and ungenerous, if not unwarrantable method of waging war, to which the English government had recourse, signally defeated, disgraced and punished as it was, during the next year of the war, it is premature to enter in recounting the occurrences of the year 1813. The narrative, however, would be imperfect if it did not mention its first appearance. The naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Cochrane, gave formal notice to our government

that it was the prince regent's determination and orders to all his subjects to carry on a war, more barbarous, bloody and destructive, than war's civilized and recognized usages allow.

Soon after General Jackson's last before-mentioned letter, he left the Alabama army under command of General Pinckney, who joined him at the place to be called Fort Jackson. The Tennessee militia officer had now begun his race of renown. His return home was a triumphant progress.—The resignation of General Harrison enabled the president to nominate Jackson a brigadier-general and major-general by brevet in the regular army. While hesitating whether to accept that grade, having long been a major-general of militia and proved his capacity for command, the resignation of Major-General Hampton afforded an opportunity to gratify his aspiration: and Andrew Jackson, who had been postponed in order to appoint General Winchester to a brigade, became a divisionary commander, and the junior major-general in the regular army.

As the tawny, if not negro kings of Africa and parts of Asia, repaired to Rome to acknowledge fealty for the crowns they held by republican sufferance, the Creek chieftains by that campaign were constrained to visit Washington to make terms of pacification; and for territories more extensive, and far more productive than the dominions of several German sovereignties, which now give princes to Great Britain, Belgium and Portugal. At an ancient French fortress, raised in the American desert before an Englishman had put his foot in Alabama, where the Coosa and Tallapoosa united their clear streams and harmonious Indian names, the king of the Hickory grounds, Tostahatchee, was a prisoner; with a prophet, Hilligahee, and a celebrated chieftain Weathersford. These noble, though ferocious barbarians had not fled their country when in danger, as the oldest and most accomplished nobility of Europe did its finest kingdom, nor submitted till nearly exterminated, but bravely fought till the last, and even when conquered, continued still unterrified and dignified in their overthrow. If they could write their history, every page might sparkle with the exploits of heroism. Instead of which it is the task of others to record their mournful downfall and to gather it from their treaties with the United States. The significant catalogue of treaties with the Creek nation, part of the American code of laws, as ratified by the Senate of the United

States, thus records their decline : first, a treaty of peace and friendship with Washington, negotiated by General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, in 1790 ; next a treaty of *peace and friendship* negotiated by Benjamin Hawkins, George Clymer and Andrew Pickens, in 1792 ; then a treaty of *limits* negotiated by James Wilkinson, Benjamin Hawkins and Andrew Pickens in 1803 ; another such treaty arranged with General Dearborn, Secretary of War, in 1805 ; at last an agreement and *capitulation* negotiated with them by General Andrew Jackson in 1814. These treaties, formally submitted by presidents to the Senate of the United States, mark the decline of an established and proud people, more ancient than their conquerors, falling gradually from stipulations of national friendship at first to those of limits, and finally of capitulation. The last treaty with Jackson surrendered to victors much of their country and all their independence. Whereas, is the tenour of it, an unprovoked, inhuman and sanguinary war, waged by the hostile Creeks against the United States, hath been repelled, prosecuted and determined successfully on the part of the states, in conformity with principles of national justice and honourable warfare : and whereas, consideration is due to the rectitude of proceeding dictated by instructions relating to the re-establishment of peace : be it remembered, that prior to the conquest of that part of the Creek nation hostile to the United States, numberless aggressions had been committed against the peace, the property and the lives of citizens of the United States and those of the Creek nation in amity with her, at the mouth of Duck river, Fort Mimms and elsewhere, contrary to national faith and the regard due to an article of the treaty concluded at New York, in the year 1790, between the two nations ; that the United States, previous to the perpetration of such outrages, did, in order to insure future amity and concord between the Creek nation and the said states, in conformity with the stipulations of former treaties, fulfil with punctuality and good faith, her engagements to the said nation : that more than two-thirds of the whole number of chiefs and warriors of the Creek nation, disregarding the genuine spirit of existing treaties, suffered themselves to be instigated to violations of their national honour, and the respect due to a part of their own nation faithful to the United States and the principles of humanity, by impostors denominating themselves prophets, and by the duplicity and misrepresentation

of foreign emissaries, whose governments are at war, open or understood, with the United States. Wherefore, 1st, the United States demand an equivalent for all the expenses incurred in prosecuting the war to its termination, by accession of all the territory belonging to the Creek nation, within the territories of the United States lying, &c.: provided, nevertheless, that where any possession of any chief or warrior of the Creek nation, who shall have been friendly to the United States during the war, and taken an active part therein, shall be within the territory ceded by these articles to the United States, every such person shall be entitled to a reservation of land within the said territory of one mile square, to include his improvements as near the centre thereof as may be, which shall inure to the said chief or warrior and his descendants, so long as he or they shall continue to occupy the same, who shall be protected by and subject to the laws of the United States; but upon the voluntary abandonment thereof, by such possessor or his descendants, the right of occupancy or possession of said lands shall devolve to the United States, and be identified with the right of property ceded thereby.

The United States demand that the Creek nation abandon all communication, and cease to hold any intercourse with any British or Spanish post, garrison or town; and that they shall not admit among them any agent or trader, who shall not derive authority to hold commercial or other intercourse with them, by license from the president or authorized agent of the United States.

The United States demand the capture and surrender of all the prophets and instigators of the war, whether foreigners or natives, who have not submitted to the arms of the United States, and become parties to these articles of capitulation, if ever they shall be found within the territory guaranteed to the Creek nation by the second article.

The Creek nation being reduced to extreme want, and not at present having the means of subsistence, the United States, from motives of humanity, will continue to furnish gratuitously the necessaries of life until the crops of corn can be considered competent to yield the nation a supply, and will establish trading houses in the nation at the discretion of the President of the United States, and at such places as he shall direct, to enable the nation, by industry and economy, to procure clothing.

Thirty-six Indian chiefs signed at Fort Jackson this mortifying capitulation with Major-General Andrew Jackson, Adjutant-General Robert Butler, Benjamin Hawkins, United States agent for Indian affairs, and Return J. Meigs, agent for the Creek nation ; by English instigation to ferocious hostilities, compelled to yield the independence, and nearly the existence, of a noble nation deserving better fate ; which the government of the United States, by every consideration of policy and principle of honour, was bound to preserve from degradation. The fate of the Creeks is one of the most memorable lessons of the war of 1812.

Generals Pinckney and Jackson, who closed the Creek war, both natives of South Carolina, brought together at Toulouse in Alabama, after having met as members of Congress when the seat of government was at Philadelphia, were eminent Americans, the one then terminating, the other beginning, distinguished public service. Pinckney negotiated at Madrid the treaty with Spain in 1795 : Jackson that with the Creek nation in 1814. In that interval of less than twenty years the vast Spanish empire was commencing a declension which, in 1795, who could have foreseen ? The treaty then signed by Pinckney and the Prince of Peace designated the southern boundary of the United States from the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, and the middle of the channel of the river Mississippi as their western boundary. It stipulated that the high contracting parties shall, by all means in their power, maintain peace and harmony among the several Indian nations who inhabit the country, adjacent to the lines and rivers which form the boundaries of the two Floridas ; and restrain by force all hostilities on the part of the Indian nations living within their boundary ; so that Spain will not suffer her Indians to attack the citizens of the United States, nor the Indians inhabiting their territory ; that no treaty but of peace shall be made by either party, with Indians living within the boundary of the other, but endeavour to make the advantages of the Indian trade mutually common, and beneficial to each nation. No one therefore knew better than General Pinckney how that treaty was infringed by Spanish agents under English influence. That leading treaty in American diplomacy, foreign intercourse and maritime principles, stipulates, moreover, those generous rules of international government, which the United States have always maintained, together with nearly all other seafaring nations, except

Great Britain, by whom they have been constantly rejected.— Privilege of undisturbed departure without molestation after war, a principle proclaimed by English Magna Charta, restoration of property taken from pirates, security for property wrecked, free ships, free goods, free colonial trade between ports of enemies, legitimate specification of contraband articles and restriction of blockade to actual investment, no search or visitation of vessels but by boats, with only two or three men without force, were established by that treaty to be perpetual law between Spain and the United States.

Pinckney, born one of the gentry of South Carolina, educated in Europe, as most of them were before the means of education became common in this country; brought up to refinement and luxury; with numerous, opulent and elevated connections, was held in high social as well as political esteem. Jackson was alone in the world, without a relative or fortune, but of his own acquisition, or education beyond its mere rudiments. The accomplishments and elegancies of refined youth to which Pinckney was born and bred, were unknown to Jackson. After serving as a captain in the army of the Revolution, Major Pinckney (as by that service he was entitled to be called), became one of the most respectable citizens of Carolina. Washington selected him to succeed John Adams as American Minister at the court of London, where Major Pinckney was Minister Plenipotentiary in 1794, when Jay negotiated the treaty commonly known as Jay's treaty, one of the first and angriest of the controversial topics dividing American parties. After spending several years as American minister in England, (when the American representative there was not so well considered as he has been since the war of 1812, placed this country on a footing of national equality, enhancing social as well as political acceptance,) Major Pinckney was succeeded there by Rufus King. Returning home, he was elected a member of Congress, in which body he was much respected for solidity of judgment, dignity of character, consistency and candour of politics, as a distinguished member of the original federal party in its first era. Major Pinckney, General Jackson and Mr. Madison were all members of Congress together. Major Pinckney's elder brother, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, was one of the special envoys from the United States to France, afterwards candidate of the federal party for the presidency

when Jefferson was elected. Major Thomas Pinckney was chosen Governor of South Carolina ; in which office his just pride was, with the firmness for which he was remarkable, that he never exercised the much-abused power to pardon ; believing that the law, to be respected, must be enforced. Authorized by act of Congress, preparatory to war, to appoint six major-generals, President Madison, with his uniform regard to wise conciliation, selected Major Pinckney as one of them from the party opposed to his administration, and to the war. His honourable course was drawing to a close, as Jackson's great career was beginning when they met in the wilds of Alabama, at an old French fort, to dictate terms to a conquered people. Less demonstrative, communicative, fierce or commanding than General Jackson, General Pinckney was a man of tried courage and firmness, slight of person, mild, taciturn, reserved, but inflexible and high-minded. From the palaces of Madrid, and the pleasures of London, to the wilderness of Alabama, and the privations of Fort Jackson, what a change for the one ! Emerging from frontier life to rise to the summit of American elevation, what a career for the other who was long after, even by admirers of his great abilities, called a Tennessee barbarian !

In the course of human events, the vast Spanish empire, like the *Nation*, as the Creeks were called, was crumbling to decay. Its American possessions, whose anarchical independence no human foresight could conceive in 1795, when Pinckney dwelt in the proud metropolis of Spain, were already in 1813 shaking off those colonial yokes which General Jackson, as Chief Magistrate of the United States, was to break to pieces. A battle was to be won by his Tennessee pupil at San Jacinto, wresting from Spanish colonists a part of what they considered part of their Mexican republic. A Mexican republic was to be acknowledged by Spain, and one of its provinces acknowledged as another republic by the United States and Great Britain. Pinckney, in the Moorish splendours of Madrid, treating with the superb minion of royal imbecility, styled the Prince of Peace, established bounds of empires which Jackson obliterated. In 1795 the titles of that upstart prince bespoke more wealth, dominion and power than were contained in 1813 in all Alabama and Mississippi, if not Tennessee : the most excellent Lord Don Manuel de Godoy, and Alvarez de Faria, Rios, Ianchez de Zarzosa ; Prince de la Paz, Duke de

Alcudia ; lord of the Soto de Roma, and of the state of Albala ; grandee of Spain of the first class ; perpetual regidor of the city of Santiago ; knight of the illustrious order of the Golden Fleece, and great cross of the royal and distinguished Spanish order of Charles the 3d ; commander of Valencia del Ventoso Riviera, and Aunchal in that of Santiago ; knight and great cross of the religious order of St. John ; counsellor of state ; first secretary of state and despatcho ; secretary to the queen ; superintendent-general of the ports and highways ; protector of the royal academy of the noble arts, and of the royal societies of natural history, botany, chemistry and astronomy ; gentleman of the king's chamber in employment ; captain-general of his armies ; inspector and major of the royal corps of body guards, &c. &c. &c. Appointing Thomas Pinckney to negotiate with the gorgeous minister of Spain, Washington, the president of the then only republic, could confer on him no title but that of citizen of the United States. Already that citizenship is a protection from the St. Lawrence to the Rio Grande del Norte, and Spain looks to this country to preserve Cuba, the last colony of Spain, from Great Britain. Such changes of empire has this century evolved ; many of them ascribable, in great part, to the militia-general whose career began in the Creek war of 1813.

In his annual message to Congress the 7th of December, 1813, when the south-western campaign was yet far from completion, indeed when the militia and volunteer troops were beginning to fail, and there was too much reason to apprehend that the issue would not be as triumphant as it proved before that session of Congress closed, the president's digest of that memorable campaign was that the cruelty of the enemy in enlisting the savages into a war with a nation desirous of mutual emulation in mitigating its calamities, has not been confined to any one quarter. Wherever they could be turned against us, no exertions to effect it had been spared. On our south-western border the Creek tribes, who, yielding to our persevering endeavours, were gradually acquiring more civilized habits, became the unfortunate victims of seduction. A war in that quarter has been the consequence, infuriated by a bloody fanaticism, recently propagated among them.

It was necessary to crush such a war before it could spread among the contiguous tribes, and before it could favour enterprizes of the enemy into that vicinity. With this view a force

was called into the service of the United States, from the states of Georgia and Tennessee, which, with the nearest regular troops, and other corps from the Mississippi territory, might not only chastise the savages into present peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears.

The progress of the expedition, as far as is yet known, corresponds with the martial zeal with which it was espoused ; and the best hopes of a satisfactory issue are authorized by the complete success with which a well-planned enterprise was executed against a body of hostile savages by a detachment of volunteer militia of Tennessee, under the gallant command of General Coffee ; and by a still more important victory over a larger part of them, gained under the immediate command of Major-General Jackson, an officer equally distinguished for his patriotism and his military talents.

The systematic perseverance of the enemy, in courting the aid of the savages in all quarters, had the natural effect of kindling their ordinary propensity for war into a passion, which even among those best disposed towards the United States, was ready, if not employed on our side, to be turned against us. A departure from our protracted forbearance to accept the services tendered by them, has thus been forced upon us. But, in yielding to it, the retaliation has been mitigated as much as possible, both in its extent and in its character, stopping far short of the example of the enemy, who owe the advantages they have occasionally gained in battle, chiefly to the number of their savage associates ; and who have not controlled them either from their usual practice of indiscriminate massacre on defenceless inhabitants, or from scenes of carnage without a parallel, on prisoners to the British arms, guarded by all the laws of humanity and of honourable war.

For these enormities the enemy are equally responsible, whether with the power to prevent them, they want the will, or with the knowledge of a want of power they still avail themselves of such instruments.

CHAPTER XI.

NAVAL WARFARE.

COMMERCIAL AND BELLIGERENT FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NAVY.—NELSON'S VIEW OF IT.—SEIZURE OF FRIGATE CHESAPEAKE.—IMPRESSMENT AND COMMERCIAL WRONGS.—DISCIPLINE AND CONFIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN NAVY.—WANT OF DISCIPLINE AND OVER-CONFIDENCE OF BRITISH.—AMERICAN SUPERIORITY.—ENGLISH NAVY UNEQUAL IN FORCE TO AMERICAN, IN AMERICA IN 1812.—ENGLISH SHIPS ENUMERATED—AND AMERICAN.—CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE AND TIMIDITY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.—DETERMINED TO LAY UP NAVY AS PORT DEFENCES WHEN IT MIGHT HAVE SUBDUED THAT OF ENGLAND.—ENGLISH VIEWS OF THAT SUBJECT.—MR. GALLATIN'S SCHEME.—VISIT OF CAPTAINS BAINBRIDGE AND STEWART TO WASHINGTON.—THEIR REMONSTRANCE AGAINST DISMANTLING THE NAVY.—MADISON YIELDS TO IT.—FRIGATE CONSTITUTION'S FIRST CRUISE AND CAPTURE OF THE GUERRIERE CONTRARY TO ORDERS.—CHASE OF THE CONSTITUTION BY ENGLISH SQUADRON.—CHASE OF THE BELVIDERA BY AMERICAN SQUADRON.—SEABOARD SENTIMENT CONCERNING NAVY.—DREAD OF ENGLAND.—CAPTURE OF THE GUERRIERE.—ENGLISH VIEWS OF IT.—CAPTURE OF THE QUEEN CHARLOTTE AND DETROIT ON LAKE ERIE.—FROLIC BY WASP.—MACEDONIAN BY UNITED STATES.—JAVA BY CONSTITUTION.—PEACOCK BY HORNET.—BAINBRIDGE.—DECATUR.—HULL.—CAPTURE OF CHESAPEAKE BY SHANNON.—LAWRENCE.—HIS CHALLENGE OF LA BONNE CITOYENNE.—LIEUTENANT COX.—HIS COURT MARTIAL.—SALUTARY NATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE LOSS OF THE CHESAPEAKE BY COUNTERACTION OF EASTERN DISAFFECTION.—SALUTARY NAVAL EFFECTS OF LAWRENCE'S INDISCRETION.—MR. QUINCY'S RESOLUTIONS IN THE SENATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.—NAVY ADOPTED BY THE NATION.—CRUISES OF THE FRIGATES PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND ESSEX.—NAVAL AMERICAN CAPACITY.—INEFFICIENCY OF ENGLISH MARINE.—COMPARATIVE COST OF WAR AND PEACE BY SEA.—LAKE WARFARE.—ON CHAMPLAIN—ON ONTARIO.—CHAUNCEY'S PURSUIT OF YEO.—RUNNING FIGHT.—YEO'S ESCAPE AND CHAUNCEY'S OMISSION TO DESTROY THE ENGLISH FLEET.—CONTENT OF SHIP-BUILDING.—ENORMOUS EXPENSE OF LAKE CONFLICTS BY LAND AND WATER.—LORD COCHRANE'S RESOLUTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.—COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH MARINE.—CAPTURES OF THE TWO FROM EACH OTHER IN 1812 AND 1813.—SUPERIORITY OF THE AMERICAN—CAUSES OF IT.—WAR OF 1812 MADE AMERICAN NAVY FROM LONG-PREPARED MATERIALS.—ITS CHARACTER—AND REWARDS.

THE foundations of naval power are extensive commerce,
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numerous shipping and seamen, enterprising merchants and adventurous mariners; in all of which the United States abound. Their first establishments were along the Atlantic from the Bay of Fundy to the Gulf of Mexico: their present extension is there and upon the inland seas of the west, where not less than fifteen thousand mariners are already employed. Commerce has always been a principal, for many years their main, reliance. From their colonial condition they have always been the most expert navigators. Their first hostilities, as an independent nation, were by sea, with the French in 1797, '98, and '99, to vindicate foreign commerce from wrongs. Their next were with the corsair powers of Northern Africa, for like vindication; whose depredations throughout the Mediterranean had long been tolerated by the great naval kingdoms of Europe—even England following the United States in that emancipation. With increasing commerce has grown an American spirit to free the ocean from all unjust restraints. As in 1801 they were the only people to resist the Algerines, Tunisians, and Tripolitans, so in 1842 they alone disputed, at least by remonstrance and negotiation, which might lead to force, the inveterate pretensions of Denmark to exclude from the Baltic all navigation not paying imposition as sound dues during a long tract of time exacted, like toll for leave to pass the gates of that entrance to Russia, to Sweden, and to Denmark. Though no party by contract to the armed neutrality of 1800, the United States were in principle and sympathy a member of that coalition, as to that of 1780 they were more formally. Not long after the most renowned of Great Britain's admirals, Nelson, by the famous battle of the Nile, broke down the naval existence of France, expelled, like that of Holland, and of Spain, from the ocean by British ascendancy, on the 1st July, 1801, an American squadron, under Commodore Richard Dale, with Captains Samuel and James Barron, William Bainbridge, and Andrew Sterrett, in the flag ship *President*, and her consorts, anchored at Gibraltar. Washington's administration laid the keels of an American navy. Adams' administration put their prows upon the seas, with perhaps precipitate development. Jefferson, accused of aversion to the navy, was no sooner installed as president than he recommended to Congress the enactment of his resolution, formed many years before, when American minister in France, to add independence by force from barbarian commercial oppression to that declared and achieved from British

by the seven years war of the Revolution. Commodore Dale derived his naval character from service by sea in that war, on board Paul Jones' ship, the *Bon Homme Richard*, in combat with a British frigate, displaying the courage, the skill, the resource, the endurance, which, with more than English freedom, united to perfect discipline, constitute the perfection of naval superiority. The most renowned of Great Britain's famous admirals, Nelson, remarking the seamanship of Dale's squadron, which he attentively surveyed through his glass, observed to an American gentleman on board of his ship at the time, that there was in those transatlantic ships a nucleus of trouble for the maritime power of Great Britain. We have nothing to fear, said Admiral Nelson, from any thing on this side of the Atlantic; but the manner in which those ships are handled makes me think that there may be a time when we shall have trouble from the other. The poorly equipped and provided American vessels of the war of the Revolution, contending against the overwhelming odds of British might by sea, long before indicated what Nelson discovered.

A spread of commerce in 1812, rapidly overtaking the tonnage of England, and ever since constantly increasing so as to be now the second, with a certainty of becoming the first in the world, opens wide those streams of belligerent naval faculty, which flow from the inexhaustible fountains of commercial. The United States of America furnish some of the best seamen and petty officers in both the commercial and naval marine of Great Britain: men more intelligent, more active, more sober, and more tractable than English sailors. Notwithstanding the great superiority in number and size of vessels which Great Britain has over the United States, if all the American mariners afloat could be gathered into the American navy, such as it is, or such as it might be made after a single year's material organization, it may be doubted whether a contest between the American marine, national and private armed on the one side, and the British navy on the other, would be altogether desperate. There are, moreover, naval alliances which might reinforce America, thus raised so near to physical equality with England as to leave only the trial of seamanship, discipline, gunnery and navigation, in which in 1812 American ships of war unquestionably surpassed English. Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, France, Italy, all Europe, that ever had ships, commerce, or colonies, have

large arrearages of maritime wrongs to settle with Great Britain, on whose co-operation the United States may reckon, and who, since the war of 1812, regard the American navy as that destined to break the fetters of the sea. Its trials and experience from its creation, in the French hostilities of 1797, '98, and '99, with the African barbarians in 1801, '02, '03, '04, and '05, from the time of Nelson's prediction to its fulfilment by the war of 1812, were the best apprenticeship. The seizure of the frigate Chesapeake in our own waters in 1807, the brutal outrages inflicted by impressment on American sailors everywhere, the paper blockades, admiralty perversions of the law of nations, orders in council, contumelious vexations of our commerce, the whole course of English insolence, arrogance, oppression, and flagrant injustice, disarmed their navy by false confidence, while it armed ours by a strong spirit of vindication.

This spirit, though restrained by the extreme forbearance of Jefferson's policy, was roused by the continual war cries of the merchants, till the nation was at last forced into war just when, however unprepared government, Congress and the executive were, the sentiment of the people of all parties was nearly unanimous that war was indispensable and just, of the war party that it should be risked at all events, without further preparation, and the conviction of the navy, both men and officers, that they could beat the English in equal combat. The seamen were admirably schooled and disciplined. The officers were confident of their crews, their ships and themselves, all eager for trial, and upon rational calculations. The English were spoiled by success everywhere over every antagonist; profoundly contemptuous, both nation and navy, of the truckling, gain-loving submission, the insignificant marine, the time-serving government, the party-struck and divided people of the United States. English ships of war were not well manned, in either the complement or composition of their crews; their discipline was loose; their gunnery negligent and never good, so inferior to ours that in any contest with equal force, American success was well nigh certain. So our officers thought, and they were right in thinking so. They knew their own strength and their enemy's weakness. Although the crew of the *Constitution*, when by the easy capture of the *Guerriere* she signalized the first demonstration of this state of things, was not a good crew, as well prepared as Captain Hull desired, yet their practice

had been so much more constant and instructive than that of Captain Dacre's ship, vapouring and vaunting along our coasts, that both Americans and English were equally surprised, not so much at the victory as at the rapidity of execution, the ease and the striking disparity of destruction with which it was accomplished. In Dacre's defence before the court-martial which tried and properly acquitted him, no mention whatever was made of the absurd pretexts afterwards assigned for American superiority. His masts were rotten, he pleaded, his ten impressed American sailors would not fight their countrymen, the Constitution was manned by British seamen, men personally known to that mendacious captain, who desired nothing better than another chance with a ship like the *Guerriere* of meeting the Constitution, whose success he attributed to the mere fortune of war. None of the absurd apologies were at first broached which were afterwards attempted; greater size of ships, weight of metal, number of men. The simple fact was that the English were taken off their guard by Americans upon their guard. That explanation is the truth as far as respects discipline, gunnery and a sentimental cause to nerve American combatants. It remains to be seen in another struggle whether superior seamanship, intelligence, docility, sobriety and greater liberty combined with kindlier obedience, are not elements of mastery to overcome better preparation than the English brought to the war of 1812, when they were less prepared in discipline than we were in shipping.

The number of English vessels on the American stations, the quality of their crews, their discipline, gunnery and condition in all respects, moral, political and physical, were such that if our naval department had been conducted with ability, the outset of hostilities by sea might have not merely confounded England and surprised America, but crippled, if not paralyzed, British naval supremacy, at least temporarily, in America. In the second chapter of this historical sketch the project of a young officer is submitted for conquering Canada in Nova Scotia; striking the root at Halifax instead of beating the branches at York, Montreal, and Fort George. The Halifax campaign might have failed, as all great undertakings are liable to discomfiture. But its failure could not have been more signal or disgraceful than the attempts to invade Canada further west in 1812 and 1813. Leaving that land view of this subject, we are now to see whe-

ther the American navy was not strong enough in June, 1812, to have inflicted incalculable injury on the enemy, with corresponding advantage and honour to this country. In the chapter to follow this, a third view of the eastern method of beginning the war will be presented: that of French ships of war, either by themselves or in concert with America, attacking the English marine, military and commercial, on the American coast. At present we are to ascertain whether the American navy, seizing the moment when Great Britain, wholly unprepared for, and incredulous of the American declaration of war, was taken unprepared for it, with small and imperfect vessels of war on the American station, whether the American navy was not then sufficient to have performed, if well directed, much more than it did by several however impressive isolated naval victories. At the time of, or before the war, the British American naval stations were, the Halifax station, commanded by Admiral Herbert Sawyer, the Jamaica station, commanded by Admiral Charles Stirling, and the Leeward Island station, commanded by Admiral Francis Foley. Although the Halifax station might have been reinforced from the other stations, yet it could not have been before August, after news of the declaration of war, and would not have been, because the Halifax force was deemed much superior to the whole American navy. On that station there was no formidable ship. The *Africa* 64 was the largest; the *Inflexible* 64, and the *Centurion* 50, were the next in size; but the two latter were used only as receiving vessels. The English navy in North America consisted then of but five frigates, with only one 64 ship afloat, vainly confident in their ability to overmatch the American navy:—The *Guerriere*, the *Shannon*, the *Spartan*, and the *Pomone*, rated at 38 guns each, the *Belvidera* 36, the *Ceolus* 32, with a considerable number of sloops and brigs of war. Such was the Halifax station force; designed to make captures, not to fight battles, which the English did not anticipate. The Jamaica station had but one ship, the *Polyphemus* 64, beyond the weight of a frigate: the Leeward Islands station had but one ship of the line, the *Dragon* 74. The line of battle ships of England were not considered necessary for America even in the event of war, which was not expected, but only small vessels for commercial captures, and the large ones were all more needed elsewhere.

The American navy then consisted of the President, the United States, and the Constitution, frigates of the first class; the Congress, Constellation, and Chesapeake of the second: the Essex and Adams of the third; the Boston and New York, which might easily have been got ready for sea, and a few sloops, brigs, and schooners of war. Eager to *escape* to sea, before the rumoured determination to lay them up in port could be effected, they hurried out of port as soon as war was declared, in detachments, almost without plan, concert or orders. The plan of the government, if it had any plan then, was to prevent their going to sea at all, where inevitable capture was supposed to await them.

Such was the condition of the hostile navies when war began. Engrossed by her great European wars, and not expecting an American war, England had not a marine on our coast equal to our own. The first remarkable exploit of an American vessel at sea, was the escape of the frigate Constitution, from a British squadron, consisting of the Africa 64, the Shannon and Guerriere, the Belvidera and another small frigate, with a sloop and brig of war. If the deplorable inclination of the American government had not been to keep our navy in port, if there had been any system or resolution in its administration of that arm, if the commanders, instead of being disconcerted by half-formed and miserable schemes of saving the navy by keeping it in port during the war—if these pusillanimous notions had been discarded, the officers kindly conferred with, and their opinions taken, a blow was then practicable, which would have far outdone the isolated victories, however impressive, which, at sea, saved the government, the Union, and the war from overthrow. If the President, the United States, and the Constitution, the Congress, the Constellation, the Chesapeake, the Essex, and the Adams, had, in June, 1812, immediately after the declaration of war, gone to sea together, and encountered the squadron which in July chased the solitary Constitution, unquestionably the English squadron of five well-sized ships, would have engaged the American of six or seven; and what must have been the issue? Though all the enumerated American ships were not then ready for sea, they might and should have been. And enough of them were actually at sea to encounter the British squadron under Commodore Broke; the only hostile ships at that time on the American coast. Not one of our harbours was blockaded. Egress

to sea was unimpeded. A judicious use of the American navy, such as it was, could not have failed to strike a blow at that of Great Britain much more deadly than those actually inflicted. What would have been the effect of Broke's squadron, brought in as prizes to New York or Boston? There was no reason why it should not have been done. Early demonstrations of the relative condition of the two navies, at that conjuncture, fully warrant the conviction that plan and confidence in our own government were alone wanting to a commencement of hostilities which would have astounded Great Britain. The defeat of the squadron of frigates which chased the *Constitution*, must have given the American navy command of the North American seas during most of the summer, the best cruising season of the year 1812, till England, consternated by the tidings, could send the larger and more numerous war-vessels which did not arrive with Admiral Warren till the autumn of that year. Meantime it is impossible to conjecture what the effect would have been throughout Europe, especially on the French government and marine. It is no fond fancy to infer, from all the naval engagements between American and English ships of war, the perfect equipment, discipline, and spirit of ours, the imperfect condition and vain-glorious confidence of theirs, that by a wise, prudent, and bold disposition of the naval force at the command of our government, it was easier to gain the command of the coast than of the lakes. That ascendancy could have been indeed but temporary; but its influences would have been permanent and profound. An American squadron might have blockaded Halifax—laid off that port during most of the summer, by its smaller vessels making havoc among the enemy's merchant ships, by its larger controlling hostilities for many weeks, and then could have returned into any of the many harbours of New England or New York, where superior British force could not have molested them.

American or individual averment, that if our government had made proper use of the naval means it had when war was declared, does not rest on any speculative or questionable theory. It is proved beyond doubt by proceedings in Parliament. On the 14th of May, 1813, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Darnley called attention to British naval disasters, as he termed them. Acknowledging that English vessels had been taken by American of equal force, particularly the *Peacock* by the *Hornet*, he

said that from April to July, 1812, there were on the Halifax station, under Admiral Sawyer, exclusive of smaller vessels, only one ship of the line and five frigates. He did not name that ship, but it must have been the *Africa* 64. It had been said, that nobleman added, that a sufficient force could not be spared, which he contested. It might be asserted, he said, that the force already on the Halifax station was equal to that of the American navy: but it had long been a matter of notoriety that the American frigates were greatly superior in size and weight of metal. War was declared on the 18th of June, and it was not till the 13th of October that letters of marque and reprisal were issued. In all the unfortunate battles the cause was the same, superior height and greater weight of the Americans, by which the English ships were crippled and dismasted early in action. Lord Darnley's motion was seconded by Earl Stanhope. The Earl of Galloway attributed their naval disasters, in the course of some professional remarks, very much to the power of the Americans to man their few large frigates with prime sailors, whereas the great demand for men in the British navy had rendered it necessary to admit a large proportion of an inferior class. He touched also on the propensity of the British seamen to desert; and thought that ships should be built precisely of the size of the American to cope with them. Lord Melville, the ministerial member of the admiralty, explained that a general opinion prevailed that the revocation of the orders in council would have pacified the American government. But there were other branches of the service to which the attention of the admiralty was called, besides America; and the British force on some stations was no more than sufficient, the blockading force in many places less than the force blockaded. It was not the opinion of any naval officers that the American ports could all be completely blockaded. The balance of captures was not, Lord Melville said, in favour of the Americans, but the reverse. The reason why letters of marque were not issued before October, was for the purpose of knowing the reception given by the Americans to the English proposals of accommodation.

Lord Darnley's motion, which was for a committee to inquire into the circumstances of the war with the United States, more particularly into the state, conduct, and management of British naval affairs, as connected with it, was further discussed by Lords Stanhope, Grey, Bathurst, Grenville, and Liverpool, and was

refused by a majority of only 66, 125 to 59. The large minority showed the state of feeling upon the subject. The various apologies for English naval defeats—what were they but verifications of Nelson's prediction of superior American seamanship?

It was in the outset of the war dishonourable to our executive, and incalculably detrimental to our cause, it is now and must ever be oppressive to an American to recollect, that, if, instead of paltry schemes of peace, after war was the law, every nerve had been strained to wage it vigorously, perhaps the power of Great Britain in America might have been paralyzed for ever. An American squadron blockading Halifax, peradventure capturing the five English frigates and one small 64 gun-ship constituting the whole British navy for several months there, or anywhere in North America, would have been an achievement to change the face of the world. The frigate *Pomone*, which was one of Broke's squadron hunting the forlorn *Constitution*, had been not long before captured in the Mediterranean by the English frigate *Active*, after a severe and protracted conflict, in which the English confessed that the French fought with great skill as well as courage, under their brave Captain Rosamel. What might not have been French naval efforts, with the large number of ships ready for sea, then in French, Dutch, and Italian ports, blockaded, as Lord Melville confessed, by forces inferior to those blockaded—what might have been French assistance to us by sea, without alliance, if their attention had been riveted on such a naval revolution as the capture of every English ship of war in America, and their flags half-masted beneath the star-spangled banner, floating in the bright sunshine of the port of Boston, Newport, New York, or Norfolk?

British influence, then, by which nearly every nerve of American independence was unstrung throughout New England, much of New York and elsewhere, till it touched the president in his cabinet, prevented his calling upon France, as he should have done, as the Congress of the Revolution by the missions of Franklin and Jefferson had done, openly and avowedly calling for French assistance. That was not done. The administration of Madison shrunk from it. But the inveterate itch of some of them for peace by other than martial means, their unworthy doubt of American capacity for war, particularly with Great Britain, the unmanly apprehension which they shared with

great numbers, that the navy was fit only to be made prizes, almost without a struggle with the lords of the ocean, unpardonable ignorance of government as to the relative force of the English and American navy at that crisis in English affairs—all these fears if not follies were the reasons why, without French alliance or assistance, the American navy was not allowed and ordered to perform what might have changed the current of English fortune even in Europe. The mind can scarcely grasp the lost consequences of the mortal blow which might then have been struck by the despised American frigates, with a bit of striped bunting at their mast-head? If the war of 1812 had begun by even the demonstration of a land expedition that summer to Halifax, and at the same time an American squadron before that port, it is not too much to say that the effect in Europe and America, would have been to raise the United States in two months, higher than their successes in three years warfare brought about.

The art of war in its philosophy, the secret of success in every undertaking, is to give the whole mind and soul to its accomplishment, an art in which the American government of 1812, in every branch, was culpably deficient. Materially prepared for war, it was not, and never will be. That is a defect, if it be one, which free institutions must have always to make head against. But much as it was complained of at the time, and is still recurred to, it was by no means the principal cause of the first year's failures. That cause was individual, not inherent in American government. More than half the expenses incurred by extravagant loans, most of the life expended in disastrous battles, and nearly all the dishonour of the beginning were attributable, not to the nature of the government, but members of it, in the executive and legislature, clinging to hopes of peace, dreading the personal, political and party effects of war, to unfounded and unworthy distrust of the institutions and people of the United States. Mr. Madison cannot be entirely exonerated, though he was the least to blame, and redeemed inaptitude for martial affairs, by great virtues for a belligerent chief-magistrate in a republic of written and limited authority. But other members of the executive, if not guilty of dereliction of duty, were extremely remiss in performance of it: one, in particular, who should have retired, (and perhaps would, but for the president's strong attachment to him,) in his misjudgment respecting the navy was barely pre-

vented committing an error which no Russian mediation could have atoned for.

The American government, in all its branches, was incredibly ignorant of the naval capacity of the country, and grossly negligent of nearly everything that might and should have been known and done with that arm : ignorance and incapacity, the result of long and ignominious peace, and of impracticable schemes to redress national wrongs without hostilities. In excuse for the government, it must be owned that the well nigh universal sentiment of the mercantile and seafaring community, was disbelief in the ability of the navy, in fact of the country, to contend in arms with Great Britain, which, at sea, was considered impossible. Dreams of perpetual peace had produced systems of self-denial, by restrictive measures, more trying and more costly than war. The navy had been discountenanced, till at last, when war came, which like death, is inevitable, to such a degree of infatuation had pusillanimity of both government and the commercial portion of the community gone, and so omnipotent was British influence in the United States, that it was the fatal design of the executive to keep the navy in port, as harbour defences, to dismantle and degrade the frigates below the much abused gun boats. In the Chesapeake, the Delaware, the Hudson, and wherever they were used during the war, they proved, that even for harbour and coast service, they were, at least till the discovery of steam boats, serviceable craft. Jefferson, a man of genius and of peace, was bent on avoiding war, at almost any cost ; and Congress is always much influenced by an executive more durable than Congress, though endowed with less legal attribute of power. Mr. Gallatin openly opposed the war before it was declared, deprecated it afterwards, continually importuned peace by other than belligerent efforts, and persevered till peace was patched up in Europe. His impolitic exertions to palsy hostilities, which, waged as they might and would have been, if he had been secretary either of war or the navy, or the treasury, with his heart and mind enlisted in its cause, would have probably made not only much better war, but a better peace. If the American people and institutions had not proved stronger than he seemed to think them, a martial and high-spirited nation might have been constrained by misgovernment to submit, after inglorious failure in war, to a dishonourable peace, which could have been no better than a mere truce, to be

broken after further and further degradation. The United States must have renewed hostilities under more disadvantages than ever. To their great enemy are they indebted for the benefits of that war. But for the severity of a struggle which forced out the spirit and resources of the country, Russian mediations and peace without a single principle in controversy settled at Ghent, where neither the final victories nor the lofty feelings they gave rise to throughout the United States, were appreciated, in fact hardly known—such a peace would have been but a truce, a mere cessation from hostilities. Victories by land and sea, in Canada and Louisiana, on the lakes, everywhere except Washington, where the anti-war hope still lingered and unnerved us, victories were the negotiators of a pacification, which has endured and improved ever since, for more than the succeeding third of a century. Without the exertions, trials and triumphs, which that fallacious hope was as perseveringly, as unwisely labouring to prevent, another war, peradventure civil war, protracted, disorganizing, desperate, was the alternative, with almost inevitable dismemberment of the Union. Extremes of speculative policy are dangerous experiments. The love of peace which Franklin and Jefferson brought home from Europe, may degenerate to a prejudice, to intoxicate a disciple so superior as Mr. Gallatin, of whom such was Jefferson's high estimate, that he said he should not be measured by the standard applied to other men. Perpetual war, passion for war was the English extravagance which unhinged her naval supremacy, by driving from the ocean all ships but those of a distant and lucre-loving people, not, as she thought, to be feared at sea. Extravagant sacrifice to peace was the American's error, as every excess is an error. Wanton and frequent war was a royal passion, which American republican apostles wisely repudiated. When the United States were but breathing into national consistence in 1793, Washington's proclamation of neutrality was an indispensable refuge. From 1805, when the maritime outrages of the great belligerents began, till the seizure of the frigate Chesapeake in our own waters, it was right to exhaust argument and remonstrance, before the last resort. But forbearance had ceased to be a virtue some time before war was at length declared. An unwise, unworthy tameness was undermining public spirit, and some of the inveterate opponents of war had much national distress and dishonour to answer for. Mr. Gallatin's party assailants unjustly imputed

to him cunning and dissimulation. He was open and explicit in opposing war. If his aversion to it had yielded when the declaration was enacted, and he had then thought proper to withdraw his great talents and experience from a war administration, no blame could have attached to him. But he chose, no doubt was urged by Madison, who highly valued his patriotism and usefulness, to bestow them, not where most needed, in strengthening the financial department; but turning his back on that, where he might have been of great importance, leaving it deserted and desolate, he went abroad upon a fruitless errand, which did not abridge one hour of war, nor add one valuable clause to a precipitated treaty of peace. In the spring of 1813, when Mr. Gallatin went to Europe, my official acquaintance began with the operations of that conjuncture. What took place the year before, having none but public knowledge of, I do not venture judgment on that gentleman's agency in imputed postponement of taxation, reliance on mere loans unsecured, or other deficiencies of preparation which added a year of disastrous outset to hostilities before they really began in earnest in 1813. Madison abhorred war as much as Mr. Gallatin could, and felt with inborn diffidence his own want of those qualities most fit for it. But he yielded, wisely and conscientiously, to overruling circumstances, when war became the law of the United States, and, while always anxious for peace, from first to last waged war to the best of his ability with a true American spirit.

Mr. Gallatin, long a leading member of two successful administrations, satisfied himself that the only safety for the navy would be in port, and its only utility as harbour defence, particularly at New York, an attack on which place was apprehended without any foundation for the fear. With the merchants of New York, Mr. Gallatin, as Secretary of the Treasury, had been much connected. Their mistaken if not foreign disquiet infected him. The frigates were to be laid up there as harbour guards, buried alive in a dismantlement which would have superadded to the preliminary reverses of the war by land, privation of the only relief and rescue the government and country experienced. When a wise and vigorous disposition of the naval means at the command of our government, might have swept the American coast from the Balize to the Bay of Fundy of all the British marine, military and commercial, it is

an instructive lesson of the short-sightedness of wise men that it was mere remonstrance of a couple of naval officers against being deprived of their livelihood, which prevented the flag so gloriously triumphant in every sea, from being veiled before that of Great Britain, without an essay or effort to establish the high character it won for the American navy, with long and prosperous tranquillity for the United States. The young statesmen, Clay, Lowndes, Cheves, Calhoun, Peter B. Porter, Troup, Bibb, Grundy, and their associates, who made the war, were fortunately seconded by officers of the navy, who entreated to be permitted to carry it on, or a war for maritime redress would have been attempted without a naval effort, by a nation which had always proved that the sea is not the exclusive domain of Great Britain, but its uses and honours are to be shared by the American Republic. Hostilities by land, which, for more than a year and a half were continually unfortunate; and privateers on the ocean, preying on British commerce, but flying from ships of war, would have been the only belligerent means of this country in that contest, but for one of those insignificant occurrences which are often decisive of the fate and character of nations. Our rescue from that naval trance is imperfectly mentioned in Dr. Harris's *Life of Bainbridge*, in a published memoir of the life of Commodore Stewart, summarily, though accurately, in Goldsborough's *Naval Chronicle* and Cooper's *Naval History*; but deserves fuller narrative as one of the fortunately prevented most deplorable and incredible mistakes of the war.

The facts are these. As soon as war was declared Captains Bainbridge and Stewart went to Washington to solicit commands. The Secretary of the Navy, appointed, as too many of the heads of that most important and least difficult of all our departments have been, from views rather to sectional, state, party, or other than personal aptitude, was Paul Hamilton, of South Carolina, a gentleman who had been governor of that gallant commonwealth, and was well disposed for the credit of the navy, but without any knowledge of maritime affairs, and otherwise unfit for his station. Bainbridge and Hull first learned at Washington from Charles Goldsborough, chief-clerk of the navy department, to their infinite amazement, disappointment, and chagrin, that it had been resolved to keep the national ships safe in port, and not to expose them to unavoidable capture and probable disgrace at sea.

Goldsborough showed them the order to that effect, which he was preparing by direction of his superior. Either by design or accident, nearly the whole navy was in port or near at hand at the moment: only the sloop *Wasp*, Captain Jones, abroad, on her return from England with some of those dispatches so much more anxiously looked after than any warlike preparation or plan. Rodgers in the frigate *President*, with Porter in the *Essex*, and Lawrence in the *Hornet*, were lying at New York ready to sail. Decatur in the *United States*, Smith in the *Congress*, Sinclair in the *Argus*, from the south, joined Rodgers's squadron in New York Bay, the 21st June, 1812, three days after war was declared. The *Nautilus*, Lieutenant Crane, arrived there soon after, but was captured as soon as she went to sea alone, destined for a cruise in the West Indies. Rodgers' squadron sailed the 21st June, on a cruise to the south-east, in search of a reported fleet of English merchantmen. Eager as our ships of war were to get to sea, not only to measure strength with the English, but to escape the confinement in port, rumoured and apprehended from their own government; sailing, therefore, almost without plan or definite object, it is not, perhaps, surprising that they did not seem to know their own power, if combined as before mentioned, to overcome any hostile vessels to be encountered in the American seas. The frigate *Constitution* was alone at Annapolis, whence she proceeded to sea on the 12th July, 1812, on her way to New York. Her chase by the English squadron from which she miraculously escaped, putting into Boston in consequence of being prevented by that squadron from going to New York, whither she was bound, Captain Hull's sailing in her from Boston before orders reached him to leave her and take command of another frigate, his capture of the *Guerriere*, in spite of all the Navy Department could do to prevent that victory, are the dramatic incidents of a beginning of naval triumphs for which the country owes everything to the navy and nothing to government, excepting the president, who always listened to reason; and in the narrative of those transactions it is due to Mr. Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, to add that he was, at any rate, well disposed to venture a trial which at least one of his colleagues resisted as too desperate to be attempted.

Bainbridge and Stewart remonstrated with the Secretary of the Navy against its suicide, by the hands of its own commander-

in-chief. The secretary listened kindly to their appeal, but told them that the thing had been settled, on full consideration, in cabinet council. The frigates were to be laid up in the harbour of New York, their guns taken out of one side, the other side to be so fixed as to be rendered water-batteries, to be manned by their crews, and commanded by their own officers. Stewart and Bainbridge explained to the secretary why they were convinced our ships were superior to the English, and would eight times out of ten, capture them in equal combat. They were so urgent, that the secretary, unable, indeed not inclined, to refute their arguments, offered to take these gentlemen with him to the presidential mansion, there to repeat what was deemed so clear and so important. Mr. Madison listened with the greatest attention to all they had to say; candidly and anxiously weighed it. Eight times out of ten, sir, said they, with equal force we can hardly fail; our men are better men, better disciplined, our midshipmen are not mere boys, only fit to carry orders, but young men, capable of reflection and action. Our guns are sighted, which is an improvement of our own the English know nothing of. While we can fire cannon, with as sure an aim as musketry or almost rifles, striking twice, out of every three shots, they must fire at random, without sight of their object or regard to the undulations of the sea, shooting over our heads, seldom hulling us, or even hitting our decks. We may be captured, and probably shall be, even after taking prizes from them, because their numbers are so much greater than ours. But the American flag will never be dishonoured, seldom, if ever, struck to equal force. The nation can lose nothing but vessels, and a few lives dearly sold. You will give us victories then, you think, said the president, inclining to their advice. We do, sir, most confidently, and not upon irrational premises. Which victories, he added with animation, will give us ships; for with victories Congress will supply them faster than they can be lost. Such, too, said he, recurring to the lessons of the Revolution, was the case in that war, when, notwithstanding a greater disparity of force than now, and much greater disparity of all nautical equipments, our officers and men proved themselves equal to the English. Encouraged by this reception, Bainbridge and Stewart persevered so strenuously with Mr. Hamilton in another interview with him, that he told them the president had resolved to hold a

cabinet council that evening to reconsider the matter, and they were desired to come to the secretary's residence and wait there till he returned from the council to apprize them of the result. At a late hour he did so, informing them that no change had taken place, but the vessels were to be laid up and used as harbour defences. Mr. Gallatin was inflexible against sending the ships to sea, with all his preponderant influence in the administration where he had been accustomed to rule by Jefferson's high estimate of his abilities for any subject, naval, military, financial, commercial, foreign, or domestic; and Mr. Gallatin's mistake was that of nearly the whole community. The merchants, almost to a man, laboured under absurd impressions of English nautical supremacy, pervading the sea-ports and most of the Atlantic states, that it was not only in the greater number of ships and seamen the English excelled the Americans, but that British seamen were superior beings, transcending all others, with whom Americans, man to man, and ship to ship, still less in squadrons or fleets, would have less chance than the Dutch, Venetians, Spanish, or French. In the most popular national song of that day, which was always sung in full chorus at the repeated celebrations of our naval victories, not only the preposterous language, but the deep-rooted sentiment of the inhabitants of our seaboard was, that although the "sons of Columbia would never be slaves, while the earth bears a plant or the sea rolls its waves," yet "the trident of Neptune must never be hurled to *incense* the *legitimate* powers of the ocean." Those legitimate powers by divine right, and that popular prejudice which is the basis of that right, were the English mariners, against whom, the judgment of at least the maritime portions of the United States, coinciding with that of Mr. Gallatin, was, that in a war undertaken for the redress of flagrant wrongs by sea, it would be folly to trust either a vessel or a man there, except in the predatory and irresponsible cruises of private armed vessels. To such adventures Bainbridge and Stewart resolved to have recourse if their prayer for permission to take public ships of war to sea should be unheeded. Stewart had built a privateer called the Snapper, eventually commanded by Captain Peregrine Green, and captured as soon as she cleared the Delaware capes. In that privateer, if denied authority to go forth in frigates, these gentlemen proposed to seek their fortunes on the

ocean, serving each in rotation as captain or first officer. It was not with them, therefore, matter of mere national character: nor were they mere youths to be moved entirely by puerile or unselfish considerations. They wanted fortune as well as fame, livelihood besides distinction. If the navy was laid up they saw their occupation gone for all advancement and all acquisition. Impelled by these strong motives to sturdy remonstrance, persevering after the Secretary of the Navy had announced to them the confirmed resolve of the executive to order all the ships of war to be laid up, Captains Bainbridge and Stewart occupied most of that night in composing a joint letter to the president, strongly setting forth reasons why that resolve should be rescinded. That letter has been lost, perhaps burnt in the conflagration of the public buildings at Washington; possibly not deemed proper for the public eye, as it stated advantages of the American navy, which, though now known to and participated by the English, were then exclusively American. Among these were not only the superior discipline, seamanship, and ardour of our seamen, burning with passion to take vengeance for oppression, but several material improvements, one of which alone proved decisive in the naval engagements of that war.

Their joint composition of that anxious night was couched in such plain language, that, when presented to the Secretary of the Navy next morning, he objected to it as too strong for communication to the chief magistrate, and advised them to soften its terms. But as it was with them an affair of subsistence, involving livelihood as well as reputation, they insisted on its being submitted without alteration. Diffident as Madison was of his own judgment at all times, especially where he was not familiar with the subject, and having long felt Mr. Gallatin's aptitude for almost any subject, the president was the man of his own administration, nevertheless, most resolved, as in duty bound, to carry into full effect the act of Congress declaring war. After, therefore, candidly, wisely, and ingenuously weighing the manly remonstrance against his own deliberate and twice considered determination, he yielded to the wishes of the two captains, who were told in another interview the same day, by the Secretary of the Navy, likewise gratified with the result, that the president would assume the responsibility of over-ruling the judgment of his cabinet and ordering the ships to sea.

It cannot be shown that an order to lay up the frigates in harbour was given by the executive : but it is certain that such a determination was formed, and instructions imparted for the order, which was prevented merely by the timely remonstrance of Bainbridge and Stewart. To risk the ships of war at sea was more than government thought wise. And the first capture of an English by an American frigate, an event the effect of which was prodigious throughout Europe and America, and may have consequences of still greater magnitude than yet experienced—that capture was made, if not in breach of orders, at least contrary to the timorous calculations of the navy department. If Hull had not hastened to sea and taken the *Guerriere* before his countermand reached him at Boston, he would not have made that capture, if indeed any such would ever have been made at all.

The order to Captain Hull was as follows :—

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, }
18th June, 1812. }

“SIR : This day war has been declared between the ‘United Empire of Great Britain, Ireland, and their dependencies, and the United States of America and their territories,’ and you are, with the force under your command, entitled to every belligerent right to attack and capture, and to defend. You will use the utmost dispatch to reach New York, after you have made up your complement of men, &c., at Annapolis. In your way from thence you will not fail to notice the British flag, should it present itself. I am informed that the *Belvidera* is on our coast, but you are not to understand me as impelling you to battle previously to your having confidence in your crew, unless attacked, or with a reasonable prospect of success, of which you are to be, at your discretion, the judge. You are to reply to this, and inform me of your progress.

“I am, respectfully,

“Yr. obt. svt.,

“P. HAMILTON.

“CAPTAIN HULL, of the *U. S. Frigate Constitution*,
“*Annapolis, Md.*”

That discouraging and, (considered with immediate results,)

incredibly pusillanimous order, was soon followed by another, as follows, of the same tenour:—

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, }
“3d July, 1812. } ”

“SIR: As soon as the Constitution is ready for sea, you will weigh anchor and proceed to New York.

“If, on your way thither, you should fall in with an enemy's vessel, you will be guided in your proceeding by your own judgment, bearing in mind, however, that you are not, voluntarily, to encounter a force superior to your own. On your arrival at New York, you will report yourself to Commodore Rodgers. If he should not be in that port, you will remain there till further orders.

“I am, &c.,

“P. HAMILTON.

“CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL,
“Annapolis, Md.”

Thus was Captain Hull, the navy, the country, and the war, indebted to the accidental chase of the Constitution by a British squadron, preventing her getting into New York, for her being driven into Boston, and thence stealing to sea, when to be laid up in New York. On the 2d August Hull sailed from Boston, in the Constitution, and did not receive the following letter till after his return from capturing the Guerriere:—

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, }
“28th July, 1812. } ”

“CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL:—

“On the arrival of the Constitution in port, I have ordered Commodore Bainbridge to take command of her.

“You will accordingly deliver up to him the command and proceed to this place and assume the command of the Frigate Constellation.

“I am, &c.,

“P. HAMILTON.”

Before he received that order or sailed, Hull sent to the Secre-

tary an account of the Constitution's escape from Broke's squadron, to which the following was the official reply :—

“NAVY DEPARTMENT, }
“29th July, 1812. }

“CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL, BOSTON :—

“Your letter of the 20th inst., just received, has relieved me from much anxiety.

“I am truly happy to hear of your safety. Remain at Boston until further orders.

“I am, &c.,

“P. HAMILTON.”

Under such discouraging, perplexing and timid nursing did American naval ardour then lie almost stifled. A series of mere accidental circumstances, so trivial that they cannot fail to suggest to the least thoughtful mind, the extreme uncertainty of the little occurrences on which great events depend, enabled Hull to escape the doom which an affrighted government had prepared for him and all his naval comrades.

With retraction of the order to keep the ships in port, Captain Stewart got an order from the Secretary of the Navy, with which, leaving Bainbridge behind him at Washington, Stewart hastened toward New York, taking Lieutenant now Commodore Ridgely along, to go to sea with one of the smaller vessels, and scour the West India seas before the English were aware of the war, or could protect their large commerce in that quarter from the mischief Stewart contemplated. Meantime, before he reached Philadelphia, then a two days' journey from Washington, news had reached the former place that Rodgers had gone to sea with all the vessels, except the few otherwise disposed of. The Constitution sailed from Annapolis for New York early in July, and was chased off by a British squadron, from her prescribed port—eventually chased to all the fortunes of that gallant frigate, which, during half a century, has always been victorious under various commanders, and in every sea. Fears of the wise, would have laid her down to rot in ignominious inactivity. Importunity overcame cabinet deliberation which might have brought the war to an end, with nothing but defeats by land, without one

redeeming triumph on the water. If so, the administration must have been borne down by overpowering opposition and its own incapacity, the war spirit discouraged, the war party overthrown, Congress either not called together at all till December, instead of being convoked in extraordinary session in May, 1813, and in December, not to vote taxes for vigorous prosecution of hostilities, but to ratify dishonourable peace. For both governments throughout the year 1812, were anxious for peace, rather than persevere in war, which too many, "like two of the commissioners who negotiated peace, considered could do no good to either nation, but must do harm to both."

Before a battle came to our relief, to dispel the misapprehensions of all save the navy itself, before one blow was struck, naval confidence was justified by an exploit which has never yet been regarded as it ought to be in the comparison of American with English nautical aptitude. When the Constitution was chased in July 1812, by five frigates, and escaped them without superior swiftness, by the contrivance which her first lieutenant, now Commodore Morris, suggested to Captain Hull, Mr. Cooper, whose naval judgment it may be rash to contradict, awards applause to the seamanship of the English pursuers as well as that of the American fugitive. Yet is it not palpable to any reflection that the enemy would have overtaken and captured our frigate, if not inferior in the fertility of resource and felicity of contrivance, which are part of the genius for all warfare, and throughout the war of 1812, seldom were displayed, any more than bold enterprise, by the British navy? The little vessel in which Lieutenant, now Commodore Crane put to sea was taken by the enemy, and then a prize to Broke's squadron, on board of which Crane was a prisoner. Such was the eagerness of the English to overhaul the Constitution, that at one time they all cut all their boats adrift as they were kedging in pursuit, after the American frigate's manner of going ahead. But was there anything to prevent their putting the small prize with them, the Nautilus, in tow of all the boats in the whole squadron, and so forcing the Nautilus ahead of the Constitution or alongside of her at such a distance as to enable the guns of the small vessel to drive in the boats of the Constitution, when the British frigates might readily have overtaken and reduced her? In the first essay of conflict there was, independent of superior gunnery and navigation, evidence

of that superiority of talent which, without unbecoming national prejudice, we may hope belongs to a people as seafaring as the English, but more intelligent, more susceptible of high discipline, more obedient because more free.

Before that demonstration of naval fortitude and ingenuity, with those of active bravery soon following, all abundant with proofs of skill, there was hardly a man in either England or America, who did not believe the English sailor superior to the American, as well as to the Dutch, the French, the Spanish and all others they encountered : not only in numbers, but in genius for the sea, contrivance, endurance, experience, confidence, most of the attributes of success. A contrary assurance was not a national sentiment in the United States : but naval faith, cherished by seamen, like Vestal fire or the mysteries of religious worship, in sacred and fervent custody, which no want of occasion, or other's incredulity could impair ; conviction which now not even many defeats can destroy. It is now a national sentiment, which Great Britain will contest, but America feels is not to be acquired, but only maintained. When the war broke out Great Britain, surprised by an American effort believed to be beyond the spirit of our government or the energy of our people, knowing that her interest lay not in fighting, but in despoiling the United States ; with all her means employed in Europe, Great Britain had some apprehensions for her American territorial possessions, but none for naval supremacy, which her few ships in this hemisphere were reckoned more than enough to preserve. British sentiment, expressed by Canning and Brougham in Parliament, universal throughout the nation and the navy above all, was profound contempt for American naval resistance. No American fleet, squadron, or hardly single ship had ever withstood the overwhelming might of British broadsides, which ruled the waves, and not a sail spread but by their permission. The people of the United States coincided in both opinions ; in strong hope of the conquest of Canada, but with no hopes of naval success. Congress did little, the executive less for the navy, distrusted, almost despised, sentenced to be dismantled and disgraced by our own constituted authority. While war was begun without taxes, troops or organization, relying on its dry declaration by Congress, the president's proclamation of it and other empty demonstrations, there was still confidence, false confidence in the raw voluntary levies to whom the

conquest of Canada was committed. General William Hull went forth to the conquest of Canada, heralding his progress by menacing announcements; high and general anticipations went with him. At the same time Captain Isaac Hull had the fortune to be the first American seaman that met an English ship of war in equal combat. His crew were not as thoroughly prepared as he wished, and there is tradition by no means to his disparagement, but quite the contrary, that Hull and his equally considerate first officer Morris, doubted whether a longer cruise and more sea service were not necessary to prepare the men for so momentous an issue as the first trial of arms by sea between sovereign America and Great Britain. It was even said that these prudent officers were more anxious than the issue proved to be necessary, about a trial upon which all England looked with perfect certainty of success and nearly all this country with painful misgivings. No one can compare the American and English official accounts of it without acknowledgment that accident or fortune had little to do with the battle, which was like nearly all the other naval engagements throughout the war; those fought after England had time to recover from her surprise, and endeavour to imitate or excel her antagonist as well as those before.—The suppressed but inextinguishable fire of well-considered confidence burning in naval bosoms, lighted indignant, but thoughtful and unequalled mariners, to such battle as commands fortune, repairs accident and insures victory. More extensive or more numerous battles would add little to the credentials of the few gained. The blaze of triumph was continued with little interruption. It established a character for naval excellence which it will be harder to lose than to get. It would be weakness to suppose that England has lost the sword of maritime authority. To no nation have American naval triumphs been more improving than to her. It would be still greater weakness to flatter the American navy to delude itself by imitating that vain-glorious English confidence which was part of the means of its discomfiture. But the history of the war of 1812 has passed into the judgment of the world, that America has what England had of naval pre-eminence: that in another war we have to keep and she to get what in the last war we won and she lost. No mere scale of operations can change the result, unless ship timber and numbers constitute national nautical superiority, not men and sea-

manship, alacrity and ingenuity, freedom and love of the country which gives it without restraint. In the glorious illustrations of naval vigour by the war of 1812, its dawn was adorned by splendid and vivifying rays, which beamed with equal brilliancy upon its last moments, shedding upon American annals lustre not easily effaced, impressions of American power felt throughout the globe, memorials of superior seamanship, enterprise, discipline, considerate courage and humanity, always conspicuous and uniform, which have become national property, never to be yielded but with national existence.

To appreciate the naval effect of the capture of the first British frigate we must inquire of English opinion on the occasion; of which the following from a London Journal indicates the whole:

“We have been accused,” said it, “of sentiments unworthy of Englishmen, because we described what we saw and felt on the occasion of the capture of the *Guerriere*. *We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and honourable minds*; we participated in the vexation and regret; and it is the first time that we have ever heard that the *striking of the flag on the high seas* to anything like an equal force, should be regarded by Englishmen with complacency or satisfaction. If it be a fault to cherish among our countrymen ‘that chastity of honour which feels a stain like a wound;’ if it be an error to consider the reputation of our navy as tenderly and delicately alive to reproach—that fault, that error we are likely often to commit; and we cannot but consider the sophistry, which would render us insensible to the *dishonour of our flag* as peculiarly noxious at the present conjuncture. It is not merely that an English frigate has been taken, after what we are free to confess, may be called a brave resistance, but that it has been taken by *a new enemy*, an enemy unaccustomed to *such triumphs*, and likely to be rendered insolent and confident by them. He must be a weak politician who does not see how important the first triumph is in giving a tone and character to the war. *Never before, in the history of the world, did an English frigate strike to an American*, and though we cannot say that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for this act, yet we do say, there are commanders in the English navy, who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colours flying, than have set their fellow-sailors so fatal an example.”

To indicate the political effect of Hull's victory, the same opinion was at the time equally significant. It deplored what is unquestionable, that the naval reign of Great Britain was at an end the moment another nation could dispute it, whose commercial marine was only second to hers, and rapidly in progress to outstrip it in numbers of tonnage and seamen.

"We have received," said a London Journal, "letters and papers from New York to the 14th, and from Washington to the 9th ult. We are not surprised to find from these, that the repeal of the orders in council, ample and unconditional as it was, has not satisfied the demagogues of America. The American government has now thrown off the mask, even of moderation, which its members have assumed in their negotiations with this country, and has made common cause with France in her attempt to subjugate the world. The tone of the National Intelligencer, the organ of Mr. Madison's government, previous to the arrival in America, of the formal repeal of the orders in council, was moderate, if not pacific, but now that Great Britain has receded from her high and commanding attitude, as *mistress of the seas* and *dictator of the maritime laws of nations*, America, like an ungrateful and malignant minion, turns upon *her benefactor*, and demands still further concessions—the American flag is now to secure all that sails under it. This is precisely the language of the French government—free ships make free goods, has been eternally echoed in our ears, since the commencement of the war; and but yesterday we were told by France, that the treaty of Utrecht was the line of demarkation of our maritime rights. This is bold language to utter to a nation whose seamen have successively beaten every power in Europe into a *confession of their superiority*—a nation whose fleets have annihilated in succession, those of Spain, Holland, France, Russia, and Denmark. *Our maritime superiority is, in fact, part of the nation's right.* It has been the right of the conqueror, since men associated together in civilization, to give laws to the conquered, and is Great Britain to be driven from the proud eminence which the blood and treasures of her sons have attained for her among nations, by a piece of striped bunting, flying at the mast-heads of a few *fir-built frigates*, manned by a *handful of bastards and outlaws?*"

I shall touch but briefly on the naval battles of 1812, already

the theme of so much description and controversy, and only as introductory to my task which begins with the succeeding year. What shall we do for vessels on Lake Erie, said Mr. Gallatin to a young lieutenant, without any, or money to build them? Take them, said Elliott. Accordingly, on the night of 8th October, 1812, a week before the attack on Queenstown, the first essay was made in the Niagara by capturing the *Caledonia*, a considerable brig of war, next year well employed in Perry's action, and a merchant vessel, the *Detroit*, both anchored under the British batteries, boarded, taken, and brought off, by an enterprise which Mr. Clay declared in the House of Representatives, with the ardour which always, perhaps some of the extravagance which at times marked his stimulation of hostilities, an enterprize which for judgment, skill, and courage, has never been surpassed. Lieutenant Roach, since Mayor of Philadelphia, now Treasurer of the Mint of the United States, and a reverend gentleman who since officiated as the respectable pastor of an Episcopal Church at Newcastle, Delaware, where he died, then Ensign Prestman, of the regular army, were volunteers in the boat with Elliott. General Towson, for many years paymaster-general of the army of the United States, then captain of artillery, was a volunteer in the other boat commanded by sailing-master Watts, of the navy, killed a few days after at the battle of Queenstown. General Winfield Scott, then a lieutenant-colonel, and Captain Barker, since Mayor of Philadelphia and comptroller of the treasury of the United States,—volunteered, but were not permitted to go in that expedition. General Towson and Commodore Elliott, more than twenty years afterwards, when there were laurels enough for both, fell into angry dispute about their respective shares; appealing to public judgment in printed publications, which excite regret that such deeds should be tarnished by such controversy.

Hull's capture of the *Guerriere* the 19th of August, 1812, would probably have taken place with greater comparative destruction, had not both ships, in the spirit of national emulation which fired each, approached so close as to deprive our gunnery of its advantages by sighted and deliberate firing. When the *Wasp* sloop of war, under Captain Jones, on the 18th of October, 1812, captured the English brig *Frolic*, of greater size and number of crew, the same advantage was conceded to the enemy by

still closer approach, by actual contact, and the English vessel was carried by boarders headed by Lieutenant, now Commodore Biddle, who hauled down the British flag himself. On the 28th of October, 1812, Decatur, in the United States frigate, captured the Macedonian, when, as the English ship held off with the weather-gage, the advantage of American gunnery was more striking: and of orderly discipline; the English ship tumultuous with huzzas accompanying her broadsides, while Decatur's crew were, as he charged them to be, as quiet as Quaker meeting. On the 29th of December, 1812, the Constitution, under Captain Bainbridge, captured the Java, British frigate, under circumstances so nearly resembling the other successes that they need not be repeated. The Constitution and United States were larger than the Guerriere, Macedonian, and Java. But the Frolic was larger than the Wasp: and the disparity of destruction in all these cases proved that something more than relative size was the cause of invariable success and much greater destruction.

On these occasions, English prisoners often behaved as if their captors were their prisoners: and American victors sometimes carried kindness beyond the policy of that virtue. Between all hostile nations, courtesy, clemency, and humanity, are to be cultivated; between kindred people they are indispensable comity. Captain Bainbridge not only paroled forthwith Lieutenant-General Hyslop and his suite, taken in the Java, but restored all their plate and valuables with, perhaps, excess of generosity. Among the testimony laid before Congress by the select committee charged, on Mr. Clay's motion, with Macon at its head, to report on the spirit and manner in which the war was waged by the enemy, it was certified by two American officers, Berry and Weaver, taken in the Chesapeake, that all their prize-money was taken from them, their side-arms taken, kept, and worn, never restored as usual, and so great was the rage for plunder, that Captain Lawrence, mortally wounded, could not obtain a bottle of wine from his private sea-stores, without a note from the doctor to the English Lieutenant, Wallis, commanding the prize, who ordered our wounded midshipmen to be instantly cut down, if they stood in what he deemed an improper part of the vessel. Among the many benefits of the war of 1812, there was none greater than breaking down that idolatry of England, which rebuked back this country to colonial reverence, and inflamed that to arrogance

and animosity detrimental to both. There yet remains too much lingering spirit of this American infidelity and European insolence not to justify unreserved exposure of the frailties of both in the second war, which superadded moral to political independence.

The capture of the *Alert*, an English sloop of war, by the *Essex*, Captain Porter, a small frigate, but much superior to her enemy, though the first capture of the war by sea, has not been mentioned before, because it was a conquest so easy, as to excite less interest than the other captures of 1812. Nor shall I now recount the numerous captures of that gallant ship, on her distant voyage, but wait till we come to the catastrophe of her adventurous cruise in the Pacific, in February, 1814. For the same reason, the cruise of Commodore Rodgers in the *President*, with his squadron, is also omitted. To detail mere captures without combats would be devoid of interest. Enough of the maritime occurrences of 1812 has been summarily presented to show that American ships of war cruised mostly without molestation, generally with unlooked-for success. The grandeur of British dominion by sea became fabulous in six months. The conviction was general, that there, as upon the lakes, it was reduced to the mere power of ship-building; that, while the numbers were against us, the prowess and palm were transferred from the Old World to the New.

Of the brave founders of this empire of opinion, Bainbridge, Decatur, and Hull, have since passed away: and we may deal with them historically. Decatur and Bainbridge were both conspicuous in events hereafter to be described. Hull was not at sea again during the war: but rested ashore on his laurels. He was an excellent seaman, but no enthusiast. Decatur envied him the fortune to be first in the race of renown, which Hull would never have envied Decatur; but took it as it came, as, perhaps, he would have let it pass, without distressing his placid nature if it had escaped him. Decatur was a restless spirit who loved danger and bloodshed, and fell in a duel from a pinnacle of distinction, when striving to repair the deficiencies he regretted, of early education. Hull died quietly in his bed, giving directions for his own funeral. No officer of the navy bore a larger part in its performances, in the French, the African, and the English wars, than Bainbridge: none was, perhaps, so instrumental in preventing its being cast away in 1812 as unfit to be

trusted at sea. But his conduct in 1814, when the government of Massachusetts attempted to put it out of the pale of national community and protection, was the most eminent of all Bainbridge's services. The responsibility he assumed, moral and patriotic courage he displayed on that trying occasion, deserve more applause than his battles; as shall be fully made known in the annals of another year.

The tide of naval triumphs was interrupted by the capture of the frigate Chesapeake, almost in sight of Boston harbour, on the 1st day of June, 1813, shortly after the extra session of Congress began. More than thirty years since that event, recollection is still vivid of the superstitious presentiment, which many felt when informed that Captain Lawrence had been challenged by Commodore Broke of the Shannon, and gone out to fight him. On the 22d of June, 1807, the ill-starred Chesapeake struck her flag in our own waters to the British ship Leopard, whose commander forcibly took from our ship some of her crew. That outrageous aggression would have produced war then, if the political pilot, Jefferson, had not been bent on the impracticable experiment of perpetual peace, which had the effect of increasing national exasperation, by constraining protracted submission to continually multiplying acts of injustice. The five following years completed the cycle of American wrongs, forbearance, and indignation, and elicited the declaration of war with a new era of naval annals, which brought unexpected and providential relief. From the depths of national degradation, and maritime despondency the country was raised all at once to intoxicating heights of triumphant assurance, to which Captain Lawrence fell a victim. In December, 1812, in the Hornet, sloop of war, after blockading an English vessel of superior force, the brig of war, Bonne Citoyenne, in the port of San Salvador, and challenging her Captain, Green, who disingenuously declined to fight him—Captain Lawrence, in the course of a cruise among the West India Islands, sunk another British brig of war of about his own force, the Peacock, with transcendent dispatch, in a quarter of an hour, in sight of the *Espiègle*, another British vessel of war which did not venture to engage him. After this round of amazing success, he returned covered with trophies, was restored to the rank, which, to his deep mortification and against his strong remonstrances, he had lost by the promotion of Cap-

tain Morris, and was appointed to the command of the frigate Chesapeake. Desiring to remain a short time on shore, he offered to exchange with Captain Stewart the Chesapeake, then ready for sea, for the Constitution, to which Captain Stewart had been appointed, which vessel, then at Boston, it would require some time to refit. Stewart was detained at Norfolk, fortifying the Constellation there from the British blockading squadron, which never had enterprise enough to capture that frigate, though they prevented her from going to sea during the whole war. On his way north, Captain Stewart heard at Washington tidings of the Chesapeake's capture. If he had commanded her, more prudent than Lawrence, never having challenged one enemy's vessel, nor sunk another, with such rapidity of execution as to disarm his discretion, it might have been that the Chesapeake's intemperate disaster would not have taken place, or its revulsion of feeling in both countries, discouraging ours, as if our flood of naval triumphs had turned to ebb, and transporting Great Britain like another victory of Camperdown, or Trafalgar, when she struck Holland, France, and Spain, from the annals of naval contest. We soon recovered from this solitary blow, although it shifted upon this country the unwelcome and mortifying burthen of apologizing for a defeat more than atoned for by a gallant captain, who expired with words of professional pride and exemplary courage on his lips, that will long rally his countrymen to victory or death.

The death and misfortune of Captain Lawrence were a noble but not uncommon sacrifice of the bravest and truest individuals, at the shrine of glory, for the benefit of their country. Lawrence, appointed to command the sloop of war Hornet, altered from a brig to a ship, was sent, in 1811, with Lieutenant, now Commodore Biddle, as bearer of dispatches to France and England, where the frigate Constitution, Captain Hull, the corvette Essex, Captain Porter, and the sloop of war Wasp, Captain Jones, then were also on similar errands. The inimical feeling between England and this country displayed itself on all occasions between vessels of war, which animosity induced Lawrence to keep his ship always ready for action whenever an English vessel was near, with one of which he had angry explanations in the British Channel—the brig Thracian, Captain Symes. After a run of only eighteen days from Europe to America, the Hornet, in

May 1812, landed Lieutenant Biddle, as bearer of dispatches, at New York, where the frigates *President*, Captain Rodgers, the *United States*, Captain Decatur, and *Congress*, Captain Smith, were lying all ready for sea. The following extract from a midshipman's diary, on board the *Hornet*, well expresses the feeling with which that squadron forthwith went to sea. "June 21. This morning the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain was received—on shore all is commotion and bustle—on board every countenance is beaming with delight, for many are the bold tars in our squadron who have been impressed for years in the English naval service that may now have an opportunity of wreaking their vengeance upon those that have oppressed them. At 10 A. M., Commodore Rodgers hove out the signal to weigh; never was anchor to the cat-head sooner, nor topsail sheeted home and to the mast-head with more dispatch than upon the present occasion; the smallest boy on board seems anxious to meet what is now looked upon as the common tyrant of the ocean, for they had heard the woeful tales of the older tars. When the ship was under weigh, Captain Lawrence delivered a short and appropriate address to the crew, which was returned by three hearty cheers, and swore never to disgrace their country's flag. Captain Lawrence had the crew called to their quarters, and told them that if there were any amongst them who were disaffected, or one that had not rather sink than surrender to the enemy with gun for gun, that he should be immediately, and uninjured, landed or sent back in the pilot boat: the reply, fore and aft, was—not one. At half-past two o'clock P. M., passed Sandy Hook and put to sea."

The midshipman's diary next gives an account of the chase of the *Belvidera*, English frigate, Captain Byron, by Rodgers' squadron, which the *Belvidera* skillfully eluded, and not without killing and wounding several men, including Rodgers, badly wounded by the bursting of a gun on board the *President*. The first American prize made that war was an English merchant brig called the *Dolphin*, sent in under charge of Midshipman Conner, acting sailing-master of the *Hornet*, now commanding the American squadron in the Gulf of Mexico. Rodgers' squadron of three frigates, a sloop and brig of war, sailed as far north as Cape Sables, on that short cruise. Why not, consisting

of the four other American frigates that might have been part of it, go off Halifax and there search for the enemy at his head quarters? The naval war began by an American squadron chasing a solitary English frigate, the *Belvidera*, and an English squadron chasing in like manner, the American frigate *Constitution*, on the same cruising ground, not far from the same time, when combination and system on our part, before these disjointed cruises took place, might have opened hostilities with an exploit of incalculable results. The British navy in North America was at the mercy of a well-combined operation of the American at that moment.

Lawrence after that cruise with Rodgers, having seen the victorious *Constitution* in Nantasket Roads, returned from her capture of the *Guerriere*, sailed on another cruise, with Bainbridge as captain of the *Constitution*, and in December, 1812, they found the English corvette *Bonne Citoyenne*, in the harbour of St. Salvador, once the capital of Brazil. Bainbridge left that neighbourhood, first having addressed a letter sent to the English consul at St. Salvador, informing him that the *Constitution* would go to a distance to prevent the possibility of her interference, while the *Hornet* engaged the *Bonne Citoyenne*. She had more guns and more men than the *Hornet*. At the same time Lawrence sent what the midshipman's diary calls a formal challenge to Captain Greene, of the enemy's corvette. That challenge probably caused the capture of the *Chesapeake* and Lawrence's death. Yet its being sent by the brave New Jerseymen who ventured it, Bainbridge and Lawrence, and being declined by the commander of an English vessel of superior force, could not be without good effect for us among the seamen of both nations. For many days Lawrence blockaded the Englishman at St. Salvador, frequently standing in close to the harbour, and making there the usual demonstrations of defiance, which Captain Greene not only declined, but assigned for it the disingenuous and offensive reason that Bainbridge, who had given his honour not to interfere, would, nevertheless, do so. Public sentiment in England would not have tolerated any English captain's refusing, in the same way, the challenge of a Frenchman. The spirit of American seamanship was disclosed in this proceeding, and its daring can hardly be condemned, notwithstanding the unfortunate fate it contributed to bring upon the gallant Lawrence. Driven from that neighbourhood by the Mon-

tagne 74, Lawrence made sail for the West Indies, and on the 24th February, 1813, off Demarara, engaged within half pistol-shot, and sunk in fifteen minutes, the English brig of war Peacock, Captain Peake, a vessel of about equal force. During the battle another British brig of war, the L'Espiègle, mounting fifteen 32 pound carronades, and two long guns, lay at anchor close by.

The particulars of the engagement between the Chesapeake and the Shannon have been too often published to justify another edition of them. Mr. Washington Irving, in 1816, from the account of officers of the Chesapeake, Mr. Fennimore Cooper in 1839, from authentic and professional sources of intelligence, have so fully explained that, the only counterblast to American naval triumphs over the great conquerors of the seas, that I shall add only what has been hitherto not overlooked, but suppressed, from mistaken motives; the condemnation of acting Lieutenant William S. Cox, to whom was ascribed the loss of the American frigate. A court-martial, of which Decatur was President, convened on board his ship the United States, in March, 1814, for the trial of Mr. Cox, (and some inferior officers, two midshipmen, the bugleman, and a seaman,) whose judgment it would not become one unskilled in naval tactics, unaffected with naval sympathies, to contradict. It is said that the absence of a member of the court, which reduced its numbers from thirteen to twelve, changed a sentence of death, as it might otherwise have been, to that of being cashiered, with a perpetual incapacity to serve in the navy of the United States. It has also been said that the blood of Byng, whether justly or unjustly shed, was the seed of all the British naval victories. Perhaps, in the state of public feeling at the time, the sacrifice of the surviving officer of the Chesapeake, a young man of respectable character and connections, was due to national policy, or naval pride. But the gentleman condemned, and his country, are both entitled to the historical vindication, which is little known, that he was honourably acquitted of the stigmatizing charges of which he was accused, and convicted and sentenced only of what any brave man might be guilty; of what a humane man might be proud; and of what many brave men were much more deplorably guilty in many of the battles of that war, without being tried, much less blasted for it. Of the first charge, cowardice; the second, disobedience of orders; part of the third, desertion of his quar-

ters, Mr. Cox was honourably acquitted; and no one can read the testimony on his trial, without acknowledging that he was wholly innocent. He was condemned for neglect of duty and unofficer-like conduct, the extent of which offences appear by the evidence, to have been no more than accompanying Captain Lawrence when disabled, from the quarter-deck to the cock-pit, and not succeeding in getting back to his station. It is due to the true account of that memorable transaction to give the testimony of those present, which is, therefore, annexed at large in the proceedings of the court-martial.

The United States Frigate United States.

At a general court martial held on board the United States Frigate United States, lying in the harbour of New London, in the state of Connecticut, in pursuance of a precept, issued under the hand and seal of the Hon. Wm. Jones, Secretary of the Navy of the United States, bearing date the 17th day of March, Anno Domini, 1814, and directed to Stephen Decatur, Esq., captain in the Navy of the United States, on Friday, the 15th day of April, 1814.

Present:—

Captain STEPHEN DECATUR, *President.*

“ JACOB JONES.

Master and Comd. JAMES BIDDLE.

Lieut. GEO. W. RODGERS.

“ WM. CARTER, JR.

“ JOHN T. SHUBRICK.

“ BENJ'N W. BOOTH!

“ ALEX'R CLAYTON.

“ DAVID CONNER.

“ JOHN GALLAGHER.

“ JOHN D. SLOAT.

“ MATTHEW C. PERRY.

THO'S OLIVER SELFRIDGE, Esq., *Judge Advocate.*

The judge advocate read the precept from the Hon. Wm. Jones, secretary as aforesaid, convoking the court, with the charges and specifications against Lieutenant William S. Cox, Midshipmen James W. Forrest and Henry P. Pleshman, William Brown, bugleman, Joseph Russell, captain of the second gun, thereto annexed. The judge advocate then read the warrant of Captain Stephen Decatur, as president of the court, appointing Thomas Oliver Selfridge judge advocate of this court. The judge advocate then administered the oath prescribed by law, to the president of the court, and to each of the members severally, and the president then administered the oath prescribed by law, to the judge advocate:

When Lieutenant William S. Cox, and Midshipmen James W. Forrest and Henry P. Pleshman, and William Brown, bugleman, and Joseph Russell, captain of the second gun, came prisoners before the court, and the following charges and specifications of the same were audibly read to them by the judge advocate.

CHARGES.

William S. Cox, Lieutenant in the Navy of the United States.

1st. FOR COWARDICE.

Specification. In that he deserted his station in time of action with the enemy, and continued absent therefrom.

2d. FOR DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS.

Specification. In that having been charged with the command of the second division of the gun-deck, he left his station in time of action with the enemy, and after having so left it, was seen by his commanding officer, James Lawrence, Esq., in the cock-pit of the said frigate, who ordered him to return to his quarters, which orders he did not execute.

3d. DESERTION FROM HIS QUARTERS AND NEGLECT OF DUTY.

Specification 1st. In that he was charged with the command of the 2d division of the gun-deck, from which he withdrew in time of action with the enemy, without orders, while the men of said division remained at their quarters.

Specification 2d. In that he did not do his utmost to aid and assist to take, or destroy the enemy's vessel, the Shannon, by animating and encouraging in his own person, conduct and example, the inferior officers and men to fight courageously; but did, contrary to orders, and his duty as an officer, leave his station in time of action, and deny to Midshipman Higginbotham, the use of coercive means to prevent the men from deserting their quarters, running or jumping below, and thereby compel them to return to their duty, and repel the boarders of the enemy.

4th. UNOFFICER-LIKE CONDUCT.

Specification 1st. In that he quitted his station designated in the foregoing specifications in time of action with the enemy, proceeded to the upper deck, and thence while the enemy was boarding or attempting to board the frigate Chesapeake, accompanied the person of his disabled commander before named, to the gun-deck, and there continued without properly exerting himself through the remainder of the action.

Specification 2d. In that, after having left his station and proceeded to the upper deck, and thence, while the enemy was boarding or attempting to board the frigate Chesapeake, accompanied the person of his disabled commander to the gun-deck, he did not return to the command of his division, but went forward on the gun-deck, and while there, and the men were retreating below, commanded them to go to their duty, without enforcing that command himself, or directing, or permitting others to do so; where, and in the steerage of the frigate he continued during the remainder of the action, contrary to his duty and the good example of an officer.

To which said Cox plead "not guilty" to the charges exhibited against him, whereupon said Cox applied to the court to have counsel to aid him in his defence which the court granted, under the restriction that the counsel for the accused, or the accused himself should propose all his cross interrogatories to the witnesses for the prosecution, through the judge advocate, and that all questions should be proposed to the witnesses for the accused in the same manner, and that the defence of the accused being made by counsel, must be reduced to writing, and might be read either by himself or his counsel.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at ten o'clock.

April 16th, 1814. The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present:—

Captain STEPHEN DECATUR, *President.*

“ JACOB JONES.

Master and Comd. JAMES BIDDLE.

Lieut. WM. CARTER, JR.

“ THOMAS T. SHUBRICK.

“ BENJ'N W. BOOTH.

“ ALEX'R. CLAYTON.

“ DAVID CONNER.

“ JOHN GALLAGHER.

“ JOHN D. SLOAT.

“ MATTHEW C. PERRY.

THO'S OLIVER SELFRIDGE, ESQ., *Judge Advocate.*

Lieutenant George W. Rodgers being ordered on other duty, is excused by the president from any further attendance upon this court martial.

Lieutenant George Budd, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, on the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, on the respective charges exhibited against him as aforesaid.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you on board the United States Frigate Chesapeake, on the 1st of June 1813?

Answer. I was, as second lieutenant, James Lawrence, Esq., commander, and we commenced a cruise at 12 A. M. with a large sail in sight, which we supposed was an enemy's frigate, and we stood to the eastward and fell in with, and brought her to action before sun-down.

Question by the same. How did you engage her?

Answer. We came down on her starboard quarter and engaged her, having the weather-gauge at pistol-shot distance, and as soon as we could train our guns upon her.

Question by the same. How was the action fought, and what was the result of it?

Answer. At the time we came up, the enemy's frigate was lying-to, with her yards aback. As we came up, we had considerable weigh upon the Chesapeake, and, as we ranged up, I perceived that we were luffing-to; the cannonading commenced from the enemy and was immediately returned from the Chesapeake, and, in my opinion, we lay broadside and broadside ten or twelve minutes, and fired three rounds, but I cannot positively state the time with accuracy. At this time, we had ranged so far ahead, that my division of guns, which was the first, could not be trained upon the enemy. Midshipman Curtiss, one of the captain's aids, came to the gun-deck with orders from Captain Lawrence, to call the boarders. Being a boarder, I immediately left my quarters and called out "boarders away." I then passed to the second division on the gun-deck, which was Lieutenant Cox's, and looked for, but could not find him, and called out "boarders away," and proceeded to the spar-deck, up the main hatchway, and gained the starboard side of the quarter-deck, abaft the life-rail, and saw a number of our men there, I suppose about twenty or twenty-five. At this moment I discovered people on the quarter-deck, passing to the fore-castle, which I did not know to be the enemy until I discovered a British uniform.

About twenty-five or thirty men passed forward, which I suppose was the first division of the enemy's boarders, and suppose that as many as sixty or seventy of the enemy had now collected on the quarter-deck. From the time I gained the quarter-deck till this time, which I suppose was two or three minutes, there was no battle on either side, and I perceived that the Chesapeake had fallen foul of the enemy.

Question by the same. How long did you remain upon the upper deck, and did you see Lieutenant Cox while you remained there?

Answer. From the time I gained the quarter-deck till I left it, six or seven minutes, I did not see Lieutenant Cox, and I should have seen him unless he was abaft the enemy.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox before the ship was carried? if not, when did you see him and what situation was he in?

Answer. I did not see him before the ship was carried, and did not see him until we were on our passage to Halifax.

Question by the same. Did Lieutenant Cox voluntarily inform you after the engagement, that he assisted in carrying Captain Lawrence to the cockpit after he was wounded? and did he further inform you that Captain Lawrence was displeased with him, and that his commander ordered him to his quarters?

Answer. In Halifax, Lieutenant Cox did inform me that he assisted in carrying Captain Lawrence to the cockpit, and that Captain Lawrence appeared to be displeased with him and did order him to his quarters.

Question by the court. Please to relate to the court the precise words Lieutenant Cox used?

Answer. He related to me in Halifax, that he assisted Captain Lawrence after he was wounded, in conveying him to the cockpit, and when Captain Lawrence discovered he was with him, he appeared to be displeased and ordered him to go to his quarters immediately.

Question by judge advocate. Was Lieutenant Cox at his quarters at any period of the action after you went to his division to order the boarders away?

Answer. I did not see him, but I was in a situation to see him only a part of the time; then he was not at his quarters.

Question by the same. Was Lieutenant Cox a boarder?

Answer. My impression is that he was not.

Question by Lieutenant Cox's counsel, proposed by the judge advocate to Lieutenant Budd, on his cross-examination. At the time of the conversation which you have stated to have had with Lieutenant Cox in Halifax, did not he state as a part of the same conversation, that Captain Lawrence, after he was wounded, requested his assistance in carrying him below?

Answer. No.

Question by the same. Did Lieutenant Cox say at the same time that Captain Lawrence was displeased with him as an individual, or displeased on account of the issue of the engagement?

Answer. I understood that Lieutenant Cox's intention was to state, that Captain Lawrence was displeased because he left his quarters to carry him below when a man would have answered as well; but I have no other means of forming a judgment than by Lieutenant Cox having uttered the precise words to which I have already testified.

Question by the same. Did not Lieutenant Cox say that Captain Lawrence

requested him to return on deck after he had left him below, and fight the ship till she sunk! and were not these the precise words in which Mr. Cox said he was ordered to return to his quarters by Captain Lawrence?

Answer. No!

Question by the same. When did Lieutenant Cox join the Chesapeake?

Answer. A few days before she commenced her cruise.

Question. Had Lieutenant Cox ever been mustered at the second division, and if so, how many times?

Answer. I do not know whether he was ever mustered at the second division.

Question by the court. After you had beat to quarters did you see at any time Lieutenant Cox in the command of the second division?

Answer. After we beat to quarters, I saw Lieutenant Cox in command of the second division, which I knew to be his quarters.

The court adjourned, the morrow being Sunday, to meet on Monday morning at ten o'clock.

April 18th, 1814. The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present:—

Captain STEPHEN DECATUR, *President.*

“ JACOB JONES.

Master and Comd. JAMES BIDDLE.

Lieut. WM. CARTER, JR.

“ JOHN T. SHUBRICK.

“ BENJ'N W. BOOTH.

“ ALEX'R CLAXTON.

“ DAVID CONNER.

“ JOHN GALLAGHER.

“ JOHN D. SLOAT.

“ MATTHEW C. PERRY.

THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, ESQ., *Judge Advocate.*

Acting Midshipman Benj'n Tollett was produced as a witness on the part of the prosecution. Being duly sworn in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox on the charges aforesaid.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st of June, 1813, and if so, in what capacity?

Answer. I was attached to her as acting midshipman.

Question by the same. In what part of the ship were you stationed in her action with the Shannon?

Answer. In the third division on the gun-deck.

Question by the same. Where was Lieutenant Cox's station in the action between the Chesapeake and Shannon?

Answer. He had charge of the second division.

Question by the same. Did he remain with his division during the whole of the engagement, and if not, when did he leave it?

Answer. I did not see him immediately before the action, nor when it commenced, but after Mr. Ludlow called the boarders through the after hatchway I saw Mr. Cox bringing down Captain Lawrence. I also saw Lieutenant Cox remove the grating off the steerage hatchway and descend from the gun-deck with Cap-

tain Lawrence. I did not hear Captain Lawrence speak to Mr. Cox, and I did not see Mr. Cox again until after the ship was carried. At the time I saw Lieutenant Cox carrying Captain Lawrence below, many of the men in the second division were standing at their quarters; whether all of them were standing at their quarters, or whether part of them had gone to the spar-deck, I do not know.

Question by the court. Was there sufficient time after Mr. Ludlow called the boarders, for Lieutenant Cox to have gone from his division to the spar-deck and brought down Captain Lawrence?

Answer. I think there was time sufficient.

Question by the same. Was there anything in Lieutenant Cox's deportment at the time you saw him, evincive of fear?

Answer. I do not think that his appearance evinced fear in the least.

Question by the court. Did any one assist in conveying Captain Lawrence below?

Answer. There were more persons than one aiding Lieutenant Cox. I do not know who they were.

Question by Mr. Cox's counsel proposed through the judge advocate. Was not your back turned upon the steerage hatchway so that a person might easily have passed up without your notice, and how long did you stand near the steerage hatchway?

Answer. A person might have passed up the steerage hatchway soon after Mr. Cox went down, without my seeing him; I remained at my quarters in the third division, several minutes after Mr. Cox went down.

Question by the same. Did you not see Lieutenant Cox doing duty in your division after Mr. Ballard was wounded and carried below, and after Mr. Cox's division had been deserted by the men?

Answer. No.

Question by the same. Could the guns of the second division have been brought to bear upon the enemy, after you saw Mr. Cox with Captain Lawrence?

Answer. No.

Midshipman Delozier Higginbotham, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution on the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, on the charges aforesaid.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st of June, 1813, and if so, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to her in the capacity of midshipman, and was stationed at the second division on the gun-deck in the action with the Shannon.

Question by the same. Where was Lieutenant Cox's station in said action?

Answer. He had charge of the second division. He behaved well throughout the action. He animated and cheered the men as long as the guns of his division could be brought to bear. He left his division before Mr. Curtiss came to call the boarders; at which time, I being a boarder, attempted to gain the spar-deck, by the main hatchway and was driven back by the enemy's marines; when I attempted to gain it by the fore-scuttle, at which time I found the Chesapeake's men jumping below. The men on the gun-deck having deserted their quarters were crowding down the fore-hatchway. Mr. Cox came forward to me from the after part of the ship with his cutlass in his hand, and said, "You damned cowardly sons of bitches, what are you jumping below for?" Witness

asked Mr. Cox if he should cut them down? Mr. Cox answered, "No sir, it is of no use." I went forward and found Lieutenant Budd, wounded, who requested me to show him the way to the cockpit, which I accordingly did, and I did not see Mr. Cox afterwards.

Question by the court. How many men were on the gun-deck at the time you asked Mr. Cox whether you should cut the men down?

Answer. As many as thirty or forty, who had not gone but were going below.

Question by the same. Were any of the men on the gun-deck, armed, and if any, what number?

Answer. About ten had arms, and the rest none, that I saw.

Question by the court. Did Lieutenant Cox attempt to rally the men on the gun-deck; or those who were jumping there from the fore-castle?

Answer. Nothing more than what I have above related.

Question by judge advocate. After Mr. Cox directed you not to cut the men down, how many men came from the spar deck through the fore-scuttle?

Answer. I should judge about fifteen.

Question by counsel for Mr. Cox. Was not Mr. Cox, preparatory to the engagement, mustered at the second division for the first time; and could he know which of the men were boarders, and which not?

Answer. He was then mustered there for the first time.

Question by the same. At any time during the action did Mr. Cox avoid danger, or discover symptoms of fear?

Answer. Not to my knowledge.

Question by the same. Might not Mr. Cox have heard Mr. Ludlow's call for the boarders, he being nearer to the after hatchway than you; and you not have heard it?

Answer. Mr. Cox was nearer the after hatchway than the witness, and might have heard Mr. Ludlow's call. Witness did not.

Question by the same. Did not the men precipitate themselves down the hatchway in a mass, so that they could not be stopped, if they were cut down, and was there any ladder to the hatchway?

Answer. There was no ladder to the hatchway; the men were in a mass, but I do not know that cutting down one would not have stopped the rest.

Midshipman James Curtiss, having been duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, on the charges aforesaid.

Question by judge advocate. On the 1st of June, 1813, were you attached to the Chesapeake, if so, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to the Chesapeake as a midshipman, and stationed on the quarter-deck as aid to Captain Lawrence.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the engagement?

Answer. After the ships were foul, Captain Lawrence ordered the boarders to be called. When the bugleman failed, I jumped below and informed the officer on the starboard side of the deck, whom I supposed had the command of the second division, that the boarders were called; whether Mr. Cox or not, I cannot say; I then passed forward to the first division and informed Mr. Budd, and then returned to the spar deck by the fore-scuttle; Captain Lawrence then had been carried below. There remained on the spar deck of the Chesapeake, twenty or thirty men, as nearly as I can judge, and the enemy, forty or fifty

strong, were in possession of the quarter-deck, and had advanced nearly as far forward as the gangway. I believe there was some fighting at this time on the larboard side forward. At this time I saw no commissioned officer on the spar-deck, and I believe that some of the Chesapeake's men were not armed. After the ship was carried, I saw Mr. Cox in the steerage.

Question by the court. You state that the officer whom you saw in the second division was on the starboard side of the gun-deck; which was the side off from the enemy; were the men of the second division also on the starboard side?

Answer. Several of the men were on the starboard side; the men were scattered about, not attached to their guns, having left them.

Question by the court. What interval of time elapsed between the Chesapeake's being carried, and your seeing Mr. Cox in the steerage?

Answer. According to the best of my recollection, ten minutes.

Question by the court. When you went below to call the boarders, did you see any of the men stationed upon the gun-deck going below?

Answer. I do not recollect that I did.

Question for Mr. Cox, by his counsel. Was Mr. Cox in the steerage before you, or did he come there afterwards?

Answer. I do not know.

Question by the same. When you supposed you saw a lieutenant on the starboard side, commanding the second division, did you not also see Mr. Higginbotham, and was he not upon the larboard side?

Answer. Mr. Higginbotham was at this time upon the larboard side.

Question by the same. Could the guns of the second division, at this time have been brought to bear upon the enemy?

Answer. I believe not.

Dr. John Dix, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, upon the charges aforesaid.

Question by judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st June, 1813, as surgeon's mate?

Answer. Yes.

Question by the court. Did you see Captain Lawrence carried into the cockpit, and who carried him?

Answer. I saw him after he passed the stanchions at the foot of the stairs, but I do not know who carried him down; I did not see Mr. Cox during the action.

Question by the same. Was your attendance upon Captain Lawrence immediate upon his being carried into the cockpit, and did you hear him give any orders, and if he had have given orders, should you have heard them?

Answer. My attendance upon Captain Lawrence was immediate. Dr. Edgar was supporting him, when he inquired for his aids, who were not present. He then ordered me to go to the deck and **TELL THE MEN TO FIRE FASTER, AND NOT GIVE UP THE SHIP**, which I attempted to do, but was prevented by the enemy's fire upon the berth deck. Had he have given any other orders, I think I should have heard them.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 A. M.

19th April, 1814. The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present:—

Captain STEPHEN DECATUR, *President.*

“ JACOB JONES,

Master and Comd. JAMES BIDDLE,

Lieutenant WILLIAM CARTER, Jr.,

“ JOHN T. SHURRICK,

“ BENJAMIN W. BOOTH,

“ ALEXANDER CLAXTON,

“ DAVID CONNER,

“ JOHN GALLAGHER,

“ JOHN D. SLOAT,

“ MATTHEW C. PERRY.

THOMAS OLIVER SELFRIDGE, ESQ., *Judge Advocate.*

Dr. Richard C. Edgar, having been duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, upon the charges aforesaid, when Lieutenant Cox filed the following objection to the competency of *Dr. Edgar* as a witness, viz :

“ Lieutenant Cox objects to the examination of *Dr. Edgar*, or any witness, on the part of the prosecution, other than those contained in the list of witnesses which has been already handed to him by the judge advocate, as it would be inconsistent with the established usage of a court-martial.

(Signed)

“ WILLIAM S. COX.”

Whereupon the court was cleared to deliberate, when the objection was overruled and the witness ordered to be examined.

Lieutenant Cox was informed by the court that he should be allowed ample time to meet the evidence, if he should require it, before the court would call upon him for his defence.

Question by judge advocate. Were you surgeon of the Chesapeake 1st June, 1813?

Answer. I was.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the action with the Shannon?

Answer. I did not see him.

Question by the same. Who brought Captain Lawrence to the cockpit?

Answer. Two persons brought him down, but the lights in the steerage were so dim that I could not see who they were, and the stairs to the cockpit were very crowded.

Question by the same. Did Captain Lawrence give any orders to the persons who brought him down?

Answer. Not in my hearing, and I was present.

Question by the same. Did he give any orders in your hearing after he was carried into the cockpit?

Answer. He gave me an order to go on deck and tell the commanding officer to fight the ship till she sunk; he immediately countermanded the order and directed me to send the loblolly boy with the same order.

Question by the court. Did the persons who brought down Captain Lawrence aid you in getting him into the cockpit?

Answer. One of them did; who he was I do not know; the other did not aid me, and I do not know who he was nor where he went.

Midshipman Edmund Russell, having been duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, on the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, upon the charges aforesaid.

Question by judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake 1st June, 1813, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to her in the capacity of a midshipman, and was stationed at the third division on the gun-deck.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the engagement with the Shannon?

Answer. I did. After Captain Lawrence was carried down, he came to the thirteenth gun, where I was stationed, and where there were but few men, and helped depress and fire it; that and the gun aft being the only guns in the battery which would bear on the enemy. This was the last gun fired. Lieutenant Cox then went away. I remained at my quarters a short time, and, perceiving the men gone from the first and second divisions, I went forward, where I saw Lieutenant Budd wounded, and the men on the gun-deck jumping below, and the men on the spar-deck jumping down. In about three minutes from the time Lieutenant Cox left my gun he came forward, but used no endeavours to rally the men or prevent their going below. According to the best of my knowledge could the men have been stopped when I first looked forward, the number upon the gun and spar-decks would have been sixty. The boarders had swords and some of them pistols, but great complaint was made of the badness of the pistols, and that the balls did not fit. Mr. Higginbotham went below with Lieutenant Budd, and when he came up he asked Mr. Cox whether he should cut the men down who were going below, and he answered "No sir, it will be of no use." About twenty men came from the spar-deck after this. At this time Lieutenant Cox was looking down the hatchway, and there were no men on the gun-deck.

Question by the court. If there were no men on the gun-deck, why did Mr. Higginbotham request of Lieutenant Cox, permission to "cut the men down?"

Answer. He requested permission to cut the men down who were coming from the spar deck.

Question by the same. Did Mr. Cox, Mr. Higginbotham or yourself, when you saw there were no men on the gun-deck, make any effort to gain the spar-deck?

Answer. We did not. Mr. Budd, when he came down, observed that the ship was carried, but this was not in the hearing of Mr. Cox.

Question by judge advocate. Was there any attempt made by Mr. Cox to put the grating upon the hatchway?

Answer. None that I saw, and it was not put on.

Question by Lieutenant Cox's counsel. When Lieutenant Cox assisted at your gun, had not Lieutenant Ballard, the commanding officer of the division, been carried below?

Answer. He had been.

Question by the same. Did the enemy take immediate possession of the gun-deck after Mr. Cox's answer to Mr. Higginbotham, and could the Chesapeake's men have been stopped, if cut down?

Answer. They took possession a few moments after. I do not think the men could have been stopped. We remained upon the gun-deck sometime, when the enemy came down and ordered us off; I went, but did not see Mr. Cox.

Question by the same. Would any attempt to rally the men on the gun-deck at that time have been successful; or were there any men there to be rallied?

Answer. There were none to rally on the gun-deck.

Question by the same. Were there any gratings near the fore-hatchway on the gun-deck?

Answer. None that I saw.

Question by the same. Did Mr. Cox avoid danger, or exhibit any symptoms of fear during the action?

Answer. He did not avoid danger, nor discover any symptoms of fear to my knowledge.

Midshipman William Steele, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, on the charges aforesaid.

Question by judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st June, 1813, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to her in the capacity of midshipman, and was stationed on the berth-deck.

Question by the same. Did you see Mr. Cox during the action with the Shannon?

Answer. I did not. I saw Captain Lawrence carried down; but who was with him, I don't know.

Question by the court. When did you first see Mr. Cox, after the engagement?

Answer. After the action, a British officer called for the surviving commanding officer of the Chesapeake, when Mr. Cox came to the hatchway; at this time all the surviving officers were in the steerage.

Midshipman John D. Fisher, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, upon the charges aforesaid.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st June, 1813, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to her as a midshipman, and stationed on the fore-castle.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the engagement with the Shannon?

Answer. I did not.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock.

20th April, 1814. The court met pursuant to adjournment.

Present:—

Captain STEPHEN DECATUR, President.

“ JACOB JONES.

Master and Comd. JAMES BIDDLE.

Lieut. WM. CARTER, JR.

“ JOHN T. SHUBBICK.

“ BENJ'N W. BOOTH.

“ ALEX. CLAXTON.

“ DAVID CONNER.

“ JOHN GALLAGHER.

“ JOHN D. SLOAT.

“ MATTHEW C. PERRY.

THOMAS OLIVER SELFRIDGE, ESQ., *Judge Advocate.*

Midshipman Horatio Bates, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution, in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, upon the charges aforesaid.

Question by the judge advocate. On the 1st of June, 1813, were you attached to the Chesapeake; in what capacity; and where stationed?

Answer. I was attached to her in the capacity of midshipman, and was stationed at the third division on the gun-deck.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the engagement with the Shannon?

Answer. I did see him in the engagement, and soon after the action commenced, in the command of the second division upon the gun-deck. When he left that station I do not know, but just before the cannonading was discontinued, and after I had carried Mr. Ballard to the after-hatchway, and when I was returning to my division, I saw Lieutenant Cox with others, aiding in carrying Captain Lawrence below; and I saw Mr. Cox step over the combings of the hatchway. At the time I saw Captain Lawrence in the arms of Lieutenant Cox and others, the men in the second division were not at their guns. As my gun, which was the aft one, was disabled, I went to the 13th gun, which was the last fired, but did not aid in firing it. Shortly after this, in about three seconds, I was informed that the boarders were called, by a singing out upon the gun-deck "boarders away." I immediately attempted to gain the spar-deck to aid in repelling boarders, but could not succeed. At this time there were but few men on the gun-deck, and they were running below. I did not see Mr. Cox after I saw him step over the combings of the hatchway during the action.

Question by the court. Was the 13th gun of the third division fired after you left it; and if it had been fired after, were you in a situation to have known it?

Answer. It was fired about the time that I left it. It is my belief that this was the last gun, as I remained on the gun-deck, and I heard no report of a gun after that.

Question by the same. Did you leave the same persons at the 13th gun, whom you found at it?

Answer. I did.

Question by the same. Did you see any officer at or near the 13th gun at the time you returned?

Answer. I saw acting Midshipman Follet between 12th and 13th guns, and I saw no other officer.

Question by the same. Is it not possible that an officer or officers might have been at the 13th gun, working it, and you not have seen them.

Answer. An officer or officers might have been there and I not have seen them.

Question by the judge advocate. Was it possible for Lieutenant Cox, after your return, when you saw him stepping over the combings of the hatchway, to have passed to the 13th gun without your having seen him; and if he had gone to the cockpit, was there sufficient time for him to have descended and returned before the gun was fired?

Answer. It was possible for Lieutenant Cox to have passed to the 13th gun without my having seen him, but if he did go to the cockpit, it is my belief that he could not have gone down and returned before the gun was fired.

Midshipman Benjamin Tollett called again for the prosecution.

Question by the court. Were you in a situation to observe who were working the 13th gun after you saw Captain Lawrence passed below?

Answer. My station was at the 11th gun, which was the first of the third division; I perceived that men were working that gun, but who they were, I cannot tell.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you between the 12th and 13th guns, at any time during the action?

Answer. I was not.

Samuel Livermore, Esq., being duly sworn, was produced as a witness for the prosecution in the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox on the aforesaid charges.

Question by the judge advocate. Were you attached to the Chesapeake on the 1st of June, 1813, and if so, in what capacity, and where stationed?

Answer. I was on board of her as a volunteer; I was rated as chaplain, and was stationed on the quarter-deck.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Cox during the engagement of the Chesapeake and Shannon?

Answer. No.

Question by the same. What voluntary declarations has Lieutenant Cox made to you, or in your hearing, of the circumstances which took place in the action with the Shannon, relative to himself?

Answer. After our arrival in Halifax, I heard Mr. Cox voluntarily declare in presence of some of the officers of the Chesapeake, but whom, I cannot recollect, that when he heard the boarders called, he went up and found Captain Lawrence wounded, and assisted in carrying him below. I have no recollection that he stated that he returned to the spar-deck, or attempted so to do, except that he informed me he was crowded down by the boarders of the enemy.

Question by Mr. Cox. Did not Lieut. Cox, in the course of that conversation, say that he assisted Captain Lawrence, in carrying him below, at his own request?

Answer. Not to my recollection.

Question by the same. Did you ever hear Captain Lawrence mention the conduct of Lieutenant Cox, during the action, in terms of disapprobation?

Answer. No. After the action I was confined in Mr. Ludlow's state-room till we arrived in Halifax, and I had no conversation with Captain Lawrence.

Question by judge advocate. When Mr. Cox stated to you, or in your hearing, that he was crowded down by the enemy's boarders, did he designate the place from which he was crowded, or at what period in the action it took place?

Answer. Not to my recollection.

The evidence for the prosecution was here closed. Whereupon Lieutenant Cox requested the court to grant him three days to enable him to procure evidence and prepare his defence, which was granted by the court.

The court adjourned to meet to-morrow at 10 o'clock.

The court having been occupied with other business from April 20th to April 26th, 1814, and Lieutenant Matthew C. Perry having been excused, the court proceeded in hearing the defence of Lieutenant William S. Cox upon the charges aforesaid.

26th April, 1814.

Midshipman John D. Fisher, being duly sworn, who was produced as a wit-

ness for the prosecution on the trial of Lieutenant William S. Cox, was now called by Lieutenant Cox and examined by his counsel.

Question by Lieutenant Cox's counsel. Did not Lieutenant Budd, at the call for boarders, gain the upper deck by the fore-scuttle ?

Answer. At the second call for boarders, I saw Lieutenant Budd gain the spar-deck by the fore-scuttle, and he said "Boarders away," and immediately ran aft upon the starboard side, and I followed him.

Question by the court. Did you see Mr. Curtiss come up by the fore-castle when he went down to call the boarders ?

Answer. I did not see Mr. Curtiss when he came up.

Question by the same. After you saw Mr. Budd go aft, did not Mr. Curtiss go forward to haul on board the fore-tack ?

Answer. Mr. Curtiss came forward with orders to haul on board the fore-tack, two or three minutes before Mr. Budd gained the spar-deck by the fore-scuttle, after which I did not see Mr. Curtiss go forward, and no orders to that effect were sent forward by any person to my knowledge after Mr. Budd came up by the fore-scuttle.

Question by the same. Did Mr. Budd appear to be wounded when he came up by the fore-scuttle ?

Answer. No.

William Gardner, seaman, being duly sworn, was produced as a witness by Lieutenant William S. Cox, in his trial on the charges aforesaid.

Question by prisoner's counsel. On the 1st June, 1813, were you on board the Chesapeake, in what capacity, and where quartered, in the action with the Shannon ?

Answer. I was on board the Chesapeake in the capacity of seaman, and was quartered in the second division on the gun-deck, and was captain of gun No. 8, in said division.

Question by the same. At the first call for boarders which reached your division, did Mr. Cox go immediately to the spar-deck by the main hatchway, and did you follow him ?

Answer. He did go and I followed him.

Question by the same. Who gave the first call for boarders which reached your division ?

Answer. Lieutenant Ludlow, from the spar-deck, at the main-hatchway, and Mr. Cox immediately called away his division.

Question by the same. Did you see Lieutenant Budd at your division at any time during the engagement ?

Answer. No.

Question by the court. Were you a boarder ?

Answer. I was a first boarder.

Question by judge advocate. When you first went up after Lieutenant Cox, what number of the enemy were on the quarter-deck of the Chesapeake ?

Answer. Twelve or fourteen, and others coming on the larboard quarter.

Question by the same. How many Americans were there upon the quarter-deck of the Chesapeake when you came up after Mr. Cox ?

Answer. In my opinion there were as many as forty or fifty men.

Question by the same. Did you see any men upon the gangway or fore-castle ?

Answer. Some in both places, but how many I do not know.

Question by the same. Did you see Captain Lawrence when you came up, and where was he standing?

Answer. I did see him leaning on the binnacle, on the starboard side, and he was wounded.

Question by the same. Did you hear him give any orders after you came up?

Answer. I did, but the noise and confusion were so great that I do not know what they were.

Question by the same. When Mr. Cox came up, where did he go, what orders did he give, and what did he do?

Answer. As soon as he came off the ladder he ordered the boarders to "rush on," and went aft himself. I did not see him again, and I do not know what else he did.

Question by the same. How long was it after you gained the upper deck, before you were disabled?

Answer. A few minutes, as near as I can judge, from five to ten.

Question by the same. Had Lieutenant Cox, when he went aft, remained upon the quarter-deck, either fighting or giving orders, should you not have seen or heard him before you were disabled?

Answer. There were so much noise and confusion on the quarter-deck, that I could not distinguish one man's voice from another, and I did not see him.

DEFENCE.

Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Court Martial:—

The unfortunate issue of the engagement between the Chesapeake and the Shannon, has given rise to many prejudiced opinions among some, and has excited a great solicitude among others, to ascertain the immediate causes of that misfortune; for the belief has been strong, that the event of an inquiry would clear from all disgrace the American naval character, and vindicate from reproach the conduct of the American officers who suffered and shared the mortification of that defeat. Confident, as I am, that this will be the result, I am far from declining a scrutiny, however minute, which I trust will place me beyond the possibility of suspicion. If, from these fair and honourable motives, which coincide precisely with my wishes, I am arraigned before you, I have reason to be gratified. But if the object be to heal the wounded honour, or reinstate the naval pride of the nation by offering me a sacrifice, I lament that some kind shot, commissioned for my death, had not saved to your feelings and to mine the necessity of this meeting. If, because I have survived, and found no fault with others, I am to bear the odium of the defeat, I cannot but consider the prosecution as ungenerous; for, if the public feelings have been wounded at all, mine have been more so. But a constitutional freedom from suspicion inclines me to adopt the more charitable presumption and urges me to embrace with eagerness this opportunity of claiming your attention to the conclusive proofs of my innocence.

Many accusations are brought against me; but for the sake of brevity and method, I venture to include them under the general charges of cowardice and neglect of duty. For desertion from quarters, disobedience of orders, and the specifications, charged under the head of unofficer-like conduct, are only differ-

ent instances of the same *neglect*. Many of the charges are repetitions, and the same conduct is laid in different places, with a little variation of language, as a distinct offence. This is sufficiently obvious upon a cursory reading; but this is not all; the charges are contradictory. I say this not merely to point your attention to the fact, but to take an opportunity of reminding you of the numerous instances, in which, by these very means, innocence has been providentially rescued from the deep malice of a false accuser. The specifications under the second charge state, that I was seen by my commanding officer, James Lawrence, Esq., in the cockpit, and by him ordered to return; while the first specification under the 4th charge states, that I accompanied the person of my disabled commander to the gun-deck, and there continued.

I am charged with cowardice, in deserting my quarters. The testimony of every witness who had the means of knowledge has been, that I remained at my quarters at least until Lieutenant Ludlow made the first call for boarders. This was heard by some and not by others. The cry of "Boarders away" is, to a young officer, an animating cry; and whether the accused heard Lieutenant Ludlow, or received the first information from Mr. Curtiss, it is certain that he heard the order before it reached Mr. Budd. The testimony of this last gentleman consists partly of his own knowledge, and partly of my conversation with him at Halifax. The substance of the first is this; that when he passed from his own division to the main hatchway, after the action had lasted ten or twelve minutes, he did not see me there, though he looked round with that view, and that he did not afterwards see me on the upper deck. If my division was filled with men, it would have been difficult for him (in his haste to head the boarders), to have seen me. If it was deserted, my duty required my presence elsewhere. And why should Mr. Budd have been anxious to find me? Was it to leave his own division in my charge? That would have been as much a desertion of my station, as any of which I am accused. Was it that he suspected my fidelity as an officer? I had but just joined the frigate, and, if in former service my character had been beyond suspicion, I trust that in this short acquaintance I had given him no reason of distrust. The call for boarders he must have supposed had reached me, before it arrived at him. Why then delay an instant in a fruitless search for me? The remainder of his testimony consists of a recital of my own declarations at Halifax; and here I may be permitted to remark that though the voluntary confession of a person accused, made after the accusation, and when he knows the use that will be made of his declarations, is the highest evidence against him, yet the occasional imperfect and unguarded conversations of a man, who has no suspicion that he is to be arrested, are of an entirely different character. In the one instance, appropriate and precise language is carefully used; in the other, thoughtless and mutilated expressions are constantly escaping. Such discourse with my companions at Halifax was common and without reserve. There were other witnesses also that were not called upon by the prosecution, and could not be by myself, who could testify to entire conversations, in which the reason for my conduct was stated, and yet that one, who is found upon the record of the court of inquiry to have stated the conversation in a manner the least favourable to me, is called on, and the others not. Besides, am I first to be convicted of such extreme folly, as to confess away my character as an officer, in an enemy's country, and that not to a stranger, but to one, on whose report I should be reputed a coward? If such idiocy has marked my conduct,

I am safe; for I am legally incapable of committing a crime. It must have been, either that a full statement was not made by me at the time, or that it was not fully understood and recollected. The declaration is stated to have been, that I assisted in conveying Captain Lawrence to the cockpit. If carrying him part of the way, and delivering him into the hands of others, before he reached the cockpit, be, as it undoubtedly is, to assist in conveying, I was correctly understood. Doctor Dix did not see me there. Doctor Edgar who came to the head of the ladder, did not see me. Mr. Steel, who was at the steerage when Captain Lawrence was carried down, did not see me; nor was I seen by the men who crowded the ladder as they carried down the others, who were wounded; yet I was seen and known after this by others on the gun-deck. That, after coming from the spar-deck with Captain Lawrence, in stepping over the combings of the steerage hatch and stooping to accommodate my burthen, Mr. Follet may have lost me for a moment is probable; but he accounts for it himself. That Captain Lawrence was angry is equally true, but it is hoped that the inference drawn by the witness, that he was angry with me, because a sailor might have rendered him the same service, is different from the inference which will be drawn by the court. Well may I join in the general grief at the death of that naval hero, whose testimony, if he were alive, would refute this charge. I knew Captain Lawrence intimately and knew him as a man. I had, as the court know, sailed with him before, in the *Argus*, and *Hornet*. In the service of my country, I had never sailed under any other commander. He recommended me to promotion, and it was through his means, and the opinion he entertained of my merit, that I obtained my rank and commission as lieutenant. My regard for him was reciprocated, and I was proud of it, and I assisted him, in this instance, from feelings of gratitude, which, long and habitually exercised towards him, had become powerful and rapid as instinct. I assisted him, too (as I claim), at his own request, and I afterwards bewailed his death with tears. Was this cowardice, or disobedience of orders? Was the man on whom Nelson leaned, when he was wounded, and who kissed him when he died, a coward, or a deserter from his duty? or was it said that a sailor would have done as well? To follow the bent of amiable feelings cannot be inconsistent with the character of an officer, or a breach of the Articles of War. If a common sailor could have done as well, have you ascertained that a common sailor was to be found?

I am charged with cowardice, and yet to support another charge, it is necessary to resort to a specification which contradicts it, for it is there said that I quitted my quarters and repaired to the upper-deck. This was no skulking place for a coward, and had the event of the contest been different, many of these acts with which I am charged, would have enhanced my merit in the public estimation.

You are satisfied, gentlemen, that I was no coward. My guns had ceased to bear: and my men took the opportunity of deserting instead of following me, as I flew at the call for the boarders, to the spar-deck.

The other charges against me amount in some shape or other to *neglect of duty*; as that I was seen in the cockpit and there received orders which I did not execute. That Captain Lawrence saw me there, or gave me either there or elsewhere, any orders, at any time, which I did not zealously endeavour to execute, or that I have committed any such fault, as is alleged in the specification

under the 2d charge, has not been proved, is not true, and is directly contradicted by the whole testimony before the court.

I imagine such a state of facts as I insist the testimony proves. An officer who has just gained the ship, is mustered at his division for *the first time* preparatory to an engagement, where the faces and particular duties of the several men are unknown to him. The list of names which is furnished him cannot enable him to distinguish persons; for if they were all strangers, he could not refer these names to the individuals around him, or to the characters or capacities in which they acted. At the call for boarders, a considerable number leave his division with him, whom he at first innocently mistakes for boarders. The men themselves know better; the sympathy of terror is contagious; the division is deserted, and the officer is astonished to see the men precipitate themselves below in a mass, without attempting to accompany him to the upper-deck, to which it is said to be unofficer-like conduct in him, thus circumstanced, to repair. It would be no desertion of duty to go where his duty called him, nor could it be a crime to leave his quarters if his duty required it. What then was his duty? Was it to remain a fixture by the side of a deserted, disabled cannon that could not be brought to bear upon the enemy; the nominal commander of an empty or a useless division! or was it, to repair to a place where there were fighting men engaged, and where information for his immediate conduct might be obtained. What he did from a sense of duty and the impulse of the moment, he trusts your deliberate judgment will approve. Some of the testimony is said to be introduced to show that if there had been more officers and men on the spar-deck, the ship would not have been carried; and yet I am censured for having repaired to the spar-deck at all, even when the guns of my division could not be brought to bear.

It may be asked, why, after assisting Captain Lawrence below, I did not return to the spar-deck?

If one of the specifications be true, that Captain Lawrence ordered me to my division, it is answered enough. But if this charge is abandoned, the conclusive answer to the inquiry is, it was impossible, for no man it is believed after this period, gained the spar-deck from below. I say that I was repelled in my attempts, as the rest state themselves to have been, and if it is asked where is the evidence of the fact, I reply, that there is no evidence of the witnesses having been repelled, except the testimony of each man as it relates to himself. The cannonading lasted ten or twelve minutes, and the whole time of the action did not exceed fifteen. Besides, I was "busied about many things," and my constant endeavours were well directed, and not entirely fruitless. Some of the witnesses endeavour now to mark the lapse of time between particular transactions by minutes and seconds. A much more certain way, however, to effect this purpose is, to ascertain what were the immediate events which took place in the quickest succession. To mark the rapidity of the transaction, you will remember that I had been on deck, carried Captain Lawrence below, as far as the steerage ladder, gone to one of the two guns that remained serviceable in the battery, assisted in training and firing the last gun and passed forward, by the time that Mr. Higginbotham was coming aft from an unsuccessful attempt to gain the spar-deck, though he made the attempt as soon as the call for boarders reached him.

But I refused to an officer the use of coercive means. The impetuosity of a

young officer was restrained by what!—the cowardice or bad conduct of the accused! No, he coolly replied, and with deep regret, “ ’tis of no use.” He was neither rash nor cruel. The number of his own slain wanted no unnecessary addition, and with the full possession of his judgment he formed an opinion, the correctness of which, when he said sorrowing “ ’tis of no use,” he still maintains. In telling the accused the event of that battle was disastrous, you tell him no news. It tortured his feelings at the time, it torments him now; and has repeatedly been the theme of melancholy reflection; and when accident or design recalls to his memory these vain regrets, he administers to his own wounded feelings the same sad consolation which he addresses to Mr. Higginbotham, “ ’tis of no use.”

He did not rally men where there were none to be rallied, nor stop the men who were falling down the hatch when the gratings were lost, and there were no means to prevent them; but he animated them by his example, which was intrepid, and his conduct, which was firm, and reproached them with his voice. He did not save the ship, nor could he, but his endeavours to preserve her and capture the enemy, will acquit him of all blame in the loss of her.

Many inquiries may be made which it is difficult to anticipate. Curiosity, excited by an imperfect statement, and events may suggest, after a misfortune has happened, many ingenious ways in which it might have been avoided, and expedients and improvements in the conduct of individuals, which, had they occurred in season, would have been of great service. You may be able, after this long deliberation, to discover instances in which the accused might have shown more judgment in the application of his exertions. So, perhaps, at this time, can he; but if his judgment was not the best, it was his misfortune, not his fault.

My whole conduct, I trust, has not disgraced the commission which I have the honour to bear in the naval service of my country. I am no coward, no deserter, not chargeable with *neglect of duty*, or disobedience of orders. I deny every charge, and assert my claims to the unsullied reputation of an officer, a man of honour and a gentleman. My sword since my arrest has been in the keeping of honourable hands, and is still fit for service in the same cause, where it has once failed of victory. May better success attend it for the future.

My anxiety during my trial must have been great, notwithstanding my innocence; but the patient investigation, by the court, of that series of transactions which I had the greatest interest and strongest solicitude to make public, has constantly sustained a mind of conscious integrity, with the animating earnest of an honourable acquittal.

The court being ordered to be cleared, and the whole proceedings read to the court by the judge advocate, the following sentence was pronounced.

SENTENCE.

The court, after mature deliberation on the evidence adduced, find the prisoner, Lieutenant William S. Cox, “not guilty” of the charges, first, “of cowardice,” second, “for disobedience of orders,” exhibited against him. Of the third charge for “desertion from his quarters and neglect of duty,” the court find the prisoner “not guilty” of desertion from his quarters, but “guilty of neglect of duty” in

not doing his utmost to aid in capturing the Shannon, by animating and encouraging, in his own example, the inferior officers and men to fight courageously, and in denying the use of coercive means to prevent the desertion of the men from their quarters, and in not compelling those who had deserted from their quarters to return to their duty. Of the fourth charge, "for unofficer-like conduct," the court find the prisoner "guilty," in that, while the enemy was boarding, or attempting to board, the frigate Chesapeake, the prisoner accompanied his disabled commander, James Lawrence, Esq., from the quarter deck, where his presence and command were essential to animate and direct the Chesapeake's crew in repelling the boarders of the enemy; and sentence him to be cashiered, with a perpetual incapacity to serve in the Navy of the United States.

STEPHEN DECATUR, *President.*

THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, *Judge Advocate.*

Approved, JAMES MADISON.

The great influence of the naval victories on public sentiment did not decline, but was corroborated by the adversity of their interruption in the capture of the Chesapeake. Induced by the successes of the summer and autumn of 1812, the twelfth Congress, soon after they met for the last time, authorized, in January, 1813, four ships of the line and six frigates to be built, and in March, six sloops of war with as many armed vessels on the lakes as the public service might require. Frigates called the *Guerriere* and *Java*, sloops the *Frolic*, the *Peacock*, and the *Wasp*, were built with the promptitude of American shipwrights, whose work, even when they are foreigners naturalized in the United States, is finished, like the voyages of American vessels, with a rapidity unknown in Europe. It is subject of regret that those names of vessels have not been kept up. Such trophies should never be relinquished or forgotten. The frigate *Constellation* which took the first (French) frigate under the American flag, the frigate *Constitution*, her English prizes, the frigates *Guerriere* and *Java*, the sloops of war *Frolic* and *Peacock*, and the brig *Boxer*, should be perpetuated in the nomenclature of an American navy.

The acts of Congress for an extensive marine, especially the last indefinite authorization for that on the lakes, gave evidence of the change and progress of public sentiment respecting a navy, which till then had never been altogether a national institution. The loss of the *Chesapeake* contributed to expel the party and other prejudice which still remained.

The House of Representatives, which declared war, rejected a bill appropriating \$100,000 to the captors of the *Guerriere*, by a vote of 59 to 54: most of the federalists who opposed the war, voting for, and most of the republican or war party, voting against, the grant. In the last expiring moments of that session, however, on the 3d March, 1813, when measures become acts of Congress by the midnight legerdemain, which then contrives their enactment, appropriations were effected for half that sum, viz: \$50,000 for the capture of the *Guerriere*, together with \$50,000 dollars for the capture of the *Java*, and \$25,000 for the capture of the *Frolic*. But the sense of Congress was not tested as on the 1st February, by open votes and speeches on the subject, nor opposition overcome by deliberate proceedings, showing that the navy had then got the better of its American as well as of its English enemies, or that even the war party was reconciled to it. Yet national sentiment was rapidly rising far, as usual, beyond congressional liberality. Nearly universal popular good-will, even emulous among opposite parties, welcomed the naval victories for which Congress allowed inadequate and almost stolen rewards, while sympathy as general deplored the first great naval misfortune. In the midst of these general indications of national satisfaction, succeeded by mourning as universal, an outrage on, not merely patriotic but natural feelings, attempted in the legislature of Massachusetts, sitting at Boston, soon after the *Chesapeake* sailed from that port to encounter the *Shannon*, provoked the final extinction of all that remained in the United States of infidelity to a naval establishment, by indignation at the sectional heresy in New England, which was reprobated everywhere else. On the 15th June, 1813, Mr. Josiah Quincy, in the senate of Massachusetts, moved the following preamble and resolutions, which were adopted:—

“Whereas a proposition has been made to this senate for the adoption of sundry resolutions, expressive of their sense of the gallantry and good conduct exhibited by Captain James Lawrence, commander of the United States ship of war *Hornet*, and the officers and crew of that ship, in the destruction of his majesty's ship of war *Peacock*: and, whereas it has been found that former resolutions of this kind, passed on similar occasions relative to other officers engaged in a like service, have given great discontent to many of the good people of this common-

wealth, it being considered by them as an encouragement and excitement to the continuance of the present unjust, unnecessary, and iniquitous war; and, on that account the senate of Massachusetts have deemed it their duty to refrain from acting on the said proposition: and, also, whereas this determination of the senate may, without explanation, be misconstrued into an intentional slight of Captain Lawrence, and denial of his particular merits; the senate, therefore, deem it their duty to declare that they have a high sense of the naval skill and military and civil virtues of Captain James Lawrence; and that they have been withheld from acting on said propositions solely from considerations relative to the nature and principles of the present war. And to the end that all misrepresentations on this subject may be obviated,

“Resolved, as the sense of the senate of Massachusetts, that, in a war like the present, waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner that indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our seacoast and soil.”

Such authoritative disloyalty disgusted and provoked patriotic reaction, far beyond the power of argument, among advocates of war, theretofore opponents of the navy. Conviction rapidly and widely spread by sympathy stronger than reason, that the navy was political attraction, as well as belligerent vindication. The representatives of rural districts, by whose votes war was declared for free trade and sailors' rights, needing some strong revulsion to subdue local prejudices and convert them to an expensive national institution, in which farmers and planters seemed to have no ostensible interest or advantage, rallied to the support of the abused marine asserters of American rights, traduced by partisans who made common cause with the enemy. Indignation against those stigmatized as little better than traitors, confirmed a growing admiration for naval achievement, and put an end to all opposition to the navy, except that denounced and counteracted as infamous and revolting. The naval aversion and parsimonious retention of the twelfth Congress, even among such members of it as were also members of the thirteenth Congress, disappeared at our first session, when the deplorable fate of

the gallant Lawrence, aggravated by Quincy's resolutions, had great effect. The republican or rural party adopted the navy as they did the war, slowly and reluctantly, but surely, urged and goaded by ungenerous opposition and English aggression. Disappointed on the land, but relieved from the sea, unlooked-for naval triumphs began republican reconciliation to the navy, which was confirmed by an odious faction maligning its victories, and refusing to condole with its greatest defeat. We have lost a frigate, said Bainbridge's official letter, of the 8th June, 1813, to the Secretary of the Navy, but no reputation. Should the enemy impute it to superior skill or bravery, they must give more than one solitary instance to convince us. Such was the argument he and Stewart used to the president a year before against laying up the navy. And it had become a national sentiment. A thousand Chesapeakes taken by as many Shannons would not quell the spirit which the naval events of a twelvemonth had inspired. When the thirteenth Congress came together, therefore, not a word was uttered, much less votes journalized, against rewarding, supporting, and extending the navy. On the 12th June, 1813, the Naval committee reported a bill to the House of Representatives, as soon as the capture of the Chesapeake was known at Washington, appropriating \$25,000 to Lawrence, his officers and crew for the capture of the Peacock; which bill, with an amendment adding \$12,000 to Elliot and his companions for their two prizes on Lake Erie in October, 1812, was passed without opposition on the 22d of that month, the anniversary of the first capture of the Chesapeake in 1807. These appropriations were nearly simultaneous with Mr. Quincy's resolutions, which provoked by wholesome reaction their unquestioned enactment. Feelings, stronger than reason, the voice of the people, the instinct of impulsive patriotism, wrought conviction in nearly every American breast, that our agricultural is also a maritime country. When Perry shifted his flag with "*Don't give up the ship,*" upon it, from a dismantled but unconquered ship, called the *Lawrence*, on Lake Erie, deep in the far west, the militia of western Pennsylvania and Ohio, who supplied the numbers of his imperfect crew, felt, without pondering, that a navy was part of American independence. When Tecumseh in the wilds of Alabama roused that primitive population, the mountaineers of Tennessee, who never saw a ship, and hardly ever heard of a sailor, to repel the invasion

of the lords of the ocean, with infuriated savages and revolted slaves, come from the seacoast to despoil their rustic homes, they too felt, without waiting to think, that their cause was that of the mariners of New England. A revolutionary sympathy electrified the American nation for victors like Hull, and victims like Lawrence. Delighted with naval victories, deploring naval misfortune, disgusted with those who delighted in what good Americans deplored, and deplored what they delighted in, "*Don't give up the ship,*" and "*fire fuster,*" became watchwords in the woods and prairies, and on the lakes of the far west, as on the waves of the Atlantic and Pacific.

Nowhere was this national enthusiasm more heartfelt than in the good people of New England—those who from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire carry their invincible and intelligent enterprise to the shores of Lake Superior and the banks of the Gulf of Mexico. Their patriotic sympathies were with the Union, and the war, with the glory and progress of the great republican empire, which many of their most educated, wealthy, and devout strove to confine within limits as narrow as their own short-sighted vision of national grandeur, and intolerant English notion of individual freedom. In another year the people of Boston prevented those infatuated promoters of revolt from surrendering the frigate Constitution, together with the ship of the line upon the stocks there, the corner-stone and national concession of the maritime extension from which New England was to derive the greatest advantages. What they termed the populace of Boston prevented their superiors, as certainly they should have been, from surrendering those ships to the English threatening to burn them in their navy yard, when governors and divines were hatching the Hartford Convention, that last extremity of passive treason, whose scheme to withhold the war taxes might have dismembered the Union by the final expedient of desperate disaffection. Naval success, and victories by land far from them, at length crushed their designs, more ruinous to their contrivers than even infamous. In spite of their malignity a navy became, by universal adoption, the shield and sword of the United States, and like the south-western territories, which Massachusetts rejected, the great bond of American national union. Local and parsimonious republicanism which held back from the navy, adopted it under the pressure of transatlantic aggression, and

reaction against American treachery. The Senate of Massachusetts, by voting Quincy's resolution, unwittingly helped to render the navy an institution of a republican confederacy, which from the Aroostook to Chicago, and thence to the Gulf of Mexico by the war of 1812 repelled transatlantic aggression.

In another respect, professional as well as national benefits arose from Lawrence's sacrifice. Triumphs transcendent, and unexpected, intoxicated national confidence, and disarmed naval prudence. Vain-glorious assurance, almost contempt for the much dreaded enemy, took place of that considerate valour from which discretion can never be rejected with impunity. No enemy can be despised. Mr. Irving and Mr. Cooper, with other accounts of the engagement between the Chesapeake and the Shannon, dwell on the unprepared and disorderly condition of the American frigate, and the misgivings with which her commander went to battle. But was he not misled by the mistaken confidence that he could take an English frigate in a quarter of an hour as he took a sloop? Many of his countrymen still believe he had done so when his ship got foul of the other, and that mere accident then, as it often does, reversed the scale of victory. If Captain Lawrence had received Commodore Brock's manly challenge before sailing, or if he had been less hasty in closing with him, the contest might have been more equal than it was, when Lawrence rushed upon every disadvantage with a brave, cautious and well-prepared foe, whose much more complete preparation did him honour.

That the English navy did not consider that solitary victory a final settlement of the question of naval superiority was apparent throughout the rest of the war, when rarely, if ever, did they engage an American vessel without some advantage. In January, 1814, it was made known to Commodore Decatur, that Commodore Hardy, commanding the squadron blockading the American squadron at New London, had yielded to the desire of two of his captains, Hope of the *Endymion* frigate, and Stackpole of the *Statira*, to meet the frigates *United States*, Captain Decatur, and Macedonian Captain Jones; but that the English commodore did not like to take the responsibility of giving the challenge, though he said he would permit the combat. Decatur immediately sent Captain Biddle with the challenge, which was

left by the English commodore to the determination of his two captains, who, after considering, declined it. The *Endymion* mounted more guns than the *United States*, and the *Statira* more than the *Macedonian*. Decatur proposed to meet them as they were, or man and arm the ships exactly alike, man for man and gun for gun. Perhaps no large inferences could be drawn from the challenge on the one part, or declining it on the other, as various points of official responsibility, as well as personal and national honour, enter into the management of such affairs. The disaffected American press on that occasion, opened its animadversions on Decatur, and bestowed commendation on the English commander. But it was replied, that what was called fighting a match, was less hazardous and as honourable with equal force, as cruising over distant seas for a long time in search of such encounter. The national advantages would be the same from victory: the glory of the flag, the conquest of the enemy, the confidence that begets further enterprise, favourable impression on mankind, and eventually peace and happiness. If it could be so, it would be an amelioration of naval warfare, to refer the result to single combat, which in war between the United States and Great Britain, might save treasure and blood to both, in the relative strength of the two navies, with great advantage to this country.

Two months after the capture of the *Chesapeake*, in the same neighbourhood, the ascendant of American naval victories was restored in the triumphant death of another gallant seaman. The schooner *Enterprize*, commanded by Lieutenant William Burrowes, sailing from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the 1st September, 1813, was encountered by the English brig *Boxer*, at least her equal in size, weight, and armament, commanded by Captain Blythe, a bold, brave Englishman, prepared to take the *Enterprize* as the *Chesapeake* had been taken; who went into action with colours streaming from all his spars, and his flag nailed to the mast. After a sharp contest, in which both commanders were killed, the English vessel was compelled to beg for quarter from her conqueror, for the flag could not be struck as it was nailed to the mast, while the American guns continued to fire. The *Boxer* was taken a prize into Portsmouth, by Lieutenant McCall, who succeeded Burrowes in command of the *Enterprize*: and Burrowes and Blythe were there buried toge-

ther with the honours both merited. Burrowes died heroically, refusing to leave the deck after being mortally wounded, like Pike and Lawrence, expiring on the hard but imperishable bed of honour. Ten days after that, Perry's victory on Lake Erie completed our revival from a momentary pang of naval depression. There, too, the English colours, nailed to the mast, were taken down by American captors.

The Enterprize and Boxer were small vessels, and their engagement therefore not as striking as that between the Chesapeake and Shannon frigates. But in no instance was the superiority of American broadsides, nautical skill, and personal courage, better signalized. The Boxer was armed, manned, fitted, and prepared at Halifax, with a chosen crew and officers, like the Shannon, to test the question of national naval pre-eminence. Taken into Portsmouth, the English brig was a much more remarkable token of success than the American frigate taken into Halifax. Her hull, masts, rigging, and sails, were studded with round and grape shot, more than ten to one in the Boxer than the Enterprize. Disingenuous efforts were made, as usual, by the federal newspapers in that quarter, particularly at Newburyport and Boston, to undervalue the victory; which induced Captain Hull, commanding that station, to examine and certify the truth. Captain Gordon, of the English vessel Rattler, sent by a flag of truce to ask for his seamen taken in the Boxer; and beyond all doubt, the victory, small as it was in the size of the combatants, was a trial of strength, prepared for in Halifax, without notice to the conqueror.

At the same time solace from England came across the Atlantic in bursts of extravagant exultation for the capture of the Chesapeake, for which the Tower guns were fired as if a fleet had been taken, and national joy so unmeasured broke loose as to show how deep the despondency must have been before what proved but short-lived resiliency. On the passage of the Frolic from the Downs to Portsmouth, having made her number to the Niobe, Captain Montague, a ship in attendance on the Duke of Clarence, afterwards King William the Fourth, amusing himself at Brighton, as soon as he understood it was the Frolic, which had been captured by the American sloop of war Wasp, the duke expressed a wish to go on board of her, which he did, and held a levee, at which the officers were introduced to

his royal highness, who complimented them on their native gallantry. Among other instances of ludicrous apology, a London newspaper published that the American victories were owing to their cartridges being made of lead, so that the shot, instead of being enclosed in canvas, were cased in a material which accounted for the destructive fire of their broadsides. The secret had been made known to the commissioners of the admiralty by a lieutenant, who was to have been promoted for it. With such royal courtship were officers cajoled, and with such newspaper fables were seamen alarmed, to explain disasters attributable to the capacity of mariners, more free and better disciplined than their European antagonists, by a combination of greater liberty with greater law than the English navy ever could boast.

Sailing from New York in June, 1813, to carry Mr. Crawford, the American minister, to France, after landing him there, the brig Argus, Captain William H. Allen, next month performed an adventurous cruise in the British Channel, where she captured twenty merchant vessels and caused great alarm to the commerce of England. In the narrow seas, where Admiral St. Vincent insisted that a British treaty with the United States should require recognition of Great Britain's exclusive mastery, that little vessel unfurled the American flag upon a cruise, the conception of which required genius, whose successful execution would have been one of the most splendid exploits of seafaring courage, and whose disastrous close brought no dishonour on the brave enterprize. The English reverence which then pervaded the seaboard of this country, magnifying English maritime power, was well rebuked by the Argus on the English coast, contrasted with the total want of British naval enterprize at the same time, with considerable fleets failing to make any serious impression in the Chesapeake, the Delaware and wherever else it was attempted in our waters. We were taught that distant and maritime power is apt to be overrated, especially by this country of that. One of the American officers who was near being condemned, by diffidence of the American navy, to remain with it as a harbour defence in New York, a calm and calculating seaman, considers that city in no more danger from English assault, than great English cities from American.

On the 13th August, 1813, the Argus captured a vessel loaded with wine, of which it was said too free use was made by the

American crew. Soon after which her flag was, not ingloriously, struck, after an engagement with the English brig of war Pelican, Captain Maples. The Pelican measured 485 tons, the Argus 298; the British vessel mounted eighteen 32 pounders, the Argus sixteen 24 pounders. The Argus, under all these disadvantages, was nobly fought in St. George's Channel, and did not strike till her case was hopeless. Captain Allen was mortally wounded, his first lieutenant Watson disabled, and the vessel, then commanded by Captain Allen's younger brother, was desperately defended till further resistance was impossible.

Besides the Shannon, Belle Poule, and Tenedos off Boston, Commodore Hardy's squadron blockading Decatur's at New London, Beresford in the Poitiers ship of the line, with a frigate and some smaller vessels, in the Delaware, whose attempt on Lewistown has been before mentioned, Admirals Warren and Cockburne, with a large fleet in the Chesapeake, beginning with paltry depredations, afterwards defeated at Craney island, and in several attempts to get possession of, or burn the Constellation, disgraced by slight success with Beckwith's land forces at Hampton, and an alarm they gave Congress at Washington, the naval efforts of Great Britain on the American seaboard continued insignificant throughout the year 1813. Whenever war with England is the theme, our assailable places and seaports are consigned to fancied destruction. The British press, and sometimes Parliament, fulminate slave insurrections, Indian incursions, lake and Atlantic invasions, most of which are imagined likewise by portions of the United States. But such was not the experience of the late war, which was mostly merely predatory on their part, and expensive rather than otherwise injurious to us. In the Delaware and Chesapeake small warfare was continually waging throughout 1813, with various success, the might always against us, our shore repulsion often deficient in vigour, and mostly in skill. Still, of the much deprecated horrors of war, the suffering was more imaginary and costly than real or durable; and should teach confidence for any such future occasion. It would be easy to fill pages with stories of these little marauds: but their details have no historical interest except as affording national instruction for preparation, moral and material, for any other such troubles.

Long and unmolested cruises during the whole year 1813 of

the frigates *President*, Captain Rodgers, the *Congress*, Captain Smith, the *Essex*, Captain Porter, and other vessels of war, traversing nearly every sea, making many captures, and encountering no enemies able to capture them, demonstrated that the ubiquity and immensity of British naval powers are, in good measure, illusive. In April, the *President* and the *Congress* put to sea from Boston, separated, and performed extensive cruises alone, seeking for English vessels. In July, the *Essex* proceeded on her memorable cruise in the Pacific Ocean, hereafter to be described. By the time Congress met in December we had accounts from Captain Porter that he had captured, manned, and armed nine large English vessels, worth two millions of dollars, and was commodore of a fleet of his own creation, in which, among other singular naval occurrences, his chaplain served, to supply the want of navigators, as a prize master. The *President* and the *Congress* returned into our ports, refitted, and sailed again, as if there were no British ships to countenance proclamations of their blockade. Rodgers sailed in December, 1813, from Newport, not only without interruption from the enemy's squadron, off New London, but of a clear moonlight night, and, as was believed, preceded by a traitor shallop which gave notice of his departure. But, as was said in the maritime confidence which the navy had then established, the fast-anchored ships of the fast-anchored isle of Great Britain, were no match for the vigilant and daring seamen of America.

The cruises and captures of these frigates were complained of in Parliament and more loudly by the English press. While large French fleets, completely armed, equipped, and ready for sea, with Dutch and Italian sailors, suffered blockade, often, as Melville declared in the House of Lords, by British force inferior to their own, a few American frigates not only traversed the ocean without interruption, but defied the English marine, and distressed the commerce under its charge. Rodgers captured off Newfoundland, a small English vessel of war, the *High-flyer*, from which he got the private signals (as the enemy captured ours in the frigate *Chesapeake*), together with circular orders from Admiral Warren, to every English ship, to capture, if possible, the frigate *President*. When it was known in England that she had watered at North Bergen, several squadrons were dispatched in pursuit of her; the *Royal Oak* and *Seahorse*,

under Lord A. Beauclerk, the *Superb*, *Menelaus*, and *Fly*, under Captain Paget, and several frigates sent by Admiral Young from his fleet.

At the same time the American privateers were active and successful; so much so, that more particular accounts of their performances is reserved for another chapter. Altogether, throughout the year 1813, proofs multiplied that on the ocean Great Britain was neither omnipotent nor invulnerable. Even the merchant voyages of the United States were not put a stop to. Without reckoning the large illicit trade from New England to Halifax, by which it was said 17,000 barrels of flour were entered in one day at that port from the United States, cotton and other staples of this country were exported in profitable adventures to France, Spain, and elsewhere. The tabular statements of treasury receipts and expenditures annexed to my fifth chapter, page 256, show that the impost of the United States was not extinguished by all the alleged might of the vast navy of Great Britain. American commercial losses by war did not excessively surpass those which, before its declaration, were caused to American commerce by English seizures and sequestrations, together with French unlawful depredations. Blockades, detentions, admiralty and other charges and impositions, cost the merchants of the United States nearly as much as war, by losses at sea. It is true that the greater expenses of war were to be added to this estimate of its cost. But ever since Franklin and Jefferson brought from Europe that just horror of war's wanton abominations which became the politics of this country, till the crisis when a resort to it was at last forced from Congress, exaggerated impressions prevailed in the United States, and were fomented by colonial reverence for England, of the effects of war, which facts and reason do not justify. The income of the United States from customs in 1813, was \$13,224,623 25; whereas, in 1809, it but little exceeded seven, and in 1810, eight millions of dollars. In 1813 it was about the same, one year after the war, that it was in 1811, one year before. The commerce of the United States was not driven from the ocean by war. Far from it. If Mr. Gallatin had given his experience and talents to the treasury department, instead of bestowing them upon first, an attempt to prevent the navy from going to sea, and then going to Europe himself to importune peace by other than war

measures, or if the American government had not been deterred by British influence from cultivating the commerce and naval co-operation it might have arranged with France, the fiscal burthens of the war of 1812 would have been much less, and its military achievements have sooner tended to the only legitimate object of war—safe and permanent peace.

Of the lake warfare in 1813, that on Lake Erie has been already mentioned. Perry's victory with a fleet, like Hull's with a frigate, the first success of the kind, was of inestimable advantage in breaking the British charm of naval ascendant, and proving that even when out-numbered, our mariners would seldom be overcome. The fleet combat on Lake Champlain is part of the events of next year. On the 9th of September, 1813, the young commander there, Thomas MacDonough, officially informed the Secretary of the Navy, that our officers in his sloop, the *President*, had in vain endeavoured to bring the enemy to action, who declined it, and stood off with his squadron to the north, acknowledging either American mastery on that lake, or English unwillingness to test it without further ship-building, of which the costly race soon began there that was prosecuting on Lake Ontario, and next day, the 10th of that month, terminated by Perry's victory on Lake Erie.

About the same time, the remains of Lawrence, and his first Lieutenant Ludlow, transported from Halifax in a flag of truce to New York, were buried there with suitable ceremonies and universal sympathy. Captain Blythe, of the *Boxer*, who bore a pall at Lawrence's interment in Halifax, was shortly before the latter's burial at New York, consigned to the grave with Burrows, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The disingenuous official statements by which Captain Carden tried to veil his capture in the *Macedonian*, the social adulation by which Dacres was welcomed when a prisoner in Boston, and generally the haughty bearing of English naval officers, together with the despicable obsequiousness of too many Americans, mutually subsided into reciprocal feelings of naval and national respect. The few naval engagements could not, indeed, expel the British marine from the ocean, or even prevent its mastery there. But they served to convince both the United States and Great Britain, as Bainbridge said of the solitary capture of the *Chesapeake*, that many more proofs of superiority must be given before the English navy

would be allowed exclusive possession of the seas. The issue there, as on the lakes, was changed to a mere question of numbers, the power of moral or accredited superiority being transferred from the English to the American flag.

On Lake Ontario the contest was protracted, expensive and undecided by any such victory as to settle the ascendant. Till September it was a contest of ship building. From the 6th to the 11th of that month, however, while Perry was conquering Barclay on Lake Erie, Chauncey was chasing Yeo's fleet, in most respects superior to his, until at last so far successful, as to bring Yeo to a running action on the 28th of September, of no important result, beyond conviction on both sides, that the dominion of the waves was no longer British. Chauncey, with his ship the Pike, the only one of the American fleet that could sail as fast as those of the enemy, except her small attendant, the Governor Tompkins, gallantly commanded by Lieutenant Finch, now Captain Bolton, brought Yeo to battle in his ship the Wolfe, which was much cut up. The English commodore was fortunate enough to escape, however, his ignoble retreat being bravely covered by Captain Mulcaster in the Royal George, who threw his ship between his own commander and ours, and took the latter's fire. Chauncey's seamanship and intrepidity on that occasion were much applauded. But from his first mistake that spring, when he carried Dearborn to the attack on York in April, instead of Kingston, as Dearborn's orders and Armstrong's plan required, to Chauncey's last misapprehension, by which he lost the greatest naval opportunity of the war, his career was rather a series of able naval evolutions, in vain attempts to bring a skilful and wary antagonist to action, than anything further, after Yeo's escape by flight with superior forces on the 28th September, 1813. He took refuge with his fleet under Burlington Heights, where Chauncey might have attacked, and in all probability would have taken or destroyed the whole British marine on Lake Ontario. But he was unfortunately misinformed by the officer sent in the Lady of the Lake, to reconnoitre the enemy's position, who reported that Yeo with his fleet had taken refuge in Kingston.—The English commodore did in fact make good his retreat to Kingston, by passing Chauncey, misinformed, and unaware of his mistake. The British had batteries and land troops at Burlington Heights, for the protection of Yeo's fleet while lying there,

before they escaped into Kingston. The autumnal season was considerably advanced, the weather stormy and unfavourable, so that it would be unjust to blame Commodore Chauncey for not subduing his enemy, of whose position in fact he was unluckily misinformed. But the impression at the time was that, excepting the chance in the summer of 1812, of capturing the British ships on the Halifax station, it was Commodore Chauncey's misfortune to miss much the greatest opportunity during the war of a naval achievement calculated to shed lustre on our arms, and to spread astonishment, if not consternation, among our enemies.

It will be recollected that just at that time General Hampton had been repulsed in his feeble attempt to invade Canada, and General Wilkinson was preparing for his inglorious descent upon Montreal. For that purpose Chauncey had at least secured the command of Lake Ontario; and on the 1st October, 1813, he reported himself to General Wilkinson as in a condition to protect and assist the embarkation of the army, to be carried from Lake Ontario, down the St. Lawrence. That unfortunate expedition was severely interrupted by Captain Mulcaster and other officers, and vessels sent by Commodore Yeo for that purpose.

War never exhibited efforts so uselessly disproportionate, both by water and land to the prize contended for, if that was the command of Lake Ontario and its shores, as when large fleets chased each other round that little sea, land-locked by hostile shores, on which numerous armies, fortifications, garrisons, and dock-yards were either stationary or marching, during the spring, summer and autumn of 1813. During all that period, on neither land nor water was there any considerable encounter of the hostile forces, but many months were consumed in the petty forays of border feuds, at vast cost of bloodshed, national character and popular forbearance. Sackett's Harbour and Kingston, the respective naval head-quarters, were, as might be said, almost within sound of the watch-word of each other's sentinels. Desertion, a common vice in the American army, was so frequent in the English, that a day seldom occurred without two or three deserters from an English to an American station in that region. It was computed that in the course of that campaign, at least five hundred British soldiers deserted to the United States, as many as a full regiment of men, at a time when the British armies were extremely in want of additional troops. It was said to be no small

part of the duty of the English soldiery, to prevent the desertion of the Irish, while, as will appear in the next chapter, the Governor-General of Canada, by orders from his sovereign, was proclaiming death on the gibbet to all such British born subjects, as should be taken, though naturalized American citizens, in arms against the King of Great Britain. Commodore Chauncey's last and greatest success, on the return from his abandonment of the attempt against Yeo under Burlington Heights, was the capture of four of the smaller vessels of the English fleet, with three hundred German troops and Major Grant on board of them; for the atrocious attempt to enforce the principle of native allegiance by the gallows, which will be explained in the next chapter, was made by Great Britain, with armies consisting of the inhabitants of various German sovereignties, besides Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians, other mercenaries and vagabonds.

The great contest of 1813, on Lake Ontario, was that of ship building, conducted by Mr. Henry Eckford, an English shipwright, on our port at Sackett's Harbour, with wonderful expedition, and as far as he was concerned, commendable skill and success. Ship after ship, the Madison and the Pike, till at last a very large ship of the line called the Superior, were converted with amazing expedition from the green forests of that region, into vessels of war, and manned by hundreds of seamen withdrawn from the ocean for that purpose. For many years after peace, the huge hulks of some of these vessels remained on the shores of that lake, monuments of the contest between Great Britain and the United States, to construct armaments on a lake, which contest it was the policy of our government to have prevented by more profitable expenditures in another direction. Nearly two millions of dollars was the sum upon which commissions were allowed at the treasury, and paid for ship building on Lake Ontario.— Captain Jones, the Secretary of the Navy, who had been a shipmaster in the merchant service at the port of Philadelphia, a zealous, intelligent, and indefatigable officer, was cordially well disposed to wage the war vigorously. But his predilections were for the high seas, where he had formed them. He had no knowledge of the lake service, or adequate idea of its importance.— Mr. Gallatin's temporary absence from the treasury, as he and the president insisted on deeming it, while abroad in Europe importing peace, in addition to the many inherent disadvantages of that department, devolved its *ad interim* and perfunctory

management upon Captain Jones, the Secretary of the Navy.— Either the navy or the treasury department at that conjuncture, was as much as any one man of considerable abilities could attend to. Both those departments were beyond the capacity of any man. Throughout the war the navy suffered for want of due appreciation of its vital importance as a primary function of the government, both at sea and on the lakes: while the treasury was derelict for more than a year after the war was declared, when, it being impossible any longer to believe either in Mr. Gallatin's return, or the success of his mission, Mr. George W. Campbell, of Tennessee, was at last appointed Secretary of the Treasury.

In the midst of these naval proceedings upon the seas and the lakes, which if properly conducted must have had much greater effect, and neglected as the navy was, were productive nevertheless of the happiest results, for they saved the army, the government, the country, and the war from discomfiture, among the many official notices taken of the subject in Great Britain, there was one by Lord Cochrane, in the House of Commons, which, more than any other, explains the philosophy of English naval declension, and American naval ascendancy. Lord Cochrane, if I am not mistaken, now surviving as the Earl of Dundonald, was an English naval officer, who, by involving himself with the party politics of that kingdom, fell under the proscriptive power of an intolerant executive, for the most part able, notwithstanding a free press, trial by jury, and many other bulwarks of individual liberty, to crush those who provoke its displeasure. He was, however, an officer whose naval exploits have never been surpassed, a man of the utmost intrepidity, scientific, intelligent, and full of resource, whose views of the causes of the unexpected successes of the American over the British navy, although at that time derided and rejected, have since received the highest acknowledgment by adoption by the British government. In July, 1813, Lord Cochrane submitted a series of resolutions in the House of Commons, which, though faintly by argument, were even furiously by invective, attacked by Croker, the Secretary of the Admiralty. Unanswerable as the doctrine of these resolutions was, it was too unpalatable for the acquiescence which national pride and official tenacity must have made too

great a sacrifice at once to yield. It is doctrine, too rational, not only as part of the history of that time, but the philosophy of government at all times, not to deserve especial remembrance. History, patriotism, and humanity concur to hold it up to all governments and nations. The cause of our lamentable defeats, said that experienced and able mariner, is not the enemy's superiority in skill or valour, nor the well-known difference in weight of metal, heretofore deemed unimportant. [Captain Carden, with the frigate *Macedonian* at Norfolk, before the war, told Captain Decatur that in the British service eighteen pound guns were preferred to twenty-four pounders, because on trial they were found to answer better.] The difference, said Cochrane, arises from the decayed and heartless state of English crews, compared with their energy and zeal in former wars, when they subdued the Dutch, the French, and Spanish; and compared on the other hand with the freshness and vigour of the American crews. Continual warfare, long confinement, monotony of life, are sufficient physical explanations of the decline of the British navy; decay of body which produces despondency of mind. Impressment, service for life in actual and hateful captivity, above all, impossibility of promotion from common seamen to commissioned officers—these grievances Lord Cochrane urged as reasons why the navy of Great Britain was filled with superannuated, disabled, disheartened mariners, who had but one ruling passion, which was to escape from the wooden walls to which they were chained in hopeless durance. He suggested many ameliorations, for what to all of English lineage can hardly fail to appear the cause of the melancholy declension of a mighty marine, compared with that young and vigorous, however much smaller one, with which it was unexpectedly brought into collision, and by which it was triumphantly vanquished, without reference to the poor pretexts alleged by ignorant apologists or interested deceivers.

In vain Mr. Croker urged with eloquence the cheering on board the *Macedonian* and the *Java*, proceeding, he averred, sometimes even from the cockpit, as evidence of the undisnayed and invincible British spirit which animated the sailors. Undoubtedly enthusiasm is one proof of vigour, and essential to every undertaking, whether to gain battles, or manufacture pins. But the noisy stimulation Secretary Croker extolled was one of the very evidences of the fainting ardour of the English marine,

compared with the stern, calm, orderly, and disciplined ardour of the American. More freedom, according to Cochrane's philosophy, was what the English wanted and Americans enjoyed. There was no Sabbath, no jubilee, no rest, no rejoicing for the wearied and exhausted mariners of England. Admiral Collingwood, Nelson's second at the battle of Trafalgar, languished till he died of irksome confinement on a ship. Napoleon's downfall was accelerated and much facilitated by the lukewarmness of his marshals and generals, pupils fatigued with the perpetual warfare to which their master fell a victim. If the summits thus wither, what must be the decay of the roots? When the prize money given by Congress to the crews of the *Constitution* for the capture of the *Guerriere* and the *Constitution* was distributed, those brave men were taken ashore, paraded at theatres, in new clothing, regaled, complimented and gratified as the English sailor could never hope to be, even though his final reward by hospitals and pensions be more promising than that of the American. Lord Cochrane, or any other man familiar with seafaring persons, indeed any one regarding the workings of humanity, could not fail to perceive the difference in the whole experience of the English and the American seamen at that period. The careless beings and peculiar people, whose cause Lord Cochrane espoused, without home on shore, without family, without prize money, with no other than marine recreation, without a sentiment but that of mere national renown, without sympathy, compelled to drag out a weary existence of uninterrupted service at sea, galley slaves, impressed and imprisoned for life, contending without a cause, or against it, with fresh, yet experienced mariners fighting for their own freedom from press gangs—how could the issue be other than it was? On the other hand, the doubt of the American navy which would have laid it up in 1812, was the European disparagement of America, which began by assigning littleness to the size of men, their growth, age, and manhood on this continent, inferiority of everything American to everything European. That European arrogance has been in gradual dispersion since it first began. Where man is better fed, housed, clothed, educated, and more independent, why should he not be a superior being? Liberty and law combined have enabled England to overcome other nations much more numerous than Great Britain. In the war of 1812 those

great means of national capacity were exerted for the first time under stress of war in the United States, when their happiest combination was in the American navy.

Before the end of 1813 the British had lost by capture the frigates *Guerriere*, *Macedonian*, and *Java*; the sloops *Alert*, *Frolic*, and *Duke of Gloucester*, brigs *Peacock*, *Dominica*, *Boxer* and *Detroit*, and schooner *Highflyer*, with 270 guns; by sea perils in operations against the United States the frigates *Southampton* and *Barbadoes*, the brigs *Emulous*, *Plumper*, *Avenger*, *Falcon*, *Magnet*, *Moselle*, and *Persian*, the schooners *Chub* and *Subtle*, with 218 guns, altogether twenty-two vessels of war captured or lost, with 489 guns. In that time the United States' loss amounted to 117 guns taken with seven vessels of war, the ships *Chesapeake* and *Wasp*, brigs *Nautilus*, *Vixen* and *Viper*, schooners *Growler* and *Julia* retaken. To these adding the fleet on Lake Erie, two ships, the *Detroit* and *Queen Charlotte*, brig *Hunter*, schooners *Lady Prevost* and *Chippewa*, and sloop *Little Belt*, six vessels with 60 guns, and the number of our captures was twenty-six war vessels with 560 guns, while theirs was seven war vessels with 119 guns, and two by storms, the *Hamilton* and *Scourge*, with 18 guns together. When Captain Yeo, in the *Southampton* frigate, took Captain Reed in the *Vixen*, and a storm followed, endangering the captor, whose men broke into the liquor room, got drunk and became ungovernable, as seamen sometimes do in emergencies of weather, Yeo appealed to Reed for help, and the American prisoners were mainly instrumental with their officers, in saving their English conquerors (by superior numbers) from destruction, as publicly acknowledged by Yeo. To this imperfect list of comparative losses by the war, the captures by privateers would make a long addition, leaving the balance still with the Americans. British seizures before the war for alleged breach of blockade, colonial trade, orders in council, or other pretexts for depredation on American commerce, probably exceeded their capture from us during the war. For, as the president's first war message well argued, hostilities had long been carried on against us, which would continually increase till we returned them. Renovation of naval and national character was, however, the most important acquisition which maritime events gained for the United States, and in the count of cost far outweighs all the losses of the war.

Great Britain had afloat in the year 1813, with no other enemy after April than the United States, about 1,000,000 of tonnage and 140,000 seamen, in her navy: 120 ships of the line, 10 ships rating from 50 to 44 guns each, 130 frigates, 100 sloops of war, and more than 120 war brigs. Yet in three years of hostilities the frigate Chesapeake was the only American vessel taken by her navy from ours on anything like equal terms. Such disparity proves that the supposed prepotency of the English navy is not a well-founded apprehension.

The American navy of 1812 was the most perfect in the world; every vessel in fine order, every officer confident, yet prudent; every sailor fighting for himself. It was like Cromwell's army of republican enthusiasts, or Bonaparte's of republican conscripts, every soldier a patriot, every officer a hero. Great fleets and large armies do not better develop, if they do not obscure national characteristics, as fully displayed in smaller bodies, perhaps more so. No matter what the numbers, wherever perfect obedience and adequate intelligence are combined with patriotic enthusiasm, victory is a moral certainty, over compulsory, mercenary, and dull submission. Seafaring habits are doubtless required for maritime success. But, as the freemen of England, with their broad and deep commercial foundations, stand firmer than the Dutch, French, or other men less free, if not less nautical, on the rock of marine power, the superiority of American mariners may be explained by the greater range of their adventurous voyages and the greater liberty of their habitual occupations. The great Asiatic empire of North-eastern Europe, the vast empire of Russia, had in 1813, fifty-three line-of-battle ships, thirty-four frigates, fifty-nine cutters and war-brigs, mounting altogether four thousand four hundred and twenty-eight cannons, manned by sixty thousand seamen, many of them expert Greeks. Would that Russian navy have been formidable to the navy of the United States? in which liberty was a right, discipline so perfect and constant, that battle was recreation, order so habitual, that battle was without other noise than that of firearms.

That war gave the American navy advantages which it may never have again: the British navy had disadvantages to contend with which it will not have in another war with this country. The American seamen had a cause, their own cause, in

which they were animated by indignation against oppressors. The British seamen had no such motive. The hatred they bore the French, if not a rational, at any rate a national and natural incentive, did not exist towards the Americans. The English seaman fought from the habit of obedience to command; the American with all his heart. British naval officers, at first almost disarmed by contempt for their foes, even after that sentiment changed to one more respectful, still could neither divest themselves of it entirely nor substitute for it the animosity which British story and British song had for ages engraved on the minds and hearts of both officers and men against the Dutch, the French, the Spanish, and the Danes. To no navy have those hostilities been so edifying as to the English. Nearly all Cochrane's suggestions are adopted. The men, though still enlisted till discharged, are not impressed, probably would not be in war. Their rations are much improved. Their treatment is kindness. They get their pay whenever they land, a great advantage over the American service. They are, indeed, no longer acknowledged lords of the ocean: but their claim to that high title they may yet assert with better right than in 1812.

More men or more ships do not make irresistible navies: but more practical mariners, with greater toils in lives of adventure by sea. Fisheries and tonnage enabled France to contend with England for its dominion. And in that contention North-eastern America performed a conspicuous part. Wrestling those foundations of a marine from France, Great Britain seized the sceptre of the ocean. Without them, Halifax for the refitment of her shipping, the seacoast of Nova Scotia, and fisheries of Newfoundland, without American naval resources, which are contiguous to New England, Great Britain would be impotent for war with the United States. By that human perversity which misleads the most intelligent people and defeats the most rational designs, the blinded sagacity of New England preferred what was not even passive co-operation with Great Britain in the war of 1812, to patriotic exertion. As far as they could, the American naval flag was dishonoured and the maritime development of New England marred. But for them, that contest might have vastly augmented the power of the eastern states. Nor was it inconsiderate passion which fettered their own limbs. Sordid miscalculation made the false impression that trade was

more profitable than war; that even illicit trade was more desirable than assisting their own government to enlarge all the avenues of trade by momentarily closing them. They may not confess, but they cannot but see their error. The war from which they held back, among other influences, taught extreme sectional disaffection the costly folly of its irrational indulgence. Such resolutions as Mr. Quincy's, such conventions as that of Hartford, the local and personal hallucinations of partisan excess, began and ended with that war, never to be repeated. It made an American nation and the American navy, in spite of the many educated, rich, and pious heretics, the respectable but infatuated of Massachusetts and Connecticut, whose factious resistance could not prevent those results; who paid the penalty of exclusion from national consideration, by blindly opposing their own advancement. Nantucket, the cradle of American maritime pre-eminence, was not only represented in Congress by a gentleman of the Boston infatuation; but it was only not a hostile possession throughout the war, because the enemy deemed it disaffected to the United States, excluded from his blockades, and entitled to his protection. The south and the west, the whole Union, would have defended Nantucket in 1812, as they did Boston in 1775, if Nantucket had been what Boston was. But lamentable degeneracy had succeeded the revolutionary spirit of American independence. Before the disruption of America from Great Britain, the mariners of New England, particularly the whalers of Nantucket, had been celebrated by the first of English philosophers as the most expert seamen of the world. "And pray, sir," said Burke, "what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis' Straits, whilst we are looking for them beneath the Arctic circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen serpent of the south. Falkland island, which seemed too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and a resting place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accu-

mulated winter of both poles. We know that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries. No climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of British enterprize ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people; a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but that through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection; when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivances melt and die away within me. My rigour relents. I pardon something to the spirit of liberty."

There, from English authority, grew the roots of American naval superiority, as signalized in the naval victories of 1812 and 1813 over the great European naval masters of mankind. Longer and more adventurous voyages, nurseries of seamen better than English collieries, greater personal freedom, with more docility, submitting to higher discipline, and a great cause, were advantages which the American navy enjoyed over that of Great Britain. The contumelious attack on the frigate Chesapeake, in American waters, was the last indignity of the press-gang, against which vengeance was treasured up till taken, as retribution for such wrongs is apt to be. The United States anxiously and humbly strove to render the peace of 1783 perpetual. Great Britain insisted on turning it into a treacherous truce, and a truce of continual tribulation for this country. Nothing was ever more false than George the Third's much mentioned reception of the first American minister John Adams, that as he had been the last to agree to peace with the United States, so he would be the last to break it. It was broken continually by his ministers from its signature to the declaration of war again in 1812. In that second war, Great Britain gave the United States a navy to cope

with hers, instead of the perpetual peace and inoffensive commerce which they much preferred. With the iron, the timber, the cordage, the materials of ship-building, swifter ships, and shorter voyages, with less numerous crews, less losses from sea-perils—with all the materials, inducements and the spirit of navigation, nothing but the overweening influence of England in America could beget the misapprehensions of 1812. By the first war Great Britain forced political independence on the United States of America. By the second war she endowed them with a navy. American tonnage is running with that of Great Britain the race of peaceable commerce, if she will suffer it. If not, what has rendered Great Britain the greatest naval power, may enable Americans to vindicate their rights, against European interference. The talisman is made of **LIBERTY WITH LAW.**

While the Senate of Massachusetts resolved that it was unbecoming to rejoice in American naval victories, against which much of the press and the pulpit fulminations of New England were aimed, Dacres, as a prisoner of war, was received with more cordial welcome at Boston than Hull, his captor, Decatur's squadron, blockaded at New London by Hardy's, was in danger of destruction by means of treasonable signals from the shore to the enemy, and his sentiment of loyalty to our country, right or wrong, was repudiated by large numbers of respectable Americans, persisting in disaffected designs to defeat the war and dishonour, if not abandon the navy, public sentiment throughout all other parts of the United States, and the will of a majority of the good people of New England coinciding with it, displayed itself in grateful and substantial acknowledgment of those victories, showering honours upon the brave men who gained them. The thanks of Congress, and gold medals were, by resolutions of January, 1813, voted to Hull, Decatur, and Jones, also silver medals, to each of the commissioned officers of the Constitution, the United States, and the Wasp, and an elegant sword to Elliott. The legislatures of many states, the corporations of cities, and various collections of citizens, bestowed upon them thanks, medals, services of plate, the freedom of cities, public entertainments, and other compliments. The naval officers were feted everywhere. Even citizens of Boston subscribed a public dinner to Hull, and the House of Representatives of Massachu-

setts voted thanks to him, his officers, and crew. The Order of Cincinnati admitted him as an honorary member. The young men of the Society of Friends of Philadelphia subscribed for the relations of those who were slain in the naval actions.

All these, however, though by no means barren or even unprofitable honours, were not lucrative or adequate: and the unworthy parsimony of the twelfth Congress was not only seen in their at first refusing any pecuniary reward to the captors of the *Guerriere*, and afterwards when something was with difficulty got through the House of Representatives in the expiring moments of the session, cutting the sum down from \$100,000 proposed by the naval committee, to but \$50,000 allowed, by which a niggardly precedent was set, but injustice was superadded to unworthy parsimony, by omitting the crews of the vessels from the votes of thanks, which were bestowed on the officers alone. These omissions and misgivings were rectified as the navy advanced in favour, and public sentiment proclaimed its title to regard. As has been already stated, the pecuniary allowance to Lawrence, his officers, and crew, met with no opposition, which was voted the 22d of June, 1813, in the midst of the graver labours of arranging the voluminous tax-bills, but also when the tidings of his memorable death were fresh in mind. All these grants, inadequate as they were, comprehended the crews as well as the officers, upon the established principles of prize-money. Had the captured ships been brought into port, instead of being sunk at sea, the compensation to their captors would have been much larger. Decatur, his officers, and crew, received \$200,000 for the frigate *Macedonian*, brought into port, by decree of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District, sitting at the city of New York.

On the 18th of April, 1814, the thirteenth Congress, by act authorizing the purchase of the vessels captured on Lake Erie, (the 10th of September, 1813,) directed the president to purchase them as British vessels, and appropriated the sum of \$255,000 in payment, to be distributed as prize-money among the captors and their heirs; by the same act allowing Captain Oliver H. Perry \$5000 in addition to his prize-money, as commander of the ship *Lawrence*. Of the whole sum allowed, only \$242,250 appears by the treasury books to have been paid.

It may not be amiss to add, although not transactions of the

year 1813, to this account of naval pecuniary rewards, that Captain Biddle was paid \$25,000 for the *Penguin*, Captain Stewart \$25,000 for the *Levant*, the representatives of Captain Blakeley \$50,000 for the *Reindeer* and *Avon*, prizes taken and destroyed or lost at sea; and Captain MacDonough, his officers and crew, \$304,292 68, for the British squadron captured on Lake Champlain. All these allowances embraced crews and officers as well as captains or commanders. Commodore Chauncey was paid \$23,363 46, commissions on his expenditures on Lake Ontario; Commodore Perry \$2000, on his expenditures on Lake Erie; and Commodore MacDonough \$5,021 90, on his expenditures on Lake Champlain.

These naval allowances were strong indications of the growing favour of the navy; for none such were made to the army, or militia; and all civil service, however meritorious and protracted, has been constantly denied in the United States any pension, gratuity, or compensation, beyond the moderate salaries paid during incumbency of office. Martial celebrities much respected by mankind, are stinted by American republicanism. All titles are forbid by the federal constitution of 1787, which adopts in this respect an interdict of the confederation of 1778. Ambassadors, though named in the latter, admirals and marshals have never been commissioned. A lieutenant-general, or commander-in-chief, was proposed by a resolution submitted by Mr. William H. Murfree, of North Carolina, in the House of Representatives, and believed to have been thought of by the president, but never appointed.

Donations and endowments sparingly allowed, titles absolutely forbid, are the theoretical conformity with the doctrine inculcated by Montesquieu, that virtue is a principle indispensable to republican prosperity. Greece and Rome flourished without the feudal seigniorage with which the monarchies of modern Europe are overrun. Without permanent wealth, mere titular rank, a principality, dukedom, or marquisate, is as insignificant as the vulgar squirearchy. And wealth perpetuated by primogeniture or entails, is the law of but one country pretending to free institutions, where liberty exists without equality.

No government, however, ancient or modern, no public sentiment has ever overcome popular fondness for heroic achievements. Organic rejection of titles, pensions, orders, and lucrative

endowments, forces national admiration into other grants ; in this country the principal means of gratifying itself is by conferring offices, from the lowest to the highest. Naval distinction in the war of 1812, though not elevated, has been suggested, as a title to the chief magistracy of the United States. Franklin's wisdom, and the genius of the author of the Declaration of Independence, were postponed to the greater popularity of a soldier for the first president. The war of 1812, has already made more than one of Washington's successors. Natural preference of mankind for heroes has not been subdued by republicanism, whose rewards, excluded from the common channels of wealth, title or hereditary privilege, take sanctuary in other appropriations. Wealth must have attractions in all ages and countries : pedigree is not without them in this. But, beyond the vulgar estimate, for historical and enduring distinction, what are dukedoms and principalities, as recompense for warriors, or patents of ennoblement, compared to the chief magistracy of a nation? One is the cube of renown, of which the other is at most but the square.

CHAPTER XII.

PROVISIONAL ARMISTICE, JULY, 1812, BETWEEN BAYNES AND DEARBORN.—REJECTED BY MADISON—WHO INSISTS ON ABANDONMENT OF IMPRESSMENT.—AMERICAN TERMS OF PACIFICATION REJECTED BY ENGLAND.—ENGLISH TERMS REFUSED BY AMERICA.—CORRESPONDENCE, OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1812, BETWEEN WARREN AND MONROE.—WAR INEVITABLE.—AMERICAN SOLDIERS SEIZED AS BRITISH SUBJECTS TO BE EXECUTED AS TRAITORS.—AMERICAN RETALIATION.—CORRESPONDENCE ON THE SUBJECT BETWEEN DEARBORN, PREVOST, AND WILKINSON.—GENERAL EXCITEMENT.—ENORMITY OF THE ENGLISH ATTEMPT—FINALLY ABANDONED.—RUSSIAN MEDIATION.—GALLATIN, ADAMS, AND BAYARD APPOINTED ENVOYS UNDER IT.—MOREAU.—ENVOYS EMBARK FOR ST. PETERSBURGH.—GALLATIN WRITES TO BARING.—BRITISH MINISTRY.—CASTLEREAGH.—BRITISH DESIGNS.—SPURN MEDIATION.—OFFER TO TREAT AT LONDON OR GOTTENBURG.—FESTIVALS FOR RUSSIAN VICTORIES.—MR. OTIS'S SPEECH TO EUSTAPHIEVE, THE RUSSIAN CONSUL.—FESTIVALS FOR AMERICAN NAVAL VICTORIES OPPOSED.—GOVERNOR STRONG'S MESSAGE TO LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS.—THEIR RESPONSE.—PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT.—CASTLEREAGH'S MOTION AND SPEECH.—ALEXANDER BARING.—FOSTER CHARGES AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WITH FRENCH INFLUENCE.—BRITISH INFLUENCE IN NEW ENGLAND.—MR. WEBSTER'S RESOLUTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.—MR. CALHOUN'S REPORT ON THEM.—MR. MONROE'S ANSWER TO THEM.—TURREAU'S LETTER.—HANSON'S MOTION.—FRENCH INTERVENTION IN THE WAR CONSIDERED.—ITS ADVANTAGES PREVENTED BY BRITISH INFLUENCE. JOEL BARLOW'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE—MERELY COMMERCIAL—FORBEARING POLITICAL CONNECTION.—BARLOW INVITED TO WILNA TO SIGN A TREATY—DIES IN POLAND—IS SUCCEEDED IN JULY, 1813, BY CRAWFORD AS MINISTER TO FRANCE.—M. SERURIER, FRENCH MINISTER AT WASHINGTON.—EMBARGO—RECOMMENDED BY PRESIDENT IN JULY, THEN REJECTED BY SENATE, ENACTED IN DECEMBER—INEFFECTUAL—AND REPEALED.

As mentioned several times heretofore, the declaration of war was so unlooked for, so incredible, that the English minister, Foster, a young man unfit for his station, surrounded by members of Congress and others, as little disposed as he to believe it, was taken completely by surprise. By his mistake and those surrounding him, England was put off her guard. Compared

with her belligerent means, she was even less prepared for hostilities in this hemisphere than the United States. During the first six months, both governments not only desiderated peace, but with such mutual aversion to war, that it was faintly waged on both sides, except that our navy, without orders or expectation, struck some solitary hard blows. Our armies struck nowhere but to be defeated always. The president, an instrument of what he believed to be the will and the interest of the nation, was, nevertheless, anxious for peace. The Secretary of State, Monroe, was heard to say, we have got into the war and must get out of it as soon as we can. The Secretary of War, Armstrong, added, what can be expected from a licentious people impatient of burthens? The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gallatin, was unreserved in his condemnation of war, after it was declared as before. While such was the pacific solicitude of our government, that of England was just then putting forth all the mighty means of Great Britain in the final struggle with France; in which most of her soldiers and sailors were employed, with an outlay of nearly five hundred millions of dollars for that one year; efforts from which that great but factitious kingdom of many countries never has recovered, and never can. There was, therefore, strong indisposition for war with America, and for more expense. Napoleon and Alexander bid high, after involving Sweden, for the co-operation of Denmark, the only European power not engaged in the great contest; while both desired, England to prevent, France to induce, the United States to take part in it. The British government did no more, on intelligence of the declaration of war by the United States, than to order an embargo the 31st July, 1812, for the detention of American ships, directing that they should be taken and detained till further orders. The commander of the British forces in America, conscious, says an English historian (Christie), of the inferiority of his strength, and uncertain of reinforcement from home, adopted a defensive system, pursuant to directions from his government, which, in hopes of a speedy termination of the differences with America, studied, by temporizing, to avoid widening the breach, or exciting the American people to embark in what England was led to consider a quarrel undertaken by their government.

The Governor-General of Canada was uneasy for his provinces, which, with the good will of New England, or an euer-

getic and fortunate American general, even without such support, would have been overrun that summer. By Foster's advice from Halifax, Prevost dispatched his Adjutant-General, Edward Baynes, with a flag of truce to Flatbush, near Albany, in New York, where General Dearborn was stationed, to negotiate with him an armistice, which Dearborn was prevailed upon at once to subscribe. It suspended military operations till the president's pleasure should be ascertained; excepting General Hull's expedition: Dearborn considered that a separate command which he had no authority to interfere with. By this ill-advised concession, which occurred in July, 1812, Dearborn relieved the enemy from all immediate fear for Canada, as far as from Montreal to Malden, comprehending all the shores of Lakes Champlain and Ontario, with the whole St. Lawrence frontier, and enabled General Brock to perform his rapid march from York to Sandwich, thence to force Hull to surrender at Detroit, the next month, August, 1812. England then had no idea that her navy could suffer. But she feared that her commerce would suffer from American privateers, her manufactures not only by losing the great market of this country, but by war forcing the United States to supply themselves with manufactures, and she feared the dishonour of losing Canada. Till war was declared, the threat of it was treated with English contempt, especially by the press. Peter B. Porter's report, in the House of Representatives, in favour of war, was ridiculed as blustering, noisy, silly, unstatesmanlike. Every American ship would be swept from the ocean, every harbour blockaded, American commerce ruined altogether. But as soon as war was proclaimed, it was discovered in London, that with 100,000 seamen, as good as any in the world, all of whom could be actively employed in public or private ships of war against British trade in every part of the ocean, to the very chops of the Channel, increasing rates of insurance, constraining merchant vessels to sail under convoy, America would be a troublesome and expensive enemy: a different sort of enemy at sea from the French, said a London newspaper, with nautical knowledge and enterprize, attempting deeds which Frenchmen would never think of, with French and other continental ports to take refuge in, their depredations much to be dreaded. In like manner desertion of British seamen was deprecated, to a service more popular and more pro-

fitable, if not more glorious, than their own. Dishonour in defeat by sea was not imagined, but expensive commercial losses. Moreover British manufactures would suffer. War would be a hot bed for those of the United States to be forced forward with the natural means of North America. It would be a trial of skill as well as trial by battle, of handicraft against fire arms. Great Britain compelled the United States to double their impost, which would, at the same time that it increased revenue, foster American fabrics. On the other hand, the supply of American raw materials for English manufactures for the army and navy would be stopped, and would be driven to France. The jeopardy of Canada, too, was felt and confessed. Undoubtedly, said the Times newspaper, we deprecate war with America, though we cannot dread it. She thinks that we have already enough on our hands in contending with France, and we desire no more certainly. We are now the only bulwark of the world, a little speck between the Old and the New World, contending with both; with one arm beating the armies of the continental master of Europe, with the other we must smite his *American præfect*. Bonaparte desires us to abandon our maritime rights: America, lending herself to him, that we should let her have our trade.

These were pleas, if not cries, of desperation rather than defiance. Great Britain claimed the sea as her domain. The orders in council were said in Parliament to be a system of self-defence to prevent the commerce of America from coming into competition with that of England: retaliatory, not upon France, but upon the United States for entering into commercial competition with the sovereign of the seas. Although the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked, yet the English Commons on the 13th of February, 1812, by a vote of 136 to 23, rejected Whitbread's motion to repeal the orders in council, which the prime minister, Percival, resisted because Great Britain had a right to do whatever was necessary to counteract the alleged injustice of France. From the present maritime strength of the United States we can hardly realize that epoch of belligerent despotism, when England and France arbitrarily undertook and well-nigh succeeded to compel all nations to submit to a sea yoke which now would be repelled by all—against which every man in this country would rise in arms. Their injustice had been so long borne by the United States that both of them believed it would never be

resisted beyond complaint and remonstrance. When at length, surprised by war, England still thought commercial gain the only cause of it, and considered all difficulty removed by repealing her orders in council. But Madison deemed impressment of seamen another substantial and a sufficient grievance, which he had long combated by irresistible reason. He therefore at once refused the armistice Dearborn subscribed with Baynes, for suspending resort to arms, and fortunately persevered in hostilities, which, if then interrupted, would have prevented all the American naval victories. Dearborn's inconsiderate acceptance of Prevost's overture might thus have rendered peace a mere suspension of hostilities, without the bulwark of marine power, of which this country has since experienced the incalculable benefits abroad and at home. It is a striking effect of that war, that the two great European powers which then, with unhesitating violation of national law and American rights, trampled upon our peaceable maritime adventures, sacrificed to unmitigated hostilities between England and France, have lately combined by clandestine contrivances, without resorting to arms, to prevent the settlement of the boundaries of the United States as acknowledged in 1812. Substituting diplomacy for force is the effect of European conviction from that war of American ability for self-protection.

A friend, then a member of the executive government at Washington, allows me to use from his diary the following entries concerning the proposed armistice:—

“1812. *August 15th.* The Secretary of War informs me that the Adjutant-General of the British army in Canada, had arrived at Albany with a flag of truce to General Dearborn; that he brought with him a letter from Sir George Prevost, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in Canada, proposing a suspension of hostilities; the ground of the proposal was, that Mr. Baker, the British Secretary of Legation, still remaining at Washington, was to lay before the American government certain dispatches forwarded to him since the repeal of the orders in council, which might prepare the way for negotiations for peace. General Dearborn, on the faith of this letter from Sir George Prevost, had consented to an armistice until he could send word to his government at Washington, and receive an answer. The secretary added that, the government having received no communication from the British government through Mr. Baker or

any other source, to authorize such an expectation as was conveyed in Sir George Prevost's letter, General Dearborn would be instructed to proceed in his military operations with increased vigour. He (the secretary) had written him a private letter to-day to this effect, and it would be followed by an official one to-morrow.

“August 22d. To-day Mr. Monroe read to me a dispatch drawn up by him, and immediately to be sent to Mr. Russell, our chargé d'affaires at London, on the subject of the proposal for an armistice lately made by the Governor-General of Canada, Sir George Prevost, through the Adjutant-General of the British army who arrived at Albany. The dispatch states at large the reasons why it would be manifestly improper in the American government to accede to the proposal under the existing circumstances of the two nations at the present moment. It states, moreover, that the proposal is not made by the British government itself, but only through its colonial agents, and might not be sanctioned in England; and that it would be wholly unequal in the advantages it would give to the parties, if agreed to by the United States—as it would give Britain time for preparation in quarters where she is weak; also, that as we had declared war for impressment as a main cause, to agree to this armistice before hearing a word from England on the subject, might look like giving it up. These are only some of the reasons which the dispatch contained. It also remarked, that the repeal of the orders in council, as transmitted lately, reserved a principle altogether disallowed by the United States, viz: a right by the Prince Regent to revive them or not as the conduct of France might make it necessary. The dispatch concludes with saying to Mr. Russell, that the President would be ready to agree to a suspension of arms on the complete repeal of the orders in council, and on satisfactory assurances being given that the question of impressment would be taken up with a view to its final adjustment.”

In all probability the armistice suggested by Foster from Halifax to Prevost, and by him procured from Dearborn, was a scheme of the British minister, Foster, to atone for his own foolish assurance that war would not be declared, and Prevost's want of means in Canada to resist it, if vigorously waged.

In September, 1812, Admiral Sir John Borlarc Warren, a vete-

ran officer of the British navy, arrived at Halifax, not only with an extensive naval command, including the Jamaica and Windward Island stations, but also with full power to negotiate a provisional accommodation with our government. On the 30th of September, 1812, he wrote from Halifax to Mr. Monroe, the Secretary of State, that the departure of Mr. Foster had devolved on the admiral the charge of making known to the government of the United States, the Prince Regent's sentiments upon the existing relations of the two countries. The orders in council ceased, he stated, nearly at the time the government of the United States declared war: on receipt of which, the order of the 31st of July, 1812, was given to detain American vessels. Under these circumstances, the admiral proposed an immediate cessation of hostilities, in order to bring about a reconciliation so interesting and beneficial to America and Great Britain. If the American government instantly recalls their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders for acts of hostility against territories, persons and property, with the understanding that immediately on receiving assurances from you to that effect, I shall instruct all English officers to desist from corresponding measures of war; British commanders will be required to discontinue hostilities from the receipt of such notice. Should the American government accede to this proposal for terminating hostilities, Admiral Warren was authorized to arrange a revocation of laws interdicting commerce. In default of such revocation, he added, by the order of the 23d of June, the orders in council of January, 1807, and April, 1809, (the obnoxious orders,) are to be revived: I earnestly recommend, said Admiral Warren, that no time may be lost in communicating to me the decision of your government, persuaded as I feel that it cannot but be of a nature to lead to a termination of the present differences. The flag of truce you may charge with your reply will find one of my cruisers at Sandy Hook, ten days after the landing of this dispatch with a flag of truce which I have directed to be there for the purpose.

This authentic proffer of peace put it in Madison's power under persuasive circumstances. No very serious steps had yet been taken towards hostilities. The presidential election was in its very crisis, and Hull's surrender had taken place, when the president was called upon in the autumnal solitude of the seat of

government in October, 1812, just before Congress would re-assemble there, to determine the great question of peace or war submitted to his single judgment. Although strongly inclined to peace, taking ground on impressment against the vast power of Great Britain, insisting upon it as her ancient, unquestionable, domestic, and vital rule of allegiance, Madison, who had so long and irresistibly argued the issue, made what was equivalent to another declaration of war—to resist impressment alone.

“The English government, on the intelligence of a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States, and the issue of letters of marque and reprisals, had done no more by way of retaliation than to direct that American ships and goods should be brought in and detained till further orders. But the disregard of the American government to the notified repeal of the orders in council and its refusal to continue the armistice agreed upon by the commanders on each side in Canada, being now made known, the Prince Regent published an order, dated October 13th, for granting general reprisals against the ships, goods, and citizens of the United States, in the usual form towards a hostile power; concluding, however, with a declaration, that nothing in this order was to annul the authority before given to his majesty’s naval commander on the American station, to sign a convention for recalling all hostile orders issued by the respective governments, with a view of restoring the accustomed relations of amity and commerce.”

Such was an English account of that conjuncture, published soon afterwards. For passive and considerate adhesion to the great cause of the war, the president was all that its advocates could desire. Great Britain had no more formidable individual enemy than he who deprecated war. If the activity and energy of his administration had equaled his own imperturbable fortitude and patriotism, the misfortunes and mismanagement of the outset would not have occurred.

Monroe’s answer to Warren, dated Department of State, the 27th of October, 1812, informed him that it would be very satisfactory to the president to meet the British government in such arrangements as might terminate without delay hostilities on conditions honourable to both nations. At the moment of the declaration of war, the president gave signal proof of the attach-

ment of the United States to peace, by proposing an armistice rejected in regard to the important interest of impressment, without which no peace can be durable. The president desires to terminate the war on solid and durable terms: to accomplish which it is necessary that the subject of impressment be satisfactorily arranged, and suspension of the practice during the armistice is necessary. The United States cannot admit or acquiesce in the right during negotiation; for this purpose a clear and distinct understanding of the parties must first be obtained. The orders in council having been repealed, no illegal blockades revived or instituted in their stead, and an understanding being obtained on the subject of impressment, the president is willing to agree to a cessation of hostilities, with a view to arrange by treaty, in a more distinct and ample manner and to the satisfaction of both parties, every other subject of controversy.

The English government refusing these terms of accommodation, war continued for the single grievance of impressment, with the English menace that such blockades as the repealed orders in council authorized, that is, illegal blockades, which Lord Melville in Parliament pronounced impracticable, would also be enforced.

The conditions proffered by our government, through Russel, their chargé d'affaires in London, when war was declared, were stated by the president in his annual message to Congress the 4th of November, 1812, without reference to the rejected overtures from Prevost and Warren. They were, repeal of the orders in council, no revival of blockades violating established rules, a stop put to the practice of impressment, and immediate discharge of American seamen from British ships. In return, we proffered an act of Congress, not a mere executive assurance, for the exclusion of British seamen, nay more, all British natives from our vessels, provided Great Britain excluded Americans from hers. On these terms an armistice, to prevent hostilities and bloodshed, could be improved into definitive and comprehensive adjustment of all depending controversies. These were reasonable and moderate terms; but which, while England was at war with France, there was little hope she would accept, impressment, if there be any right to it, being a war right, at all events a war need. The act of Congress concerning seamen afterwards enacted, as promised, made great concessions. It distinguishes between native and naturalized seamen, contrary to

the act of Parliament, the practice of all nations and the habits of seafaring men to take service in vessels other than those of native, or indeed of any permanent allegiance. It makes a distinction incongruous with the fundamental principle of American institutions, by which our political community is to consist of foreigners invited from all the world to participation of American citizenship and protection. These terms were rejected as soon as proffered to Great Britain.

On the 2d of February, 1813, Castlereagh laid before Parliament the Prince Regent's manifesto or proclamation of the 9th January, of that year, in which the British pretensions were set forth with unusual fullness, arrogance and falsification. Not only were our terms scornfully repudiated, but the motives of our government, the independence and honour of the country, were impugned by insolent and elaborate argument of the prominent English charge of American subserviency to France. English employment of the Indians was expressly denied in this false state paper, and American connivance with the French ruler expressly asserted; two equally gross falsehoods, the groundwork of the manifesto.

It was, by this time and by these proceedings, manifest that war or abject submission were the only alternatives of the United States. The principles of the orders in council were by no means disavowed; their practice was only suspended, with distinct threat of their renewal; while impressment in principle and practice was insisted upon. Madison's administration had no option left but perseverance in hostilities of which the English overtures for accommodation would save only the bloodshed, leaving most of the maritime injustice as great as ever. Perhaps Mr. Madison himself, certainly others of his cabinet, flattered themselves with a prospect of peace, soon after disclosed by the Russian mediation. But Great Britain rejected that too, and soon began the outrageous aggravation of wrong which is next to be exhibited. However, and not perhaps unduly, solicitous of peace, by insisting on freedom from the odious and intolerable grievance of impressment, the American government renewed the war issue on terms by which the United States might fairly stand before the world and posterity. On the 29th January, 1813, Felix Grundy, from the committee of Foreign Affairs, reported to the House of Representatives the bill which became the promised law the 3d March, 1813, for the

regulation of seamen on board the public and private vessels of the United States. The committee by a report at the same time expressed their astonishment at the rejection, by England, of the terms of accommodation offered by our minister to Lord Castlereagh. Our proposition at first made to exclude British seamen was enlarged so as to exclude all British native subjects not already naturalized, which too was rejected. No disposition for fair conditions of accommodation was to be found in the English minister's communication to ours at London, or in Admiral Warren's from Halifax. They profess willingness for amicable discussion, but will do nothing towards redress of the principal grievance. On a full view of the conduct of the American executive since the declaration of war, the committee expressed their entire approbation of it. It remained for the United States to take their final attitude and maintain it with unshaken firmness and constancy. The manner in which our friendly advances and liberal propositions had been received, in great measure extinguished the hope of amicable accommodation. The committee thought it unnecessary to inquire what our course would have been respecting impressment, had the orders in council been repealed before the declaration of war. War having been declared, and impressment, one principal cause of it, remaining in full force, it must be provided for in pacification. The British pretension was maturing into a right. The period had arrived when forbearance could be no longer justified. The people of America were one family to defend their liberties; and had no fear of the result.

The stand taken by the executive in October, 1812, and corroborated by Congress in January, 1813, were like repetition of the declaration of war in June, 1812. It was the national position, from which the United States were not to be driven but by force, which Madison performed a duty to the country highly deserving its gratitude when he maintained alone, and which Congress confirmed.

Pacification refused on the terms proposed by the enemy, left war on the single issue of impressment, and produced fresh and monstrous aggravation of hostilities. All the enormities of British warfare, excitement of slaves and employment of savages, were to be exceeded by another still more abominable device. The United States were to be *punished*. The dogma of British indisputable allegiance was to be enforced on hundreds of thou-

sands of American citizens and soldiers. The olive branch having been rejected, the sword was not the only alternative, but the gibbet was to be erected wherever a naturalized American citizen was taken in arms, if born a Briton. Impressment by sea was to be imposed by extermination ashore. The armies and navy of the United States were to be deterred and more than decimated by executing their soldiers and sailors as traitors: by English officers, among whose soldiers and sailors were German, Spanish, French, Italian, and Indian levies.

Of the American prisoners taken at Queenstown, twenty-three privates of the first, sixth, and thirteenth regiments of regular infantry were seized without any notice to American officers or authorities, and, as British subjects, sent to England, to be tried as traitors taken in arms fighting against their sovereign. The first and sixth were old regiments commanded, respectively, by Colonels Kingsbury and Simonds. The thirteenth was a new regiment, raised for the war, commanded by Colonel Schuyler. When the American commissary of prisoners in England became aware of this proceeding, he apprized his government of it. The president immediately in May, 1813, directed General Dearborn to confine twenty-three British prisoners as hostages for our twenty-three soldiers confined as traitors in England: and at the same time to give notice of the determination to retaliate any similar severity begun by England. Dearborn was a man of strong American sympathies and recollections. He had been commanding officer of the day when Washington, in an analogy of martial rigour, inflicted upon Major André the inexorable law of war. Dearborn, therefore, promptly and cordially vindicated American right by the confinement of the English prisoners, and gave notice of it to Prevost, the Governor-General of Canada. Thus the matter stood during several months without further action in this dreadful resort. Whenever England made a step in it, our officers kept pace: but nothing like a settled plan was divulged till the autumn of 1813. The storm muttered, but no more. On the same day that Admiral Warren tendered peace to Mr. Monroe, 30th of September, 1812, from Halifax, he addressed another letter to him, complaining that Commodore Rodgers had seized twelve British seamen from a cartel, for twelve of ours taken from the Chesapeake, and he issued a proclamation to the English to uphold them in their loyal attach-

ments. Great Britain only deferred the enforcement of impressment at sea by execution of naturalized Americans taken in arms ashore, while she had hopes that war would cease with orders in council. Warren had, no doubt, his alternative orders: and as soon as war was the settled course of both countries, Great Britain, in addition to her employment of the Indians and revolt of the slaves, undertook to put to death a large portion of the American army and navy in cold blood—to execute them after trials in England, which could be but mockeries of justice. Accordingly, the Governor-General of Canada gave from his head-quarters at Montreal, on the 17th of October, 1813, formal official notice to General Wilkinson, that the British commander was instructed to select out of the American *officers* to be put in close confinement, as many as double the number of British *soldiers* put to death, should any be so dealt with, in consequence of death being inflicted on guilty British soldiers confined in England, and such selected American officers would suffer death immediately. And, furthermore, Prevost was instructed by his Britannic majesty's government to notify Wilkinson for the information of the government of the United States, that the commander of his majesty's armies and fleets on the coasts of America had received instructions to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity, against all cities, towns, and villages, belonging to the United States, and the inhabitants thereof, unless deterred from putting to death any persons then or thereafter held as hostages for the purposes stated by Major-General Dearborn.

This was the first notice of that *punishment* which Castlereagh had resolved should be part of the American atonement for declaring war. On the 1st of November, 1813, from his head-quarters at Grenadier Island, General Wilkinson, with brevity and dignity answered this brutal threat by a letter to Prevost, simply stating that a copy of his letter should be immediately transmitted to his government, but that it could not be deterred by any consideration of life or death, of depredation, or conflagration, from the faithful discharge of its duty to the American nation. On the 27th of October, 1813, Adjutant-General Baynes published, together with the official account of General Hampton's repulse in his attempt to enter Canada in September, the substance of the correspondence between Dearborn, Prevost, and Wilkinson, respecting retaliation, in general orders to the British troops.

They would be sensible of the Prince Regent's paternal solicitude for the honour and protection of the British soldiers, grossly outraged in the persons of twenty-three of them confined for that number of traitors guilty of the unnatural and infamous crime of raising parricidal arms against the country that gave them birth; an aggravation of the cruel barbarities daily and maliciously practised on British soldiers fallen into the hands of their American enemies.

When England took her position on the dogma of perpetual allegiance, Generals Winchester, Chandler, and Winder, Colonel Lewis and Major Madison were prisoners on parole near Quebec: but not one of the superior officers was seized as a hostage. A dogma originally applied only to vassals, never enforced against lords, in the feudal ages, from whose dark codes it sprang, England on this ferocious revival of it, restricted to men in humble stations. No American above the grade of captain was confined as a hostage under it. At the same time the English government, in concert with those of Russia and Germany, employed General Moreau, taken from America, in the midst of naturalized Frenchmen, Britons, Germans, and men of all other countries by birth, to serve in conjunction with Bernadotte, another elevated exception to the rule, at the head of armies, subsidized by England to compel the naturalized emperor of the French to abdicate his throne. Moreau and Bernadotte, at the outset of their ascent to greatness, when in the ranks, or inferior grades, might have been executed as traitors, according to the English rule, for bearing arms against their native country. But as commanders and princes, the rule ceased to apply to them. The Earl of Cathcart, English ambassador in Russia, Sir Charles Stewart, brother of Lord Castlereagh, were with the allied armies led by Moreau and Bernadotte. Pozzo di Borgo, another fugitive from French service, like Napoleon, a Corsican by birth, was one of the many other eminent personages in English pay against France. Besides Moreau's instance, the war of 1812 furnished yet more immediate practical refutations of at best a harsh and doubtful doctrine, the enforcement of which England undertook to coerce by the gibbet, and Castlereagh upon thousands of his unoffending Irish countrymen. Admiral Cochrane, who succeeded Admiral Warren in command of the British fleets in America married an American; also, Commodore Hardy, who so long

blockaded Decatur at New London. An act of Congress, like the act of Parliament, incorporating foreign seamen who marry in England, would it comprehend those persons if sailors before the mast but not when risen to command? England thought proper to bring impressment in that much aggravated exercise of an extremely questionable principle to the standard of brute force. As such it was met, with no other advantage to her than increased horror of the press-gang and the gibbet, which it was monstrous to erect for the execution of large numbers of unoffending men domesticated throughout the United States, and disposed to live in peace with England, till war commanded their new allegiance. They left Great Britain, most of them Ireland, a part of that kingdom much oppressed. They left it with no treasonable design. Their sole object was the pursuit of happiness elsewhere. Many of them were infants at departure from the home of their nativity, in search of a happier home. Injustice can scarcely be more egregious than that which would put to death as traitors large numbers of such inoffensive and persecuted exiles.

Among other complaints in this country against that during the war of 1812, many were current of the hardships of American captivity in British prisons and prison ships. Such complaints had descended from the Revolution, and there were many survivors in 1812, who had experienced those hardships. Their bitter recollections were revived by the further enormity of the measures of retaliation, to which our government was driven by the English introduction of a new and dreadful grievance. When the intelligence was officially published at Washington, of the seizure of our officers on parole in the neighbourhood of Quebec, and their incarceration in the towers of its impregnable fortifications, the semi-official notice of that extremity published in the *National Intelligencer*, just before the second session of the thirteenth Congress, aptly pronounced it an occasion for trying the temper of the nation. If the intention was to alarm and deter, the very opposite was the effect. It was not in the power of the naturalized population of the United States, even if so disposed, to renounce the belligerent duties of their American allegiance. In those quarters of the country, and particularly in the great cities where the Irish population was numerous, intense feelings of animosity to the mother country broke forth. Retaliation

was proclaimed from the house tops with Irish enthusiasm. The verse of Leviticus was appealed to: breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. In the legislature of Pennsylvania it was unanimously resolved that while deeply anxious that a sanguinary result may be averted and the calamities of war unembittered by wanton bloodshed or cruelty, we are, nevertheless, prepared, under all circumstances, to support our government in every measure of just retaliation to which it may be driven.

The British press, then as mostly, coarsely abusive of this country, particularly the Courier, which was the ministerial paper, put us out of the pale of civilization for what it stigmatized as Madison's chicanery in breaking the bonds of allegiance. Parricides ought to be executed for attempting the life of their mother country, by impudent, monstrous and unnatural principle. Does Madison think we shall submit to it? If he dare to retaliate on the life of one English prisoner, he puts himself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an outlaw. Armies and navies acting against such outlaws, are absolved from all the laws of nations: hostilities may be carried on against them in any mode. We must support public law against a systematic attempt to steal away our countrymen and arm them against us.

Mr. Madison proved himself fully equal to that painful crisis. Calm, meek and forbearing, his serene but tenacious and imperturbable temper was better suited for such an encounter than a more irascible or violent chief-magistrate might have been. Of Proctor's army, whose capture just preceded the outrageous orders at Montreal and seizures at Quebec, several colonels and other superior British officers supplied the president with means which he did not hesitate an instant to use for retaliation. Governor Wright introduced a bill in the House of Representatives, and Mr. George W. Campbell, himself, I believe, Scotch by birth, another in the senate, investing the president with large powers of retaliation. Neither of those bills became a law, however. Independent of executive power, officers of the army and of the navy, the commissary-general of prisoners, commanders of private armed vessels, in short, nearly all invested with authority even in the most disaffected parts of New England, retorted that last extreme of British hostility with such energy, that Great Britain, soon forced to pause, was finally compelled to abandon the

attempt. Sixteen of the crew of the *Chesapeake*, having been confined at Halifax, as soon as it was known, sixteen English sailors were collected from the prison ship at Salem, in Massachusetts, the very focus of disaffection to the war, and put in close confinement in the common jail at Ipswich. In October, 1813, as soon as Great Britain made known her determination, no less than one hundred English soldiers and sailors were ordered to be detained for an equal number understood to have been sent from Halifax to England, for trial as traitors. The relatives and friends of the unfortunate victims of a cruel policy, torn from their American families and children, and threatened with death for having been guilty of no other crime than fleeing from privation and persecution in the pursuit of happiness in a new world, were assured that at least equal numbers of such victims would be set apart to abide whatever might be their fate. The whole power of the American people, and authority of their government were pledged to vouchsafe them at every hazard. The British officers taken at the Thames, were several of them, with 80 men confined at Newport, Kentucky. Perry's prisoners, till then treated with noble generosity, were put in close confinement in a common jail, by the marshal of Ohio. Reaction, palpably politic in any event, was so general and so severe, that imprecations on their own government began to be uttered by numerous British hostages, reduced from comfortable parole to strict confinement. It is distressing to think of what a single execution under this shocking system of retaliation might have produced. Savage war and servile war would have been less revolting.

At length in April, 1814, both governments were enabled to relax their respective measures of retaliation. In consequence of indulgence shown by Sir George Prevost to General Winder, during his captivity in Canada, particularly, permission to return home, the president felt himself called upon to extend like indulgence to British officers similarly situated. About the same time Prevost allowed Colonel Lewis and Major Madison, on their parole, to leave Quebec and return home. In consequence of this, the president, not to be outdone in philanthropy, and disposed to encourage abatements of the shocking system forced upon him by the enemy, gave directions that all British officers held in custody as hostages, should be permitted to go to Canada on parole. Thus retaliation, long terrible and menacing, began

to lose its ferocity, in a way not to irritate either nation, or mortify ours. Voluntary indulgence extended by both governments, sufficiently simultaneous to take from either the appearance of yielding, when in fact ours acted altogether on the defensive, opened a way for relinquishing a resort which it was impossible for England to persevere in without incurring universal odium.

This removal of the gibbet by tacit retirement of both belligerents from its threatened erection, after the American executive had resisted and defied the whole power and apparent determination of Great Britain to enforce by it the execution of a terrible assertion of her rule of allegiance, had much greater effect than relieving large numbers of naturalized American citizens from peril and alarm. It was impossible to execute what was threatened : and the threat only increased the hatred before felt against press-gangs and compulsory belligerent service.

England never has been able to get at one time anywhere out of England, more than thirty thousand British troops embodied : the rest of her armies consists of foreigners. The threat to execute naturalized Americans, involved more lives than she could send British subjects from Europe to execute it ; so that to resist was to frustrate the design. The physical force was against it. Great Britain gave the United States an advantage which could hardly fail to be taken over her when she proclaimed the attempt. But the moral and political consequences of its inevitable failure were much greater than any exhibition of superior physical reaction by this country. The result added another, and perhaps the most effectual of all, to the many lessons continually learned, that Great Britain was not so formidable, inexorable and inflexible as large numbers of Americans believed. It helped to extirpate the colonial reverence which prevailed along the Atlantic seaboard, and chiefly among the elevated and influential classes, amounting to an inveterate prejudice that England never yields. Both individual and national pride and tenacity are strong English characteristics. And deep-rooted American impression of her unyieldingness was a moral force which operated much against this country in both wars with that. American armies, legislatures and communities, contained many native Americans who considered it almost hopeless to contend with Great Britain, on whom her recognition of American independence produced little effect to render them independent of English influence, and

awe. When the contest was reduced to the single issue of impressment, which was the English claim to perpetuity of allegiance marshaled against the American claim to naturalize all foreigners renouncing their native allegiance, and adopting that of the United States, Great Britain shrunk from the exercise of her sovereign right. After solemnly proclaiming and beginning its severest exercise, that result could not but be salutary upon all, and unexpected to the idolaters of her majestic domination. Foolish and pernicious reverence was staggered by such giving up on her part of an asserted principle for which, right or wrong, all the might of Great Britain was enlisted, with all her pride. It was in fact yielding the cause of the contest. Executive anxiety for peace adjusted a treaty at Ghent without any settlement, but simply an adjournment of this question: not, however, till a stream of successes by land and water rendered that adjournment less unwise than it otherwise would have been. In the midst of our discomfitures and the British triumphs in Europe and America, of the year 1813, the virtual surrender by her of the enforcement of perpetual allegiance, was an American victory, silent indeed; and not as much noticed then as it deserved to be, but vital to the controversy by which it practically appeared that the British principle, however plausible in theory, was incapable of enforcement.

The English rule of allegiance, and the American of naturalization, are in irreconcilable collision. Impressment insisted on by them, was insufferable by us; and a surviving grievance after the offensive orders in council were revoked. At the capture of Washington, the British distributed great numbers of a pamphlet printed in London, entitled the right and practice of impressment; forcibly, coarsely, almost brutally written, denying that Madison had for his war, of which impressment was the mere after-thought and pretext, any other motives than hopes of assisting France, and conquering Canada; and discussing the whole subject of allegiance, impressment and naturalization. After reducing the 1558 impressed American seamen, said to be our account, to 47 by theirs, and quoting a report of the 26th February, 1813, by a committee of the legislature of Massachusetts, to show that of 21,000 eastern seamen, only 12 had been impressed by British cruisers, that pamphlet explained the English statutes of 13 Geo. 2, and 20 Geo. 3, naturalizing foreigners after

two or three years' service on board British vessels, by asserting that such naturalization is but permission to enjoy English rights, not protection of foreigners enjoying them against demands of their original sovereigns; calling Madison's view of these statutes foul falsehoods, only fit for an attorney's clerk. The author concludes that the only cause of war between the two countries, was not of America against England for impressment, but of England against America, for having carried on under legal and official forms, a system of fraudulent and malignant hostility against the British means of wealth in peace and defence in war; and that peace could only but readily be made by America's giving up her new-fangled system of public law, and her attempt, in spite of God and nature, to change British traitors and deserters into honest American citizens, acknowledging the right of England to impress her natives everywhere, and ceasing to wage war for the mere abstract principle asserted by Madison. On the other hand, in his annual message at the beginning of the second session of Congress, the president, 7th December, 1813, informed us that while in Canada, natives of the United States were compelled to bear arms against them, some of whom we had taken prisoners, the commander of that province with the sanction of his government, had selected from the American prisoners, and sent to Great Britain for trial as criminals, a number of individuals who had emigrated from the British dominions long prior to the war, and incorporated themselves into our political society, in the modes recognized by the law and practice of Great Britain, and who were made prisoners of war, under the banners of their adopted country, fighting for its rights and safety. Protection of those citizens requiring an effectual interposition in their behalf, a like number of British prisoners of war were put into confinement, with a notification that they would experience whatever violence might be committed on the American prisoners of war. Whereupon, American officers double the number of British soldiers confined here, were ordered into close confinement, with formal notice that they would be put to death, in the event of retaliation by death inflicted here for it there: and that furthermore, the British fleets and armies were ordered in that event, to proceed with destructive severity against our towns and inhabitants. To leave no doubt of our adherence to the retaliating resort imposed on us by the enemy, a correspondent

number of British officers, prisoners of war, were immediately put in close confinement, the president said, to abide the fate of those confined by the enemy, with notice to them of our determination to retaliate any other proceedings contrary to the legitimate modes of warfare.

While the United States were undergoing the English revengeful hostilities of 1813, including those which produced the terrible retaliations, threatened as before mentioned, government was flattered with hopes of relief from an unexpected quarter, by Russian mediation. The deserted and almost useless condition of our foreign relations was noticed in a former chapter. We had hardly a sentinel on posts where there should have been many; and our only one had no sympathies for the war. In all Europe, Mr. John Quincy Adams was the only American foreign minister. American diplomatic advocates should have been stationed in many, if not most of the capitals of Europe, in order to explain and vindicate our cause and counteract the influence of Great Britain, always great, and never so great as then, throughout that continent, actively operating to misrepresent the American war, and render it odious. Such counteraction would have been more effectual than any foreign mediation, or for bringing mediation about, if desirable. The English method of discrediting this country in Europe was to stigmatize the war as made in concert with the French ruler, and to aid him in resisting Great Britain.

It is not the immediate argument of this sketch to enter upon the quarrel in which he became involved then with all Europe—except Denmark. The fact is enough for our present topic that in the course of 1812, after our declaration of war, the immense dictator of France was involved in hostilities, first with Russia, and in 1813 with all the other potentates of Europe, but one. Acknowledged chief magistrate of France by every one of them, he was compelled by a coalition, of which Great Britain was the head, to abdicate the French crown, and driven into confinement in the little island of Elba.

In 1812, by French invasion, the Russian empire was reduced to the mere elements of national existence, and rescued from destruction by the landlords and their slaves. The emperor, almost dethroned, withdrew to his European capital St. Petersburg, while the Asiatic metropolis, Moscow, was sacrificed for Russia.

When the Russian conquerors, next year, overran France, probably the French empire might have been snatched from ruin, as the Russian was, by as great a sacrifice. During these events Mr. Adams was the only American minister in Europe from the time of Mr. Barlow's death in December, 1812, to the arrival of Mr. Crawford at Paris in July, 1813. Mr. Erving's special mission to Denmark had closed. Mr. Russell's at London, ended early in September, 1812. It was not till October, 1812, that Mr. Adams had information of our war, and then only by a letter from Mr. Russell, dated at London in September, acquainting him that the English ministry rejected Russell's proposal for peace after war was declared. Not till December, 1812, did Mr. Adams get a duplicate of his dispatches from Washington, dated the 1st July, 1812, to apprise him of the war declared nearly six months before; his first official communication of that event. Meantime the French invasion of Russia had been driven back to Poland, where Mr. Barlow was invited by the Duke of Bassano to meet the French emperor at Wilna, on his way to which place he died at Czarnovitch, the 26th December.

Jefferson, perceiving, what few Americans did, the importance to the United States of both political amity and commercial intercourse with the great Asiatic empire which Russia had established in Europe, soon after the accession of the Emperor Alexander, resolved on cultivating his good will. The Emperor Alexander was, independently of his high position, one of the most remarkable men of his age; well-educated, well-informed, liberal, generous, and regarded this country with such kindness, that on the most despotic throne of the Old World, he freely expressed his admiration of the republican institutions of the New. Jefferson sent Levett Harris as American consul to St. Petersburg, through whom a correspondence ensued between the Russian emperor and the American president, which began the good relations that have subsisted without interruption between the most absolute and the most popular of sovereignties. One of the last acts of Jefferson's administration was to nominate an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia, whom the Senate rejected. Soon after Madison succeeded to the presidency he appointed, with the Senate's concurrence, Mr. John Quincy Adams to that station. The first Russian envoy to

this country was Count Theodore Pahlen, one of the sons of the Count Pahlen who superintended the cruel assassination of the Emperor Paul, by which Alexander acquired the throne. From that event Russia ceased to be a French connection, as Paul's admiration of Bonaparte had rendered her, to become sometimes English, sometimes neutral, never, even when the Emperor Alexander was forced to submit to Napoleon's continental system, a cordial ally in the restriction of Russian commerce by the exclusion of English, which was distressing to the Russian empire. One of Napoleon's warmest admirers and personal friends, Alexander was never reconciled to his system of conquest by destroying commerce. The invasion of his dominions in 1812, was retaliated, in 1813, by that of France. And when there was reason to believe that the coalition of which Russia and Great Britain were the principal members, would triumph over the French, the Russian emperor proffered his mediation to put a stop to hostilities between the United States and Great Britain, which interrupted American commerce with Russia. Count Pahlen had then left this country, appointed minister to Brazil, and was succeeded here by Mr. Andrew Daschkoff. Mr. Poletica, who followed Daschkoff as Russian minister in the United States, was a member of Count Pahlen's mission here.

Mr. Adams' instructions from his own government, accompanying information of the war, were that in resorting to it against Great Britain, it was the desire and hope of the United States that it might be confined to her only. With France, our affairs in many important circumstances, are still unsettled; nor is there any certainty that a satisfactory settlement of them will be obtained. Should it, however, be the case, it is not probable that it will produce any closer connection between the United States and that power. It is not anticipated that any event whatever will have that effect.

Such was the text of Mr. Adams' instructions received by him at a moment when the fortunes of Napoleon underwent their first great check in Russia. Thanksgivings for Russian successes, at which the American minister in St. Petersburg assisted, were in harmony with instructions which gave him to understand that the United States would, under no circumstances, connect their war with that of France. These instructions Mr. Adams greatly extended, if he did not transcend them in his offi-

cial intercourse with the Russian government, preliminary to the mediation it offered, and he cultivated, to put a stop to the war.

On the 20th September, 1813, the Russian minister, Romanzoff, informed Mr. Adams that having made peace and established relations of amity and commerce with Great Britain, the emperor was much concerned and disappointed to find the whole benefit which he expected his subjects would derive commercially from that event, defeated and lost by the new war between the United States and Great Britain. He therefore suggested the Russian mediation in terms of great good will, which Mr. Adams met and answered with corresponding cordiality. In the course of his conversation with the Russian minister, the American envoy went so far as to say that he knew his government engaged in the war with reluctance; that it would be *highly injurious both to the United States and to England; that he could see no good result as likely to arise from it to any one.* At the time of this confession, the Russian government had, through Lord Cathcart, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, informed the English ministry of the proposed mediation, which that ministry forthwith refused. In December, 1813, before which time Romanzoff had shown Mr. Adams the letter to Daschkoff directing him to proffer the mediation at Washington, the American minister gave the Russian assurances, not stronger, perhaps, than the desire of the American government, that in no event would the United States connect themselves with France. Repeating substantially the plain terms to that effect of Monroe's before-mentioned letter of the 1st July, 1812, Mr. Adams, on the 11th December, 1813, told Romanzoff that the disposition of the American government to avoid that of France was expressed in terms as clear and strong as language could afford. Romanzoff answering that it was the emperor's fixed determination to maintain friendly and commercial relations with the United States, as far as depended on him, in their fullest extent, asked Mr. Adams if he had any objection to Romanzoff's communicating to the British government itself that part of Adams' information to Romanzoff which related to France. Mr. Adams replied, that on the contrary, as the British government had in the course of our discussion with them frequently intimated the belief that the American government was partial to France, and even actuated by French influence, he supposed that a

knowledge of this frank and explicit statement, with a due consideration of the time and occasion on which it was made, must have a tendency to remove the prejudice of the British cabinet, and produce on their part a disposition more inclining to conciliation. Accordingly Romanzoff wrote to Lieven, the Russian ambassador at London, instructing him to make known to Castlereagh all that had been said by the American minister of the *settled* determination of his government respecting France. That communication Mr. Adams undertook to authorize on his own responsibility, without directions from his own government, but probably with their entire concurrence, as he fully made it known to them, and they were far from disapproving it. In December, 1813, Romanzoff informed Mr. Adams that the British government, without accepting or rejecting the proffered Russian mediation, had answered the Russian ambassador Lieven's, suggestion of it, that it would probably not be acceptable in America, where, however, it was seized with as much avidity as it was unhesitatingly rejected by England. As Count Romanzoff afterwards made known to Mr. Adams, Count Lieven's answer from London was, that the English ministry, in terms of much politeness, declined submitting to any mediation differences of a nature which involved the internal government of the British nation.

On the 8th of March, 1813, Mr. Daschkoff, the minister at Washington, proffered the Russian mediation in the kindest manner, declaring that his master took pleasure in doing justice to the wisdom of the government of the United States of America, and was convinced that it had done all that it could to prevent the rupture. On the 11th of March, 1813, the Russian mediation was formally accepted. Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Bayard, were appointed commissioners under it. The merchant ship Neptune, commanded by Captain Jones, brother of the Secretary of the Navy, was engaged to convey Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard, to join Mr. Adams at St. Petersburg, and a Russian Secretary Schwertscoff, left Norfolk under a flag of truce on the 21st of March, 1813, for the British admiral's ship in the Chesapeake, for a safe conduct to protect the Neptune on her voyage. Soon after Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard repaired to Philadelphia to embark, with instructions which they united in declaring were so conciliatory that they could not fail, either to

produce peace, or to unite the whole United States in support of the war.

No such end was accomplished: On the contrary, this attempt at peace by mediation, like all the other schemes for reaching the end of war, but by its vigorous operations, though it was proper to embrace it, came to nothing. Mr. Gallatin, whose aversion to the war never abated, was so confident of peace by Russian mediation, that he desired to be one of the commission to go abroad for it. He scouted the idea as absurd of England's refusing it: and with the strength of error which characterizes mistakes of superior men, insisted on the certainty of prompt pacification. Mr. Adams, whose long residence in Europe affected him with that distrust of American institutions, which sometimes is part of American patriotism, was so solicitous of propitiating England, that as an American minister he made known to Lord Castlereagh his opinion, that no good could result from the war to any one. Mr. Bayard, as a senator, voted against it. The war had not one official American advocate in Europe, except Crawford, who did not get there until Napoleon's downfall. Its only patron there was his conqueror, the Emperor Alexander, and in the insolence of intoxicating triumphs, Great Britain rejected his mediation. There were some who disapproved importuning peace by foreign mediation. I denounced it in my first speech in the House of Representatives, which it may be proper to allude to, lest this narrative should appear biased by improper views of the subject. Madison's administration, by all its attempts at conciliating the enemy, and the party countenancing the enemy, gained no strength, won no way toward peace. Victory would have done more in 1813 than all collateral resorts. Even by escaping all connection with France, that it might parry the loud and incessant blows of English influence, reverberated in the United States, sounding the falsehood of subserviency to the despotic and tottering ruler of the French—even that contagion was less dangerous than refraining from waging war, which it was impossible to do with adequate effect, while peace was solicited by derogatory resorts. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Adams were not its most successful negotiators, but Brown and his companions in Canada; Jackson and his in Louisiana, and their naval associates everywhere. That trial of American government proved that free institutions are strong enough, if well ad-

ministered, to vindicate a nation by war. In 1812 and 1813 the despotic government of Russia was more convulsed by hostilities than the republican government of the United States, and the government of France was demolished by war, while that of the United States was much more dismayed than endangered by it.

At Philadelphia the American envoys on their way to Russia found General Moreau also going there, but clandestinely, having secretly transferred his services to the Emperor Alexander, that he might wreak his long-cherished vengeance on the Emperor Napoleon. Moreau, who had then passed several years in Philadelphia, New York, and Morrisville, a village near Trenton, where he resided in a house before inhabited by Robert Morris, was a stout, square, sociable man, with fine eyes, but nothing in personal intercourse to remind one of the hero of Hohenlinden. Like Napoleon in being very talkative, he had no resemblance to him in the varied intelligence and fascination* of his converse. Shooting, fishing, smoking, drinking, pastimes without mental employment, occupied Moreau's time; and in conversation he was, as in all other intellectual attractions, far inferior to Mr. Gallatin. He constantly spoke of Napoleon as a coward, and of his new nobility as men spat by a tyrant. Influenced, perhaps, by his wife, who was accomplished in the elegancies of physical education, and sighed for European opportunities to display them, actuated by hatred of his conqueror, the second general on the long roll of superior military men produced by the French Revolution, was led to put himself at the head of foreign armies, with another more fortunate French commander, Bernadotte, and left this country for Europe about the time that Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard did. On the 21st June, 1813, the day they entered the sound at the entrance of the Baltic, Moreau sailed from New York in charge of Schwinin, a subordinate of the Russian legation, arrived at Gottenburg the 24th July, fell mortally wounded by a cannon ball at the side of the Emperor Alexander, the 26th of August, at the battle of Dresden, and expired the 2d September, with all the solace that he could receive from enemies of his country.

Mr. Adams' assurances, through Count Romanzoff and Lord Cathcart, to Count Lieven and Lord Castlereagh, of the American government's settled determination to have no connection with

that of France, and its anxiety for conciliation with England, were followed up by Mr. Gallatin in a letter to Mr. Alexander Baring, since Lord Ashburton, whose commercial house were bankers of the American government in Europe, in which Mr. Gallatin strove to bring his mission to Castlereagh's good will through Mr. Baring, who, having married in this country, was well disposed to it. But Castlereagh, then triumphing in Wellington's successes in Spain, and Napoleon's change of fortune in Germany, was bent on conquering France and punishing America for co-operating with her. A hard, bold, reckless statesman, Castlereagh inherited Pitt's hatred of France. Pitt sunk into a premature grave without enjoying, like Castlereagh, the power of victories begun by Nelson and completed by Wellington, whose final march on the French capital where he twice dictated peace, is said, by a British historian, to have been more the work, at least the hardy conception of the inferior statesman than the victorious soldier. Great Britain had never been so great as when, with Castlereagh as prime minister of a sensual prince regent, who could seldom be prevailed upon to attend even to the indispensable routine duties of government, which disturbed the luxurious trifling of his mature age, representing a father incapacitated by insanity, the affairs of that vast empire were everywhere prosperous throughout Europe, Asia, and America. George the Fourth's first act, as regent, was to discard all the associations of his prior life, and throw himself into the arms of those who were no friends of America. Eldon, Vansittart, Buckinghamshire, Rose, Palmerston, Grant, Melville, Sidmouth, Castlereagh and Richmond were a ministry of a school in which liberal sentiments were never taught, or American rights tolerated. The present prime minister, Peel, as Irish secretary, then on the first step of the ladder of which he has ably reached the top, was the only one who could at that time conceive the reforms which American example has since wrought in England. The United States were despised for pusillanimous submission, and feeble resistance even when war was declared. They were detested for French subserviency. Their appeal to Russian protection was at once an acknowledgment of weakness, and resort to a dangerous intervention. Great Britain felt no inducement to forbear the infliction due to the United States, who deserved the punishment which Castlereagh meditated at the same time for

America and France. Impressment was a domestic right, which was not a fit subject for foreign mediation. And if it were, Russia was not a safe umpire. Such were the sentiments of the English ministry when Mr. Adams and Mr. Gallatin by vain propitiation, attempted to solicit peace through Russian patronage.

It is unimportant whether Lord Palmerston, then Secretary of War, actually wrote, or Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State for foreign affairs, and prime minister, only dictated the subjoined paragraph from the ministerial paper, the *London Courier*: it proclaimed the national sentiment and ministerial resolution, to make no terms with this country till crushed to submission.

We hope, said the *Courier*, the Russian mediation will be refused. Indeed we are sure it will. We have a love for our naval pre-eminence that cannot bear to have it even touched by a foreign hand. Russia can be hardly supposed to be adverse to the principle of the armed neutrality, and that idea alone would be sufficient to make us decline the offer. We must take our stand—*never to commit our naval rights to the mediation of any power*. This is the flag we must nail to the national mast, and go down rather than strike it. The hour of concession and of compromise is past. Peace must be the consequence of *punishment to America*; and retraction of her insolent demands must precede negotiation. The thunder of our cannon must first strike terror into the American shores, and Great Britain must be seen and felt in all the majesty of her might, from Boston to Savannah, from the lakes of Canada to the mouths of the Mississippi.

In another London paper it was said, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard are certainly going to Russia, to open a negotiation for peace under her mediation. On this point there cannot, we apprehend, be any doubt. Commit our naval rights to the mediation of a foreign power? We hope and believe no British minister would entertain such an intention for a moment.

Accordingly, the English answer to our humble suggestion of the Russian mediation was cold and disdainful denial. On the first of September, 1813, Lord Cathcart, the English ambassador to Russia, then with the allied armies at Toplitz, answered the Russian Secretary, Count Nesselrode's prior verbal communication on this subject, that the Prince Regent had not found himself in a situation to accept the mediation of his imperial majesty, to whose beneficent wishes, nevertheless, of seeing the war

closed, the Regent desired to give effect. With this view, having learned that the American envoys had arrived in Russia, notwithstanding that the Regent found himself under the necessity of not accepting the mediation of any friendly power, in the question forming the principal object in dispute, he was ready to nominate plenipotentiaries to treat directly with those of America. If, through the good offices of his imperial majesty, this proposition should be accepted, the Prince Regent would prefer that the conferences should be held at London, on account of the facilities it would give to the discussion. If this choice should meet with insuperable obstacles, his royal highness preferred Gottenburg as the place nearest to England.

While impressment by sea and perpetual allegiance everywhere were the English conditions, the ministry repelled Russian or any mediation, and, though willing to listen to the American prayer for peace, required that it should be submitted at the British metropolis, or some other place as near as possible to England.

On the 4th of November, 1813, Lord Castlereagh communicated to Mr. Monroe, for the president's information, the answer which Lord Cathcart was directed to present to the Russian government, as soon as the Prince Regent was informed that American plenipotentiaries had been nominated to negotiate peace under the mediation of Russia. Lord Cathcart, from the imperial head-quarters, had informed Lord Castlereagh that the American commissioners had no objection to negotiate at London, and were desirous, as the British government had declared itself, that this business should not be mixed with the affairs of the continent : but that the powers of the American commissioners were limited to negotiate under the mediation of Russia. Under these circumstances Lord Cathcart's note was transmitted to the president, that, if disposed, he might enter upon a direct negotiation for peace. But, added Castlereagh, the terms must not be inconsistent with the established maxims of public law, and the maritime rights of the British empire. Early in January, 1814, Monroe answered Castlereagh's letter, regretting the English rejection of Russian mediation, especially as the president was called upon to take another course before he had heard from Messrs. Gallatin, Adams and Bayard. It was a delicate step to recede from mediation kindly offered and accepted. Neverthe-

less, the president acceded to the English proposition, and would take the measures depending on him for carrying it into effect at Gottenburg, it being presumed that his majesty the King of Sweden, as the friend of both parties, would readily acquiesce in the choice of a place within his dominions, for their pacific negotiations.

The great successes of the allied arms, including Sweden, whose forces were led to battle by the elected crown prince of that kingdom, Bernadotte, had just then taken place. At the battles of Dresden and Hulm in August, Peterwalde, Dolnitz and Richoffswerde, in September, and Wachan and Hanau in October, the flickering light of Napoleon's star was obviously going out. For all these victories by English stipendiaries, one of our commissioners to treat for peace, had attended solemn thanksgivings celebrated in the splendid Greek churches of St. Petersburg. The popular effects of these prodigious reverses were deeply felt and loudly told throughout the United States. They occasioned in England a delirium of joy, and were hailed with acclamations by a large party in this country. Communicating to Congress the 7th of January, 1813, the correspondence concerning the Russian mediation, the president said, that in appreciating the accepted proposal of Great Britain, Congress must not fail to keep in mind that vigorous preparations for carrying on the war, could in no respect impede the progress to a favourable result, whilst a relaxation of such preparations, should the wishes of the United States for a speedy restoration of the blessings of peace be disappointed, would necessarily have the most injurious consequences.

For the present we leave Russia in Europe and the Emperor Alexander's ineffectual mediation. His rebuke of Mr. Gallatin's importunity for peace will appear in another year, when the American envoys followed that monarch to London. All that need be added here is, that in his official communication to our government in 1813, he had the generous resolution to make his minister declare before England and the world, that he took pleasure in doing justice to the wisdom of the United States, and was convinced that they had done all they could to prevent the rupture, which he wished to heal. He neither intimated nor perceived French influence in it.

The balance of power in Europe, and pragmatic disposition

of all the great states of that continent, especially England and France, have for ages kept alive controversies for national influence, which prevail as much in peace as war. English and French parties continually struggle for ascendancy in Russia, Turkey, Germany, Spain, and other sovereignties which ought to be self-sustained and independent. Those conflicting influences reached America; and in the war of 1812, furnished means by which England operated with more effect than by arms.

European influence in America must needs be great. It is the most difficult consummation of American freedom to rise above it, and consider all foreign nations alike, as admonished by the declaration of independence. The war of 1812 was, for this accomplishment, of inestimable importance. It may surprise those of the present day, who have come to years of discretion since then, to learn that the most effective of all the moral and political influences operating against that war was the prejudice which England studiously, yet naturally and easily inculcated, that it was made by an American government under French influence. So much is this recrimination of that period faded away, that at present it is not easy to conceive how flagrant it was then. The party opposed to the war laid hold of what were called the Russian victories, as a lever to wield with great power, against Madison's administration and the war's supporters. All along the Atlantic seaboard, from Boston to Baltimore, the triumphs of the allies of England were celebrated by public festivals and other demonstrations of exultation, at the approaching overthrow of the French tyrant. That party contrivance in Boston, where such things originated, was carried to extremes at once ludicrous and humiliating. Eustaphie, the Russian consul there, became a shrine for faction to kneel before, and a personage more important than Daschkoff, the emperor's representative at Washington, who properly discountenanced interference on occasions unbecoming, he said, for Russian participation in America. Eustaphie composed a farce called the *March to Paris*, in which troops of Cossacks figured on the Boston stage, to crowded audiences of the New England ladies and gentlemen, exulting with that insignificant foreigner in what was hailed as the defeat of America.

At a public entertainment given to Eustaphie, to celebrate the Russian victories, one of the most conspicuous gentlemen

of Massachusetts, her frequent and eloquent representative in both Houses of Congress, Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, son of the venerable Secretary of the Senate of the United States, delivered a speech which indicated the derogatory spirit then prevalent among those who, step by step, in unjustifiable opposition, were brought eventually to the last degradation of such extremes in the Hartford Convention, of which that gentleman was a leading member, and one of the three disconcerted commissioners to Congress, put to shame and confusion by victorious peace. In Mr. Otis' Russian speech, he did not hesitate to say of the nation his country was at war against, "One nation remained true to herself, and competent to sustain her liberties, but not competent or disposed to force upon others (meaning this) the benefits of *protection* and freedom, the value of which they were too *stupid* to distinguish, or too proud and jealous to accept. But suddenly the Almighty fiat, which first illumined creation, was repeated: God said, Let there be light, and there was light. A light of glorious effulgence burst from the northern vaults of Heaven. The skies of Russia sparkled with their peculiar splendours, and exhibited to the astonished world its enemy prostrate and in ruin. The basis of the disastrous policy which is big with ruin for our country, is undermined, and we are rescued from our greatest danger. The rage of the passions which have produced the present war will now be suddenly assuaged: they are deprived of their chief aliment. With probably great sufferings yet to endure, bitter experience has a chance to make us wise before it makes us slaves."

Party conflict so far resembles other war that success is mostly decisive of its character and that of the combatants. There is fortune of faction as well as of war. It will probably be the effect of the party excesses of the war of 1812 to deter similar attempts in future collisions; for statesmen, like generals, who failed in great contests, lost at least all national consideration. Mr. Otis, Governor Strong and Mr. Quincy were prominent citizens of New England, who might have contributed much to preserve the national influence they helped to destroy. In most respects less provincial than many others, Mr. Otis became a martyr to the effort to distinguish in war between a country and its government. The option is free to all. But they choose at their peril. Speech, the press, state legislation were perfectly

free throughout the United States in the war of 1812. But those who carried that freedom to licentiousness and derogatory disaffection, suffered punishment, not corporeal, yet severe. Leaving them, if otherwise respectable, their provincial and local notability, it extinguished them as men of the American nation.

It was unwholesome public sentiment in the United States to rejoice in the overthrow of the French empire, even with a military dictator or despot at its head. Still the democratic principle of popular sovereignty was cast down, great measures with a great man, however spoiled by fortune and arbitrary in action. The armies of Russia and Germany, in English pay, superintended by the English ambassador in Russia, Cathcart and Lord Castlereagh's brother, Sir Charles Stewart, attending those armies, to see that their English stipends were earned by war against the French, were armies of enemies to the American republican principle, and their triumphs were our discomfitures. Such was the sentiment of the great, right-minded body of the American nation concerning the celebration in the United States of Russian victories, which were not confined to New England, but extended along the seaboard, and one of the most offensive of those festivals took place at Georgetown, in the District of Columbia.

Instead of Russian victories, the war party celebrated those of their own country, particularly those by sea, which were open to persons of all parties, and should have been gratifying more especially to the maritime and commercial population.

When Parliament assembled on the 2d February, 1813, Lord Castlereagh presented the Prince Regent's proclamation or manifesto of its causes as explained to the world by Great Britain, in the document published for that purpose the 9th January of that year. That war could not be avoided without the sacrifice of England's maritime rights, or injurious submission to France, this document pronounced a truth which the American government would not deny. Arguing at large the questions at issue between France and England, as if the United States were a party belligerent or colonial to them, it pronounced partiality to France to be as observable in American negotiations as in their measures of alleged resistance. Contingent revocation of the French decrees was accepted by the president as absolute, and

England required to repeal the orders in council unconditionally. Audaciously denying employment of the Indians, this document boldly declared that the real origin of the contest was that spirit long unhappily actuating the councils of the United States; their marked partiality in palliating and assisting the aggressive tyranny of France; their systematic endeavour to inflame the people against the defensive means of Great Britain; their ungenerous conduct towards Spain, the intimate ally of Great Britain, and their unworthy desertion of the cause of other neutral nations. Through the prevalence of such councils America had been associated in policy with France, and committed in war against Great Britain. This disposition of the government of the United States, this complete subserviency to the ruler of France, are evident in almost every page of the official correspondence of the American with the French government. Whilst contending against France in defence not only of the liberties of Great Britain, but of the world, the Prince Regent was entitled to look for a different result. From their common origin, from their common interests, from their professed principles of freedom and independence, the United States were the last power in which Great Britain could have expected to find a willing instrument and abettor of French tyranny.

These totally false and absurd imputations of French influence in America, were not only natural, but politic in England. They were the inveterate prejudice of a nation, for many centuries mostly at war, always at variance with France. But applied to the United States, they were egregiously false as to their government, and applicable only to the partial, well nigh subdued sympathies of portions of the American people, taught to be grateful for French aid in their revolutionary struggle with Great Britain, and inclined to rejoice in French emancipation from absolute government, by a revolution that followed their own. While to no great extent or depth, this was the American feeling, the influence of England in the United States was paramount, universal and profound. It required not only the war of 1812, but its English inhumanities and American successes to eradicate a colonial reverence, which infatuated large parts of the most influential classes of the country, and as was shown in the first chapter of this historical sketch, inflamed the clergy, the bar, the merchants, with the constituted authorities of whole states in New England,

to deplorable English subserviency. Falsely imputing to France a pervading influence which England alone exercised, she might have preserved it for ever, but for the repeated hostilities to which that country has driven this. Unintermitted enmity of the English press, and literature, commercial and territorial controversy, have kept up perpetual ill-will between them. At the same time, the course of events has been such as to alienate the governments of France and the United States, which, with strong political and commercial inducements for more extensive intercourse, have seldom, if ever, been in harmony. It is the fate of England and the United States to communicate mostly through commercial intercourse. There are in England large and powerful classes, the aristocracy in all its branches, noble and gentle, the great landed interest, the clergy, army and navy, constituting with the populace a great majority of Great Britain, with whom Americans have scarcely any communication. We deal almost exclusively with English merchants, manufacturers and government. In like exclusion from American public sentiment and power, the English government confines its agency to the American sea ports, and a political metropolis. With the great landed interest, the planters and farmers of the United States, who control the American government, England has no relation or knowledge. Foster, the English minister's house at Washington, was the resort of those representing the commerce of the seaboard; less educated or independent than the elevated classes of the rural population; more colonial, more obsequious to, more intimate with England, and less acquainted with the rest of the world. To a great degree the intimate relations between Great Britain and the United States are those of two nations of rival shop-keepers, their petty interests and paltry quarrels.

Next to foreign rule, the most disastrous yoke of nations is foreign influence; by which fetters this country, so recently independent, suffered more than most others; English, French and Spanish regulation. Natural sympathies and colonial veneration for Great Britain, shocked by the revolution, were combated by the alliance offensive and defensive with France, without which independence was scarcely feasible, and by French revolution following American, with Frenchmen like La Fayette in ours, and Americans like Franklin and Jefferson in theirs. But French political sympathies contended in vain with natural En-

lish affections. Serurier, the French minister at Washington, when war was declared, was an isolated stranger, while Foster, the English minister, was at home there, surrounded by friends of his country. The act of Congress in April, 1812, admitting Louisiana, preliminary to the war, as one of the United States, put an end to French authority in America. Jefferson, accused of being under French influence, with the prescience of genius, and instinct of Americanism, united with Bonaparte, reviled as the demon who bewitched the United States to extinguish that influence forever on this continent. Jefferson, after several years residence at the capital of France, which is in many respects the metropolis of Europe, returned indeed with sympathies for the revolution which he witnessed there, in its glorious outbreak, and preferences for French social enjoyments and convivial refinements, which nearly all prefer, who have opportunities to compare them with those of other countries, not excepting the English, who are but imitators in these attractions of the French and Italians. But in attachment to liberty, Jefferson and his disciples constantly followed and exceeded, in love of equality they transcended English leaders. No American more strenuously than he as Secretary of State, repelled the licentious follies of the first French revolutionary minister to the United States, Genet, more openly or constantly denounced the ambition of Napoleon, by the brilliancy of whose splendid career Jefferson was never dazzled, or reconciled to its arbitrary sway. Jefferson's infirmities were, excessive dread of Napoleon and of war, as Napoleon's error was, contempt for an Anglo-American republic, whose capacity of resistance by sea to England he never understood. In all these sentiments, Madison, more reserved, was not less fixed than Jefferson. When a weak and ignorant minister of England to the United States, Foster, in his place as member of Parliament, stupidly vouched the impeachment of American government for subserviency to that of the ruler of France, which was the burthen of English manifestoes, proclaimed by the cabinet and press of England, echoed in New England, and reverberated throughout the seaboard of the United States, there was not a member of any branch of our government, executive, legislative, or judicial, in the slightest degree guilty of the charge. It was an English prejudice, propagated by English influence, by numbers of intelligent and respectable Americans, imbued with horror at a French influence which had no existence.

Of Spanish influence or sympathy there was never any. But Spanish vicinage and subserviency to British influence were an annoyance before the war of 1812, which, during it, became insufferable. The campaign of 1813 disclosed and that of 1814 fully manifested, that Spanish North American territories, north of Mexico, were footholds for English interference, dangerous to Spain, and a nuisance which the United States must either abate or remove by purchase, as was afterwards done by the treaty of Florida.

The war of 1812 achieved not entirely the extinction, but a great reduction of British influence in this country; of which, till then, it benumbed the efforts and retarded the progress. Hostilities of the English press and impost, incessant enmity and abuse, the territorial encroachments and maritime interference of Great Britain, since that war, in spite of vast commercial relations and seaport affinities, have continually still further enfeebled, by counteraction, British influence in the United States, which may soon be left with all their pristine American love of English liberty, and much greater equality, emancipated from detrimental obsequiousness.

While this portion of a sketch of the second war of kindred nations is closing, European intervention, inconceivable by either European or American when war between England and France involved this distant and pacific country in their hostilities, intervention, then inconceivable, has thrust its intrigues and transactions into North America. In strange, unexampled, incredible, and portentous concord the two great belligerents of Europe, who for many centuries disturbed the world by their quarrels and conquests, have united, by monstrous alliance, to limit the boundaries, destroy the rights of their former American establishments, and circumscribe the territories of the United States. Speaking with authority, the prime minister of France has proclaimed a balance of power to be imposed upon North America by the same potentates, who inflicted that calamitous domination upon Portugal and Turkey, and other subordinate states of Europe. Should that intimation of French insolence be attempted, the war of 1812 will have prepared the United States for a still more serious conflict, in which both French and English influence will find this country a world by itself to expel the curse of European intermeddling by unanimous repulsion.

On the 18th February, 1813, Castlereagh made his speech in support of a motion for vigorous prosecution of the war against America. Denying that there were 15,000 impressed American seamen among the 145,000 seamen in the British navy, he confessed that there were 1700; and would his majesty's government irritate a foreign power for that inconsiderable number? He commented on the manifesto of the 9th January and enforced its allegation of French influence in American government. His motion was for an humble address to be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, to acquaint his royal highness that we have taken into our consideration the papers laid before us by his royal highness' command, relative to the late discussions with the government of the United States of America: that whilst we deeply regret the failure of the endeavours of his royal highness to preserve the relations of peace and amity between this country and the United States, we entirely approve of the resistance which had been opposed by his royal highness, to the unjustifiable pretensions of the American government, being satisfied that those pretensions could not be admitted without surrendering some of the most ancient, undoubted and important rights of the British empire; and impressed as we are with these sentiments, and fully convinced of the justice of the war in which his majesty has been compelled to engage, his royal highness may rely on our most zealous and cordial support, in every measure which may be necessary for prosecuting the war with vigour, and for bringing it to a safe and honourable termination.

Mr. Alexander Baring denied Lord Castlereagh's assertion that the American declaration of war had connection with the state of France or Russia, and appealed to Mr. Foster, the late ambassador in that country, then sitting in the House, whether earlier repeal of the orders in council would not have prevented the war. Mr. Foster betrayed, by his answer, his total ignorance of the country it was his mission to comprehend. Repeal of the orders in council would not have prevented war. The government of the United States was not sufficiently master of the Congress to be able to do what it thought most beneficial for the country. Mr. Foster could not agree with Mr. Baring that there was no party in America friendly to France. The revolution had made a strong impression there. And although

the subsequent turn of events might have detached the better part from them, they were yet a powerful party. There was also an anti-Anglican party, who took every opportunity to foment animosity against Great Britain. There were no fewer than six united Irishmen in Congress, distinguished by their inveterate hostility to England. The war was carried in Congress by that rancorous faction against the English, who persuaded others to join them through fear that a difference might break up the democratic party: and in the Senate the war measure was carried by the opponents of government, who were desirous of making it unpopular.

By such misconception of this country was English prejudice confirmed by a weak envoy misled by American disaffection. The anti-Anglican party Foster denounced to Parliament was that of Jefferson, Madison, Macon, Clay, Gerry, Lowndes—in a word, the agricultural republican party was the faction of United Irishmen, into whom silly Englishmen converted all Americans not English in their inclinations. War was the result of that blind misconception. When declared, its successes would not have been deferred but for the prevalence of English prejudice in too many parts of the United States. It is not to disprove the alleged existence of French influence, but to show this English error, as part of the history of that day, that American adoption of an English calumny must be dwelt upon. Mr. Baring was the only member of Parliament to gainsay it. In the House of Lords Earl Bathurst repeated Lord Castlereagh's movement, where it passed without opposition. In the Commons Ponsonby and Whitbread, Whig leaders, but faintly denied what Croker and Canning strongly reiterated. Canning particularly, in a long and eloquent speech, frequently greeted with cheers, renewed this American disparagement: the topic on which he principally bestowed his eloquence being invective against the American government, for having taken the time when Great Britain was deeply engaged in the glorious struggle for the emancipation of Europe from tyranny, to impede her exertions and league America with the oppressor.

These were sentiments and prejudices natural and venial, however mistaken, in Englishmen. It was American misfortune and disgrace that to so great an extent they prevailed in the United States; in New England, especially, where they were the common

political and too much of the religious belief. Governor Strong's message on the 26th May, 1813, to the legislature of Massachusetts, brought all the causes of war into review, arguing each one of them in favour of Great Britain. "Although," said this message, "in proportion to her maritime means of annoyance, we had suffered much greater losses from France than England, has not our language to France been mild and conciliatory, while to England we have indulged in offensive reproaches and undeserved asperity? Are we encouraged by the moral qualities of the French government to take part in its wars? Should we cultivate the friendship of France because she can do us more injury than England, or because her manners, religion, or policy is more congenial to ours? In our embarrassed and alarming situation, it is indeed a very favourable circumstance, that the people have so very generally expressed their aversion to a French alliance. Such an alliance would be the greatest calamity, and must produce the most fatal effects. In claims liable to the least doubt, the claims even of an enemy should be impartially examined. If we discover that our opinions or measures have been erroneous, we have the strongest motives, both from interest and duty, to relinquish them."

To this message from the governor a committee of both Houses of the legislature of Massachusetts, on the 15th June, 1813, responded that it was not to be expected that a moral and Christian people should contribute their aid in the prosecution of an offensive war, without the fullest evidence of its justice and necessity. They could not but recollect whatever the pretences of the Emperor of France may have been, pretences which have uniformly preceded and accompanied the most violent acts of injustice, that he was the sole authority of a system calculated and intended to break down neutral commerce, with a view to destroy the opulence and cripple the power of a rival. We are persuaded the United States, by a firm and dignified yet pacific resistance to the French decrees, might have prevented the recurrence of any retaliatory measures not intended to injure us; and we do not hesitate to say that France merited, from our government, a much higher tone of remonstrance and a more decided opposition. After once more retouching the whole subject of the French decrees and British orders, this remonstrance denounced the war as improper, impolitic, and unjust.

While the oppressed nations of Europe are making a magnanimous and glorious effort against the common enemy of free states, we alone, the descendants of the pilgrims, sworn foes to civil and religious slavery, co-operate with the oppressor to bind other nations in his chains, and divert the forces of one of his enemies from the mighty conflict. Were not the territories of the United States sufficiently extensive before the annexation of Louisiana, the projected reduction of Canada, and seizure of West Florida? Already have we witnessed the admission of a state, beyond the territorial limits of the United States, peopled by inhabitants whose habits, language, religion and laws are repugnant to the genius of our government, in violation of the rights and interests of some of the parties to our national compact. The hardy people of the north stood in no need of the aid of the south to protect them in their liberties. If the war into which we have been rashly plunged was undertaken to appease the resentment or secure the favour of France, deep and humiliating must be our disappointment. For, although the emperor is lavish in his professions, yet no reparation has been made or offered for the many outrages, indignities and insults he has inflicted on our government, nor for the unnumbered millions of which he has plundered our citizens. When we consider the mysterious policy which has veiled the correspondence of the two governments from our view, and that in many instances the most important measures of our government have been anticipated at Paris long before they were known to the American people, we cannot conceal our anxiety and alarm for our preservation from all connection with the common enemy of civil liberty.

In the before-mentioned speech of Mr. Otis at the public entertainment held to rejoice in the Russian victories, the same strain of unworthy imputation against the American government was indulged. We have nearly been victims, said that gentleman, to the delirium by which the fairest portion of the globe has been reduced to chains and tears. The history of our government for several years has exhibited a coincidence in the measures and a conformity to the plans of Napoleon too plain to be mistaken. It will not be very easy to specify any measure calculated to promote his views, which, according to our means and circumstances, we have not

adopted. We have sacrificed our resources by embracing his continental system, and exchanged a state of unprecedented prosperity for that of voluntary and ruinous war. It is of secondary consequence now to ascertain whether our unhappy condition has arisen from obedience to his suggestions, fear of his power, sympathy in his policy, hatred of his rival, or a mere respect for his example. The tendency to a close connection in the event of his success was irresistible, and in such a connection it is but too probable that our domestic peace and national union would have met their fate.

By false and preposterous imputations English influence inculcated many of the most intelligent people of New England, with absurd apprehensions of French influence. On the day that the legislative answer to the governor's message was adopted, 15th of June, 1813, Mr. Quincy's resolution was also adopted against rejoicing for naval victories. Without treason by armed insurrection, schemes of disunion and coercion against Madison's administration were rife. Without secret correspondence or understanding, the influence of England was as strong in Boston and some other parts of New England, as it was in Scotland, stronger than it was in Ireland, so far as hostile feeling to France, and everything but hostile opposition to Madison's administration as connected with France. There was at least sympathetic alliance, offensive and defensive, between England and parts of New England. At the same time illegal commercial intercourse with Halifax and other adjacent British places, was as incessant as cupidity combined with disaffection could render it. That was an offence of long standing. When restrictive commercial measures were attempted by Jefferson to prevent war, they pressed severely on Eastern commerce and were evaded and resisted systematically, and almost universally. Mr. Otis and other eminent lawyers openly proclaimed the right of juries to defeat the efforts of government to enforce that system: so that when war at last followed it, the inhabitants of New England had been trained to insubordination, which was easily carried to treasonable intercourse with the enemy, when war succeeded embargo. During all that time, as the maritime injustice of France was as extensive as the limited means of that empire, resistance to the French ruler, and Madison his American pre-

fect, was a cry naturally raised in London, and repeated in Boston.

Opposition under British influence adopted every English sentiment. When the Russian mediation was made public, its existence was denied. It was said to be a contrivance of Madison to form an open alliance with Bonaparte. Mr. Bayard, one of their own party, apprised of the nature of his errand, was commissioned to make peace: yet the violent opponents of war or of peace on any but England's own terms, declared that both he and Mr. Gallatin were to wait on Napoleon at Prague, and receive his orders. They were mere emissaries of that falling despot, whom the Emperor of Russia had never invited to Europe, and would never receive. At the same time that English journals published the refusal of Great Britain to submit her rights to any foreign mediation, American newspapers declared that the whole contrivance of the Russian mediation was a trick to prolong the existence of Madison's power, which was falling with that of the ruler of France. In vain was it obvious that the Russian mediation was accepted by Madison, without any communication with France. The successes of the coalition in Europe, and disasters of our Canadian warfare, had so excited both Englishmen and Americans who were their instruments, that both deprecated even peace, unless the United States should be chastised for their connection with Bonaparte. Those who identified their country with its government, set no bounds to opposition to both, save only not actually taking up arms against either. Twenty years of bloody and bitter, till then alarming, all at once amazingly triumphant warfare with France, had not implanted in English bosoms more implacable animosity to that country, than their influence imparted to this, in the counting houses, the bar, the press and the pulpits of New England, denouncing French influence.

Imbued with these narrow and violent sectional prejudices, Mr. Webster went from New Hampshire to take his seat in Congress: too wary, if not too wise to proclaim, but charged to represent them at the seat of government; one of the many well-informed and not ill-disposed Americans, whose education, impressions and ideas were exclusively English; who knew no other language, learning, commerce, law or power but those of Great Britain; and under that overweening influence deprecated and

denounced as unnatural, and an American subserviency to French influence, the independent patriotism which Franklin, Jefferson, and Washington inculcated. Mr. Webster left home to signalize his first appearance in Congress, by exposure of the French influence which regulated Madison's administration and caused the war. A few days after he took his seat, on the day when Eppes reported the tax bills, the 10th of June, 1813, Mr. Webster moved five resolutions, accusing our government of collusion with that of France, in certain fraudulent or negligent conduct of the latter as to its alleged revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, which was said to have produced our declaration of war. It would be useless, if practicable now, to review for any satisfactory explanation, the controversy between England and France, on this the great question of that day.— Granting that the French government was uncandid and even deceptive, which was the English averment, ours was uniformly and fastidiously shy of all connection with it; more so than became the interest of the United States. Madison distrusted Napoleon as much as Mr. Otis or Mr. Webster could. The second term of Jefferson's presidency had been a period of continual quarrel with the Emperor of the French, from the time that France and England, in 1805, began their vexations of American commerce. General Armstrong at Paris, had boldly and to the emperor offensively, presented Jefferson's strong complaints. When Madison succeeded to Jefferson's annoyances and sentiments in that respect, and Joel Barlow to Armstrong, as American minister in France, there was no cessation of diplomatic hostilities, if not an aggravation of them. And unless Madison could be made responsible for Napoleon's ignorance of or double dealing with America, nothing but English prejudice against him could implicate us in it. In Massachusetts, vituperation of Madison, as Napoleon's tool, was easy: for the preponderance of public prejudice was such, that any loose or unfounded accusation was acceptable there. But in the House of Representatives at Washington, it was necessary to confront a majority that knew better, and an executive fortified with the truth. Mr. Webster's resolutions, therefore, like that gentleman's public acts and speeches, were unexceptionably guarded in assertion. The short speech with which he prefaced them, was decorous and abstemious; no assertion was ventured by either the speech or the

resolutions of what at Boston and Portsmouth might be said without hesitation. Even discussion was waived: all he wanted was inquiry. In a short and inoffensive preface he merely said that no repeal of the French decree appeared till after our declaration of war: if issued before, it had laid dormant, mere *brutum fulmen*. The whole matter was involved in doubt; and he moved his resolves to shed light on the transaction, in the discharge of what he deemed a duty to his constituents and to the country. Mr. Grosvenor called for the yeas and nays on the question of consideration, which were 122 to 28, most of the war party voting for them, with all its opponents. Mr. Bibb, not objecting to them, moved to lay them on the table, which was done.

On the 16th June, the resolutions, at Mr. Webster's instance, were debated, and for several days after, by Mr. Grosvenor, Mr. Oakley, Mr. Hanson, Mr. Sheffey, Mr. Shipherd, Mr. Gaston, and Mr. Morris Miller, who attacked the administration, which was defended by Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Fisk, (of New York,) Mr. Sharp, Mr. Yancey, Mr. Farrow, and Mr. Bibb. The debate was, as usual on such occasions, elaborate and acrimonious. Mr. Grosvenor particularly, spoke harshly of the executive; Mr. Oakley and Mr. Gaston, with ability and force; Mr. Hanson with fierce invective. Mr. Sharp, who was afterwards assassinated in the Beauchamp murders of Kentucky, was an eloquent young man and a ready debater; Mr. Calhoun, then chairman of the committee of foreign affairs, argued with a rapid and masterly dialectic seldom surpassed.

He and Mr. Oakley I believe, are the only survivors who took part in that conflict, the most impressive suggestion of which now is the vain and transient nature of such party dissensions. The question of French influence in the United States, which then agitated the country, is hardly credible to this generation as a chief controversy with that. On the 21st June, Mr. Bibb said that, while time had not been lost in that discussion, yet, as it interfered with the tax bills then ready, he should move to go into committee upon them next day, which Mr. Calhoun also urged as much more important than Mr. Webster's resolutions. After Mr. Bolling Robertson, afterwards Governor of Louisiana, had therefore assigned at large his reasons for voting for, while he disapproved them, the questions on each were taken, and they

were adopted by large majorities ; all of their, with most of our party voting for them, ayes about 130 to 25 or 30 nays. Being referred to the committee on foreign affairs, (of which I was a member,) next day the chairman, Mr. Calhoun, reported that after examining the message and documents with all the attention their importance demanded, they furnished strong additional proof of the justice and necessity of the war, and powerful motives for the steady and vigorous prosecution of it, as the surest means of a safe and honourable peace. It can now no longer be doubted, that it was the pressure of our measures, combined with the determination of Congress to redress our wrongs by arms, and not the repeal of the French decrees, that broke down the orders in council, that dangerous system of monopoly, by which we were, as to our commerce, in fact re-colonized. As to the conduct of the executive, the language of the resolutions, and the motives avowed by their supporters, leave no alternative but to express sentiments of approbation or censure by the House ; and upon a full investigation of that conduct in relation to Great Britain and France, as disclosed in the message and documents, the committee were of opinion that a just course had been pursued towards both nations, and in no instance had the dignity, interests or honour of the United States been compromised ; wherefore they recommended the adoption of a resolution, that the conduct of the executive, in relation to the various subjects referred to it, in the resolutions of the 21st June, 1813, meets with the approbation of the House. That report was referred to a committee of the whole, and made the order for the following Thursday. Mr. Webster and John Rhea were appointed the committee, to present the resolutions to the president, then, as formerly mentioned, confined by illness ; still desirous of this occasion to vindicate himself from the aspersion of these resolutions. On the 12th July, Mr. Monroe's answer was brought to the House, of which 5000 copies were ordered to be printed. On the 20th July, Mr. Calhoun, desirous of still further discussion, moved that the House go into committee of the whole to take up the subject ; but his motion failed by a majority, mostly adherents of the administration, of 74 to 62. The subject had been fully discussed. Mr. Monroe's answer was conclusive. Mr. Webster had gone away on leave of absence. The business of the session, taxation, had already

been, for several days, interrupted by debate on these resolutions. Their mover and his friends had enjoyed every opportunity, of which Mr. Webster had not availed himself, to substantiate them. Numerous printed speeches and the secretary's report exhausted the topic.

No greater favour can be done an impeached party than to provoke him to full opportunity of vindication. This favour Mr. Webster did Mr. Madison. All the machinery and all the talents of government, convincing speeches and official reports, the calm and persuasive argument of Monroe, who had great experience and excellent ability for it, the wisdom of Madison, with the advice of his counselors, anonymous but cogent views evolved, semi-officially, through the National Intelligencer, were all put in requisition, combining a power of reaction on Mr. Webster's resolves, which silenced that kind of attack. Their author did not attempt to maintain it on the floor of the House of Representatives; but got leave of absence and went home; struck with the difference between bold, uncontradicted assertion of French influence at Boston, and its still bolder and complete refutation at Washington. Whatever might be said of the war, French influence was not one of its causes.

In December, 1813, at the next session of Congress, Alexander Hanson, editor of the Federal Republican, one of the most violent newspapers against Madison, renewed Mr. Webster's attempt in a different form, but in effect the same charge of subserviency to France, which Mr. Hanson repeated with much invective on the floor of the House of Representatives, by resolutions concerning a letter of Turreau, the French minister in this country in 1809. Turreau, one of the French republican generals, a coarse soldier, who represented the French empire in the United States for several years, had sent to Robert Smith, when Secretary of State, an offensive letter, which the French minister was required to withdraw. The letter, insulting enough certainly, proved by a tenour of complaints, anything but harmony between France and our government, which for five years preceding 1809, Turreau complained, had so conducted itself towards that of France as not to merit the advantages of a liberal commercial convention. The American government has been drawing near England who outrages its rights, and injuring France, who favours them. It persists in considering the two belligerents as doing equal injustice to

American rights. There is a general disposition to attribute wrongs to France in order to soften those of England. Part of Turreau's long catalogue of grievances, by this absurd letter, was complaint of American submission without resistance to impressment, by which the English navy was replenished with sailors, it said, to act against France; it charged, too, the naturalization laws of the United States with seducing French mariners to leave their country for this. Among numerous instances of alleged wrongs to France, the French minister presented freedom of the American press and speech as intolerably insulting: that, said this indecent burlesque of diplomatic expostulation, which your insufferable free press and your irresponsible public speakers proclaim, not only of the emperor, at whose instance this remonstrance is not made, but of all France, whose rights I represent and must vindicate. This French rhapsody accused Jefferson's administration of placing obstacles in the way of reconciliation between France and America. It was throughout as remarkable a proof as Madison could desire of his more than freedom from French influence. Madison's administration, tintured with British, kept far from French influence, which, from this letter of the minister of Napoleon, it was palpable had never had the slightest existence, while that of England prevailed notwithstanding war.

Within a few months of the discussion provoked by Mr. Webster's resolutions, Lord Castlereagh, who caused them, (not by direct or criminal communication, but by overpowering English influence in America,) was a conqueror in the French capital, with all its archives in his grasp, where he found as little proof of American collusion with the dethroned emperor, or of any other French subserviency, as Mr. Webster himself discovered, when afterwards, as Secretary of State, the files of that department at Washington were in his hands, to ascertain that first mistake of his young statesmanship.

Monroe's report, after fully exhibiting the case, on the revocation of the French decrees and British orders, averred that the declaration of war against England had no effect on the relations of the United States with France. War was declared without any concert or communication with the French government; produced no connection or understanding with it. The ostensible relations were the true and only ones between the two countries.

American claims for French spoliations were pursued with energy.

No English policy or American servility was more profound or noxious than their falsehood adopted here, that the United States made war on England, by connivance with France. English and American authoritative publications abounded with that falsehood. Brock's proclamation against Hull, the first state paper of the conflict, intimated that it had been agreed between the United States and the French emperor, that Canada should be ceded to him when conquered by us. That prejudice was a bond of alliance offensive and defensive between large numbers of Americans and the English government, which deprived the American government of all amicable understanding with a nation with which, in a former war, the United States sought an alliance offensive and defensive. Brock's proclamation avowed and justified English alliance with the Indians, while it reprobated American alliance with France. And such was British influence, that numerous and respectable Americans implicitly believed in the right of England to unite with the savages, while they utterly denied ours to unite with the French. At a convention of delegates from thirty-four counties of New York, held at the capitol, in Albany, on the 17th and 18th of September, 1812, of which Jacob Morris was president, and William Henderson, secretary, it was resolved,

That we contemplate with abhorrence, even the probability of an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life has demonstrated that the attainment, by any means, of universal empire, and the consequent extinction of every vestige of freedom, are the sole objects of his incessant, unbounded and remorseless ambition. His arms, with the spirit of freemen, we might openly and fearlessly encounter; but of his secret arts, his corrupting influence, we entertain a dread we can neither conquer nor conceal. It is, therefore, with the utmost distrust and alarm that we regard his late professions of attachment and love to the American people, fully recollecting that his invariable course has been by perfidious offers of protection, by deceitful professions of friendship, to lull his intended victims into the fatal sleep of confidence and security, during which the chains of despotism are silently wound round and riveted on them.

We must distinguish between American sympathy for French

freedom, offspring of American, and French influence in America. When Burgoyne's capture at Saratoga, in 1777, enabled Franklin to procure the first and best, the model of all American treaties, at Versailles in 1778, when Jefferson, after contributing by his wisdom to the liberal beginning of the French Revolution, as La Fayette, and many other Frenchmen reinforced by their arms the consummation of the American Revolution, which might never have ended as it did without their reinforcement, it would have been unnatural if sympathy for French emancipation had not pervaded the United States. It was thought indispensable even in England to subdue that sympathy there by the war, which for twenty years made head against it. Nearly every eminent man in the United States was the open advocate of the French republic. Long after the worst excesses of the Parisian mobs and misrule, after the king and queen, with thousands of noble victims had fallen by the guillotine, sympathy for France was an American sentiment. Washington and Alexander Hamilton, were still proud of their titles as honorary French citizens. After the proclamation of neutrality in 1793, by which the onerous terms of the treaty of Versailles were infringed by so just a man as Washington, after the first French revolutionary minister to this country, Genet, had disgusted Jefferson by his intolerable excesses in 1792, after Jay's treaty of 1794 had divided parties on French and English influence and attachments, when Pickering, as Secretary of State, on the first of January, 1796, presented the new French minister Adet to President Washington, his cordial and enthusiastic welcome by that sedate and circumspect magistrate, indicated the still strong regard universally cherished for France.

Born, sir, said Washington, in a land of liberty; having early learned its value; having engaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; having, in a word, devoted the best years of my life to secure its permanent establishment in my own country; my anxious recollections, my sympathetic feelings, and my best wishes are irresistibly attracted, whensoever, in any country, I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom. But above all, the events of the French Revolution have produced the deepest solicitude, as well as the highest admiration. To call your nation brave, were to pronounce but common praise.— Wonderful people! ages to come will read with astonishment the

history of your brilliant exploits. I rejoice that the period of your toils and of your immense sacrifices is approaching. I rejoice that the interesting revolutionary movements of so many years have issued in the formation of a constitution, designed to give permanency to the great object for which you have contended. I rejoice that liberty, you have so long embraced with enthusiasm, liberty, of which you have been the invincible defenders, now finds an asylum in the bosom of a regularly organized government; a government, which being formed to secure the happiness of the French people, corresponds with the ardent wishes of my heart, while it gratifies the pride of every citizen of the United States, by its resemblance to their own. On these glorious events, sir, accept my sincere congratulations.

In delivering to you these sentiments, I express not my own feelings only, but those of my fellow-citizens in relation to the commencement, the progress, and the issue of the French Revolution: and they will certainly join with me in purest wishes to the Supreme Being, that the citizens of our sister Republic, our magnanimous allies, may soon enjoy in peace that liberty which they have purchased at so great a price, and all the happiness that liberty can bestow.

I receive, sir, with lively sensibility, the symbol of the triumphs, and of the enfranchisements of your nation, the colours of France, which you have now presented to the United States. The transaction will be announced to Congress, and the colours will be deposited with the archives of the United States, which are at once the evidence and the memorials of their freedom and independence. May these be perpetual; and may the friendship of the two republics be commensurate with their existence.

Such official communion bespoke the national emotion which the harmonious transactions of the American and French Revolutions could not but excite. But great and rapid reaction took place in this country, by which English influence, superadded to the madness of French misconduct towards the United States, at last extinguished nearly every feeling of amity in the hostilities prosecuted in 1798 and 1799, till terminated by the treaty of the 30th September, 1800, one of the first acts of Bonaparte's advent to power, negotiated by his brother Joseph, with the American envoys Ellsworth, Davie and Murray. By that treaty cardinal principles were revived, as first settled with Franklin,

at Versailles, in 1778: free ships free goods, with other foundations of international peace and maritime freedom. Soon after by Robert Livingston and Monroe's treaty with Bonaparte, the United States acquired from him, with Louisiana, the cotton, the sugar, the lead, the great staples of American prosperity and union. But the monstrous belligerent struggle between France and England provoked controversies with both, which prevented all approximation to France, while they could not subdue the attachments which bound this country to England. British influence transpired from every American pore, and easily propagated antipathy to the dictator who stifled liberty in France. Dread of Bonaparte became a general and intense American feeling. His government was treated as an usurpation, while England was regarded as a natural ally, whose *protection* was needed by this country, as the last refuge of freedom, the bulwark of religion, the only hope of mankind. After Merry, the English minister in the United States, with Lord Cornwallis, by the treaty of Amiens, recognized Napoleon as in effect the monarch of France, antipathy to him was as prevalent and more pronounced in America than in La Vendée. Clergy, bar, merchants, governors, legislatures, judiciary were, in 1813, fast approaching to open resistance to the war against England, lest it should involve alliance with France. Militia were withheld and debauched. The national administration was villified as what they were called in England, præfects of Bonaparte. County meetings were held in Massachusetts, resolving that the payment of taxes to support the war should be stopped. British influence begot the cry of French influence propagated from New England south and west wherever that indefatigable portion of the American people could carry their prejudice. When Benedict Arnold deserted the American army, he did not want the cunning to declare that he left Washington and Greene because they were under French influence. With much less reason was that aspersion repeated by the peace party in 1812 and 1813. Men of education, good repute, rich, devout, and popular, virulent with rabid disaffection to the war and Madison's administration, rallied to Russian and to English alliance, denouncing French influence which had no existence.

Nor was it in New England alone that English influence disarmed the war of great efficacy. The error of Madison's administration was to be deterred by British influence in America

from such understanding with France as might have been as important in 1812 as French alliance was in 1782. Madison shrunk from what the Congress of the Revolution courted, when Franklin went to Paris to supplicate aid from France. While English allies in America were savages, with all their barbarities, and slaves to be armed in dreadful revolt, American government did not dare solicit the co-operation of the French whose fleets might have rendered the same services at New York and Halifax, in 1812, which those of the King of France rendered at New York and Yorktown in 1782. Such was the servitude of mind, the habitual control of England over the United States, till her own hostilities broke the charm in repeated wars, and forced her offspring to superadd moral to physical independence. Madison's administration dared not ask the Emperor of the French, so effectually was he decried by England, to send a squadron of ships to scour the coasts of America. Three thousand French seamen in three line-of-battle ships, in June or July, 1812, would have found the American coasts, from Halifax to Bermuda, without any English naval force to resist such a squadron. It was easy to strike an early blow by the French marine, of which it is impossible to estimate the consequences. There was no necessity for the much deprecated alliance with France, or with the more dreaded ruler of the French. All that need be done was for the American minister in France to impress upon him the palpable advantage of sending a small squadron to sweep the western Atlantic from the Bay of Fundy to the Gulf of Mexico. The English marine, the English commerce, possibly some of the English stations and islands in America, were at the command of such an adventure. As soon as superior British fleets pursued the French, the refuge and protection of American ports were at their service. If Mr. Barlow, by Madison's instructions, instead of importuning Napoleon for treaties of indemnity for spoliation, had done as his successor, Mr. Crawford did for Louis the Eighteenth, postponed such demands till a more convenient moment, and impressed the French government with the vital importance to their marine of striking the fatal blow at that of England, which the coasts of America then invited, the consequences might have been decisive of the wars waging both in Europe and America. British influence, operating through party opposition on the American admi-

nistration, forbade the attempt or suggestion of it. Castlereagh's false manifesto, Foster's absurd calumny in Parliament, Canning's invective, repeated in America, propagated the English prejudice of French influence as effectually in parts of this country as in Great Britain. The American government was deterred from arrangements which, without alliance with France, would have been as politic, and might have been as decisive in 1812 as in 1782. The ravings of the pulpit, the threats of the press, the maudlin eloquence of factious festivals, which should have been defied, and might have been despised, alarmed Madison's administration from instructing Barlow to intimate anything like what the Congress of the Revolution sent Franklin to beg. Franklin entreated alliance, offensive and defensive, for ever. Barlow was ordered to avoid all connection, which Mr. Adams assured Castlereagh was the settled policy of the United States, made known in terms as strong as language would bear. Yet without entangling alliance, arrangements advantageous to both nations were feasible. When it was believed that Mr. Barlow had negotiated a favourable treaty, English influence broke forth in America, in the apprehension, disseminated by the press, of secret articles in the treaty, by which ten sail of the line and some frigates were to be put at the president's disposal. And, his adherents were anxious to deny and disprove the calumny! During the hostilities with France in 1799, British ports gave refuge to American ships of war, American merchant ships took British convoy, the war was common cause between the United States and Great Britain against the French Republic. Plate was gladly accepted by the captain of an American frigate for capturing a French frigate when voted by merchants and underwriters in London. In the war against England, French assistance was repudiated with horror.

The mistake of that crisis was not confined to British influence on American councils. The bright intelligence guiding the councils of France, overlooked that sure occasion of striking a great blow at English naval supremacy. If the French emperor had not been entirely absorbed by preparations for transferring his immense warfare from Spain to Russia, surrounded as he was by excellent sea officers, it was impossible for him and them not to perceive that the many experienced mariners of France, Holland and Italy, all united under the French empire, had before

them in America a theatre for reviving that naval power which Great Britain had crippled, but by no means destroyed. France had, in 1812, large fleets, well manned and provided, ready for sea, in many sea-ports: some of them not closely blockaded by the English. It was practicable for sufficient squadrons to have made good their way to America. The emperor had never been inattentive to a marine, which, though unequal to that of Great Britain, was, with those of Holland and Italy, then still formidable. But on the 13th of February, 1813, an order to the minister of marine, Decrés, directed him to withdraw 12,000 men from the French ships in port, ready for sea, and march them as soldiers to German battles, thus leaving the marine without the faculty of sea service, which even then might have been injurious to England, useful to France, and important to the United States. The insular power which combined all Europe, except Denmark, for the dethronement of the ruler of France, compelled him to strip his navy for the final struggle, and deprived the United States of the co-operation which, if the French navy had been employed, as it might have been, might have waged our war, and perhaps ended that of Europe otherwise than it did next year. The errors of Napoleon's vast genius in the invasions of Spain and Russia, were perhaps not more fatal than his failing to see the importance of the steamboat, when proffered by Fulton, and the exposure of England when war was declared by America.

An uncommon nobleman, Talleyrand—rarely do men of noble birth and luxurious indulgence display the constant activity, address and success which marked his long life of extraordinary eminence, seldom long out of favour with any of the many antagonist governments he served—had passed some time as an emigrant in the United States, where he formed impressions unfavourable to American republicanism, and was disgusted at the simplicity of manners (certainly much out of harmony with his loose morals and voluptuous habits) and free institutions, of which he was an innate enemy. It has been supposed that he prejudiced his imperial master, the first consul and emperor, against this country. For it is hard to reconcile Napoleon's unquestionable superiority of capacity to perceive whatever would benefit France, with his blindness to the opportunity which the American declaration of war presented for a French blow at the

English navy, that might have atoned for French naval defeats at the Nile and Trafalgar. From the government, the public journals or the people of the United States, Napoleon received neither information nor encouragement. But if his usual watchfulness had not forsaken him, he might have learned, from the English newspapers, that not long before he withdrew twelve thousand sailors from their ships to be marched to Germany, the debate on Lord Darnley's motion in the House of Lords, proved that in July, 1812, there were but one English line of battle ship, and five frigates, on the American station.

The negotiations between the United States and France were watched with unworthy suspicions of French influence and American collusion. Our complaints were urged with querulous importunity, and listened to by the imperial master of most of Europe without umbrage, and answered with good will. But Barlow's letter of the 28th October, 1812, that "if there was any intention of coupling commercial arrangements with other views not then brought forward, and if they extended beyond the simplicity of commercial interests and the indemnities we claim, I shall be at no loss how to answer them," was hailed by most of the war party as their voice, while denounced and discredited by the other party as the double dealing to be suspected in all intercourse between our agents and those of the hateful enemy of all mankind. Napoleon was under the ban of British malediction; his alliance was dreaded; his overtures would have been rejected; his good will was not desired.

Monroe's instructions to Barlow, on the eve of his departure for France, dated 26th July, 1811, after enjoining demand for a full explanation of the much-contested allegation of repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, complained of French annoyance as contrary to the usages of commerce between friendly nations; the injustice of France insisting on American vessels bringing back return cargoes of French produce; of the system of licenses; of the injury done to American commerce by French influence exerted against it in Spain, Holland and Naples; of the atrocity of burning our vessels at sea; and directed Barlow to demand indemnities.

In another letter of the 21st November, 1811, transmitting the president's message to Congress, the Secretary of State repeated and enforced these instructions with still more positive injunc-

tions. Among the measures to support the attitude taken by the United States, it is more than probable that a law will pass, said Monroe, enabling all merchants to arm their vessels in self-defence.

Mr. Barlow sailed in the frigate *Constitution*, Captain Hull, and landed at Cherbourg, the 8th September, 1811. His reception was flattering. The emperor was disposed, as his minister, the Duke of Bassano, assured Mr. Barlow, to do everything he could reasonably ask, to maintain a good understanding between the two countries. The American envoy explained all his views to the French minister, which had no allusion to any other than commercial indemnities and maritime peace. Mr. Barlow's views of commerce were new to Napoleon's inquisitive mind, engrossed with other subjects. Since the death of that much abused personage, and the decline of prejudices which dethroned and destroyed him, American history may venture to expose the weakness which rejected assistance from France, lest it should endanger the United States. Long after his demise, the American claims on France were adjusted for a sum (five millions), which, if expended in French armaments on the American coast in 1812, might have saved the United States a much larger one. But the American government, accused by England of French subserviency, did not dare to confront British influence by such an aid from France, which, even if proffered, would have been refused.

In January, 1812, Mr. Barlow sent home, by the frigate *Constitution*, assurances of a treaty of reciprocal commerce, of which he was so confident that he kept the sloop of war *Hornet*, to take it. Discussion of Russian and other European affairs delayed the negotiation, in the French capital, of our complaints to the great French commander in the midst of his vast preparations for the prodigious campaign of Russia. On the 13th October, 1812, the Duke of Bassano invited Mr. Barlow to Wilna to conclude, without further delay, arrangements desirable and conformable to the amicable views of both governments. Accepting that invitation, by letter, from Paris, the 28th of the same month, Mr. Barlow assured his government of his confidence that the proposition was with a view of expediting the business. There might, indeed, he added, be an intention of coupling it with other views not yet brought forward. If so, and they extend to objects be-

yond the simplicity of commercial interest and the indemnities we claim, I shall not be at a loss how to answer them, were Barlow's last assurance to a government fearful of Napoleon. The negotiation, then far advanced at Paris between him and the Duke of Dalberg, Mr. Barlow had no doubt would be soon ripened into a treaty of commerce and convention of indemnity. On the way to Wilna, the 26th December, 1812, Joel Barlow died at Czarnovitch, in Poland, of an attack of fever, which, in the winter of that severe climate, carried him off at the age of fifty-four.

Left, by Barlow's death, without a minister in France, American interests there were almost unrepresented till the arrival of his successor, William H. Crawford, in July, 1813. In announcing the death of the one and the appointment of the other by his message to Congress, at the opening of the special session in May, 1813, the president's significant language complained that the French government, after the death of our minister there, had taken no measures for bringing the depending negotiations to a conclusion through their representative in the United States, which failure added to delays before so unreasonably spun out. The course the new minister will pursue was prescribed by a steady regard to the true interests of the United States, "which equally avoids an abandonment of their just demands, and a connection of their fortunes with the systems of other powers." Nothing could be plainer than such language to France, England and America. If alliance with France had been asked by the French minister, it would have met with peremptory rejection. No arrangement or understanding for consentaneous, without combined, action at sea against the common enemy of France and the United States, was suggested. Mr. Barlow's negotiations were exclusively commercial: claims for indemnities for past wrongs and stipulations for future security. If he had lived, or Napoleon had not abdicated, in all probability Franklin's treaty of 1778 would have been substantially renewed, without connecting American fortunes with those of France.

Joel Barlow was that uncommon American of early time, a Connecticut democrat, distinguished by his literary publications, having written several tracts, particularly one upon the privileged orders, which made considerable sensation in Europe. A warm adherent of the French Revolution, he resided many years in

Paris, and was admitted, as several other eminent Americans were, among them Washington and Hamilton, to the honours of French nominal citizenship. Returning to this country, with a fortune acquired in France, he expended a liberal part of it in the typographical decorations of his national poem, the Columbiad, an American performance, less read than it merits. At his residence, Kalorama, near the city of Washington, he was employed collecting materials for a history of the United States, when President Madison appointed him minister to France.

Mr. Crawford sailed on his mission, as Barlow's successor, in the *Argus*, brig of war, Captain Allen, from New York, the 18th of May, 1813: arriving in France, when the government there was transferred from the capital, to distant places in Germany, attending the great conflicts in arms and by negotiations throughout that year, till Napoleon's first abdication in April, 1814. Mr. Crawford assumed the responsibility of not pressing American claims under such circumstances; and like Mr. Barlow, he had no instructions for other purposes, but was to avoid alliance. He was a man of large stature, six feet four inches tall, and stout in proportion; not graceful or elegant, but of kind and prepossessing manners; of uncommon decision and great rectitude. Mr. Macon's laconic character of him was, that he was a man who could say no; not an easy task for statesmen. Even that superb model of absolute kings, who considered himself the state, Louis the Fourteenth, answered suitors by the gentle circumlocution, *nous verrons*, we will see about it. Like many American statesmen, Crawford had kept a school for subsistence; and like too many, had killed his antagonist in a duel, a resort more fatal than in other countries, either from less perfect civilization, or greater recklessness of life. Mr. Crawford was the last nominee by Congressional caucus, a new word for a novel contrivance, to provide for one of the most difficult American substitutions of the elective principle, for that of divine right in the choice of a chief magistrate. With Mr. Crawford's nomination, the Congressional caucus expired; under those blows of party opposition, which will always be bestowed upon whatever is proposed by one party, to get the better of another; and has been succeeded by another less responsible contrivance. He had served with general approbation in the Senate of the United States, and as Secretary of War, and as Secretary of the Treasury, under diffi-

cult circumstances in Monroe's administration. Disappointed of election to the presidency, for which he had many excellent friends, but no extensive popularity, and retiring to Georgia, he was elected by the legislature, the judge of a circuit court, according to that peculiarity of American republicanism, which, allowing little pay and no pension for civil service, reduces unsuccessful competitors for high place to the stinted support of inferior situations.

The gentleman who succeeded General Turreau in the French mission at Washington, is still living, a type of the vicissitudes of his government during the present century. Mr. Serurier is a nephew of the French marshal of that name who served with distinction under Bonaparte in his Italian campaigns, and was afterwards appointed by him governor of the Hospital of Invalids, in which the remains of the emperor transported by the son of the present king of the French, from the Island of St. Helena, have been latterly deposited with great pomp. In 1814, at the capture of Paris by the allied armies, Marshal Serurier collected the 14,000 stands of colours taken from the enemies of France and displayed in that institution, committed them to the flames, and threw the ashes into the river Seine. His nephew, Mr. Serurier came to this country not long before the war of 1812, married here in 1813, and was in 1814, upon the downfall of Napoleon, the only French foreign minister not displaced. On Napoleon's short-lived restoration, during the hundred days in 1815, Mr. Serurier sent in a cordial but unfortunate adhesion to his old master. The letter was received by the minister of Louis the Eighteenth, once more reseated upon the French throne. Doomed by that mischance to disgrace and poverty, Mr. Serurier returned to his country, where he remained during fifteen years in retirement. One of the first acts of the Revolution of 1830, which chose Louis Philippe for King of the French, was to reinstate Mr. Serurier in his American mission, from which, after some years, he was transferred to another in Europe and finally to that anomalous aristocracy, the French Chamber of Peers, and a title without fortune. His son, born in Philadelphia when the parents were there in distress, is now a viscount, and Secretary of the French Legation in the United States.

On the 20th July, 1813, the president sent, by Mr. Graham, a special message to Congress, recommending an embargo. There was reason to believe, he said, that the enemy intended to com-

bine with the blockade of our ports, special licenses to neutral vessels or British vessels in neutral disguises, to extract such exports as he wanted, while our commerce remained obstructed. The enemy had invidiously discriminated between different ports of the United States; by all which means the pressure of war on us would be increased and diminished on the enemy. The House of Representatives went into secret session, with closed doors, upon that message, which was referred to the committee on foreign relations. It was a favourite plan with the executive, still clinging to other than the ordinary enforcement of war, and much annoyed by the continual and treasonable trade carried on from New England to the British neighbouring possessions, especially Halifax, where it was not uncommon for large quantities of American flour to arrive at a time when it was not plenty and the price high in the United States. Seventeen thousand barrels of flour were landed at Halifax in one day. The day after the message was committed to the committee on foreign relations, the chairman, Mr. Calhoun, reported against the measure. But that report was reversed by the House still in secret session, and the subject committed to a select committee, instructed to report the bill as proposed. Mr. Speaker Clay constructed the select committee, exclusively of friends of the measure and of the administration, with Felix Grundy as chairman. On the 22d July, 1813, he reported an embargo bill, which, after a sharp contest, was immediately put through all the stages of enactment, and finally passed by a majority of thirty; a party vote, excepting Messrs. Lowndes, Cheves, and Calhoun, who constantly voted against all such schemes. The Senate promptly rejected the bill as it went from the House. With this defeat of one of the president's plans, the session closed soon after, on the 2d August, 1813. As soon after the beginning of the next session as the 9th December, 1813, the president repeated his recommendation of an embargo. Again the House of Representatives closed their doors, and after many fruitless efforts by Mr. Pitkin, Mr. Oakley, Mr. Stockton, Mr. Grosvenor, Mr. Post and Mr. Hanson, to defeat or alter the bill, it passed the House once more on the 11th December, and then passed the Senate. That embargo, however, lasted only till the following April, when it was repealed. It had not the desired effect. Those who would break the law of war by

treasonable commerce and intercourse with the enemy, were not to be deterred by so much less stringent an interdict as an embargo.

Yet, with all the disadvantages and reverses of the first eighteen months of war, no branch of government doing all it should to carry it on, the mere majority of a divided people, armed with the faculties, attributes and illusion of government, withstood all assaults, foreign and intestine, and maintained the contest till more experience brought better fortune. One-third of the most intelligent people of the United States, with more than half the active and convertible funds, were opposed to the war. But factious and party opposition to government was much more sound than substance. There is potency in lawful authority, when sustained by the mass, however denounced and thwarted by the most intelligent opponents. Clamour appeals in vain against the action of the less educated or wealthy mass directed by government, and vindicating a country. If the war of 1812 had begun with the successes it ended with, the party opposed to it would have been annihilated during the war. Defeats and mismanagement endangered and embarrassed the administration, which its enemies would never have been able to check with victories to rally to. Procrastination of belligerent severities, postponement of burthens on the people, looking to a third power to mediate peace, shrinking from enlisting the co-operation of France, all abstinence of every kind from strenuous war, did but aggravate hostilities until hostile pressure forced from the nation exertions, which government at last seconded.

CONCLUSION.

WE have now reached the end of the first eighteen months of the war, and passed the lowest point of its mismanagement and disasters. Henceforth it culminates; and its history will be more agreeable both to the writer and the reader. The transactions sketched in the volume closed here, with the year 1813, both political and military, demonstrate that war is not the only or the greatest national evil, but that, as all extremes are dangerous, there may be injury from too long a peace as well as by too much war.

The president's annual message to Congress, at our meeting, in December, 1813, in a strain of persuasive optimism argued the alternative good which hostilities evolved; revival of military knowledge, almost extinct by thirty years of flattering peace; gratifying proof of American capacity for vindication against the greatest naval power of the world; establishment of manufactures till then scarcely attempted; acquisition of national character and confidence: corroboration of the federal union, stronger than sectional or state resistance. These and other advantages, Madison, a sincere, if not excessive lover of peace, extracted from hostilities, whose military occurrences had been mostly unfortunate, yet whose reverses his message varnished with hues of consolatory explanation to Congress and the people.

Another volume of this historical sketch, embracing the events and philosophy of the succeeding year, 1814, will more than realize that consolation.

Without anticipating its details, a synopsis of some of them is suitable valedictory to the perils and disadvantages past and told in the volume here closed. Early in 1814, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Clay, was taken from it, to be united with Messrs. Adams, Bayard and Gallatin, to whom

also Jonathan Russel, the former Chargé d'Affaires of the United States, first in France, then in England, was joined, in the mission of peace sought in Europe. In Mr. Russel the war had a friend on that mission, in Mr. Clay a champion of western, ultramontane tenacity, indispensable to curb the anxious and yielding tendencies of Messrs. Adams and Gallatin. Mr. Clay took with him the ancient policy which Tacitus ascribes to the Germans, rather to resist than deprecate hostilities as the way to peace.

And that spirit inspiring the government at home displayed itself in successes almost everywhere in 1814. Having conquered France, Great Britain was enabled to turn her whole force upon the United States. Her best troops were nevertheless vanquished in the north and in the south, by sea and land, in everything like equal encounter save one—the shameful capture of Washington. Accustomed to the controlling metropolitan influence of Europe, the captors of that city supposed that its fall made them masters of the United States; whereas it did but rouse and unite nearly the whole country for strenuous hostilities.

In the midst of its smouldering ruins Congress doubled the taxes and established a revenue. The deserted and prostrate Treasury was resuscitated by Secretary Dallas, with heroic exertions sustaining armies in Canada and Louisiana notwithstanding the disappearance of coin. The Hartford Convention in its fetid maturity was overwhelmed by victories which the rebuked authorities of New England celebrated for preserving Louisiana as one of the United States, and conquering peace in Canada. A system of war jurisprudence and international law was adjudicated, which, together with the more various and extensive legislation of the year 1814, the commencement of the great internal improvements of the United States, the scientific and artificial inventions of men of genius, excited by the exigencies of war—the steamboat, the rail road, the cotton gin, in the year 1813 and 1814 struggling into the immense development they have since attained, for peace and for war—will be among the grateful topics of another volume.

The peace of Ghent, with our European and all other American foreign relations in the year 1815, will supply the subjects of a third and last volume, in which the whole foreign policy of the United States may be presented.

In the age of commercial gain which succeeded that of conquest, which in its turn supplanted that of chivalry, the United States ventured to contend, first in traffic then in arms, with the great maritime ruler of mankind, and triumphed over many disadvantages

*Illi justitiam confirmavère triumphi,
Presentes docuère Deos. Hinc sæcula discant
Indomitum nihil esse pio, tutumve docenti.*

CLAUD. DE IV CONS. HONORII 98.

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